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C  Sam-Yel  Park  1999 Abstract 
A  Study  of  the  Mind-Body  Theory  in  Spinoza 
by 
Sam-Yel  Park 
This  thesis  investigates  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  starting  with  the 
discussion  of  the  diverse  interpretations  of  his  mind-body  theory  such  as 
hylomorphism.,  idealism,  epiphenomenalism,  and  materialism.  From  the  critical 
comments  on  inadequacies  of  these  interpretations,  it  turns  out  that  Spinoza's 
argument  of  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  should  be  understood 
as  holding  that  there  is  a  non-causal  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body 
and  that  they  have  equal  weight. 
Although  the  parallelistic  interpretation  is  compatible  with  the  above 
understandings,  we  cannot  ascribe  traditional  parallelism  to  Spinoza.  His 
parallelism  is  derived  ftom  his  argument  of  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body, 
which  is  based  on  his  substance  nionism.  and  attribute  dualism.  We  should  therefore 
understand  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as  an  identity  theory  which  leads  to  a 
parallel  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Since  the  double  aspect  theory 
argues  both  identity  and  parallelism  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  the  doctrine 
we  should  ascribe  to  Spinoza  is  the  double  aspect  theory. 
Furthermore,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Spinoza  maintains  substance  monism 
and  attribute  dualism  (assuming  an  objective  view  of  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension,  which  are  distinct),  there  is,  in  Spinoza's  theory,  an  identity  between 
mental  and  physical  events  while  there  is  no  identity  between  mental  and  physical 
properties:  the  mental  and  the  physical  events  are  one  and  the  same  event  described 
tinder  mental  and  physical  properties,  respectively.  From  the  fact  that  Spinoza  finds 
identity  in  individuals  or  events,  but  not  in  properties,  it  follows  that  his  theory 
should  also  be  understood  as  a  kind  of  token  identity  theory. There  are  Miculties  in  this  interpretation.  Spinoza  tries  to  combine  mind- 
body  identity  with  the  separation  of  attributes,  but  some  have  argued  that  the 
identity  would  threaten  the  doctrine  that  thought  and  extension  are  causally 
separate.  Again,  some  have  argued  that  if  the  attributes  are  distinct  then  a 
substance  has  more  than  one  essence;  while  if  they  are  not  really  distinct,  but  only 
seen  as  distinct,  then  even  God  cannot  know  the  true  nature  of  reality.  It  is  difficult 
to  render  Spinoza's  claims  both  consistent  and  plausible,  but  I  have  tried  to  flnd 
arguments  for  some  of  Spinoza's  claims  in  this  area:  my  interpretation  of  Spinoza's 
mind-body  theory  entails  both  token  identity  and  property  (or  conceptual) 
parallelism  whilst  ruling  out  type  identity  as  well  as  substance  parallelism.  So,  I 
have  called  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  a  token  double  aspect  theory. 
Spinoza's  discussion  of  the  representative  nature  of  ideas  does  not  sit  easily 
with  his  doctrine  of  parallelism,  at  least  so  far  as  finite  beings  are  concerned,  I  have 
tried  to  make  the  doctrines  consistent,  but  ultimately  Spinoza  seems  to  bring  his 
representationalism  and  parallelism  into  line  by  appealing  to  the  confused  nature  of 
human  ideas. 
Despite  all  the  problems,  Spinoza's  thought  on  mind  and.  body  has  seemed 
to  many  to  promise  real  insight  into  the  nature  of  mind  and  body,  and  I  have  tried 
to  see  how  far  modern  versions  of  materialism  (anomalous  monism),  person 
theory,  and  some  developments  in  cognitive  science  can  be  said  to  follow  strands 
in  Spinoza's  work. Acknowledgements 
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Number  of  the  Part,  (2)  Number  of  Axiom,  De-finition,  Proposition  or  Postulate, 
(3)  Where  appropriate,  Demonstrates,  Corollary  or  Scholium,  with  the  Mowing 
abbreviations: 
Ax  =  Axiom 
Corol  =  CoroRary 
Def  =  Definition 
Demon  =  Demonstration, 
Post  =  Postulate 
Prop  =  Proposition 
Schol  =  Scholium. 
Thus,  for  example,  "E,  11,  Prop  13,  Schor'  stands  for  thle  schorium  to  proposition  F 
thirteen  of  part  two  of  Ethicv,  and  "E,  11,  Prop  16,  Corol  2"  stands  for  the  second 
corollary  to  proposition  sixteen  of  part  two  of  Ethics, 
Unless  otherwise  indieated  in  the  footnotes,  pass-ages  from  Spinoza's 
Ethics  in  this  thesis  wiR  be  quoted  from: 
Spinoza,  Benedict  De.  Ethics.  Translated  by  James  Gutma-m.  New  York  and 
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this  thesis  use  the  term  "Scholliunf'. 
xii Chapter  One 
Introduction 1.  Introductory  Remarks 
There  have  been  diverse  interpretations  of  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the 
relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body-hylomorphism,  idealism, 
epiphenomenalism,  materialism,  parallelism,  and  the  double  aspect  theory-all  of 
which  are  controversial!  It  seems  that  all  interpreters  of  Spinoza  have  adopted  one 
or  other  of  these  theories.  In  contemporary  thought,  however,  there  has  been  no 
consensus  or  agreement  as  to  whether  to  adopt  one  theory  or  another  to  interpret 
and  evaluate  Spinoza's  solution  to  the  mind-body  problem  and  other  related 
doctrines  of  his  philosophy  of  mind  and  metaphysics. 
I  shall  explicate  the  widely  misunderstood  interpretations  of  Spinoza's 
account  of  the  mind  and  its  relation  to  the  body,  and  then  I  shall  elucidate 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  by  offering  a  -new 
idea:  (1)  Spinoza's  min-d-body 
theory  ought  to  be  understood  as  involving  token  identity  together  with  property 
(or  conceptual)  parallelism,  and  thus  -should  be  classifled  as  a  token  double  aspect 
theory,  and  (2)  this  double  aspect  theory  could  be  supplemented  by  introducing  the 
concept  of  representation.  My  belief  is  that  this  idea  may  provide  a  way  of 
understanding  Spinoza's  ambiguity  on  the  mind-body  problem  which  is  caused  by 
his  perplexing  views  on  the  attributes  of  the  one  substance,  and  that  may  help  to 
redefine  the  explanation  of  his  mind-body  theory  and  give  it  stronger  support.  Thus 
I  shall  try  to  unravel  the  difficulties  behind  Spinoza's  ideas  and  attempt  to  reveal 
the  real  meaning  behind  his  thought. 
To  investigate  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  I  shall  unfold  this  thesis  from 
the  following  angles: 
Firstly,  in  chapters  two  and  three,  I  shall  consider  various  interpretations  of 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  in  detail  so  that  I  can  analyse  the  grounds  and  logic  on 
which  these  interpretations  are  based,  and  try  to  find  out  how  and  why  his  theory 
was  misunderstood. 
1  R-  I  Delahunty  informs  us  of  the  diverse  interpretations  (except  idealism)  and  briefly  comments 
on  them  in  his  Spinoza  (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1985).  pp.  191-197. 
2 Secondly,  in  cbapter  four,  I  sball  concentrate  on  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the 
attributes  in  order  to  establish  a  basis  for  interpreting  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory 
as  the  double  aspect  theory.  I  believe  that  Spinoza's  account  of  the  relation  of  the 
mind  to  the  body  is  inferred  from  substance  monism  together  with  attribute 
dualism. 
Thirdly,  in  chapter  five,  I  shaff  move  on  to  argue  for  the  validity  of  the 
double  aspect  theory,  and  try  to  explain  why  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  should 
be  considered  as  a  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory,  which  holds  that  the  mind 
and  the  body  are  two  different  ways  of  describing  the  same  thing,  namely 
substance.  I  shall  also  consider  the  problems  of  interpreting  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory,  comparing  the  double  aspect  theory  with  event-parallelism  and  deciding  in 
favour  of  the  former  view.  Furthermore,  I  shall  offer  a  new  interpretation  that 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  entails  both  token  identity  and  property  parallelism 
whilst  ruling  out  type  identity  as  well  as  substance  parallelism  (event-parallelism):  if 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  a  token  identity  theory,  which  leads  to  a  parallel 
relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  we  ought  to  regard  Spinoza  as  a 
token  double  aspect  theorist.  In  addition  to  this,  I  shall  attempt  to  support  the 
double  aspect  theory  through  the  other  areas  of  Spinoza's  thought,  such  as  his 
metaphysical  determinism  and  moral  theory.  Unlike  his  mind-body  theory,  it  is 
accepted  by  most  commentators  that  a  consensus  exists  in  interpreting  Spinoza's 
metaphysics  as  determinism,  whereas  his  mind-body  theory  has  been  controversial 
with  a  variety  of  diverse  interpretations.  From  my  perspective,  this  kind  of 
agreement  or  consensus  regarding  determinism  could  open  the  way  towards 
seeking  a  solution  to  Spinoza's  account  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body.  In 
fact,  Spinoza's  account  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body  relies  on  the  one- 
substance  doctrine,  and  this  doctrine  is  also  commonplace  in  the  interpretation  of 
Spinoza.  Thus  I  shall  consider  Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism  so  as  to  find  a 
clue  to  the  solution  of  his  mind-body  problem  through  his  determinism.  I  believe 
that  we  can  acquire  some  understanding  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  from  his 
moral  theory.  Thus  I  shall  also  draw  out  Spinoza's  points  of  view  on  the  moral 
theory  which  can  provide  insight  into  the  interpretations  of  the  relationship 
3 between  the  mind  and  the  body.  This  kind  of  work  may  help  to  redefine  the 
explanation  of  his  mind-body  theory  and  give  it  stronger  support.  In  so  doing,  I 
shall  show  that  the  double  aspect  theory  gives  us  the  most  fundamental  Perspective 
on  Spinoza's  system. 
Fourthly,  in  chapter  six,  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  will  be  approached 
not  only  through  his  metaphysics  but  also  through  his  epistemology.  The  former  is 
the  double  aspect  theory  which  is  based  on  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and 
the  body,  and  the  latter  is  representationalism  which  is  based  on  the  mind  as  the 
idea  of  the  body.  To  understand  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  in  a  comprehensive 
manner,  we  have  to  consider  both  doctrines.  Therefore,  I  shall  explore  the  concept 
of  representation  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
Fifthly,  in  chapter  seven,  I  shall  explore  whether  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  can  be  aligned  with  any  theory  of  contemporary  philosophy  of  the  mind.  I 
believe  that  some  contemporary  versions  of  the  mind-body  problem  are  in  some 
way  related  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  and  hold  the  possibility  of 
demonstrating  a  connection  with  Spinoza's  perspective.  Thus  I  shall  deal  with 
cognitive  science  and  Strawson's  person  theory,  and  also  compare  Spinoza's 
position  with  Davidson's  anomalous  monism.  The  concept  of  representation  in 
cognitive  science  can  be  seen  as  having  links  with  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  as 
both  argue  for  the  importance  of  a  representational  fimction.  However,  Spinoza's 
notion  of  mental  causation  is  more  robust  than  that  used  in  cognitive  science. 
Strawson  has  a  similar  position  to  Spinoza  in  arguing  identity  not  in  the 
onesideness  of  materialism  or  idealism  but  in  a  common  referent  of  the  mind  and 
the  body.  But  for  Strawson  this  dual  ascription  is  limit  to  one  sort  of  object,  that  is, 
humans  in  the  world,  whereas  for  Spinoza  everything  has  both  sorts  of  property. 
Furthermore,  for  Spinoza,  there  is  an  identity  between  mental  and  physical  events, 
whereas  for  Strawson,  mental  events  are  not  identical  with  physical  events. 
Spinoza  finds  identity  of  the  mental  and  physical  within  tokens  or  events  as 
opposed  to  Strawson  who  -finds  identity  within  a  primitive  concept,  person.  As  to 
Spinoza  and  Davidson,  Spinoza's  double  aspect  theory  maintains  that  the  mind  is  a 
thing  which  is  described  by  the  mental  descriptions  and  the  body  is  the  very  same 
4 thing  which  is  described  by  the  physical  descriptions.  The  core  of  his  theory  is  that 
the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  individual  although  they  have  different 
types  of  descriptions.  Similarly,  Davidson's  anomalous  monism  argues  that  the 
mental  event  and  the  physical  event  are  one  and  the  same  event,  which  has  mental 
and  physical  descriptions  respectively.  Further,  both  of  them  claim  the  identity  of 
mind  and  body  without  the  reduction  of  one  to  the  other.  However,  for  Davidson 
physical  descriptions  dominate,  whereas  for  Spinoza  both  descriptions  are  of  equal 
weight.  I  think  that  this  kind  of  work  is  worthwhile  in  considering  how  far  his 
mind-body  theory  contributes,  as  a  classic  theory,  towards  mind-body  problems 
and  provides,  a  route  to  tackling  this  problem  today. 
Before  proceeding  with  the  main  discourse,  I  shall  briefly  outline  a  preview 
of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  which  is  based  on  my  perspective  so  as  to  lay  the 
foundation-  stone  of  this  thesis. 
2.  A  Preview  of  Spinoza's  Mind-Body  Theory 
(1)  God  as  Substance:  Monism 
One  cannot  understand  many  philosophers'  mind-body  theories  without 
first  understanding  their  metaphysical  systems,  This  is  even  more  true  of  Spinoza 
whose  mind-body  theory  is  based  on  substance  and  attributes.  In  my  view, 
Spinoza's  metaphysical  monism  which  emphasises  the  unity  of  substance  should 
also  be  considered  in  relation  to  his  mind-body  theory,  since  without  God 
(substance),  it  is  not  possible  for  finite  modes  to  exist  and  therefore  his 
metaphysical  system  cannot  be  established.  Further,  Spinoza  tens  us  directly  that 
identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  is  inferred  from  the  one-substance 
doctrine: 
[S]ubstance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same 
substance,  which  is  now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now 
5 under  that.  Thus  [sic],  also  a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that 
mode  are  one  and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways.  (E,  111, 
Prop  7,  Schol) 
This  quotation  implies  that,  in  order  to  find  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body 
in  Spinoza's  theory,  we  should  rely  on  the  one-substance  doctrine,  Bennett  takes 
the  above  quotation  not  as  an  inference,  but  as  a  comparison  by  treating  the  Latin 
term  sic  as  likewise.  2  However,  the  fact  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  modes  of 
the  one  substance  under  the  different  attributes  offers  the  interpretation  that  the 
relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  follows  the  relationship  between 
substance  conceived  under  thought  and  substance  conceived  under  extension.  For 
Spinoza  the  mind  and  the  body  are  the  modifications  of  one  and  the  same 
substance  under  the  different  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  respectively.  As 
long  as  the  mind  and  the  body  come  from  the  one  substance,  Bennett's  view  that 
regards  sic  not  as  an  inference  but  as  a  comparison  is  hardly  acceptable  to 
Spinoza's  intention?  Thus,  I  shall  describe  Spinoza's  metaphysics  before 
considering  his  mind-body  theory,  as  I  understand  it. 
The  first  part  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  is  entitled  "Of  God,  "  but  it  would  be 
possible  to  entitle  it  "Of  Substance,  "  because  the  term  Substance  is  used  in 
defining  "God"  and  more  precisely,  for  Spinoza,  God  is  no  more  than  substance.  4 
Spinoza  defines  God  as  the  "substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  each  one  of 
2  Bennett  states  that  "I  have  rendered  the  Latin  sic  as  'likewise',  which  is  one  of  its  meanings. 
Another  meaning  is  'therefore';  but  I  think  its  sense  here  is  comparative  rather  than  inferential. 
Two  identity  propositions,  each  involving  a  straddle  of  the  attributes,  are  being  laid  side  by  side 
and  rightly  implied  to  be  similar"  (Jonathan  Bennett,  A  Studly  of  the  Spinoza's  Ethics 
[Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984],  p.  142). 
'  Most  commentators  regard  it  as  inference  rather  than  comparison.  See  Edwin  Curley,  Behind 
the  Geometrical  Method:  A  Reading  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1988),  p.  153,  note  3;  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza  (New 
York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1996),  pp.  129-130;  Leyden,  Seventeenth  Century  Metaphysics 
(London:  Gerald  Duckworth,  1968),  p.  21;  Allison,  Benedict  de  Spinoza:  An  Introduction  (New 
Haven:  Yale  University  Press,  1987),  pp.  85-86;  Richard  Aquila,  "The  Identity  of  Thought  and 
Object  in  Spinoza,  "  Journal  of  the  History  of  the  Philosophy,  vol.  16  (1978),  pp.  272-273. 
4  Richard  Schacht  argues  that  "it  would  have  been  still  better  if  it  had  been  entitled  'Concerning 
Substance';  for  this  term  is  the  most  basic  of  the  three  [God,  Substance,  and  Nature]"  (Classical 
Modern  Philosophers:  Descartes  to  Kant  [London:  Routledge,  1993],  p.  75). 
6 which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence"  (E,  Iý  Def  6),  and  God  is  the  only 
possible  substance.  If  there  were  any  substance  besides  God,  this  substance  would 
exist  possessing  some  attributes  of  God,  because  God  possesses  all  possible 
attributes  (infinite  attributes)  due  to  the  fact  that  God  is  an  absolutely  infinite 
Being;  accordingly,  there  would  exist  two  substances  which  have  the  same 
attribute  (E,  1,  Prop  14;  Def  6).  However,  for  Spinoza,  it  is  impossible  that  there  be 
two  or  more  substances  with  the  same  nature  or  attribute  in  Nature  (E,  1,  Prop  5). 
Consequently,  besides  God  no  other  substance  can  be  granted  or  conceived  of  (E, 
1,  Prop  14).  In  this  way,  God  is  identified  with  one  single  substance  in  Spinoza's 
metaphysics.  This  is  his  official  statement  as  to  substance  monism. 
However,  for  Spinoza,  it  is  impossible  that  there  be  two  or  more  substances 
with  the  same  nature  or  attribute  in  Nature  (E,  1,  Prop  5).  Consequently,  besides 
God  no  other  substance  can  be  granted  or  conceived  of  (E,  1,  Prop  14).  In  this 
way,  God  is  identified  with  one  single  substance  in  Spinoza's  metaphysics.  This  is 
his  official  statement  as  to  substance  monism. 
However,  a  minor  problem  arises  from  the  ten-n  "infinite.  "  Either  "infinite" 
does  not  mean  what  we  normally  take  it  to  mean,  or  Spinoza's  argument  is  a  bad 
one.  When  Spinoza  mentions  "substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes"  in 
definition  6,  the  term  "infinite"  has  to  be  regarded  as  denoting  number.  Otherwise 
Spinoza's  demonstration  would  not  be  understood.  That  is  to  say,  unless  we  take 
"infinite  attributes"  to  imply  all  possible  attributes,  Spinoza's  argument  would  be 
unjustified.  We  can  infer  this  point  from  the  following  statement: 
Since  God  is  Being  absolutely  infinite,  of  whom  no  attribute  can  be 
denied  which  expresses  the  essence  of  substance  (Def  6),  and  since  He 
necessarily  exists  (Prop  11),  it  follows  that  if  there  were  any  substance 
besides  God,  it  would  have  to  be  explained  by  some  attributes  of  God, 
and  thus  two  substances  would  exist  possessing  the  same  attributes, 
which  (Prop  5)  is  absurd.  (E,  1,  Prop  14,  Demon;  my  italics) 
I  think  that  the  phrase  "of  whom  no  attribute  can  be  denied"  implies  that  God 
possesses  "all  possible  attributes.  "  We  should  distinguish  the  statement  that  God  is 
7 the  being  infinite  from  the  statement  that  God  possesses  infinite  attributes.  The 
former  statement  means  that  God  is  the  being  absolutely  perfect  (i.  e.  our  general 
sense),  whereas  the  latter  means  that  God  possesses  all  possible  attributes.  It 
follows  that  God  is  the  being  "perfect  without  limitation7'  constituting  "all 
attributes  without  exception.  "'  I  think  that  Spinoza  believed  that  if  God  has  the 
nature  of  the  infinity  God  must  have  infinite  numbers  of  attributes. 
It  is  commonplace  to  regard  "infinite  attributes"'  as  all  possible  attributes. 
Curley  states  about  this  point:  "[I]f  there  must  be  a  substance  which  has  infinite 
attributes  (where  having  infinite  attributes  implies  having  all  possible  attributes), 
.... 
556  Bennett  also  has  the  same  point  of  view:  "The  role  of  infinity  in  Ethics  Ip  I  4d 
shows  that  Spinoza  takes  'God  has  in-finite  attributes'  to  entail  that  God  has  all  the 
attributes.  This  entailment  does  not  hold  when  'infinite'  is  used  in  our  way;  so 
Spinoza's  meaning  for  the  term  differs  from  ours,  and  the  question  is,  'HowT  One 
possible  answer  is  that  he  used  'infinite  attribute'  to  mean  'all  (possible)  attributes,  ' 
so  that  Nature's  having  infinite  attributes  is  consistent  with  its  having  onl  y  two.  "7 
From  these  explanations,  I  suggest  that  we  should  bear  in  mind  all  possible 
attributes,  when  Spinoza  mentions  "infinite  attributes.  " 
-Returning  to  his  substance  monism,  there  necessarily  exists  only  one  thing 
which  exists  per  se  (in  itself),  namely  God.  Notbing  else  can  be  in  itself,  that  is  to 
say,  there  necessarily  exists  only  one  substance.  If  so,  what  is  the  status  of  all  other 
things?  According  to  Spinoza,  they  are  not  substances  but  merely  modifications,  of 
the  one  substance,  God.  Thus  mind  and  body  are  modes  not  substances.  In 
'  George  Kline  claims  these  two  senses  of  the  term  "infinite"  in  Spinoza  ("On  the  infinity  of 
Spinoza's  attributes,  "  in  Siegfried  Hessing  [ed.  ],  Speculum  Spinozanum  1677-1977  [London: 
Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1977],  pp.  342-343). 
6  Edwin  Curley,  op.  cit.,  p.  10. 
7  Jonathan  Bennett,  "Spinoza's  Metaphysics,  "  in  Don  Garrett  (ed.  ),  The  Cambridae  Companion 
to  Spinoza  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996),  p.  65.  Alan  Donagan  also  takes 
"infinite  attributes"  to  mean  "all  attributes  without  expect  attributes"  following  George  Kline's 
treatment  of  "infinite  attributes"  ("Spinoza's  Dualism,  "  in  Richard  Kennington  [ed.  ],  The 
Philosopkv  of  Baruch  Spinoza  [Washington  D  C:  The  Catholic  University  of  America  Press, 
1980],  pp.  93-94);  see  also  his  Spinoza  (-New  York:  Harvester  and  Wheatsheaf,  1988),  pp.  83-84. 
J.  1.  Friedman  regards  "infinite  attributes"  as  "infinitely  many  attributes"  ("Spinoza's  Denial  of 
Free  Will  in  Man  and  God,  "  in  Jon  Wetlesen  [ed.  ],  Spinoza's  Philosophy  of  Man  [Oslo: 
Universitetsvorlaget,  1977]ý  p.  53). 
8 Spinoza's  metaphysical  system,  however,  we  can  flnd  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension  between  the  substance  and  modifications;  the  concept  of  the  attribute  is 
very  important  in  interpreting  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system  as  well  as  his  mind- 
body  theory.  According  to  Spinoza,  an  attribute  is  that  "which  the  intellect 
perceives  of  substance  as  constituting  its  essence"  (E,  T,  Def  4).  That  is  to  say,  the 
attribute  is  that  "which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  divine  substance"  (E,  1,  Prop 
19,  Demon).  In  the  discussion  of  Spinoza's  notion  of  the  attributes,  there  have 
been  the  subjective  and  the  objective  interpretations.  Nowadays,  although  most 
commentators  support  the  latter,  there  have  been  many  different  suggestions  within 
the  objective  interpretation  (as  we  shall  see  in  chapter  four).  There  are  infinitely 
many  attributes,  but  humans  can  only  perceive  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension.  Spinoza  understood  that  humans  are  manifested  in  the  mode  of  the  mind 
through  the  attribute  of  thought  as  well  as  in  the  mode  of  the  body  through  the 
attribute  of  extension. 
From  these  expositions  of  Spinoza's  metaphysics,  we  can  summarise  the 
position  as  Mows: 
(1)  There  is  only  one  substance  and  this  substance  is  God,  which  necessarily  exists. 
(2)  Substance  possesses  the  infinite  numbers  of  attributes,  which  express  the 
essence  of  the  substance. 
(3)  All  finite  beings  are  modifications  of  the  substance. 
(4)  Between  the  substance  and  modifications,  there  are  the  attributes  of  thought 
and  extension  which  are  the  only  ones  we  as  humans  can  perceive. 
(5)  Therefore  God  (the  substance)  has  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension. 
(6)  The  modes  are  the  modifications  of  substance  under  the  approximate  attribute; 
the  mind  is  the  mode  of  the  substance  tinder  the  attribute  of  thought  and  the 
body  is  the  mode  of  the  same  substance  under  the  attribute  of  extension. 
(7)  It  follows  that  all  things  belong  to  the  one  substance,  that  is  to  say,  that  nothing 
can  exist  or  be  conceived  of  without  God  (substance).  ' 
8  In  addition  to  these,  there  are  also  immediate  infinite  modes  and  mediated  infinite  modes  which 
solve  the  unbridgeable  gap  between  the  infinite  realm  and  the  finite  realm  in  explaining  his 
ontological  system  from  the  substance  to  the  modes. 
9 This  conclusion  is  the  basis  on  which  the  common  characterisation  of  Spinoza  as  a 
monist  is  maintained  in  relation  to  the  unity  of  substance. 
Spinoza,  as  is  well  known,  maintains  that  one  substance  has  the  attributes 
of  extension  and  thought,  unlike  the  dualism  of  Descartes,  where  the  thinking  thing 
and  the  extended  thing  are  different  substances-9  Spinoza  recognises  the  unique 
existence  of  substance,  and  therefore  he  establishes  monistic  metaphysics. 
Conceptually,  thinking  substance  is  different  from  extended  substance  due  to  the 
fact  that  one  single  substance  has  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension. 
However,  these  two  substances  are  in  reality  one  and  the  same  thing  (substance). 
The  order  of  the  whole  of  Nature  or  the  connection  of  causes  should  be  explained 
through  the  attribute  of  thought  as  long  as  things  are  considered  under  the  attribute 
of  thought  alone,  whereas  when  things  are  considered  under  the  attribute  of 
extension,  the  order  of  the  whole  of  Nature  must  be  explained  through  the  attribute 
of  extension  alone.  Accordingly,  when  we  consider  one  substance  under  the 
attribute  of  thought  it  is  the  substance  thinking  and  when  we  consider  one 
substance  under  the  attribute  of  extension  it  is  the  substance  extended.  From  thisý 
we  can  see  that  one  and  the  same  substance  Mers  in  how  it  is  conceived,  and  this 
is  Spinoza's  substance  monism. 
(2)  The  Mind  and  the  Body 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  rooted  in  his  substance  monism.  Spinoza 
regards  the  mind  as  the  mode  (the  modification)  of  the  substance  tinder  the 
attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  as  the  mode  (the  modification)  of  that  substance 
under  the  attribute  of  extension.  Namely,  the  mind  is  the  modification  of  the 
substance  conceived  as  thing  thinking  and  the  body  is  the  modification  of  the  very 
same  substance  as  thing  extended.  When  Spinoza  says  that  the  mind  and  the  body 
9  There  is  a  tine  expression  as  to  the  relation  between  Descartes  and  Spinoza  in  The  Encyclopedia 
of  Philosophy:  "It  is  certainly  true  that  the  study  of  Descartes  was  seminal  for  Spinoza,  and  there 
are  obvious  debts  both  of  doctrine  and  of  terminology.  Nonetheless,  Spinoza's  philosophy  is  in 
one  crucial  respect  at  the  opposite  pole  from  that  of  Descartes"  (Alasdair  MacIntyre,  "Spinoza, 
Benedict,  "  in  Paul  Edwards  [ed.  j.  The  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,,  vol.  7  [New  York: 
Macmillan,,  1967],  p.  534). 
10 are  the  modes  of  attributes,  we  should  understand  him  as  meaning  that  the  mind  is 
the  mode  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  substance  tinder  the  attribute  of 
thought,  and  the  body  is  the  mode  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  very  same 
substance  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  The  mind  and  the  body  are  not  distinct 
modes  of  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  but  they  are  modes  of  the  same 
substance  through  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  respectively.  'O  The  mind 
is  the  mode  of  the  substance  as  given  by  mental  descriptions  (attribute  of  thought), 
and  the  body  is  the  mode  of  the  same  substance  as  given  by  physical  descriptions 
(attribute  of  extension). 
Since  the  mind  and  the  body  are  modes  of  the  one  same  substance,  we  can 
infer  his  position  on  the  identity  of  the  mind  and  the  body  from  substance  monism. 
It  follows  that  if  the  substance  thinking  and  the  substance  extended  are  one  and  the 
same  thing,  the  mode  considered  mentally  (the  mind)  and  the  mode  considered 
physically  (the  body)  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Hence,  just  as  a.  single  substance 
is  a  substance  thinking  as  well  as  a  substance  extended  according  to  the  attributes 
of  thought  and  extension,  so  a  single  individual  thing  is  at  one  time  a  mode 
mentally  and  at  another  a  mode  physically  which  both  express  the  substance  in  a 
certain  and  determinate  manner.  The  latter  relationship  is  only  a  special  case  of  the 
fon-ner.  One  and  same  mode  differs  in  bow  it  is  conceived,  as,  one  and  the  same 
substance  differs  in  how  it  is  conceived;  the  former  is  Spinoza's  mind-body  identity 
theory  derived  from  the  latter,  his  substance  monism.  Spinoza  did  not  leave  any 
doubt  as  to  the  identity  of  the  mind  and  the  body.  He  mentioned  "mind  and  body 
are  accordingly  one  and  the  same  thing  conceived  at  one  time  under  the  attributes 
of  thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of  extension7  (E,  11  Prop  7,  Schol).  This 
statement  makes  it  quite  clear  that  even  if  there  are  differences  between  the  mind 
and  the  body,  they  are  ultimately  and  essentially  the  same  thing  with  two  different 
aspects. 
Howeverý  some  commentators  concentrate  on  there  being  two  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension,  and  from  this  they  claim  that  there  must  be  two  sets  of 
events.  However,  as  I  have  argued,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  not  the  modes  of  the 
10  This  issue  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  five  (pp.  133-136). 
11 attributes,  but  are  modes  of  the  one  substance  considered  at  one  time  under  the 
attribute  of  thought  and  at  another  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  Substance 
monism  guarantees  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  so  mental  events  and 
physical  events  are  not  two  different  sets  of  events  but  are  one  set  of  events.  Those 
commentators  who  assert  that  these  two  sets  of  events  are  paranel  with  each  other 
rely  most  on  Spinoza's  statement  that  "[flhe  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the 
same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things"  (E,  TI,  Prop  7). 
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  there  are  two  orders  of  events,  but  it 
means  that  there  exists  one  order  of  events.  Why  is  it  that  the  event  which  has 
mental  properties  and  the  event  which  has  physical  properties  are  one  and  the  same 
event  for  Spinoza?  Without  one  substance  doctrine,  we  cannot  answer  this 
question.  Since  there  exists  one  single  substance,  substance  conceived  as  mental 
and  substance  conceived  as  physical  possess  the  same  essence  and  consequently 
they  are  identical.  Then,  since  there  is  one  sort  of  event  owing  to  the  fact  that  they 
are  modes  of  one  substance,  the  event  described  by  mental  properties  (the  mode  of 
the  former  substance)  and  the  event  described  by  physical  properties  (the  mode  of 
the  latter  substance)  possess  the  same  essence  and  consequently  they  are  identical 
with  each  other. 
I  suggest  that  the  parallel  relationship  occurs  not  in  two  sets  of  events  but 
in  one  set  of  events:  one  event  under  the  mental  descriptions  and  the  same  event 
under  the  physical  descriptions  are  parallel.  "  The  two  attributes-doctrine  does  not 
provide  a  one-to-one  correspondence  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Rather, 
substance  monism  is  the  reason  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same 
event.  This  fact  that  there  is  one  set  of  events  is  the  reason  that  "the  event  under 
mental  descriptions"  (mind)  and  "the  same  event  under  the  physical  descriptions" 
(body)  are  parallel  with  each  other.  Thus,  I  disagree  with  the  interpretation  that 
11  As  we  shall  see  in  chapters  three  and  five  (pp.  67-69;  pp.  136-137),  for  Spinoza  a  parallel 
relationship  occurs  not  only  between  "the  event  under  mental  descriptions"  and  "the  same  event 
under  the  physical  descriptions"  but  also  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  (or 
descriptions).  The  former  would  be  called  conceptual  parallelism,  the  latter  property  parallelism. 
Both  of  them  are  derived  from  Spinoza's  doctrine  that  there  is  one  order  of  events;  there  is  no 
identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  due  to  the  fact  that  the  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension  are  really  distinct. 
12 argues  the  parallel  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  without  considering 
identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  I  also  disagree  with  the  interpretation  that 
regards  parallelism  as  being  prior  to  the  identity  theory  by  arguing  that  parallelism 
entails  the  identity  theory. 
In  this  way,  if  the  mind  and  body  are  one  and  the  same  individual  conceived 
in  two  Merent  ways  and  their  relationship  is  parallel  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
one  and  the  same  thing,  we  can  regard  this  as  a  version  of  the  double  aspect 
theory.  As  we  shall  see  in  chapter  five,  the  double  aspect  theory  entails  both 
identity  and  a  parallel  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  If  there  were 
two  substances  (thinking  and  extended)  with  respect  to  the  mind  and  the  body,  it 
could  not  be  considered  as  the  double  aspect  theory.  But  this,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
absurd  for  Spinoza  due  to  his  substance  monism;  according  to  his  monism  there  is 
only  one  substance  and  one  order.  Therefore,  once  we  establish  the  formulation 
that  they  are  identical  with  each  other  from  the  fact  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
both  aspects  of  the  same  entity  which  is  one  substance,  we  need  to  ask  what  the 
relationship  is  between  the  two  aspects,  and  then  our  answer  is  that  there  is  a 
parallel  relationship  as  the  outcome  of  identity.  12  1  believe  that  this  version  of  the 
double  aspect  theory  gives  us  a  whole  perspective  on  Spinoza's  system.  The 
double  aspect  theory  as  the  mind-body  theory  is  consistent  with  Spinoza's  monism 
and  his  explanations  of  the  parallel  relationship  of  the  mind  and  the  body.  Thus, 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  should  be  considered  within  the  version  of  the  double 
aspect  theory  which  holds  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  two  different  ways  of 
describing  the  same  thing,  namely  substance. 
12  Spinoza  also  argues  that  representational  relationship  exists  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  I 
shall  discuss  this  in  chapter  six. 
13 Ch  ter  Two 
Diverse  Interpretations  of  Spinoza's  Mind- 
Body  Theory The  first  premise  in  this  chapter  is  that  the  relative  weighting  of  thought 
and  extension  is  equal,  and  therefore  we  can  give  greater  weight  neither  to  the 
body  nor  to  the  mind.  That  is  to  say,  the  body  is  not  prior  to  the  mind  or  vice 
versa.  The  second  premise  is  that  there  is  no  causal  relationship  between  what  is 
thought  and  what  is  extended,  and  consequently  the  mental  never  causes  the 
physical  or  vice  versa.  With  respect  to  this,  Spinoza  states  as  follows: 
The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  things  - 
(E,  11,  Prop  7) 
Hence  it  follows  that  God's  power  of  thinking  is  equal  to  His  actual 
power  of  acting,  that  is  to  say,  whatever  follows  formally  from  the 
infinite  nature  of  God,  follows  from  the  idea  of  God  [Idea  Defl,  in 
the  same  order  and  in  the  same  connection  objectively  in  God.  (E,  U, 
Prop  7,  Corol) 
The  body  cannot  deten-nine  the  mind  to  thought,  neither  can  the  mind 
determine  the  body  to  motion  nor  rest,  nor  to  anything  else  if  there 
be  anything  else.  (E,  HI,  Prop  2) 
Therefore,,  as  the  order  and  connection  of  the.  ideas  in  the  mind  is 
according  to  the  order  and  connection  of  the  modifications  of  the 
body  (Prop  18,  pt.  2),  it  follows,  vice  versa  (Prop  2,  pt.  3),  that  the 
order  and  connection  of  the  modification  of  the  body  is  according  to 
the  order  and  connection  in  the  mind  of  thoughts  and  ideas  of  things. 
(E,  V,  Prop  1,  Demon) 
It  follows  that  we  must  be  suspicious  of  any  interpretation  which  is  not  compatible 
with  these  premises,  even  if  it.  offers  some  otherwise  adequate  explanation  of 
Spinoza's  theory.  In  other  words,  any  interpretation  has  to  be  in  accord  with  the 
premises.  Among  the  various  interpretations  which  have  been  advanced, 
epiphenomenalism  is  contradictory  to  the  first  premise  as  well  as  the  second,  and 
15 materialism  and  idealism  have  problems  of  compatibility  with  the  first  premise. 
They  deny  the  equality  of  the  mind  and  the  body;  either  the  mind  or  the  body  is 
given  priority  in  these  interpretations.  On  the  other  hand,  hylornorphism, 
parallelism,  and  the  double  aspect  theory  can  retain  "the  equality  of  the  mind  and 
the  body"  and  "no  causality  between  the  mind  and  body,  "  and  therefore  they  are 
compatible  with  the  two  premises.  This  gives  us  some  reason  to  prefer  one  of  these 
interpretations.  However,  even  if  the  former  interpretations  are  incompatible  with 
our  two  premises,  they  may  have  some  other  advantages.  We  should,  therefore, 
consider  their  strengths  as  well  as  their  problems,  and  this  can  help  us  arrive  at  a 
clearer  understanding  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  Therefore  I  shall,  in  this 
chapter,  examine  their  perspectives  on  Spinoza  and  discuss  some  of  the  problems 
which  arise  from  their  interpretations  and  the  inadequacies  of  applying  them  to 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
1.  Hylomorphism 
Hylomorphism.  has  its  origin  in  Aristotle's  "matter  and  form7'  system  which 
posits  that  every  natural  object  is  somehow  composed  of  matter  and  form  There  is 
a  hylomorphic  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  of  mind,  which  is  advocated 
by  H.  A.  Wolfson.  According  to  him,  Spinoza's  philosophy  inherited  this  doctrine 
through  Aquinas'  metaphysics  during  the  scholastic  period.  This  interpretation 
emphasises  Spinoza's  intellectual  inheritance  from  Aristotle  and  the  resemblance 
between  the  systems  of  Aristotle  and  Spinoza. 
(1)  Hylomorphism  in  Aristotle 
In  order  to  examine  the  hylomorphic  interpretation,  we  need  to  grasp  the 
outline  of  Aristotle's  "matter  and  fornf'  system.  According  to  Aristotle,  a 
particular  thing  such  as  a  house,  is  a  composite  of  matter  such  as  bricks  and  timber, 
16 formed  in  a  certain  way.  In  a  further  example,  we  can  distinguish  "what  stuff  a 
thing  is  made  of'  from  "what  makes  that  stuff  the  thing  it  is-say  a  bronze  sphere"; 
the  former  is  matter  (bronze),  and  the  latter  is  form  (sphericity).  The  "form,  " 
however,  should  not  be  thought  of  simply  as  "shape"  as  in  the  example  of  a  bronze 
sphere.  In  the  case  of  an  oak  tree,  for  example,  the  "form"  is  not  simply  its  visual 
shape.  It  encompasses  its  whole  organisation  which  is  characterised  by  activities 
such  as  growth  by  synthesising  water  and  other  nutrients,  and  its  production  of 
fruit.  I 
f  HOWS.  2  This  "form-matter  systenf  'can  be  iRustrated  as  0 
(1) 
bronze 
wood  and  iron 
bread  and  cheese 
(2) 
sphericity 
ability  to  chop 
cheese  between 
bread  slices 
(3) 
a  bronze  sphere 
an  axe 
a  sandwich 
bricks  and  timber 
letters 
n,  k 
a  bility  to  shelter 
placed  in  order 
a  house 
a  word 
An  item  (1)  constitutes  an  item  (3)  if  it  has  the  appropriate  item  from  (2);  therefore 
(1)  is  designated  "matter,  "  (2)  is  "form,  "  (3)  is  "composite.  "  Regarding  axes,  for 
instance,  some  wood  and  iron  constitutes  an  axe  by  virtue  of  its  having  the  power 
to  chop. 
Here  we  can  see  that  "fomf'  is,  in  Aristotle,  regarded  as  properties, 
structures,  and  powers.  He  regularly  distinguishes  form,  matter,  and  the  composite 
i.  e.  the  actual  thing.  The  distinction  between  matter  and  form  is  to  explain  what  an 
individual  thing  is.  In  other  words,  to  speak  of  form  and  matter  is  to  speak  of  the 
form  and  matter  of  such  a  thing.  The  form  and  matter  system  is  also  applied  to 
living  things  such  as  human  beings.  More  precisely,  in  Aristotle,  the  soul  is  the 
'  R.  S.  Woolhouse,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibniz:  the  Concept  of  Substance  in  Seventeenth 
Century  Metaphysics  (London:  Routledge),  p.  10 
2  J.  L.  Ackrill,  "Aristotle's  Definition  of  psuche,  "  in  Jonathan  Bames,  Malcohn  Schofield, 
Richard  Sorabji  (eds.  ),.,  Articles  on  Aristotle,  vol.  4  (London:  Duckworth,  1979),  p.  66.  The  last 
example  is  mine. 
17 form  of  a  natural  body  with  organs  and  the  terms  "body,  soul,  man  (or  animal  or 
plant)"  is  "matter,  form,  and  composite,  "  respectively.  In  the  case  of  human  beings, 
therefore,  "what  makes  a  body  a  marf  'is  his  having  a  rational  soul?  To  be  sure,  the 
hylomorphic  conception  of  a  human  being  is  a  composite  of  an  organising  form,  or 
rational  soul,  and  of  matter,  the  flesh  and  blood  of  the  body.  Tn  other  words,  the 
soul  is  regarded  as  the  form  of  the  body  which  is  matter.  4 
Although  interpretations  of  Aristotle's  account  of  the  relationship  between 
body  and  soul  have  been  widely  divergent,  the  above  is  a.  general  interpretation  of 
Aristotle's  "matter-form  systenf'  in  relation  to  the  mind  and  body  of  living  things 
(man,  animals,  plants),  and  Wolfson's  hylomorpbic  interpretation  of  Spinoza  is 
posited  on  this  point  of  view  of  Aristotle. 
(2)  The  Hylomorphic  Interpretation  of  Spinoza 
The  hylomorphic  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  treats  his 
"mind"  and  "body"  as  Aristotle's  "fornf'  and  "matter.  "  According  to  Wolfson, 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  and  other  related  areas  of  his  philosophy  should  be 
interpreted  as  stemming  from  this  doctrine.  He  strongly  asserts  and  insists  upon 
Aristotle's  influence  on  Spinoza  through  the  medieval  Aristotelians.  He  develops 
this  point  of  view  throughout  his  book5  The  Philosophy  of  Spinoza,  and  we  can  see 
that  he  stresses  this  influence  on  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as  follows: 
Consequently,  following  the.  Aristotelian  view  that  it  is  the  form  of  a 
thing  and  not  its  matter  that  is  identical  with  the  soul,  Spinoza  says  that 
the  first  thing  which  is  identical  with  the  actual  human  mind  is  the  idea 
of  a  thing;  the  term  "idea"  here  is  used  by  him  in  the  most  general  sense, 
comprehending  what  Aristotle  would  call  the  sensible,  imaginable,  and 
intelligible  form  of  a  thing.  Since  the  mind  or  the  soul  is  identical  with 
Ibid.  See  also  Richard  Sorabji,  "Body  and  Soul  in  Aristotle,  "  in  Jonathan  Barnes,  Malcolm 
Schofield,  Richard  Sorabji  (eds.  ),  ibid.,  pp.  43-45. 
4  The  term  "soul"  is  anima  in  Aquinas'  Latin,  and  psyche  in  Aristotle's  Greek. 
18 the  idea,  Spinoza  sometimes  uses  the  expression  "idea  or  soul"  (idea, 
seu.  anitna).  ' 
Let  us  examine  Wolfson's  hylomorphic  interpretation  in  more  detail.  The  principal 
points  that  Wolfson  suggests  as  the  main  influences  of  Aristotle  on  Spinoza  are  as 
follows: 
(1)  The  ontological  system 
the  doctrine  of  substances  and  modes  (Spinoza)  /  the  principle  of  species  and 
genus  (Aristotle) 
(2)  The  doctrine  of  attributes 
extension  and  thought  (Spinoza)  /  the  system  of  matter  and  form  (Aristotle) 
(3)  The  psychological  doctrine 
mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body  (Spinoza)  /  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body 
(Aristotle) 
Firstly,  as  to  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  "substance  and  mode,  "  Wolfson  holds 
that  the  relation  of  mode  to  substance  can  be  explained  as  the  relation  of  species  to 
genus  in  Aristotle.  He  emphasises  that  even  if  Spinoza  reconstructs  and  amends  the 
mediaeval  Aristotelians'  definition  of  substance  in  terms  of  the  additional  phrase 
"conceived  through  itself'  and  by  restricting  it  to  God  alone,  there  is,  in  fact,  no 
change  from  the  mediaeval  definition.  6  He  states: 
Thus  the  mediaeval  definition  of  the  term  "substance"  has  not 
undergone  any  change  in  Spinoza,  though  its  application  was 
restricted  only  to  God.  It  is  still  defined  as  that  which  is  in  itself. 
5  H.  A.  Wolfson,  The  Philosophy  of  Spinoza,  vol.  2  (New  York:  Schocken  Books,  1969),  pp.  47- 
48. 
6  Ibid.,  vol.  1,  pp.  61-78.  As  to  Spinoza's  'ýmodes,  "  Wolfson  claims  that  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
Spinoza's  modes  are  entirely  changed  from  Aristotelian  accidents,  his  modes  can  also  be  found  in 
Aristotelian  logic,  i.  e.  "species  in  its  genus.  "  He  states  that  "[tjhis  is  what  Spinoza  means  by  his 
definition  of  mode  as  'that  which  is  in  another  thing  through  which  also  it  is  conceived'.  -  that  is 
to  say,  it  is  in  another  thing  in  the  sense  that  it  is  conceived  through  it,  namely,  as  the  individual 
in  its  genus"  (ibid.,  vol.  I.,  p.  76). 
19 Even  the  additional  fact  of  its  being  a  summum  genus,  undefinable 
and  unknowable,  is  not  new;  it  is  a  mediaeval  commonplace. 
Hence,  for  Wolfson,  when  Spinoza  states  that  the  modes  exist  in  substance  it 
implies  Aristotle's  concept  of  genus  and  species  as  well  as  of  substance  and 
qualities.  That  is  to  say,  Spinoza  speaks  of  modes  and  substance  in  the  same  sense 
as  Aristotle  in  saying  that  "man  is  in  animal  and  generally  species  [is]  in 
genus.  "(Physics,  IV  3,210a  18).  In  this  way,  Wolfson  conceives  of  Spinoza's 
substance  as  the  most  general  genus,  the  genus  of  any  species,  and  a  mode  as  a 
species  of  a  genus.  In  Wolfson's  words,  "[w]e  shall  therefore  use  here  the  term 
ýgenus,  '  and  describe  Spinoza's  conception  of  the  relation  between  mode  and 
substance  as  that  between  the  individual  essence  and  its  genus.  "8  Therefore, 
Wolfson  suggests  that  just  as  in  Aristotle  the  genus  is  prior  to  the  individual,  so  in 
Spinoza  substance  is  prior  in  nature  to  its  modes  (E,  1,  Prop  1).  9  Here,  we  can  see 
that  Wolfson  attempts  to  make  Spinoza  an  Aristotelian.  Speaking  more  precisely, 
Wolfson  unfolds  his  view  that  in  spite  of  amending  the  definition  of  substance, 
Spinoza's  metaphysical  system  is  under  the  influence  of  Aristotle. 
Secondly,  with  respect  to  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought, 
Wolfson's  treatment  of  them  is  that  the  root  of  Spinoza's  attributes  is  to  be  found 
in  Aristotelian  matter  and  form  rather  than  in  Descartes.  According  to  him, 
Spinoza's  "extension  and  thought"  are  the  two  constituent  elements  of  the  world, 
matter  and  form.,  which  Spinoza  prefers  to  call  extension  and  thought.  10  The 
translation  of  "form  and  matter"  into  "thought  and  extension7'  is  the  fundamental 
task  for  Wolfson  in  order  to  adduce  his  hylomorphic  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  As 
to  the  reason  for  changing  "fornf'  into  "thought,  "  Wolfson  says  "the  reason  for 
Spinoza's  substitution  of  thought  for  form  is  quite  obvious,  for  the  highest  form  or 
God  is  spoken  of  by  Aristotle  and  throughout  the  Middle  ages  as  pure  thought.  "" 
Next,  concerning  "matter  into  extension,  "  he  mentions  as  follows. 
7  Ibid.,  pp.  76-77. 
8  Ibid.,  pp.  75-76. 
9  Ibid.,  pp.  77-78. 
10  For  Wolfson's  treatment  of  Spinoza's  "extension  and  thought,  "  see  ibid.,  pp.  214-261. 
Ibid.,  p.  235. 
20 The  common  matter  underlying  the  four  elements,  according  to 
Aristotle  and  his  commentators,,  is  something  extended;  in  fact,  it  is 
the  first  kind  of  matter  that  is  extended,  and  hence  could  be  called 
extension.  12 
Wolfson  explains  that  Spinoza  needed  to  find  certain  equivalents  for  matter  and 
form,  and  he  found  these  two  terms  in  extension  and  thought  which  stand 
respectively  for  one  traditional  specific  matter  and  for  one  traditional  specific  form. 
Thus,  according  to  Wolfson,  Aristotle's  terms  "form"  and  "matter"  are  modi-fied  to 
"thought"  and  "extension"  by  Spinoza  to  suit  his  own  theory.  "  In  this  way, 
according  to  Wolfson's  view,  the  Aristotelian  metaphysics  is  transformed  into  the 
metaphysics  of  Spinoza. 
Lastly,  regarding  the  mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body,  Wolfson,  as  quoted  at 
the  beginning  of  this  section,  termed  it  "the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body  in 
Aristotle.  "  The  key  to  this  point  of  view  for  Wolfson  is  Spinoza's  doctrine  that 
omnia.  animata..  Spinoza  states  in  his  Ethics,  "those  things  which  we  have  proved 
hitherto  are  altogether  general,  nor  do  they  refer  more  to  man  than  to  other 
individuals,  all  of  which  are  animate,  although  in  different  degrees"  (E,  11,  Prop  13, 
Schol).  This  statement  is  the  starting  point  of  and  the  reason  for  a  hylomorphic 
interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  Wolfson  interprets  this  not  as 
panpsychism  but  as  hylomorphism  by  holding  that  all  things  are  said  to  have  an 
anima  in  the  same  sense  as  in  older  philosophy  where  all  things  have  aforma.  In 
the  Aristotelian  "matter-form7'  system,  Wolfson  tries  to  find  the  real  meaning 
behind  Spinoza's  utterance  that  all  things  are  animate,  defending  Spinoza  from  a 
pappsychistic  interpretation.  In  his  words: 
This  statement  that  all  things  are  animate,  as  we  have  been  trying  to 
show,,  does  not  point  to  a  pan-psychistic  conception  of  nature.  ... 
All 
that  he  means  by  his  statement  that  all  things  are  animate  in  different 
12  Ibid.,  p.  234. 
13  Ibid.,  p.  234-235. 
21 degrees  is  exactly  what  Aristotle  would  have  meant  by  saying  that  all 
things  have  forms  in  different  degrees.  14 
Spinoza's  term  "ideW'  is  used  in  the  sense  of  the  intelligible,  imaginable,  and 
sensible  forms.  Wolfson  holds  that  Spinoza  uses  it  in  the  place  of  the  old  ten-n 
"fornf'  which  corresponds  to  Aristotle's  cognition,  imagination,  and  perception 
respectively.  Therefore,  just  as  Aristotle's  "form7'  exists  in  all  things  in  a  variety 
of  different  meanings,  so  Spinoza's  "idea"  exists  in  all  things  in  a  different  degree. 
In  this  way,  Spinoza's  omnia  animata  is  explained,  and  the  hylomorphic 
interpretation  is  generated  by  Wolfson. 
(3)  The  Inadequacy  of  the  Hylomorphic  Interpretation  of  Spinoza 
In  the  Letter  to  Hugo  Boxel,  Spinoza  says  that  "[t]he  authority  of  Plato, 
Aristotle,  and  Socrates  does  not  carry  much  weight  with  me"  (Letter  56).  "  This 
seems  to  imply  that  Spinoza's  system  is  difficult  to  interpret  as  hylomorphism  or  at 
least  that  Spinoza  was  rather  confused.  In  the  face  of  the  such  evidence,  Wolfson's 
insistence  on  seeing  Spinoza  as  a  hylomorphist  seems  strained.  Let  us  examine 
whether  his  solitary  position  is  justified. 
a.  Metaphysical  System 
Wolfson's  view  that  the  term  "substance"  denotes  genus  and  the  term 
"mode"  denotes  individuals,  may  provide  us  with  a  source  of  historical  influence  on 
Spinoza.  However,  this  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  terms  "substance"  and  "mode" 
is  not  convincing. 
14jbid.,  vol.  2,  pp.  58-59. 
15  k  H.  M.  Elwes  (trans.  ),  The  Chief  Works  of  Spinoza,  (London:  Chiswick  Press,  1883),  Vol.  2, 
p.  388.  E.  M.  Curley  and  Thomas  Carson  Mark  use  this  letter  to  attack  Wolfson's  position 
(Curley,  Spinoza's  Metaphysics:  An  Essay  in  Interpretation  [Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University  Press,  1969],  p.  3  1;  T.  C.  Mark,  Spinoza's  Theory  of  Thith  [Now  York:  Columbia 
University  Press.,  1972],  p.  11,  note  4). 
22 Wolfson  regards  Spinoza's  "substance"  as  Aristotle's  "genus,  "  and  also  his 
"mode"  as  Aristotle's  species,  or  ultimately  individual  things.  Wolfson  treats 
Spinoza's  substance  as  "a  transcendent  immanence"  or  "a  whole  transcending  the 
universe,  "  and  therefore  he  regards  the  relationship  between  substance  and  mode 
as  whole  and  part,  in  the  same  sense  as  the  relationship  between  genus  (whole)  and 
species  (part)  in  Aristotle.  16  Therefore,  he  alleges,  both  "genus"  in  Aristotle  and 
"substance"  in  Spinoza  have  the  common  characteristic  that  they  exist  in 
themselves  and  they  are  prior  to  individual  things  or  modes;  Spinoza's  substance 
also  exists  in  itself  (E,  1,  Def  3)  and  it  "is  by  its  nature  prior  to  its  modifications" 
(E,  1,  Prop  1). 
In  fact,  the  relationship  between  genus  and  species  in  Aristotle  cannot  be 
identified  with  the  relationship  between  substance  and  mode  in  Spinoza.  We 
should,  therefore,  pay  careful  attention  to  the  Merence  between  "substance  and 
mode"  in  Spinoza  and  the  Aristotelian  "genus  and  species/individual  thingS.,,  17  The 
Merence  is  that  for  Aristotle  there  is  no  suggestion  that  a  genus  is  more  real  than 
(species  or)  individual  things,  whereas  for  Spinoza  the  individual  thing  is  less  real 
than  substance.  Furthermore,  as  Curley  rightly  points  out,  if  modes  exist  in 
substance  in  the  same  sense  as  individuals  exist  in  a  genus,  as  Wolfson  claims,  the 
modes  would  have  to  be,  in  predicative  sense,  substances  by  the  principles  of 
Aristotle's  logic.  "  Let  us  consider  this  point  in  some  more  detail. 
According  to  Aristotle,  for  example,  if  Socrates  is  a  member  of  the  species 
44mah"  and  "man  "  is  a  species  of  the  genus  "animal,  "  we  can  say  that  Socrates  is  a 
man  and  also  say  that  he  is  an  animal:  "the  species  is  predicated  of  the  individual, 
the  genus  both  of  the  species  and  of  the  individuals"  (Categories,  Ch.  5,3'  36- 
39).  '9  But  in  Spinoza's  philosophy  this  kind  of  relation  cannot  be  found.  If  the 
"  See  Wolfson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1,  pp.  74-75. 
17  Wolfson  uses  at  one  time  the  word  "species,  "  at  another  uses  "individual  things.  " 
18  Curley,  op.  cit.,  P.  32. 
19  Aristotle,  again  states:  "[M]an  is  predicated  of  the  individual  man,  and  animal  of  man;  so 
animal  will  be  predicated  of  the  individual  man  also-for  the  individual  man  is  both  a  man  and  an 
animal"  (Categories,  Ch.  3,  P  10-15).  As  to  Aristotle's  quotations  in  this  chapter,  I  use  W.  D. 
Ross  (ed.  ),  The  Works  of  Aristotle  Translated  into  English,  2  vols.  (Oxford:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1926). 
'23 relation  of  mode  to  substance  is  the  relation  of  a  species  to  a  genus  in  the 
Aristotelian  sense,  as  in  Wolfson's  Spinoza,  we  would  have  to  say  that  "substance" 
is  predicated  of  modes.  We  cannot  say  this  of  modes  in  Spinoza.  Therefore,  we 
cannot  derive  substance  from  mode  in  the  same  way  as  we  can  derive  genus  from 
species.  Here  lies  the  problem.  One  of  the  fundamental  principles  in  Spinoza  is  that 
modes  are  not  self-subsistent  but  are  the  modifications  of  substance.  In  so  far  as 
modes  are  dependent  on  substance  in  Spinoza,  it  is  clear  that  the  relationship 
between  substance  and  mode  is  not  the  same  as  the  relationship  between  species 
and  genus. 
Furthermore,  there  is  a  problem  with  "priority"  in  Aristotle  and  Spinoza.. 
Wolfson  argues  that  substance  is  prior  to  modes  in  Spinoza  in  the  same  way  as 
genus  is  prior  to  species  in  Aristotle,  so  that  the  relationship  between  substance 
and  modes  in  Spinoza  is  rooted  in  the  relationship  between  genus  and  species.  It  is 
certain  that  for  Spinoza  substance  is  prior  to  modes.  It  follows  that  if  genus  is  prior 
to  species,  Wolfson  seems  to  have  evidence  for  interpreting  Spinoza  as  an 
hylomorphist.  However,  we  should  not  accept  this  without  examining  the  sense  of 
"prior  to"  in  the  relationship  between  genus  and  species. 
For  Aristotle,  the  sense  of  "prior  to"  is  unfolded  in  several  ways:  (1)  time- 
44  older"  or  "more  ancient"';  (2)  non-reciprocity  as  to  implication  of  existence-A  is 
prior  to  B  when,  if  there  is  B  there  is  A,  but  if  there  is  A  there  is  not  necessarily  B; 
(3)  order-in  geometry  the  elements  are  prior  in  order  to  the  propositions;  (4) 
value-better  and  more  valued;  (5)  cause-A  causes  B  (Categories,  12,14b). 
However,  we  cannot  infer  that  genus  is  prior  to  species  from  any  of  these 
definitions.  These  definitions  are  in  a  context  where  Aristotle  is  picking  out 
Merent  uses  of  "prior.  ""  Priority  of  genus  over  species  is  unusual  in  Aristotle 
(though  some  medieval  philosophers  might  have  defended  the  priority  of  genus). 
Thus  we  need  to  examine  whether  genus  is  prior  to  species  and  the  nature  of  the 
priority.  Concerning  this,  Aristotle  writes  as  follows: 
For  annul  the  genus  and  differentia,  and  the  species  too  is  annulled,  so 
that  these  are  prior  to  the  species.  They  are  also  more  familiar;  for  if  the 
24 species  is  known,  the  genus  and  differentia  must  of  necessity  be  known 
as  well  (for  any  one  who  knows  also  what  a  man  is  knows  also  what 
animal  and  terrestrial  are),  whereas  if  the  genus  or  the  differentia  is 
known  it  does  not  follow  of  necessity  that  species  is  known  as  well;  thus 
the  species  is  less  intelligible  (Topics,  VI,  4,14  lb  28-34). 
Wolfson  maintains  that  this  statement  of  Aristotle  corresponds  with  his  fourth 
definition  of  priority---"better  and  more  valued"  (above).  If  they  do  correspond, 
we  can  infer  "the  priority  of  genus  to  species"  from  the  assertion  that  genus  is 
better  known  or  more  intelligible  than  species.  We  can  therefore  say  that  in  some 
sense  genus  is  prior  to  species  in  Aristotle  as  Wolfson  maintains.  But,  Wolfson's 
quoted  passage  is  not  very  typical.  See  Categories  Ch.  5,2  b  6-10:  "Of  secondary 
substances,  the  species  is  more  truly  substance  than  the  genus,  and  Ch.  5  on 
secondary  substances  2b  29:  "It  is  more  informative  to  give  man  than  animal.  " 
Moreover,  even  if  Wolfson  is  right  in  pointing  out  that  genus  is  prior  to 
species  in  Aristotle,  we  still  need  to  discover  whether  Aristotle's  sense  of  "priority" 
between  genus  and  species  is  the  same  as  Spinoza's  sense  of  "priority"  between 
substance  and  modes  and  Wolfson  is  wrong  about  this  for  the  following  reasons. 
Wolfson  takes  two  senses  of  "priority"  between  genus  and  species:  "better"  and 
"the  cause  of  something.  ýý20  However,  I  cannot  find  that  genus  causes  species,  as  in 
Aristotle's  fifth  definition  of  priority.  Since  substance  is  the  cause  of  mode  in 
Spinoza,  genus  must  be  the  cause  of  species  in  Aristotle,  for  Wolfson's 
interpretation  to  be  correct.  Wolfson  asserts:  "This  seems  to  be  nothing  but  a 
legitimate  extension  of  its  use  in  the  sense  of  'cause,  '  for  the  genus  is  considered 
by  Aristotle  as  the  cause  of  the  individual  essence.  Or  it  may  also  reflect  Aristotle's 
statement  that  the  whole  is  prior  in  nature  to  the  parts.  "2'  But  the  relationship  does 
not  imply  the  sense  of  cause.  From  where,  then,  does  Wolfson  infer  that  genus 
causes  species?  Where  Wolfson  says,  as  above,  that  "the  genus  is  considered  by 
Aristotle  as  the  cause  of  the  individual  essence,  "  his  footnote  indicates  that  this  is 
'0  Wolfson,  op.  cit.  vol.  1,  p.  77. 
21  Ibid.,  p.  78. 
2-5 from  Analytica  Posteriora,  11,29  90a 
,31. 
But,  I  cannot  find  the  fifth  definition  of 
cause  in  the  discussion  on  priority  in  that  text.  Furthermoreý  that  text  has  no 
discussion  of  "genus  and  specieS.,,  22  It  is  hard  to  find  evidence  that  "priority"  of 
genus  does  imply  the  sense  of  "cause.  "  It  seems  clear  that  Wolfson  misinterprets 
the  sense  of  priority  between  genus  and  species  in  Aristotle  and  applies  this 
misinterpretation  to  Spinoza.  It  is  misleading  to  make  Spinoza  Aristotelian  by 
emphasising  genus  so  much  and  regarding  it  as  prior  in  causality  to  the  individual. 
Hence,  Wolfson's  perspective  cannot  be  adopted  in  interpreting  Spinoza's 
"substance  and  mode"  system. 
Wolfson,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  first  section,  also  maintains  that  Spinoza's 
"thougbt  and  extension"  is  transformed  from  the  Aristotelian  "form  and  matter,  "  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  Spinoza's  "thought  and  extensiorf'  is  in-fluenced  by 
Aristotle's  "form  and  matter.  "  Nevertheless,  Wolfson  misses  an  essential  aspect  of 
Spinoza's  thinking  which  is  derived  from  Descartes.  Spinoza's  conception  of 
metaphysics  is  greatly  influenced  by  Descartes  in  spite  of  his  objection  to 
Descartes'  dualism.  Descartes  selected  extension  as  the  essence  of  material 
substance,  and  thought  as  the  essence  of  immaterial  substance.  The  difference 
between  these  concepts  of  Spinoza  and  Descartes  is  that  Descartes  distinguished 
between  extended  and  thinking  substance,  wbile  Spinoza  treated  them  as  attributes 
of  the  one  single  substance.  Apart  from  the  difference  of  the  status  of  "extension 
and  thought.  "  Spinoza  follows  Descartes'  conception  of  them.  Therefore,  there  is 
not  only  Aristotle's  influence  but  also  Descartes'  on  Spinoza's  concepts  of 
extension  and  thought.  However,  in  Spinoza,  these  concepts  are  derived  less  from 
Aristotle's  concepts  of  "matter  and  fornf'  than  Descartes'  concepts  of  "extension 
and  thought.  "  Furthermore,  Wolfson  argues  that  "in  fact,  it  is  the  first  kind  of 
matter  that  is  extended,  and  hence  could  be  called  extension.  "2'  However,  for 
Aristotle,  pure  matter  is  just  potentiality  with  no  properties  at  all,  whereas,  for 
22  The  passage  is  as  follows:  "For  perception  tells  that  it  is  now  screening  it  (for  it  is  clear  that  it 
is  now  eclipsed);  and  from  this  the  universal  would  come  about.  So,  as  we  say,  to  know  what  it  is 
is  the  same  as  to  know  why  it  is-and  that  either  simpliciter  and  not  one  of  the  things  that  belong 
to  it,  or  one  of  things  that  belong  to  it,  e.  g.  that  it  has  two  right  angles,  or  that  it  is  greater  or  less" 
(Posterior  Analytics,  11,2,90a  31-34). 
23  Wolf 
., 
0  son  V.  cit.,  Vol.  1,  p.  234. 
26 Descartes  and  Spinoza,  extension  is  the  essence  of  material  substance.  In  view  of 
the  above  explanations,  it  is  clear  that  in  spite  of  Aristotle's  influence,  Spinoza's 
acceptance  of  Descartes'  view  does  not  allow  us  to  interpret  Spinoza's  "extension 
and  thought"  as  hylornorphism. 
In  addition  to  this,  Wolfson's  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes  is 
contradictory  to  his  connection  between  Aristotle's  "form  and  matter"  and 
Spinoza's  "thought  and  extension.  "  If  the  attributes  are  an  illusion  or  invention  of 
our  mind  as  Wolfson  argues,  it  is  hardly  acceptable  to  argue  "thought  and 
extension7  are  derived  from  Aristotle's  "form  and  matter,  "  since  for  Aristotle 
"form  and  matter"  exist  outside  our  mind  and  they  are  not  the  illusory  concepts.  24 
Thus,  Wolfson's  view  that  Aristotelian  "matter  and  form7'  is  transformed  into 
Spinoza's  "extension  and  thought"  is  problematic. 
b.  Mind.  -Bociý  Theory 
Furthermore,  Wolfson  asserts  that  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body 
in  Spinoza  is  understood  as  differing  only  in  terminology  from  the  Aristotelian 
point  of  view  that  the  soul  is  the  fon-n  of  the  body.  That  is  to  say,  he  interprets 
Spinoza's  "mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body"2'  as  the  Aristotelian  "soul  as  the  form  of 
the  body.  "  Concerning  this,  he  advances  the  view  that  "it  [Spinoza's  definition  of 
mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body]  is  nothing  but  a  new  way  of  restating  the  Aristotelian 
definition  of  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body.  iý26  Here  we  can  see  that  Wolfson 
identifies  the  term  "idea7'  in  Spinoza  with  "fornf  '  in  Aristotle. 
The  clue  to  Spinoza's  position  at  this  point  is  provided  by  his  concept  of 
the  idea.  We  should  understood  Spinoza's  "idea7'  not  as  Aristotle's  concept  of  the 
form  but  under  the  epistemological  version.  In  Spinoza,  the  idea  is  the  medium 
24  1  discuss  the  objective  and  the  subjective  interpretations  of  attributes  in  chapter  four. 
25  Here  are  the  statements  of  Spinoza  with  reference  to  "mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body":  "The 
object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  body,  or  a  certain  mode  of  extension  which 
actually  exists,  and  nothing  else"  (E,  11,  Prop  13),  or  "[t]he  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal 
being  of  the  human  mind  is  not  simple,  but  is  composed  of  a  number  of  ideas"  (E,,  11,  Prop  15). 
Proposition  13  is  quoted  from  Edwin  Curley  for  the  sake  of  clarity  (Ae  Collected  Works  of 
Spinoza,  [Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1985],  p.  457). 
261bid.,  p.  48. 
27 which  represents  (confusedly)  the  human  body  and  external  bodies.  The  human 
mind,  "perceives  no  external  body  as  actually  existing  unless  through  the  ideas  of 
the  modifications  of  its  body"  (E,  II,  Prop  26).  From  this  proposition,  we  can  infer 
that  the  cognitive  situation  requires  the  presence  of  ideas  and  the  ideas  represent 
both  the  knower's  own  body  and  external  bodies.  This  role  of  the  idea  is  clearly 
distinct  from  the  role  of  the  form  in  Aristotle.  In  Aristotle,  as  we  have  seen  at  the 
beginning  of  this  paper,  the  form  is  regarded  as  properties,  structures,  powers  and 
so  on.  In  the  case  of  human  beings,  accordingly,  the  body  is  "what  a  man  is  made 
of'  and  the  soul  as  the  form  is  "what  makes  the  body  a  man.  "  There  is  no 
representative  role  in  Aristotle's  concept  of  the  "fornf'  as  in  Spinoza's  concept  of 
idea.  It  seems  to  me  that  Wolfson  does  not  pay  attention  to  this  kind  of 
representative  role  of  idea  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
Apart  from  the  role  of  the  idea,  there  is  some  sin-d1arity  between  Spinoza's 
idea  and  Aristotle's  fonn,  since  there  are  the  two  uses  of  idea  in  Spinoza.  Spinoza 
talks  of  the  Oference  between  the  idea  of  Peter  which  constitutes  the  essence  of 
Peter's  mind,  and  the  idea  of  Peter  which  is  in  another  man  (E,  11,  Prop  17,  Schol). 
The  former  seems  to  be  closer  to  Aristotle's  concept  of  "form.  "  Nevertheless,  a 
similarity  does  not  lead  us  to  making  Spinoza  a  hylomorphist.  Furthermore,  in 
Aristotle,  the  soul  has  more  actuality  than  the  body  whereas  there  is  no  suggestion 
in  Spinoza  of  mind  having  priority  over  body  (as  we  have  seen  in  the  first  premise), 
and  thus  this  similarity  is  not  sufficient  in  interpreting  Spinoza's  theory  as 
hylomorphism.  From  this,  we  can  confirm  that  Spinoza's  concept  of  "idea7'  (even 
the  similar  one)  is,  after  all,  Oferent  from  Aristotle's  "form.  " 
The  contradiction  between  Wolfson's  subjective  interpretation  of  the 
attributes  and  his  connection  of  Aristotle's  "form  and  matter"  with  Spinoza's 
"thought  and  extension7  does  not  also  allow  us  to  interpret  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  as  hylomorphism.  For  Aristotle,  the  mind  is  the  form  of  the  body,  that  is,  the 
mind  is  what  makes  a  body  a  man.  However,  if  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension  are  an  illusion  as  in  the  subjective  interpretation,  we  cannot  argue  that 
for  Spinoza  the  mind  as  the  idea  of  the  body  would  make  the  body  a  man  in  spite 
of  Spinoza's  claim  that  the  idea  constitutes  or  explains  the  essence  of  the  man. 
28 Even  more,  Wolfson's  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes  cannot  justify  his 
other  argument  that  just  as  Aristotle's  doctrine  that  "fornf  '  exists  in  all  things  in  a 
variety  of  Merent  meanings  so  Spinoza's  "idea"  exists  in  all  things  in  a  different 
degree,  because  under  the  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attribute  "idea7  does  not 
really  exist  in  all  things  due  to  fact  that  the  attribute  of  thought  (together  with  all 
the  other  attributes)  does  not  really  exist. 
There  is  another  ground  for  refuting  the  hylomorphic  interpretation  to  be 
found  in  Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism.  We  have  seen  that  the  crux  of  this 
interpretation  is  that  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body  in  Spinoza  is 
understood  as  differing  only  in  terminology  from  the  Aristotelian  point  of  view  that 
the  soul  is  the  form  of  the  body.  That  is  to  say,  Wolfson  interprets  Spinoza's  "idea 
(mind)  as  the  form  of  the  body"  as  the  Aristotelian  "soul  as  the  form  of  the  body.  " 
However,  Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism  rejects  this  hylomorphic 
interpretation.  In  this  interpretation,  the  idea  is  "what  makes  the  body  a  man,  "  but 
according  to  Spinoza's  determinism  a  man  is  determined  by  substance  in  a  certain 
manner.  A  man  is  not  made  in  terms  of  the  finiction  of  form  but  is  determined  by 
substance  (God)  in  Spinoza's  system  in  two  attributes  of  thought  and  extension. 
Consequently,  the  idea  does  not  correspond  to  form  as  in  the  soul  of  Aristotle's 
theory  nor  is  the  body  "stuff'  as  in  Aristotle's  matter.  It  is  just  as  much  "fornf'  as 
the  mind  is.  The  mind  and  the  body  are  nothing  but  the  modifications  of  the 
attributes  of  the  substance  in  a  determinate  matter,  and  therefore  a  man  is  not 
"what  the  idea  makes  from  the  body"  but  the  modification  of  substance  in  both 
thought  and  extension.  Furthermore,  if  the  mind  makes  the  body  a  man  as  in  the 
hylomorphic  interpretation,  it  implies  that  to  a  certain  extent  the  mind  can 
determine  the  body  even  if  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  relationship  is  causal  or  not. 
But  it  is  true  that  there  is  no  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  since  from 
Spinoza's  deternU*M*SM  the  mind  and  the  body  are  determined  by  the  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension  respectively,  but  neither  can  extension  determine  the  mind 
-nor  can  thought  determine  the  body.  Therefore,  it  follows  that  the  bylomorphic 
position  that  treats  the  soul  as  the  form  of  the  body  is  not  compatible  with  Spinoza 
due  to  his  metaphysical  determinism. 
29 Wolfson  makes  an  ingenious  attempt  to  interpret  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  and  other  related  areas  of  his  philosophy  via  an  historical  approach. 
Nevertheless,  Aristotle's  influence  on  Spinoza  which  Wolfson  strongly  asserts  and 
insists  upon  throughout  his  writings  is  overstated.  27  He  does  not,  in  my  opinion, 
express  accurately  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as  we  have  seen  in  this  section. 
Therefore,  Wolfson's  hylomorphic  interpretation  does  not  provide  us  with  an 
adequate  perspective  on  Spinoza's  system. 
2  Idealism 
Unlike  hylomorphism,  the  idealistic  interpretation  makes  much  of  Spinoza's 
doctrine  that  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  attributes,  of  which  we  know  only 
thought  and  extension  (E,  1,  Prop  11).  2'  However,  an  idealistic  interpretation  of 
Spinoza,  like  the  hylomorphic  interpretation,  is  ffindamentally  dependent  upon  the 
dominance  of  the  attribute  of  thought  over  extension  and  the  other  attributes;  the 
attribute  of  thought  is,  following  this  interpretation,  highlighted  and  treated  as  the 
primary  one.  The  main  arguments  in  favour  of  the  dominance  of  thought  in  the 
idealistic  interpretation  are  derived  from  the  following  sources:  Spinoza's 
definition  of  substance,  the  definition  of  attributes,  and  "letter  66"  to  Tschirnhaus,  I 
27  Some  commentators  criticise  Wolfson's  interpretation  by  pointing  out  that  he  too  much 
undercuts  Spinoza's  originality.  Curley  states:  "[W]e  could  reconstruct  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
Ethics  just  by  making  appropriate  selections  and  arrangements  of  the  doctrines  of  his 
predecessors.  This  is  an  extreme  thesis---one  which  Wolfson  is  forced,  later,  to  qualify  in  curious 
ways,  and  one  which  makes  Spinoza's  originality  quite  problematic"  (Curley,  op.  cit.,  p.  30).  R 
J.  Delahunty  also  states:  "By  minimising  his  originality,  Wolfson  falsifies  his  thought"'  (Spinoza 
[London:  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul:  1985],  p.  194). 
28  See  also  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  of  God,  Man  and  Human  Weýfare,  Part  1,  Chapter  VH,  note.  a 
in  Edwin  Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1985),  p.  88. 
30 shall,  in  this  section,  consider  these  sources  as  they  are  the  grounds  for  supporting 
the  dominance  of  thought  in  the  idealistic  interpretation.  29 
(1)  The  Sources  of  the  Idealistic  Interpretation 
Those  who  support  an  idealistic  interpretation  highlight  the  phrase  "the 
intel-lect  perceives  of'  in  the  definition  of  the  attributes.  Spinoza's  precise  definition 
is  as  follows:  "By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  inteflect  perceives  of 
substance  as  constituting  its  essence"  (E,  1,  Def  4).  1  Clark  Murray  uses  this 
definition  in  claiming  the  precedence  of  thought  over  the  other  attributes.  Murray 
states  the  view  as  fol-lows: 
[A]II  attributes  are  defined  to  be  what  they  are  in  themselves  by  what 
intellect  conceives  them  essentially  to  be.  That  is  to  say,  they  are 
defined  by  their  relation  to  thought;  and  thus  thought  becomes  the 
supreme  attribute  or  category,  by  relation  to  which  all  else  must  be 
30  interpreted. 
In  this  way,  Murray  argues  that  Spinoza's  attributes  are  ordered  in  the  intellect, 
and  he  adopts  the  phrase  "the  intellect  perceives  of'  as  evidence  of  the  dominance 
of  thought.  He  gives  a  privileged  position  to  thought  and  asserts  that  "all  attributes 
are  ultimately  interpretable  in  terms  of  thought.  ""  FoHowing  on  from  this,  Murray 
claims  that  in  Spinoza  all  attributes  are  united  in  substance  and  he  designates  this 
unity  as  an  intelligible  unity.  32 
So  as  to  support  his  idealistic  interpretation,  Murray  also  uses  the  definition 
of  substance  and  emphasises  the  phrase  "is  conceived"  as  he  does  in  the  definition 
29  The  idealistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza  is  different  from  idealism  in  a  general  sense  since  the 
former  maintains  that  mind  has  dominant  or  extensive  power  over  body  rather  than  mind  is  real 
and  body  is  unreal. 
30  j.  Clark  Murray,  "The  Idealism  of  Spinoza,  "  The  Philosophical  Review,  5  (1896),  p.  479. 
31 
Ibid.,  p.  48  1. 
32 
Ibid.,  p.  480. 
31 of  the  attributes.  His  idealistic  point  of  view  from  the  definition  of  substance  is  as 
follows: 
Substance  is  defined  to  be,  not  merely  that  which  is  in  itself,  but  also 
that  which  is  conceived  by  itself,  and,  to  make  the  meaning  perfectly 
explicit,  this  latter  predicate  is  more  fully  expanded  into  "that  of 
which  the  concept  does  not  require  the  concept  of  anything  else,  by 
which  it  has  to  be  formed.  "  Substance  is,  therefore,  not  an  empirical 
idea  taken  up  simply  as  something  which  happens  to  be  found 
among  the  natural  furniture  of  our  minds.  It  is  a  necessary  concept  of 
reason.  33 
Murray  tries  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  one  substance  and  the  diversity  of 
attributes  by  interpreting  Spinoza's  system  as  idealism.  In  other  words,  he  tries  to 
make  the  unity  of  thought  and  substance  the  key  to  understanding  Spinoza's 
system  and  making  it  inteffigible.  Concerning  this  point,  Murray  refers  to  the 
scholium  to  proposition  10: 
[Spinoza]  is  at  pains  to  explain  that  there  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  a 
substance  to  possess  several  different  attributes  (1,10,  Schol).  But  there 
is  another  connection  between  the  two  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension.  Thought  is  conscious  of  itself,  but  it  is  conscious  of  extension 
as  well.  Werentially  we  may  add  that  thought  must  be  conscious  of  all 
the  attributes  of  substance.  34 
In  Murray's  opinion  if  there  is  unity  of  thought  and  substance,  the  system  of  "one 
and  many"  is  not  hard  to  explain,  because  all  the  modes  of  inflnite  attributes  are 
ordered  in  the  system  of  thought. 
Spinoza's  correspondence  with  Tschirnhaus  is  another  of  the  grounds  used 
to  support  an  idealistic  interpretation;  Erroll-  E.  Harris  used  this  letter  as  the  source 
33  Ibid.,  pp.  477-478. 
34  Ibid.,  pp.  479-480. 
32 of  the  idealistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza 
. 
35  Tschirnhaus  raises  the  issue  that  in 
Spinoza's  system,  the  argument  of  infinite  modes  of  infinite  attributes  is 
contradictory  to  the  argument  that  our  mind  perceives  only  the  body. 
Hence  it  seems  to  follow,  that  the  modification  constituting  my  mind, 
and  the  modification  constituting  my  body,  though  one  and  the  same 
modification,  is  yet  expressed  in  infinite  ways-first,  through  thought; 
secondly,  through  extension;  thirdly,  through  some  attribute  of  God 
unknown  to  me,  and  so  on  to  infinity,  seeing  that  there  are  in  God 
infmite  attributes,  and  the  order  and  connection  of  the  modifications 
seem  to  be  the  same  in  all.  Hence  arises  the  question:  Why  the  mind, 
which  represents  a  certain  modification,  the  same  modification  being 
expressed  not  only  in  extension,  but  in  infinite  other  ways,  -why,  I 
repeat,  does  the  mind  perceive  that  modification  only  as  expressed 
through  extension,  to  wit,  the  human  body,  and  not  as  expressed  through 
any  other  attributes?  36 
What  Tschirnhaus  points  out  here  is  that  if  we  are  modes  of  infinite  attributes, 
there  is  a  conflict  between  our  existing  as  modes  of  infinite  attributes  and  our 
awareness  of  ourselves  as  the  mind's  perception  of  the  body;  the  fact  that  the  mind 
cannot  perceive  modes  in  attributes  other  than  extension  is  problematic.  Here  is 
Spinoza's  answer  to  this  question. 
But  in  the  answer  to  your  objection  I  say,  that  although  each  particular 
thing  be  expressed  in  infinite  ways  in  the  infinite  understanding  of  God, 
yet  those  infinite  ideas,  whereby  it  is  expressed,  cannot  constitute  one 
and  the  same  mind  of  a  particular  thing,  but  infinite  minds;  seeing  that 
each  of  these  infinite  ideas  has  no  connection  with  the  rest,  as  T  have 
35  Erroll  E.  Harris,  Salvation  ftom  Despair  (The  Hague:  Martinus  Nijhoff,  1973),  pp.  70-7  1. 
Thomas  states  that  for  Harris  "The  dominance  of  the  order  of  God's  thinking,  implied  by  Letter 
66,  makes  this  letter  one  of  the  main  grounds  for  this  interpretation.  "  ("Spinoza's  Letter  66  and 
Its  Idealist  Reading,  "  Idealistic  Studies  [  1994],  p.  19  1). 
36  Letter  65  in  R.  H.  A  Elwes  (trans.  ),  The  Chief  Works  of  Benedict  de  Spinoza,  vol.  2,  (London: 
Chiswick  Press,  1887),  pp.  400-401. 
33 explained  in  the  same  note  to  Ethics,  H.  vii.,  37  and  as  is  also  evident 
from  I.  x.  If  you  will  reflect  on  these  passages  a  little,  you  will  see  that 
all  difficulty  vanishes,  &c.  38 
In  this  way,  Spinoza  distinguishes  the  infinite  intellect  from  the  finite  mind,  and 
therefore  he  claims  that  the  hifinite  series  of  attributes  and  modes  appears  not  to 
the  finite  mind  but  to  the  infinite  intellect. 
The  idealistic  interpretation  can  be  derived  from  this  letter.  From  this  letter, 
Harris  inferred  the  fact  that  thought  is  more  dominant  than  any  of  the  other 
attributes,  since  although  our  mind  cannot  comprehend  any  other  attributes  besides 
thought  and  extension,  the  infinite  intellect  comprehends  all  attributes.  According 
to  him,  in  God's  thinking  there  is  an  idea  of  the  modes  of  every  attribute,  and  it 
follows  from  this  that  the  attribute  of  thought  is  more  comprehensive  than  the 
others:  '9  "First,  because  if  there  is  an  infinity  of  singular  minds  (or  ideas)  for  every 
mode  of  substance,  and  if  this  inflnity  is,  as  it  must  be,  comprehended  in  God's 
intellect,  then  the  attribute  of  thought  is,  in  spite  of  an  Spinoza  says,  in  some  sense 
more  comprehensive  and  'wider'  than  any  other  attribute.  For  every  mode  in  every 
attribute  will  have  its  own  idea  and  all  ideas  belong  to  the  attribute  of  Thought.  -)940 
Furthermore,  Harris  points  out  the  contradiction  between  the  dominance  of 
thought  and  the  independence  of  all  attributes,  and  regards  it  as  an  inconsistency  in 
Spinoza.  With  respect  to  this,  he  states: 
37  Among  the  many  statements  in  the  scholium  of  proposition  7  in  part  H,  the  relevant  statements 
are  as  follows:  "Nor  have  I  had  any  reason  for  saying  that  God  is  the  cause  of  the  idea,  for 
example,  of  the  circle  in  so  far  only  as  He  is  a  thinking,  and  of  the  circle  itself  in  so  far  as  He  is 
an  extended  thing,  but  this,  that  the  formal  being  of  the  idea  of  a  circle  can  only  be  perceived 
through  another  mode  of  thought,  as  its  proximate  cause,  and  this  again  must  be  perceived 
through  another,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  So  that  when  things  are  considered  as  modes  of  thought 
we  must  explain  the  order  of  the  whole  of  Nature  or  the  connection  of  causes  by  the  attribute  of 
thought  alone,  and  when  things  are  considered  as  modes  of  extension,  the  order  of  the  whole  of 
Nature  must  be  explained  through  the  attribute  of  extension  alone,  and  so  with  other  attributes.  " 
And  proposition  10  in  part  I  is  as  follows:  'Tach  attribute  of  a  substance  must  be  conceived 
through  itself.  " 
38  Letter  66  in  R-  H.  M.  Elwes  (trans.  ),  op.  cit.,  vol.  2.,  p.  401. 
39Harris,  op.  cit.,  p.  71. 
401bid. 
34 No  doubt,  Spinoza's  theory  of  infmity  of  the  attributes  is  untenable  and 
cannot  be  made  self-consistent,  and  no  doubt,  to  be  consistent,  he  should 
have  maintained  that  the  modes  in  all  attributes  were  united  to  one 
another  as  the  mind  is  united  to  the  body.  His  statement  in  the  66th  letter 
is  itself  out  of  harmony  with  his  main  teaching,  and  contradictory  even 
on  its  face.  For  he  says  that  each  thing  is  expressed  in  infinite  ways  in 
the  infmite  intellect  of  God,  and  yet  that  the  infinite  ideas  by  which  it  is 
expressed  cannot  constitute  one  and  the  same  mind  of  a  singular  thing.  41 
This  problem  is  discussed  in  his  later  article  "Infinity  of  Attributes  and  Idea  Ideae,  " 
and  is  argued  as  follows.  (1)  The  dominance  of  thought  as  complex  or  multi- 
dimensional  in  the  letter  is  incompatible  with  Spinoza's  argument  that  "the  order 
and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things"  in 
proposition  7  of  part  11  in  Ethicv,  because  "the  order  of  causes  in  any  attribute 
other  than  Thought  is,  so  to  say,  one  dimensional,  the  order  of  ideas  in  God's 
intellect  is,  as  it  were,  multi-dimensional  to  infinity.  ýý42  (2)  The  assertion  that  "each 
of  the  infinite  numbers  of  ideas  has  no  connection  with  the  rest"  in  the  letter  is 
consequently  posited  on  the  perspective  that  there  must  be  separate  worlds.  But 
this  is  incompatible  with  Spinoza's  position.  43  (3)  In  Spinoza,  there  must  be  an 
infinite  number  of  modes  on  the  basis  of  the  infinite  numbers  of  attributes,  so  that 
there  must  be  as  many  different  ideas  of  different  modes  as  there  are  different 
attributes.  However,  Spinoza's  theme  that  "all  corresponding  modeS"44  are 
identical  in  substance  is incompatible  with  the  theme  that  the  ideas  of  the  modes  of 
all  other  attributes  than  thought  are  not  identical  with  one  another;  Harris  infers  the 
latter  from  Spinoza's  statement  that  the  ideas  of  the  modes  of  all  other  attributes 
than  thought  cannot  constitute  one  and  the  same  mind  of  a  particular  thing,  and 
41  ibid., 
P.  89. 
42  Harris,  "Infinity  of  Attributes  and  Idea  Ideae,  "  Neue  Hefte  Fur  Philosophie,  vol.  12  (1977),  p. 
10. 
43  ibid. 
44  The  mind,  the  body,  and  the  rest  of  the  unknown  modes  at  same  time.  Harris  states:  "So  body 
and  mind  are  one  and  not  two  entities,  being  identical  in  substance.  It  should  follow  that  the 
coff  esponding  modes  in  other  attributes  are  identical  with  our  bodies  in  substance"  (ibid.  pp.  10- 
11.  ) 
35 have  no  connection  between  themselves  . 
4'  Harris  is  aware  that  this  incompatibility 
is  solved  by  Spinoza's  theses  "(a)  that  an  absolutely  infinite  substance  must  have 
infinite  attributes,  and  (b)  that  the  human  mind  can  become  aware  of  two  only.  " 
Accordingly,  Harris  regards  these  as  the  apparent  incompatibilities,  and  the  reason 
that  these  incompatibilities  appear  in  Spinoza's  philosophy  is  due  to  the 
contradiction  between  dominance  of  thought  and  the  independence  of  the 
attributes.  46  Harris  highlights  the  former,  and  therefore  his  interpretation  of 
Spinoza  is  idealistic. 
(2)  Remarks  on  the  Idealistic  Interpretation 
The  above  description  of  the  idealistic  interpretation  is  the  main  argument 
in  its  favour.  We  can  subject  this  interpretation  to  the  following  criticisms. 
Firstly,  as  Murray  argues,  Spinoza's  definitions  of  the  attributes  and 
substance  could  be  the  ground  for  an  idealistic  interpretation.  In  fact,  as  Frederick 
Pollock  argues,  so  long  as  Spinoza  defines  an  attribute  in  tenns  of  what  "the 
intellect  perceives,  "  whether  it  is  Spinoza's  intention  or  not,  the  attribute  of 
thought  is  counted  twice  as  opposed  to  the  other  attributes.  Pollock  states  that 
"inasmuch  as  Attribute  is  defined  by  reference  to  intellect,  and  Thought  is  itself  an 
attribute,  Thought  appears  in  a  manner  counted  twice  over.  1947  Pollock  also 
emphasises  the  privileged  position  of  the  attribute  of  thought  in  Spinoza's  system. 
He  asserts  this  point  as  follows:  "The  series  of  ideas  or  modes  of  Thought  is 
whole  and  continuous  ;  no  other  Attribute  has  any  part  in  it. 
... 
Hence  all  the 
Attributes  except  Thought  are  really  superfluous  :  and  Spinoza's  doctrine,  when 
thus  reduced  to  its  simplest  terms,  is  that  nothing  exists  but  thought  and  its 
modifications.  08 
45  ibid. 
46  Thomas  points  out  this  (Thomas,  op.  cit.,  pp.  192-193). 
47  Frederick  Pollock,  Spinoza:  His  Life  and  Philosophy  (London:  Duckworth  and  Co.,  1899),  2d 
ed.,  p.  153. 
48  Ibid.,  P.  164.  Robert  N.  Beck  also  argues  for  that  "the  attribute  of  Thought  has  a  predominant 
and  hence  idealistic  role  in  Spinoza's  metaphysical  vision"  ("The  Attribute  of  Thought,  "  in 
James  B.  Wilbur  [ed.  ],  Spinoza's  Metaphysics:  Essays  in  Critical  Appreciation  [Assen:  van 
36 However,  in  my  opinion,  the  fact  that  Spinoza  uses  the  phrase  "the  intellect 
perceives  of'  in  the  definition  does  not  imply  that  he  holds  the  view  that  thought  is 
dominant  over  the  other  attributeS.  49  What  we  can  infer  from  this  phrase  is  not  that 
everything  is  or  exists  in  God's  thinking  but  that  everything  is  represented  or 
perceived  by  God's  thinking.  The  difference  between  the  former  and  the  latter  is 
important.  The  former  leads  to  the  dominance  of  thought  in  the  idealistic 
interpretation,  whereas  the  latter  emphasises  the  representational  role  of  thought.  If 
in  God's  thinking  the  attribute  of  extension,  or  any  other  attribute  exists,  it  exists 
not  as  itself  but  as  the  idea  of  extension.  Thought  expresses  the  essence  of  God  as 
well  as  representing  the  other  attributes.  It  follows  that  we  ought  to  distinguish 
representational  dependency  from  ontological  dependency,  and  pay  attention  to  the 
fact  that  "the  dominance  of  thought"  is  not  related  to  the  latter  but  related  to  the 
former.  Even  if  thought  is  distinctive  or  singled  out  from  the  other  attributes,  this  is 
the  representational  function  of  thought.  The  dominance  of  thought  should  be 
regarded  not  as  ontological  dependency  but  as  representational  dependency.  "The 
dominance  of  thought  in  a  representational  sense"  does  not  lead  to  idealism. 
Moreover,  in  Spinoza's  system,  for  every  idea  there  is  an  ideatum,  and  this  implies 
that  the  idea  is  equally  dependent  on  the  ideatum.  Here  we  can  see  that 
representational  dependency  occurs  in  both  ways  which  is  from  the  mental  to 
physical  as  well  as  vice  versa.  If  the  dominance  of  thought  is  treated  as  arising 
ftom  the  representational  function  between  the  mental  and  physical, 
representational  dependency  does  not  lead  to  either  idealism  or  materialism.  Hence, 
idealism  is  not  an  obvious  conclusion. 
Gorcum,  1976],  p.  10).  Beck  also  states  that  "a  type  of  idealism  may  be  ascribed  to  him  [Spinoza] 
because  of  the  kind  of  priority  the  attribute  of  Thought  has"  (p.  1). 
49Let  us  define  the  intellect  as  infinite  intellect,  because  Spinoza's  definition  is  not  the  definition 
of  only  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  but  the  definition  of  the  infinite  attributes  in  general, 
and  in  Spinoza,  even  though  it  is  insufficient  as  Tschirnhaus  asserts,  it  is  clear  that  the  finite 
intellect  cannot  perceive  the  other  attributes  besides  thought  and  extension  (and  this  is  what 
Spinoza  makes  clear  in  Letter  66).  That  is  to  say,  as  long  as  the  definition  talks  about  the 
attributes  in  general,  the  intellect  has  to  be  the  infinite  one  due  to  the  fact  that  the  finite  intellect 
can  only  perceive  only  two  attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  Although  Murray  does  not 
mention  whether  the  intellect  is  the  infinite  or  the  finite,  it  should  be  the  infinite  intellect  in  his 
argument  due  to  the  above  fact.  I  discuss  this  definition  of  attributes  in  chapter  four. 
37 The  same  criticism  can  be  attached  as  to  the  idealistic  interpretation  in 
terms  of  Spinoza's  Letter  66,  because  it  also  asserts  the  dominance  of  thought.  As 
we  have  seen  in  the  above,  Harris  observes  that  the  attribute  of  thought  is  more 
comprehensive  than  the  others  from  Letter  66.  Why  is  it  more  comprehensive?  The 
reason  for  his  suggestion  is  because,  from  the  letter  we  can  infer  that  in  God's 
thinking  there  is  an  idea  of  the  modes  of  every  attribute.  And  this  is  the  manner  of 
the  dominance  of  the  order  of  God's  thinking.  However,  if  in  God's  thinking  there 
were  the  modes  themselves  of  every  attribute,  we  would  say  that  thought  swallows 
up  all  the  other  attributes,  and  the  idealistic  interpretation  could  be  ascribed  to 
Spinoza.  But,  in  reality,  as  long  as  there  is  an  idea  of  the  modes  of  every  attribute 
instead  of  the  modes  themselves,  we  should  say  that  thought  is  representative 
unlike  the  others;  it  follows  that  although  we  could  say  it  is  "more  comprehensive,  " 
we  cannot  say  it  is  more  real.  From  this  perspective,  as  to  both  the  definition  and 
the  Letter  66,1  would  like  to  suggest  the  representative  interpretation  rather  than 
the  idealistic  interpretation.  'o  It  follows  that  we  can  point  out  the  uniqueness  of 
thought  in  Spinoza's  system  in  terms  of  the  representative  fimction,  but  should  not 
interpret  Spinoza's  system  as  idealism. 
For  Spinoza,  as  in  one  of  the  premises  in  this  chapter,  the  relative  weighting 
of  thought  and  extension  is  equal,  and  therefore  we  can  give  greater  weight  neither 
to  the  mental  series  nor  to  the  physical  series.  I  shall  cite  again  Spinoza's 
statements  on  this  point. 
Hence  it  follows  that  God's  power  of  thinking  is  equal  to  His  actual 
power  of  acting,  that  is  to  say,  whatever  follows  formally  from  the 
infinite  nature  of  God,  follows  from  the  idea  of  God  [idea  Dei],  in 
'0  One  might  say  that  the  representative  role  of  the  attribute  of  thought  is  related  to  the 
dominance  of  thought  over  the  others  i.  e.  the  dominance  of  thought  in  a  representative  sense.  But 
even  in  this  case,  it  is  difficult  to  support  the  idealistic  interpretation,  because  the  dominance  of 
thought  in  a  representative  sense  does  not  imply  that  thought  is  real  and  extension  is  unreal.  In 
other  words,  if  the  other  attributes  belong  to  God's  thinking  as  an  idea  in  a  representative  sense, 
the  doctrine  of  the  attributes  has  a  certain  distance  from  the  idealistic  interpretation.  In  my 
opinion,  even  though  the  dominance  of  thought  is  the  idealistic  element  in  the  interpretation  of 
Spinoza,  it  does  not  play  a  major  part  in  his  system  but  a  small  part  which  we  have  to  unravel. 
38 the  same  order  and  in  the  same  connection  objectively  in  God.  (E,  H, 
Prop  7,  Corol) 
The  idealistic  interpretation  is  not  compatible  with  the  above  statement,  while  the 
representative  interpretation  is  compatible  with  it.  "  Viewed  from  this  perspective, 
it  is  clear  that  the  idealistic  interpretation  is  a  misunderstanding  of  Spinoza's  real 
tendency,  and  consequently  it  is  hardly  possible  to  regard  Spinoza  as  an  idealist.  52 
I  Epiphenomenalism 
We  can  quickly  dismiss  one  finther  viewpoint,  advocated  by  Harold 
Barker,  that  Spinoza  was  an  epiphenomenalist.  "  This  interpretation  is  not  only 
incompatible  with  a  non-causal  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  but 
also  with  the  equality  of  weight  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  However,  it  will 
be  helpful  to  explore  the  rationale  behind  Barker's  claim.  Especially,  in  view  of  the 
interest  to  modem  theories  of  mind,  it  is  worth  looking  at  this  claim- 
initially,  we  should  reflect  on  some  general  definitions  of 
"epiphenomenalisnf'  so  that  Barker's  point  of  view  is  better  understood. 
Epiphenomenalism  is  generally  defined  as  the  view  that  "all  mental  events  [are 
considered]  to  be  the  effects  of  physical  events  but  never  the  causes  of  either 
5'  The  representative  interpretation  will  be  dealt  with  at  some  length  in  chapter  six. 
52  One  might  say  that  even  if  idealism  is  not  Spinoza's  intention,  Spinoza  is  somehow  committed 
to  the  assertion  of  the  dominance  of  thought  and  subsequently  his  system  can  be  regard  as  an 
idealistic  one.  However  if  Spinoza  was  committed  to  it.,  we  should  regard  it  as  a  contradiction  or 
inconsistency  rather  than  interpreting  it  as  idealism.  The  most  important  point  in-  the 
interpretation  of  Spinoza,  as  in  the  interpretation  of  any  philosopher,  is  trying  to  find  his  real 
tendency  and  thinking.  Spinoza's  real  tendency  is  not  arguing  the  primacy  of  idealism  but 
overcoming  the  inadequacy  of  materialism  and  idealism.  Therefore  we  should  not  infer  an 
idealistic  interpretation  from  the  definition  and  the  letter,  since  Spinoza's  real  tendency  in  both 
sources  is,  as  I  have  explained,  not  an  idealistic  but  a  representative  one. 
53  H.  Barker,  "Notes  on  the  Second  Part  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  "  in  S.  Paul  Kashap  (ed.  ),  Studies  in 
Spinoza  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press.,  1972),  pp.  10  1-144. 
39 physical  or  other  mental  events,  04  and  ephiphenomenalists  "have  maintained  that 
the  body  acts  upon  the  mind  to  produce  consciousness,  thought,  and  feeling,  but 
that  the  mind  itself  has  no  physical  effects.  "" 
(1)  H.  Barker's  Notes  on  Ethics 
a.  The  Priority  of  the  Body 
From  the  above  substantially  similar  deflnitions,  we  can  identify  and  arrange 
the  characteristics  of  epiphenomenalism  as  foRows. 
(1)  There  is  only  one  direction  of  causalityý--from  the  body  to  the  mind.  In  other 
words  the  body  acts  upon  the  mind  but  not  vice  versa. 
(2)  The  mind  is  never  the  cause  of  even  any  other  mental  events. 
(3)  Without  the  body,  there  can  be  no  mental  effects  such  as  consciousness, 
thought,  and  feeling.  In  other  words,  bodily  effects  result  from  bodily  causes 
and  mental  effects  also  result  from  bodily  causes. 
From  the  above  tbree  cbaracteristics,  we  can  recognise  that  epipbenomenalism  is 
posited  on  the  basis  of  the  priority  of  the  body  to  the  mind. 
Now,  Barker,  throughout  his  article,  in  order  to  maintain  consistency  with 
the  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  as  wel-l  as  to  support  it,  emphasises  the 
priority  of  the  body  in  Spinoza's  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body, 
We  can  note  the  fact  that  Barker  has  a  scheme  which  is  intended  to  hold  the 
priority  of  the  body  in  his  mind  from  the  first  page  of  his  article  by  expressing 
dissatisfaction  with  the  phrase  "per  se  concipi"  (be  conceived  through  itself)  in 
proposition  10  of  Ethic.  v,  part  1:  "Each  attribute  of  a  substance  must  be  conceived 
through  itself  "  Here,  he  holds  that  thinking  and  knowledge  depend  upon  an 
54  Antony  Flew,  ed.,,  4  Dictionary  ofPhilosophy  (London:  Pan  Books,  1979),  p.  109. 
"  Richard  Taylor,  Metapkysics  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-flall,  1974),  p.  17.  Another  similar 
definition  is  that  "the  causal  connection  goes  in  only  one  direction,  from  body  to  mind,  so  that 
mental  events  are  effects  only,  never  causes.,  of  brain  events"  (Jerome  Shaffer,  "Mind-Body 
Problem,  "  in  Paul  Edwards  fed.  ],  The  Encyclopedia  ofPhilosophy,  vol.  5  [New  York:  Macmillan, 
1967],  p.  343). 
40 objective  world.  That  is  to  say,  he  places  stress  on  the  priority  of  extension  over 
thought  in  the  relationship  between  these  two  attributes  and  thus  argues  against  the 
independence  of  the  attributes.  " 
Barker  adheres  to  this  kind  of  tendency  in  explaining  the  relationship 
between  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  the  mind  and  the  body.  For 
example,  he  emphasises  the  priority  of  the  body,  even  arguing  that  it  is  misleading 
to  translate  "Deus"  in  the  Ethics  as  "God"  especially  with  respect  to  the  attributes 
of  thought  and  extension.  The  tenn"Deus,  "  according  to  Barker,  should  have  been 
understood  as  "Natura.  "  Hence,  it  ought  to  be  translated  into  English  not  as  "God" 
but  as  "Nature,  "  since  the  "Deus"  of  Spinoza  is  not  the  "God"  of  ordinary 
,,  57  linguistic  usage. 
Barker  maintains  that  as  long  as  someone  uses  the  ordinary  term  "God" 
which  concerns  "the  divine  mind  and  divine  omniscience,  "  he  will  fall  into  the 
Oficulty  of  criticising  God  as  a  thinking  thing  rather  than  God  as  an  extended 
thing.  In  Barker's  words,  "he  will  be  less  critical  about  the  notion  of  Deus  as  res 
cogitans  than  he  is  about  the  notion  of  Deus  as  res  extensa.  ""  He  further  carries 
the  criticism  into  the  domain  of  "thought"  in  Spinoza's  "attributes-modes"  system. 
As  to  the  attribute  of  extension,  Barker  does  not  regard  it  as  giving  rise  to 
difficulties  of  understanding.  However,  concerning  the  attribute  of  thought,  he 
regards  it  as  posing  a  difficult  problem. 
Next,  we  can  see  that  he  tries  to  move  Spinoza's  theory  from  paraRelism.  to 
epiphenomenalism.  He  unfolds  an  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  pointing  out 
some  problems  of  parallelism,  or  at  least  he  presents  the  argument  of  "the  priority 
of  the  body  over  the  mind"  effectively.  He  states  in  relation  to  this  interpretation 
the  following: 
[I]n  spite  of  his  denial  of  any  communio  between  the  attributes,  his 
argument  repeatedly  suggests  that  he  is  really  thinýg  of  the  mind  as 
56  H.  Barker,  op.  cit.,  P.  101. 
57  Ibid. 
ý  pp.  11  0_  I  11. 
58 
Ibid.,  p.  110. 
41 determined  by  the  body,  so  that,  not  parallelism,  but  epiphenomenalism, 
would  be  the  word  to  describe  the  real  tendency  of  his  thought.  '9 
What  is  the  reason  for  Barker  asserting  the  above  point  of  view?  In  other  words,  in 
what  sense  does  he  think  that  the  mind  is  determined  by  the  body  in  Spinoza's 
theory?  I  shall  explore  the  answer  to  this  question. 
h.  The  Epi]phenom.  ena-listic  Interpretation 
I  would  like  to  take  two  statements  presenting  Barker's  main  argument 
from  which  he  adduces  his  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation,  although  there  are 
other  statements  afleged  by  hirn.  The  first  is  on  the  ground  of  the  scholium,  to 
proposition  13,  part  11,  the  other  is  on  the  ground  of  the  scholium.  to  proposition  2, 
part  111.  Here  are  parts  of  the  statements. 
Firstly,  after  he  complains  of  the  confusion  of  the  scholium  to  proposition 
13ý  he  offers  an  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation.  He  states  this  as  follows:  "But  in 
the  sentence  that  begins,  Hoc  ta.  men  in  genere  dico  [Thus  much,  nevertheless,  I 
will  say  generally],  he  is  evidently  thinking  of  the  body  as  the  organ  of  mind  or 
indeed  as  determining  it,  and  the  stress  he  lays  on  a  prior  knowledge  of  the  body  as 
,,  60 
the  key  to  an  understanding  of  the  mind  then  takes  on  a  different  significance. 
That  is  to  say,  even  though  Spinoza  claims  the  union  of  mind  and  body  in  the  first 
paragraph  of  this  scholium,  Barker  argues  that  in  the  second  paragraph  the  mind  is 
determined  by  the  body-for  instance,  "in  proportion  as  one  body  is  better  adapted 
than  another  to  do  or  suffer  many  things,  in  the  same  proportion  will  the  mind  at 
the  same  time  be  better  adapted  to  perceive  many  things"(E,  11,  Prop  13,  Schol).  In 
this  way,  Barker  interprets  this  scholium  (at  least  in  the  second  paragraph),  as 
showing  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  epiphenomenalistic,  because  he 
interprets  the  above  statement  as  that  the  body  acts  upon  the  mind  but  not  vice 
versa,  that  is  to  say,  changes  in  the  body  are  the  cause  of  changes  in  the  mind  but 
not  vice  versa. 
59 
Ibid.,  p.  144. 
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42 Secondly,  Barker's  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  finds  support  in  the 
scholium  to  proposition  2,  part  111.  From  the  scholium  he  brings  in  his 
epiphenomenalistic  statement  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  of  mind.  This  is  related  to 
what  he  sees  as  the  essential  point  and  obvious  tendency  of  this  scholium.  Barker 
says:  "[T]he  essential  point  is  that  he  really  gives  priority  or  predominance  to  the 
body,  in  spite  of  his  professed  doctrine  of  the  complete  independence  and  equality 
of  the  attributes.  The  obvious  tendency  of  the  scholium  to  111,2-in  spite  of  what 
the  proposition  itself  asserts-is  to  glorify  the  body  at  the  expense  of  the  mind.  41 
From  this  statement,  we  can  see  that  Barker  emphasises  the  priority  of  the  body  as 
determining  the  mind,  and  therefore  he  takes  a  strongly  epiphenomenalistic  point  of 
view  on  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
(2)  The  Inadequacy  of  the  Epiphenomenalistic  Interpretation 
I  shall  criticise  Barker's  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  in  the  following 
respects:  firstly,  I  shall  treat  the  scholium  of  the  proposition  2  in  part  III  at 
length  ; 
62 
and  secondly,  point  out  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  contradicts 
definitions  of  epiphenomenalism.  By  doing  so,  I  shall  show  that  Spinoza's  real 
tendency  is  not  epiphenomenalistic. 
a.  The  Equality  or  Priority  between  the  Mind  and  the  Body: 
the  Scholium  ofProposition  Two,  Part  Three  63 
Spinoza  regards  thought  and  extension  as  equal  attributes,  although  some 
passages  seem  to  imply  the  priority  of  extension.  Spinoza  also  strongly  attacks 
interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Let  us  consider  these  two  points  in  the 
following  passage  (E,  ITT,  Prop  2,  Schol);  I  shall  break  this  passage  up  by 
numbering  for  convenience. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Barker,  also,  as  we  have  seen,  relies  on  the  scholium.  of  proposition  13  in  part  11.  As  to  this 
scholium,  I  shall  deal  with  it  when  I  discuss  the  materialistic  interpretation  in  the  next  section. 
6'  There  are  no  divisions  within  the  passages  in  this  scholitun  in  the  Latin  text,  but  for 
convenience  I  shall  divide  one  long  section  into  some  passages. 
43 denial  of  "the  superiority  of  the  mind  over  the  body"  and  of  "mind- 
body  interactionism  " 
Although  these  things  are  so,  and  no  ground  for  doubting  remains,  I  scarcely  believe, 
nevertheless,,  that  without  a  proof  derived  from  experience,  men  will  be  induced  calmly 
to  weigh  what  has  been  said,  so  firmly  are  they  persuaded  that,  solely  at  the  bidding  of 
the  mind,  the  body  moves  or  rests,  and  does  a  number  of  things  which  depend  upon  the 
will  of  the  mind  alone,  and  upon  the  power  of  thought.  For  what  the  body  can  do  no  one 
has  hitherto  determined,  that  is  to  say,  experience  has  taught  no  one  hitherto  what  the 
body,  without  being  determined  by  the  mind,  can  do  and  what  it  cannot  do  from  the  laws 
of  Nature  alone,  in  so  far  as  nature  is  considered  merely  as  corporeal. 
(1)  For  no  one  as  yet  has  understood  the  structure  of  the  body  so  accurately  as  to  be 
able  to  explain  all  its  functions,  not  to  mention  the  fact  that  many  things  are  observed  in 
brutes  which  far  surpass  human  sagacity,  and  that  sleepwalkers  in  their  sleep  do  very 
many  things  which  they  dare  not  do  when  awake-all  this  showing  that  the  body  itself 
can  do  many  things  from  the  laws  of  its  own  nature  alone,  at  which  the  mind  belonging 
to  that  body  is  amazed. 
(2)Again,  nobody  knows  by  what  means  or  by  what  method  the  mind  moves  the  body, 
nor  how  many  degrees  of  motion  it  can  communicate  to  the  body,  nor  with  what  speed  it 
can  move  the  body.  So  that  it  follows  that,  when  men  say  that  this  or  that  action  of  the 
body  springs  from  the  mind  which  has  command  over  the  body,  they  do  not  know  what 
they  say,  and  they  do  nothing  but  confess  with  pretentious  words  that  they  know  nothing 
about  the  cause  of  the  action  and  see  nothing  in  it  to  wonder  at. 
(3)  But  they  will  say  that,  whether  they  know  or  do  not  know  by  what  means  the  mind 
moves  the  body,  it  is  nevertheless  in  their  experience  that  if  the  mind  were  not  fit  for 
thinking  the  body  would  be  inert.  They  say,  again,  it  is  in  their  experience  that  the  mind 
alone  has  power  both  to  speak  and  be  silent,  and  to  do  many  other  things  which  they 
therefore  think  to  be  dependent  on  a  decree  of  the  mind.  But  with  regard  to  the  first 
assertion,  I  ask  them  if  experience  does  not  also  teach  that  if  the  body  be  sluggish  the 
mind  at  the  same  time  is  not  fit  for  thinking?  When  the  body  is  asleep,  the  mind 
slumbers  with  it  and  has  not  the  power  to  think,  as  it  has  when  the  body  is  awake. 
Again,  I  believe  that  all  have  discovered  that  the  mind  is  not  always  equally  fitted  for 
thinking  about  the  same  subject,  but  in  proportion  to  the  fitness  of  the  body  for  this  or 
that  image  to  be  excited  in  it  will  the  mind  be  better  fitted  to  contemplate  this  or  that 
object. 
(4)  But  my  opponents  will  say  that  from  the  laws  of  Nature  alone,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
considered  to  be  corporeal  merely,  it  cannot  be  that  the  causes  of  architecture,  painting, 
and  things  of  this  sort,  which  are  the  results  of  human  art  alone,  could  be  deduced,  and 
that  the  human  bodyý'  unless  it  were  determined  and  guided  by  the  mind  would  not  be 
able  to  build  a  temple.  I  have  already  shown,  however,  that  they  do  not  know  what  the 
body  can  do,  nor  what  can  be  deduced  from  the  consideration  of  its  nature  alone,  and 
that  they  find  that  many  things  are  done  merely  by  the  laws  of  Nature  which  they  would 
44 never  have  believed  to  be  possible  without  the  direction  of  the  mind,  as,  for  example, 
those  things  which  sleepwalkers  do  in  their  sleep,  and  at  which  they  themselves  are 
astonished  when  they  wake.  I  adduce  also  here  the  structure  itself  of  the  human  body, 
which  so  greatly  surpasses  in  workmanship  all  those  things  which  are  constructed  by 
human  art,  not  to  mention,  what  I  have  already  proved,  that  an  infinitude  of  things 
follows  from  Nature  under  whatever  attribute  it  may  be  considered. 
I  shall  give  the  main  points  of  each  stage  of  the  argument: 
(1)  An  explanation  can  in  principle  be  given  for  much  behaviour  in  ten-ns  of  the 
corporeal. 
(2)  The  hypothesis  of  mental/physical  interaction  is  more  abstruse  than  that  of 
physical  action. 
(3)  There  is  an  illusion  of  the  mind  freely  bringing  about  change  in  the  corporeal, 
but  if  the  body  is  sluggish  the  mind  is  also  sluggish. 
(4)  For  all  we  know  a  physical  explanation  is  possible  for  any  action. 
From  this  summary,  we  can  see  that  this  passage  concerns  bodily  explanation  in 
order  to  refute  the  common  belief,  held  in  Spinoza's  time,  of  the  superiority  of  the 
mind  over  the  body,  and  also  presumably  to  repudiate  Cartesian  interactionism.  We 
can  see  that  Spinoza  denies  the  dependency  of  the  body  upon  the  m  wi-id  by  pointing 
out  repeatedly  a.  common  -misunderstanding  regarding  the  body.  He  holds  that  the 
body  can  do  many  things  without  the  direction  of  the  mind  from  the  analogy  of 
sleepwalkers.  All  these  examples  and  explanations  are  intended  to  undermine  the 
view  that  the  mind  can  determine  or  act  upon  the  body,  that  is  to  say,  the  mind  can 
cause  the  body  to  move. 
It  may  be  argued  however  that  Spinoza's  real  tendency  is  to  assert  the 
priority  of  the  body  over  the  mind  as  Barker  suggests.  However,  does  Spinoza 
really  hold  a  priority  of  the  body  over  the,  mind  in  this  scholium?  I  think  not.  The 
proposition  itself  informs  us  of  two  points:  (a)  the  body  cannot  determine  the  mind, 
(b)  the  mind  cannot  determine  the  body.  What  Spinoza  seeks  to  do  in  the  second 
paragraph,  as  he  mentions  in  the  first  sentence,  is  to  prove  point  (b)  so  as  to 
persuade  those  who  strongly  believe  in  the  dependency  of  the  body  upon  the  mind, 
He  regards  this  belief  as  blocking  a  fair  consideration  of  the  matter,  It  was  a 
45 common  belief  in  Spinoza's  time  that  the  mind  commanded  the  body.  The 
following  statements  of  Spinoza's  (at  the  beginnin  of  the  above  quotation)  M=9 
conveys  this  fact:  "...  so  firmly  are  they  persuaded  that,  solely  at  the  bidding  of  the 
mind,  the  body  moves  or  rests,  and  does  a  number  of  things  which  depend  on  the 
will  of  the  mind  alone,  and  upon  the  power  of  thought.  "  Spinoza  might  not  have 
felt  the  need  to  offer  a  proof  of  point  (a)  since  the  belief  that  the  mind  commands 
the  body  was  so  widespread.  We  cannot  argue  from  his  silence  here  that  he 
thought  there  was  physical-mental  causality,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  clearly 
denies  it  in  several  places. 
The  passage  which  could  possibly  be  regarded  as  claiming  the  priority  of 
the  body  is  restricted  to  "in.  proportion  to  the  fitness  of  the  body  for  this  or  that 
image  to  be  excited  in  it  will  the  mind  be  better  fitted  to  contemplate  this  or  that 
object.  "  However,  we  should  note  that  Spinoza's  meaning  is  that  the  mind  and  the 
body  move  together  as  well  as  that  the  mind  is  the  idea.  of  the  body  and  the  body  is 
the  object  of  the  mind.  That  is  to  say,  we  should  regard  this  not  as  giving  priority 
to  the  body  but  as  asserting  equality  to  the  body.  Spinoza's  intention  and  purpose 
in  arguing  against  the  common  belief  that  the  mind  determines  the  body  is  to 
support  his  denial  of  causal  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body  which  he 
claims  in  the  proposition  itself  Spinoza's  explanations,  in-  the  schorium  are 
compatible  with  this  interpretation.  I  shall  consider  more  passages  in  the  scholium. 
of  proposition  2. 
(ii)  one  order  of  event  and  two  descriptions  of  the  mental  and  the  physical 
[T]he  infant  believes  that  it  is  by  free  will  that  it  seeks  the  breast;  the  angry  boy 
believes  that  by  free  will  he  wishes  vengeance;  the  timid  man  thinks  it  is  with  free  will  he 
seeks  flight;  the  drunkard  believes  that  by  a  free  command  of  his 
-mind 
be  speaks  the. 
things  which  when  sober  he  wishes  he  had  left  unsaid.  Thus  the  madman,  the  chatterer, 
the  boy,  and  others  of  the  same  kind,  all  believe  that  they  speak  by  a  free  command  of 
the  mind,  whilst,  in  trutk  they  have  no  power  to  restrain  the  impulse  which  they  have  to 
speak,  so  that  experience  itself,  no  less  than  reason,  clearly  teaches  that  -men 
believe 
themselves  to  be  ftee  simply  because  they  are  conscious  of  their  own  actions,  knowing 
nothing  of  the  causes  by  which  they  are  determined;  it  teaches,  too,  that  the  decrees  of 
the  mind  are  nothing  but  the  appetites  themselves,  which  differ,  therefore,  according  to 
the  different  temper  of  the  body.  For  every  man  determines  all  things  from  his  emotion; 
46 those  who  are  agitated  by  contrary  emotions  do  not  know  what  they  want,  whilst  those 
who  are  agitated  by  no  emotion  are  easily  driven  hither  and  thither.  All  this  plainly 
shows  that  the  decree  of  the  mind,  the  appetite,  and  determination  of  the  body  are 
coincident  in  Nature,  or  rather  that  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing  which,  when  it  is 
considered  under  the  attribute  of  thought  and  manifested  by  that,  is  called  a  "decree,  " 
and  when  it  is  considered  under  the  attribute  of  extension  and  is  deduced  from  the  laws 
of  motion  and  rest  is  called  a  "determination.  " 
The  same  order  of  events  which  can  be  described  mentally  can  also  be  described 
physically;  there  is  also  a  suggestion  that  "appetites"  are  a  Merent  way  of 
describing  "decrees"  and  "determinations.  "  Are  they  mental,  or  physical?  If  mental, 
he  might  be  implying  that  reference  to  appetites  is  a  better  way  of  describing  the 
mental  than  reference  to  "decrees.  " 
(iii)  denial  of  "the  command  theory  of  mind 
)y  64 
This,  however,  will  be  better  understood  as  we  go  on,  for  there  is  another  thing  which  I 
wish  to  be  observed  here-that  we  cannot  by  a  mental  decree  do  a  thing  unless  we 
recollect  it. 
(1)  We  cannot  speak  a  word,  for  instance,  unless  we  recollect  it.  But  it  is  not  in  the  free 
power  of  the  mind  either  to  recollect  a  thing  or  to  forget  it.  It  is believed,  therefore,  that 
the  power  of  the  mind  extends  only  thus  far-that  from  a  mental  decree  we  can  speak  or 
be  silent  about  a  thing  only  when  we  recollect  it. 
(2)  But  when  we  dream  that  we  speak,  we  believe  that  we  do  so  from  a  free  decree  of  the 
mind,,  and  yet  we  do  not  speak,  or,  if  we  do,  it  is  the  result  of  a  spontaneous  motion  of 
the  body.  We  dream,  again,  that  we  are  concealing  things,  and  that  we  do  this  by  virtue 
of  a  decree  of  the  mind  like  that  by  which,  when  awake,  we  are  silent  about  things  we 
know.  We  dream,  again,  that,  ftom  a  decree  of  the  mind,  we  do  some  things  which  we 
should  not  dare  to  do  when  awake. 
(3)  And  I  should  like  to  know,  therefore,  whether  there  are  two  kinds  of  decrees  in  the 
mind-one  belonging  to  dreams  and  the  other  free.  If  this  be  too  great  nonsense,  we 
must  necessarily  grant  that  this  decree  of  the  mind  which  is  believed  to  be  ftee  is  not 
distinguishable  from  the  imagination  or  memory,  and  is  nothing  but  the  affirmation 
which  the  idea  necessarily  involves  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  idea  (Prop  49,  pt.  2). 
(4)  These  decrees  of  the  mind,  therefore,  arise  in  the  mind  by  the  same  necessity  as  the 
ideas  of  things  actually  existing.  Consequently,  those  who  believe  that  they  speak  or  are 
silent  or  do  anything  else  from  a  free  decree  of  the  mind  dream  with  their  eyes  open. 
641  shall  also  break  up  this  passage  by  numbering  for  convenience. 
47 Spinoza  goes  on  to  develop  the  view  that  reference  to  "decrees"  is  inadequate  and 
confused: 
(1)  It  shows  an  inadequacy  which  does  not  cover  all  mental  acts 
(2)  Decrees  in  dreams  do  not  really  bring  about  anything 
(3)  Unless  there  are  two  sorts  of  decree,  we  must  treat  all  decrees  of  the  mind  as 
ineffective 
(4)  Apparently  free  decrees  are  really  caused. 
This  passage  thus  supports  the  argument  contained  in  the  second  paragraph.  It 
refutes  the  common  belief  that  the  mind  commands  the  body,  or  even,  perhaps,  that 
the  mind  commands  the  mind.  His  point  is  that  we  engage  in  some  activity  not  by 
the  free  will  of  the  mind  but  by  responses  to  external  stimuli.  In  other  words  the 
action  of  the  body  does  not  depend  upon  the  free  will  of  the  mind. 
Now,  we  can  see  that  this  schollium  is  not  concerned  with  either  giving  a 
priority  to  the  body  or  glorifying  the  body  at  the  expense  of  the  mind,  as  Barker 
WW 
argues.  But  it  is  concerned  with  the  explanation  of  the  experience  of  the  body  in 
order  to  refute  the  common  belief  of  the  superiority  of  the  mind  over  the  body  and 
to  refute  Cartesian  interactionism  by  showing  the  causal  independence  of  the  body 
from  the  mind.  I  think  that,  in  the  scholium,  Spinoza's  intention  is  to  expound  and 
prove  what  be  says  in  the  proposition  (the  mind  cannot  determine  the  body) 
through  the  example  of  sleepwalkers,  and  he  does  not  -have  any  further  intention  to 
give  priority  or  predominance  to  the  body. 
Barker  uses  the  phrase,  "in  spite  of  what  the  proposition  itself  asserts  "65  hence,  it 
is  evident  that  he  is  aware  of  the  clear  sense  of  proposition  2,  part  III. 
Nevertheless,  he  seems  to  reinterpret  it.  Here,  we  should  remind  ourselves  that  this 
scholium.  is  attached  to  proposition  2.  That  is,  "the  body  cannot  determ  'me  the  mind 
to  thought,  neither  can  the  mind  determine  the  body  to  motion  nor  rest,  nor  to 
anything  else  if  there  be  anything  else"  (E,  111,  Prop  2).  In  Spinoza,  we  should  not 
consider  any  scholium  without  the  associated  proposition  in  the  Ethics.  How 
would  Barker  be  able  to  treat  the  proposition  itser.  Barker  should  have  interpreted 
this  scholium  in  a  manner  faithful  to  the  proposition  itself  Moreover,  we  haNe  seen 
65  Ibid.,  p.  149. 
48 that  the  scholium  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  the  priority  of  the  body  over  the 
mind.  Consequently,  as  long  as  Spinoza  holds  Proposition  2  and  the  scholium  is 
consistent  with  the  proposition,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  interpret  his  position  as 
epipheno-menaHsm. 
b.  Incompatibility  between  Definitions  of  Epi]phenomenahsm,  and 
Spinoza's  Theory 
Barker,  as  we  have  just  seen  above,  tries  to  attach  epiphenomenalism  to 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  I  shall  discuss  some  problems  of  this  kind  of 
interpretation  dealing  with  the  definition  of  epiphenomenalism.  At  the  beginning  of 
section  1.1  drew  some  points  from  the  definition  of  epiphenomenalism.  These 
were: 
(1)  There  is  only  one  direction  of  causality-from  the  body  to  the  mind.  In  other 
words  thle  body  acts  upon  the  mind  but  not  vice  versa. 
(2)  The  mind  is  never  the  cause  of  even  any  other  mental  events. 
(3)  Mental  events  such  as  consciousness,  thought,  and  feeling  are  always  the  effect 
of  bodily  causes. 
As  to  point  (1),  1  have  just  criticised  Barker's  assertion  with  relation  to  these 
points.  Now,  let  us  examine  points  (2)  and  (3)  in  the  definition  of 
epiphenomenalism.  Normally  in  Spinoza,  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body 
is  presented  by  saying  that  a  mind  is  the  idea  of  a  mode  of  extension  and  a  body  is 
the  object  (ideatum)  of  a  mind.  This  kind  of  relationship,  however,  also  occurs 
within  the  mental  process  since  Spinoza  states,  "[flhis  idea  of  the  mind  is  united  to 
the  mind  in  the  same  way  as  the  mind  itself  is  united  to  the  body"  (E,  11,  Prop  21; 
my  italics).  Therefore  we  can  see  that  there  is  an  idea  of  the  idea  in  Spinoza's 
system,  and  that  the  object  of  this  idea  is  not  the  body  but  the  mind.  This  gives  self- 
consciousness.  If  Spinoza  is  interpreted  as  an  epiphenomenalist,  the  fact  that  "the 
body  is  the  object  of  the  mind,  "  must  imply  that  the  body  is  the  cause  of  the  mind, 
and  the  mind  the  effect  of  the  body.  Likewise,  concerning  the  idea  of  the  idea,  The 
mind  is  the  cause  of  the  idea.  of  the  idea,  "  since  here  the  mind  is  the  object 
49 [objectum.  ]  of  the  idea  of  the  mind.  This  contradicts  the  definition  of 
epiphenomenalism,  precisely,  in  point  (2):  the  mind  would  have  to  be  causally 
active  in  producing  the  idea  of  the  mind.  Due  to  the  above  fact,  it  is  not  true  that 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  can  be  interpreted  as  epiphenomenarism.  In  other 
words,  so  long  as  there  is  the  theory  of  idea  ideae  in  Spinoza's  philosophy  of 
mind,  it  is  unlikely  to  be  possible  to  treat  Spinoza's  theory  as  epiphenomenalistic. 
According  to  Barker,  the  idea  ideae  is  "a  reflective  awareness  of  what  is  in 
the  mind,  "  and  he  adds  "reflective  knowledge  can  only  become  aware  of,  not 
create,  any  unity  or  continuity  there  is  in  the  mind.  9ý66  However,  the  mind  must  be 
the  cause  of  the  idea  of  the  mind  in  respect  to  the  epiphenomenalistic  sense,  since 
the  body  is,  in  epiphenomenalism,  treated  as  the  cause  of  the  mind. 
Apart  from  this  argument,  we  can  simply  dismiss  the  epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation.  There  exists  a  consensus  that  for  Spinoza,  there  is  a  causal 
relationship  within  the  realm  of  the  mind  (also  within  the  realm  of  body),  whereas 
there  is  no  causal  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  In  Spinoza's  view, 
causation  occurs  between  mental  events  and  does  not  rely  on  causation  of  the 
physical.  For  Spinoza,  the  causation  of  mental  events  is  determined  by  mental  laws 
(and  physical  events  are  caused  by  physical  laws),  although  there  is  ultimately  one 
order  of  causation.  Here  we  can  see  that  the  mind  is  active  in  Spinoza's  theory 
unlike  the  mind  according  to  epiphenomenalism.  Thus,  if  Barker  maintains  the 
epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  he  is  the  only  one  who  disagrees  with  this 
consensus,  since  the  thesis  of  epiphenomenalism  is  completely  the  reverse  of  each 
case  of  the  causality.  Consequently,  since  all  characteristics  of  epipbenomenalism 
contradict  Spinoza's  mind-body  doctrine,  epiphenomenalism  should  be  discarded  in 
the  interpretations  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
When  Barker  interprets  Spinoza's  statement,  in  my  view,  he  places  too 
much  stress  on  the  isolated  statements  which  seem  to  suggest  that  Spinoza  speaks 
of  the  priority  of  the  body  rather  than  concentrating  on  the  whole  context  of  what 
Spinoza  says.  Moreover,  he  does  not  accept  Spinoza's  direct  statements  literally, 
66jbid.,  p.  157. 
50 as  we  have  seen  in  the  discussion  on  proposition  2  of  part  11.  It  seems  to  me  that 
Barker's  treatment  of  Spinoza's  statements  of  the  mind-body  theory  is  suspect 
because  it  is  preconditioned  by  his  own  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation.  Barker's 
view  sometimes  seems  attractive  when  we  find  the  isolated  statements  which  seem 
to  suggest  that  Spinoza  speaks  of  the  priority  of  the  body.  However,  even  if  there 
were  the  priority  of  the  body  in  Spinoza's  system,  it  could  not  be  interpreted  as 
epiphenomenalism,  since  it  is  clear  that  in  Spinoza's  system,  there  is  no  causal 
relation  between  the  mind  and  the  body  while  there  is  causality  in  the  mental  realm. 
These  essential  points  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  are  not  compatible  with  the 
definitions  of  epiphenomenalism.  So  the  priority,  if  there  is  one,  requires  a  different 
sort  of  explanation.  As  we  shall  see  later,  others  have  found  an  explanation  in 
Spinoza's  discussion  of  the  representative  function  of  ideas.  (See  chapter  six.  ) 
Briefly,  for  now,  if  we  consider  the  role  of  the  "idea"  in  the  relationship 
between  mind  and  body,  we  can  realise  there  is  the  representational  function  in 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  and  this  function  is  the  most  important  part  of  the 
mind-body  relationship,  as  well  as  the  crux  of  interpreting  his  point  of  view  on  that 
relationship.  For  Spinoza,  the  cognitive  situation  requires  the  presence  of  ideas  and 
these  ideas  of  the  events  in  the  body  are  contained  in  the  mind.  Therefore  the  ideas 
in  the  human  mind  represent  the  nature  of  its  own  body,  together  with  external 
bodies  which  affect  the  human  body.  In  Spinoza's  epistemological  realm,  the 
relationship  between  the  human  mind  and  its  body  or  external  bodies  is  a 
representative  one  through  the  medium  of  ideas  which  represent  those  objects.  67 
Barker  does  not  consider  this  kind  of  representational  role.  He  just 
highlights  "the  priority  of  the  body"  and  converts  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  into 
a  position  whereby  "the  body  is  the  cause  of  the  mind"  through  Spinoza's  assertion 
that  "the  body  is  the  object  of  the  idea  of  the  mind.  "  He  misses  the  representational 
role  of  the  idea  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  and  the  doctrine  of 
representationalism  is  irrelevant  to  "the  priority  of  the  body.  " 
67  Even  though  the  word  'ýrepresentationll  is  rare  in  Spinoza,  we  can  infer  a  representative  role 
from  his  cognitive  theory. 
51 In  section  IýI  used  determinism  to  criticise  the  hylomorphic  interpretation. 
From  my  point  of  view,  deternnimism  is  also  available  as  a  means  to  criticise  an 
epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  tbeory.  We  can  criticise 
it  in  terms  of  Spinoza's  metapbysical  deternuiniism. 
Barker,  as  we  have  seen,  regards  epiphenomenalism  as  Spinoza's  real 
tendency.  But  if  it  is  Spinoza's  real  tendency,  it  is  contradictory  to  his  metaphysical 
determinism.  For  Spinoza  the  cause  of  thought  is  substance  and  not  anything  else, 
and  the  cause  of  extension  is  also  substance.  If  Spinoza's  substance  is  merely  a 
physical  one,  epiphenomenalism  is  plausible  in  the  interpretation  of  Spinoza's 
mind-body  theory.  But  it  is  clear  that  Spinoza's  substance  is  not  only  physical  but 
also  mental.  In  Spinoza,  there  are  two  distinct  causal  series:  one  is  from  thought  to 
the  mental  modes,  the  other  from  extension  to  the  bodily  modes.  The  mind  is 
determined  only  by  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  the  body  is  determined  only  by  the 
attribute  of  extension.  Thought  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  body  and  extension 
cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  mind,  because  the  attributes  are  conceptually 
independent  (E,  1,  Prop  10);  for  Spinoza,  the  mind  is  conceived  through  the 
attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  is  conceived  through  the  attribute  of  extension, 
and  the  phrase  "is  conceived  througW'  implies  causation  (E,  1,  Ax  5;  E,  11,  Prop  6, 
Demon) 
. 
6'  Hence,  his  metaphysical  determinism  makes  clear  the  fact  that  there  is 
no  causal  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  This  kind  of  metaphysical 
determinism  in  Spinoza  is  quite  enough  to  refute  an  epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation  of  Spinoza's  theory.  Unlike  epiphenomenalism,  in  Spinoza's  system 
what  determines  the  mind  is  not  the  body  or  any  other  physical  thing,  but  the 
attributes  of  thought  belonging  to  the  one  substance.  Therefore,  in  so  far  as  his 
metaphysical  determinism  is  allowed  in  both  the  mental  and  the  physical  realm,  that 
is  to  say,  in  so  far  as  for  Spinoza  the  mind  is  determined  by  substance  and  this 
substance  has  the  attribute  of  thought  together  with  the  attribute  of  extension, 
epiphenomenalism  has  no  ground  for  support  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
Viewed  from  the  perspectives  which  I  have  explained  in  this  section,  we 
can  say  that  Spinoza's  position  on  the  mind-body  theory  is  not  epiphenomenalism 
68  This  issue  is  discussed  pp.  83-84  in  chapter  three. 
52 since  that  would  not  be  an  accurate  interpretation  or  an  adequate  one.  Therefore,  1 
would  like  to  conclude  this  section  by  suggesting  that,  in  relation  to  Spinoza's 
assertion  that  "the  body  is  the  object  of  the  idea  of  the  mind,  "  representationalism 
rather  than  epiphenomenalism  is  the  key  to  interpreting  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory.  69 
4.  Materialism 
In  philosophical  discussions  of  the  mind-body  problem,  there  has  been  from 
the  time  of  the  ancient  Greeks  until  the  present  day  a  wide  range  of  theories  of 
materialism  such  as  classical  materialism,  behaviourisn-4  reductive  materialism, 
central  state  materialism,  and  so  on.  Strictly,  materialism  is  posited  on  the  view 
that  mental  events  are  really  nothing  more  than  physical  events  occurring  to 
physical  objects,  but,  as  we  shall  see,  it  can  also  refer  to  positions  which  emphasise 
the  dominance  of  the  physical  explanations  over  the  mental  explanations. 
The  first  premise  in  this  cbapter  is  that  for  Spinoza  the  relative  weigbting  of 
thought  and  extension  is  equal,  and  therefore  neither  can  we  give  greater  weight  to 
the  body  nor  to  the  mind:  the  body  is  not  prior  to  the  mind  nor  vice  versa. 
However,  from  time  to  time,  some  commentators  give  weight  either  to  one  or  to 
the  other;  as,  for  example,  we  have  seen  in  Harris'  idealism  and  Baker's 
Epiphenomenalism.  Furthermore,  among  the  various  interpretations  of  Spinoza's 
mind-body  problem,  there  is  a  notable  materialistic  point  of  view:  "modified 
materialism"  by  Stuart  Hampshire.  In  the  following  two  sections,  I  shall  consider 
the  appropriateness  of  his  perspective  on  Spinoza  and  discuss  some  of  the 
problems  which  arise  from  his  interpretation  and  some  of  the  inadequacy  of 
applying  it  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
69  See  chapter  six  for  more  on  this. 
53 (1)  The  Interpretation  of  Stuart  Hampshire 
a.  The  Princi]pal  Point  Ofthe  Book  "Spinoza 
In  order  to  examine  and  evaluate  Hampshire's  materialistic  interpretation  of 
Spinoza's  mind-body  problem,  we  need  to  expound  his  point  of  view  regarding 
Spinoza's  mind-body  tbeory  as  it  is  asserted  in  bis  books  5pinoza  and  Freedom  of 
mind. 
Firstly,  in 
-his 
book  Spinoza  (195  1),  Hampshire  tends  to  regard  Spinoza  as 
holding  the  view  that  humans  are  nothing  more  than  a  part  of  nature,  and  he 
naturally  finds  it  difficult  to  understand  how  individuals  can  become  free  in 
Spinoza's  theory.  He  is  thus  doubtful  as  to  whether  Spinoza's  Ethicy  really  provide 
a  way  of  salvation  or  merely  a  means  of  distinguishing  between  servitude  and  a 
freedom  which  we  can  never  attain  . 
70  Thus  he  states  Spinoza's  position  as  follows: 
"[O]ur  whole  duty  and  wisdom  is  to  understand  fully  our  own  position  in  Nature 
and  the  causes  of  our  imperfections,  and,  having  understanding,  to  acquiesce; 
manýs  greatest  happiness  and  peace  of  mind  (acquiescentia  animi)  comes  only 
from  this  full  philosophical  understanding  of  himself.  "71  Elsewhere  Hampshire 
briefly  points  out  that  Spinoza's  position  is  that  a  human  body  embodies  a  human 
mind.  More  precisely,  "every  modification  of,  or  change  of  state  in,  a  human  body 
necessarily  involves,  in  view  of  the  identity  of  the  order  of  causes  within  the  two 
attributes,  a  modification  of  the  idea  of  that  body,  and  so  involves  a  modification  of 
the  mind.  ýý72  Then,  Hampshire  does  justice  to  the  innate  power  of  the  mind  by 
comparing  it  with  Freud's  conception  of  libido.  According  to  him,  it  is  a  reflection 
of  man's  physical  energy. 
Hatred  and  love,  jealousy  and  pride,  and  the  other  emotions  which 
he  feels,  can  be  shown  to  him  as  the  compensations  necessary  to 
restore  loss  of  "psychical  energy.  " 
... 
Every  person  is  held  to 
dispose  of  a  certain  quantity  of  psychical.  energy,  a  counterpart  (for 
70  Stuart  Hampshire,  Spinoza  (Melbourne:  Penguin  Books,  195  1),  p.  115. 
71  Ibid.,  P.  12  1. 
72jbid.,  p.  68. 
54 Spinoza  at  least)  of  his  physical  energy,  and  conscious  pleasures  and 
pains  are  only  reflexions  of  the  relatively  uninhibited  expression  and 
frustration  of  this  energy.  73 
Hampshire  does  not  directly  propound  any  kind  of  materialistic  interpretation  of 
Spinoza  in  any  part  of  the  book  Spinoza,  and  it  seems  to  me  that  Hampshire's 
assertions  in  his  book  Spinoza.  cannot  be  formulated  clearly  enough  to  explain 
Spinoza's  standpoint  on  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body,  Moreover, 
initially  his  two  pages  (pp.  68-69)  of  explication  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory 
(under  the  title  "Mind  and  Body")  do  not  seem  to  give  this  subject  adequate 
consideration.  The  points  in  these  two  pages  is  that  (1)  for  every  body  there  is  an 
idea  of  that  body,  (2)  a  body  involves  a  mind  (an  idea  of  that  body)  in  view  of  the 
identity  of  the  order  of  causes,  and  (3)  the  greater  or  less  Power  and  perfection  of  a 
human  mind  follows  from  the  power  and  perfection  of  the  body  and  vice  versa. 
Hampshire  does  not  argue  these  points  but  merely  states  them,  so  that  it  is  Oficult 
on  their  basis  to  assert  a  distinctive  position  on  Spinoza. 
However,  throughout  the  book  we  can  surmise  that  his  point  of  view  on 
Spinoza's  mind-body  problem  is  basically  a  materialist  interpretation.  For  example, 
Hampshire  states:  "In  the  last  century  Spinoza  was  sometimes  celebrated,  and 
much  more  often  abominated,  as  a  precursor  of  materialism;  but  his  was  a 
materialism  with  a  difference,  if  only  because  the  word  'matter'  normally  suggests 
something  solid  and  inert,  and  no  such  notion  of  matter  is  to  be  found  in  his 
writing.  5174  He  also  claims  that,  in  Spinoza,  the  body  can  do  many  things  without 
the  mind.  In  other  words,  Hampshire  believes  that,  in  Spinoza's  theory,  behaviour 
can  be  explained  without  mental  processes  such  as  win  or  judgement  through  the 
example  of  the  behaviour  of  animals  and  of  sleepwalkers.  75  (See  quotation  on  pp. 
44-45.  ) 
73 
Ibid.,  p.  14  1. 
74jbid.,  p.  79. 
75 
Ibid.,  pp.  13  0-13  1. 
55 b.  A  Kind  ofMaterialism 
Hampshire  returns  forcefully  to  his  materialistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza 
about  20  years  later.  We  can  find  this  in  his  book  Freedom  of  Mind  (1972),  in  the 
chapter  called  "A  Kind  of  Materialism.  "  I  shall,  therefore,  move  on  to  Freedom  of 
Mind,  within  which  a  clearer  materialistic  interpretation  is  advanced  by  Hampshire. 
Here,  Hampshire  interprets  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as  "a  modified 
materialism7'  which  is  a  new  term  among  the  variety  of  interpretations  of  Spinoza's 
philosophy.  Hampshire  regards  "a  modified  materialism"  as  "the  sense,  or  point,  of 
Spinoza's  so-called  double  aspect  theory  of  personality.  5176 
The  main  assertion  of  this  theory  is  that,  for  Spinoza,  "every  change  in  the 
state  of  the  organisn-4  which  is  a  change  in  thought,  is  also  a  change  in  some  bodily 
state,  and  usually  in  the  principal  instrument  of  thought,  the  brain.  ýý77  In  other 
words,  his  point  of  view  on  the  relation  of  the  body  to  the  mind  in  Spinoza  is  that 
the  body  is  a  contrivance  for  producing  thought,  and  therefore  the  mind  is 
embodied  in  the  body  as  its  contrivance.  78  With  respect  to  this  point,  Hampshire 
says  that  "if  the  condition  of  the  instrument  is  grossly  changed,  as  by  drugs,  the 
power  of  thought  is  grossly  changed  also  . 
"79This  implies  that  the  body  is  prior  to 
the  mind  in  the  order  of  explanation.  Hampshire's  above  explanation  is,  I  assume, 
rooted  in  the  apparent  asymmetry  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  the  scholium 
to  proposition  13  in  the  Ethics,,  part  11;  Hampshire  does  not  quote  or  indicate  the 
source  of  his  explanations,  but  they  bear  a  strong  resemblance  to  the 
aforementioned  scholium.  80 
76  Stuart  Hampshire,  "A  Kind  of  Materialism"'  in  his  Freedom  ofMind  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press, 
1972),  p.  229. 
77jbid.,  pp.  225-226. 
78  Ibid.,  p.  218.  Hampshire's  terminology  is  initially  puzzling.  The  trouble  is  that  phrases  such  as 
"instrument  of  thought"  and  'ýphysical  instrument  of  the  mind"  tend  to  suggest  "that  which  is 
employed  by  thought.  "  This  gives  all  the  wrong  associations.  To  describe  the  brain  as  the 
instrument  of  thought  suggests  something  thought  uses:  Mind  calls  the  shots.  Thus,  even  though 
Hampshire  uses  this  phrase,  I  avoid  it  and  use  the  phrase  'machine  for  producing  thought"  except 
in  the  direct  quotations,  since  this  better  represents  his  materialistic  interpretation. 
79  ibid. 
11  This  scholitan  will  be  considered  in  more  detail  from  p.  59. 
56 A 
,  ',,  -cording  to  the  modified  materialistic  interpretation,  modes  of  thought 
and  modes  of  extension  are  irreducible  one  to  the  other,  since  this  interprets 
Spinoza's  two  orders  as  follows:  The  order  of  thoughts  can  only  be  adequately 
explained  by  the  rational  and  associative  connections  peculiar  to  thoughts,  and 
physical  states  by  their  connection  with  other  physical  states  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  of  physics.  ""  Therefore,  Hampshire  holds  that  "the  classical  materialists  are 
wrong  in  supposing  that  the  two  orders  of  explanation  could  properly  be  reduced 
to  one.  02  In  this  way,  Hampshire  points  out  that  Spinoza  denies  reductionism  of 
the  mental  to  the  physical.  He  means  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is 
materialism  without  reduction. 
Now,  we  can  identify  the  crux  of  the  modififed  materialistic  interpretation  as 
follows: 
(1)  The  priority  of  the  body  over  the  mind 
Not  only  is  the  body  independent  from  the  mind  in  explaining  it,  but  it  is  also 
primary  and  the  mind  is  secondary  in  the  order  of  explanation  by  virtue  of  the 
predon-ýinance  of  the  laws  of  physics  (with  the  mind  being  secondary).  At  final 
analysis,  the  mind  is  embodied  in  the  body,  especially  in  the  brain  (and  not  vice 
versa). 
(2)  The  problem  of  reduction 
Unlike  classical  materialism,  this  doctrine  regards  the  two  orders  of  explanation 
(mental  and  physical)  as  irreducible. 
Modified  materialism  can  thus  be  seen  as  accepting  a  central  feature  of  the  double 
aspect  theory  namely  the  double  order  of  explanation.  In  that  sense,  it  is  a 
reconsideration  of  the  interpretation  of  the  double  aspect  theory  through 
materialistic  glasses. 
Hampshire's 
-materialistic 
interpretation  and  double  aspect  view  both 
involve  physical  descriptions  and  mental  descriptions.  But  the  difference  between 
8'  Ibid.,  p.  229. 
82  Ibid.  In  his  book  Spinoza,  Hampshire  also  considers  this  point:  "[B]oth  conceptions  of  the 
Universe  are  complete  in  themselves,  but  one  is  not  reducible  to  the  other"  (p.  58).  Here  it  is  not 
so  clear  that  the  order  of  thoughts  is  complete. 
57 them  is  that  in  Hampshire's  materialistic  interpretation  he  emphasises  that  physical 
descriptions  are  prior  to  mental  descriptions  in  getting  an  overall  picture  of  the 
world. 
(2)  Inadequacy  of  Hampshire's  Interpretation 
First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  point  out  the  fact  that  modified  materialism 
differs  from  strict  materialism,  since  "materialisuf  '  is  generafly  presented  as 
follows: 
Materialism  must  either  deny  that  there  are  any  nonmaterial  mental 
objects,  events,  and  states,  or  claim  that  while  there  are  some  entities 
classified  as  mental,  each  one  is  actually  not  only  identical  with  but 
reducible  to  purely  material  phenomena,  usually  said  to  be  certain 
brain  processes.  " 
From  the  above  definition  of  strict  materialism,  we  can  infer  that  it  is  dffficult  to 
classify  ifi 
.,  modified  materialism  as  strict  materialism.  The  reason  is  that  mod  ed 
-materialism,  as  we  have  seen,  accepts  the  fact  that  there  are  nonmaterial  laws  and 
explanations  and  it  does 
-not  accept  the  possibility  of  reducing  one  order  of 
explanation  to  the  other.  Therefore,  we  can  see  that  modified  material-ism  is  the 
doctrine  that  the  mental  order  exists,  but  the  physical  order  dominates;  but  yet  that 
mental  events  do 
-not  exist  over  and  above  physical  events. 
Modified  material-ism  involves  both  the  double  aspect  theory  and 
materialism.  Hampshire,  as  we  have  seen,  insists  on  his  materialistic  point  of  view 
on  Spinoza  by  treating  the  brain  as  the  machine  for  producing  thought.  According 
to  him,  for  Spinoza.,  the  bodyý--principafly,  the  brai-is  a  machine  for  producing 
thought,  and  the  mind  is  associated  with  the  body  in  the  sense  that  the  mental 
properties  are  ultimately  a  physical  state  of  the  brain. 
83  James  W.  Cornman,  Materialism  and  Sensations  (New  Haven  and  London:  Yale  University 
Press,  197  1),  p.  1. 
58 It  is,  however,  problematic  to  say  that  this  kind  of  interpretation  can  be 
regarded  as  Spinoza's  view.  Although  Hampshire  does  not  quote  or  indicate 
directly,  the  reason  or  ground  for  his  interpretation  is,  as  I  mentioned,  Spinoza's 
following  statement: 
Therefore,  in  order  to  determine  the  difference  between  the  human  mind 
and  other  things  and  its  superiority  over  them,  we  must  first  know,  as  we 
have  said,  the  nature  of  its  object,  that  is  to  say,  the  nature  of  the  human 
body.  I  am  not  able  to  explain  it  here,  nor  is  such  an  explanation  necessary 
for  what  I  wish  to  demonstrate.  Thus  much,  nevertheless,,  I  will  say 
generallyý--that  in  proportion  as  one  body  is  better  adapted  than  another  to 
do  or  suffer  many  things,  in  the  same  proportion  will  the  mind  at  the  same 
time  be  better  adapted  to  perceive  many  things,  and  the  more  the  actions  of 
a  body  depend  upon  itself  alone,  and  the  less  other  bodies  co-operate  with 
it  in  action,  the.  better  adapted  will  the  mind  be  for  distinctly  understanding. 
(E,  11,  Prop  13,  Schol) 
There  is  an  asymmetry  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  this  statement. 
Hampshire  seems  to  take  this  asymmetry  as  ground  for  the  physical  order 
dominating,  so  that  he  thinks  that  this  leads  to  a  materialistic  interpretation. 
However,  I  do  not  think  this  asymmetry  argues  for  materialism.  In  the  above 
passage,  Spinoza  is  saying  that  the  best  way  of  discovering  mental  differences  is  by 
studying  physical  differences.  Body  is  prior  to  mind  as  far  as  gaining  knowledge  is 
concerned:  Spinoza  favours  the  physical  over  the  mental  as  a  way  of  gaining 
knowledge.  This  ties  up  with  what  we  said  earlier  (pp.  43-49  in  section  2):  the  way 
we  explain  how  minds  work.  is  more  confi-ised  than  the  way  we  explain  how  bodies 
work:  talk  of  commands,  with  no  proper  measurements  (E,  111,  Prop  2,  Schol). 
Does  that  argue  for  materialism?  Not  really.  What  Spinoza  claims  in  the  above 
statement  is  not  that  the  physical  is  actually  prior  to  the  mental,  but  that  the  way  in 
which  we  explain  things  using  mental  vocabulary  is  less  successfi-il  than  the  way  we 
explain  things  using  physical  vocabulary.  I  shall  emphasise  that  this  passage  does 
not  argue  for  materialism  by  the  following  points.  Firstly,  in  m  any  places  Spinoza 
59 argues  for  the  equivalence  of  adequate  mental  and  physical  descriptions.  Secondly, 
there  is  no  reason  to  think  Spinoza  would  have  permanently  ruled  out  the 
possibility  of  good  mental  explanations.  The  present  position  is  best  seen  as  a 
temporary  phase  in  our  coming  to  acquire  a  better  knowledge  of  things.  We  can 
-hope 
for  complete  mental  as  well  as  physical  explanations  one  day. 
I  think  that  Spinoza  really  has  this  sort  of  attitude  in  arguing  his  philosophy: 
that  is,  our  knowledge  at  the  present  day  is  not  capable  of  completely  grasping 
some  facts,  but  we  shall  be  able  to  discover  them  when  our  knowledge  is  increased 
by  more  scientific  discovery.  Even  when  Spinoza  talked  of  unknown  attributes,  he 
makes  this  point: 
From  what  has  now  been  said,  it  is  clear  that  Idea  of  infinite  attributes  in 
the  perfect  being  is  no  fiction.  But  we  shall  still  add  the  following:  After 
the  proceeding  reflection  on  Nature  we  have  not  yet  been  able  to  find  in 
it  more  than  two  attributes  that  belong  to  this  all-perfect  being.  84  (My 
italics) 
-D 
,  egarding  the  attributes  of  which  God  consists,  they  are  nothing  but  F 
infmite  substances,  each  of  which  must,  of  itself,  be  infinitely  perfect. 
Clear  and  distinct  reason  conceives  us  that  this  must,  necessarily,  be  so. 
Sofar,  however,  only  two  of  all  these  infinite  attributes  are  known  to  us 
through  their  essence:  Thought  and  Extension.  "  (my  italics) 
84  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  of  God,  Man  and  Human  Welfare,  Part  1,  Chapter  1,  [8],  note.  d  in 
Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1,  pp.  63-64.  The  note  continues  as 
follows: 
"And  these  give  us  nothing  by  which  we  can  satisfy  ourselves  that  these  would  be  the  only  ones  of 
which  this  perfect  being  would  consist.  On  the  contrary,  we  find  in  ourselves  something  which 
openly  indicates  to  us  not  only  that  there  are  more,  but  also  that  there  are  infinite  perfect 
attributes  which  must  pertain  to  this  perfect  being  before  it  can  be  called  perfect. 
And  where  does  this  Idea  of  perfection  come  from?  It  cannot  come  from  these  two,  for  two 
gives  only  two.,  not  infinitely  many.  From  where,  then?  Certainly  not  from  me,  for  then  I  would 
have  had  to  be  able  to  give  what  I  did  not  have.  From  where  else,  then,  than  from  the  infinite 
attributes  themselves,  which  tell  us  that  they  are,  though  they  so  far  do  not  tell  us  what  they  are. 
For  only  of  two  do  we  know  what  they  are"  (my  italics). 
85  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  of  God,  Man  and  Human  Welfare,  Part  1,  Chapter  VII,  note.  a  in 
Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1,  p.  88. 
60 From  the  above  passages,  we  can  see  that  Spinoza  claims  that  in  the  contemporary 
position  we  are  not  completely  aware  of  some  facts,  but  we  may  be  able  to  know 
them  in  the  future.  By  our  knowledge  up  to  the  present  day,  we  can  grasp  only  two 
attributes  of  thought  and  extension  and  this  knowledge  does  not  lead  to  denying 
the  existence  of  the  other  attributes;  one  day,  we  may  be  able  to  know  what  they 
86 
are  (so,  they  are  not  unknowable).  I  believe  that  concerning  our  knowledge  of  the 
mind  and  the  body,  Spinoza  takes  the  same  kind  of  position:  even  tbou.  gb  we  know 
the  existence  of  both  the  mode  of  thought  and  the  mode  of  extension,  our 
temporary  position  does  not  permit  us  to  obtain  knowledge  of  the  mind  without 
relying  on  the  knowledge  of  the  body.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  science  is  not  yet 
enough  developed  for  us  to  know  what  the  mind  is,  we  have  flrstly  to  gain  access 
to  the  body  in  order  to  give  access  to  the  mind.  87 
Now,  we  can  see  that  our  understanding  of  the  mind  depends  upon  our 
understanding  of  the  body  as  far  as  our  gaining  knowledge  is  concerned,  more 
precisely,  as  far  as  our  gaining  knowledge  up  to  the  present  day  is  concerned.  Can 
or  should  we  take  this  as  a  justification  for  materialism?  Certainly  not.  This  does 
not  lead  us  to  materialism  since  this  dependence  originates  from  our  temporary 
understanding  of  the  present  day.  It  is  certain  that  there  is  not,  in  reality,  any 
priority  or  dependence  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  Spinoza's  theory.  I  shall 
confirm  this  by  the  following  textual  evidence: 
Between  the  idea  and  the  object  there  must  necessarily  be  a  union,  because 
the  one  cannot  exist  without  the  other.  For  there.  is  no  thing  of  which  there.  is 
not  an  Idea  in  the  thinking  thing,  and  no  idea  can  exist  unless  the  thing  also 
+0 
exists- 
86  11.11.  Joachim  and  Erroll  E.  Harris  observe  this  point,  and  they  also  present  Letter  56  as  textual 
evidence,  but  they  are  confined  here  to  its  unknown  attributes;  they  do  not  apply  this  to  the 
scholium  of  proposition  13,  as  I  do  (H.  H.  Joachim,  Stuqý  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  [Oxford,  1901],  p. 
39,  note  5;  Erroll  E.  Harris,  "Infinity  of  Attributes  and  Idea  Ideae,  "  Neue  Hefte  Fur  Philosophie, 
vol.  12  [1977],  pp.  17-20). 
87  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  it  is  certainly  possible  for  us  to  know  of  the  mind  by  reliance 
on  the  body,  since  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
61 Further,  the  object  cannot  be  changed  unless  the  Idea  is  also  changed,  and 
vice  versa,  so  that  no  third  thing  is  necessary  here  which  would  produce  the 
81 
union  of  soul  and  body. 
If  we  consider  this  statement  with  Spinoza's  perspective  of  our  provisional 
knowledge,  we  can  confirm  the  view  that  the  scholium  of  proposition  13  should  be 
understood  as  indicating  not  that  the  physical  explanation  is,  in  effect,  prior  to  the 
mental,  but  that  the  best  way  of  discovering  mental  differences  is  by  studying 
physical  differences;  that  is,  the  body  is  prior  to  the  mind  as  far  as  gaining 
knowledge  is  concerned.  Therefore,  Hampshire's  argument  that  if  the  condition  of 
the  body  is  changed,  the  power  of  thought  is  also  changed  is  contrary  to  Spinoza's 
real  position,  since  for  Spinoza  the  converse  must  be  also  true;  '9  it  follows  that  for 
Spinoza  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  should  be  described  by 
either  that  "the  changes  in  the  mind  are  dependent  on  the  changes  in  the  body  and 
vice  versa"  or  that  "the  changes  in  the  body  come  before  the  changes  in  the  mind  in 
our  provisional  understanding.  "  The  dependence,  here,  however,  is  not  causal 
"  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  of  God,  Man  and  Human  Welfare,  Part  11,  Chapter.  Y.  X,  note  c,  #  10  in 
Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1,  p.  136.  The  final  statetnent  in 
that  note  is  as  follows: 
"But  it  should  be  noted  that  here  we  are  speaking  of  such  Ideas  as  necessarily  arise  in  God  from 
the  existence  of  things,  together  with  their  essence,  not  of  those  Ideas  which  things  now  actually 
present  to  us*  [or]  produce  in  us.  Between  these  two  there  is  a  great  difference.  For  in  God  the 
Ideas  arise  from  the  existence  and  essence  [of  the  things],  according  to  all  they  are-not,  as  in  us, 
from  one  or  more  of  the  senses  (with  the  result  that  we  are  nearly  always  affected  by  things  only 
imperfectly  and  that  my  Idea  and  yours  differ,  though  one  and  the  same  thing  produces  them  in 
US.  ).  " 
*Curley  informs  us  that  the  phrase  is  treated  as  "things,  actually  existing,  present  to  us"  by  the 
Pleiade  editors,  and  as  "things,  as  they  now  exist,  present  to  us"  by  Gebhardt  (Curley,  ibid.  ). 
89  1  shall  offer  Spinoza's  other  statements  on  this  point: 
"As  thought  and  the  ideas  of  things  are  arranged  and  connected  in  the  mind,  exactly  so  are  the 
modifications  of  the  body  or  the  images  of  things  arranged  and  connected  in  the  body"  (E,  V, 
Prop  1). 
"Therefore,  as  the  order  and  connection  of  the  ideas  in  the  mind  is  according  to  the  order  and 
connection  of  the  modifications  of  the  body  (Prop  18,  pt.  2),  it  follows,  vice  versa  (Prop  2,  pt.  3), 
that  the  order  and  connection  of  the  modification  of  the  body  is  according  to  the  order  and 
connection  in  the  mind  of  thoughts  and  ideas  of  things"  (E,  V,  Prop  1,  Demon). 
62 dependence  but  a  consequence  of  the  truth  of  parallelism:  that  is,  given  parallelism 
of  explanation,  to  change  one  order  of  explanation  is  to  change  the  other.  The 
present  point,  then,  is  that  given  parallelism  of  explanation  and  the  imperfect  state 
of  our  knowledge  of  mental  explanation,  our  knowledge  of  physical  explanation 
may  give  us  an  entry  into  mental  ones.  Hampshire  misses  or  ignores  the  point  that 
this  explanatory  dependence  occurs  only  in  our  provisional  understanding.  90  Even 
if  Spinoza  argued  that  we  will  -never 
know,  this  would  not  be  regarded  as  a 
justification  for  materialism  in  so  far  that  this  is  within  our  understanding. 
Furthermore,  if  it  is  a  provisional  dependence  in  our  understanding,  there  is  no 
room  for  us  to  treat  it  as  an  argument  for  materialism.  91 
Hampshire  seems  to  regard  "modified  materialism"  as  an  illustration  of 
Spinoza's  own  point  of  view.  However,  in  my  opinion,  "modified  materialism"  can 
only  be  viewed  as  a  development  from  Spinoza's  miind-body  theory,  especially 
since  in  Hampshire's  essay  he  does  not  give  a  full  range  of  Spinoza's  statements  aus 
the  reason  or  ground  for  his  interpretation,  Hampshire  should  have  adduced 
Spinoza's  statements  to  support  his  interpretation  and  to  make  his  point  of  view 
clearer,  when  be  advocated  his  tnodified  materialism.  However,  we  can  assume 
92  that  he  relies  on  the  scholium  of  proposition  13  in  part  2. 
90  It  might  be  argued  that  common  sense  is  closer  to  Hampshire  than  Spinoza.  However,  more 
precisely  speaking,  I  think  that  common  sense  of  the  present  day  is  closer  to  Hampshire  than 
Spinoza.  Hampshire  says  that:  "He  [Spinoza]  is  modern,  in  the  smse  that  he  thinks  principally  L  -1 
about  the  future  applications  of  the  physical  sciences  to  the  study  of  personality"  ("A  Kind  of 
Materialism,  "  p.  210).  Blut,  we  could  say  that  Snipo7a  was  even  more  modern  than  Hampshire 
thinks  of  him. 
-- 
in  the  art--  91  In  fact,  with  reference  to  this  issue,  Hampshire's  position  irle,  "A  Kind  of 
Materialism"  is  different  from  his  position  in  the  book  Spinoza.  Hampshire  (,  ýpinoza,  p.  68)  states 
that  "A  human  mind  has  greater  or  less  power  and  perfection  in  so  far  as  the  body,  of  which  it  is 
the  idea,  has  greater  power  and  perfection;  the  converse  must  also  be  true"  (my  italics,  ).  This  is 
different  from  his  later  position  (in  "A  Kind  of  Materialism").  However,  I  have.  argued  this  issue 
on  the  basis  of  his  later  position. 
92  Curley  also  interprets  Spinoza  as  a  materialist.  He  states  as  follows:  "Illf  we  follow  out  the  L-J-  ' 
details  of  Spinoza's  treatment  of  the  mind,  as  it  develo-ps  in  the  course  of  Part  11,1  do  not  see  how 
we  can  characterize  it  as  anything  but  a  materialistic  program.  To  understand  the  mind,  we  must 
understand  the  body,  without  which  the  mind  could  not  function  or  even  exist.  In  spite  of  all  the 
parallelistic  talk,  the  order  of  understanding  never  proceeds  from  mind  to  body"  (Behind  the 
Geometrical  Method.,  A  Reading  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  [Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press, 
1988],  p.  78),  and  also  states  that  "the  existence  of  the  mind  is  tied,  in  the  most  intimate  way 
63 It  is  clear  that  Hampshire's  r-n-odified  materialism  digresses  from  the  double 
aspect  theory  as  well  as  strict  materialism.  Hampshire  should  have  made  explicit 
the  crux  or  key  point  as  to  how  the  two  perspectives,  the  double  aspect  theory  and 
materialism,  are  related. 
At  this  stage,  we  need  to  grasp  the  definition  of  double  aspect  theory  so  as 
to  consider  its  compatibility  with  materialism.  With  respect  to  the  definition  of  the 
double  aspect  theory,  Richard  Taylor  states  as  below. 
Still  others,  finding  the  same  diffficulty  in  the  idea  of  the  body's 
acting  upon  the  mind  as  in  the  idea  of  the  mind's  acting  upon  the 
body,  have  suggested  that  there  is  really  only  one  kind  of  substance, 
and  that  what  we  call  "mind"  and  "body"  are  simply  two  aspects  of 
this.  This  is  called  the  double  aspect  theory.  9' 
Within  the  above  definition,  I  hold  the  view  that  the  main  points  are  in  the  terms 
"one  kind  of  substance"  and  "two  aspects  of  this.  "  The  something  (a  single 
substance  in  Spinoza)  which  underlies  the  two  aspects  includes  both  the  immaterial 
process  and  the  material  one.  Therefore,  this  thing  is  regarded  as  a  reality  more 
flundamental  than  the  mind  and  body,  and  the  mind  and  the  body  are  regarded  as 
the  aspects  of  this  reality  which  itself  is  not  solely  mental  nor  solely  material  but 
both.  Modified  materialism  falls  within  the  realm  of  the  double  aspect  theory. 
However,  modified  materiiialism,  is  really  a  kind  of  materialism  -and  therefore  this 
doctrine  emphasises  materialistic  aspects  such  as  the  view  that  the  brain  is  the 
machine  for  producing  thought.  Hampshire  thinks  that  physical  descriptions  are 
more  widespread  than  mental,  -and  more  easily  regarded  as  self-contained. 
Therefore,  we  can  say  that  he  has  a  "onte-and-a-half  aspects  theory,  "  with  the 
possible,  to  the  existence  of  the  body'  (p.  75).  In  this  way,  along  with  Hampshire,  he  also  relies 
on  an  asymmetry  (in  the  scholium  to  proposition  13)  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  arguing 
his  materialistic  interpretation.  Hence,  Curley's  materialistic  interpretation  is  also  implausible  as 
an  interpretation  of  Spinoza  by  the  same  points  in  the  criticism  of  Hampshire,  as  I  mentioned, 
Baker's  epiphenomenalistic  interpretation  (in  the  previous  section)  also  relies  on  an  asymmetry  in 
this  scholium  apart  from  the  scholium  of  proposition  2  in  Part  111.  Thus,  we  can  clearly  confirm 
that  epiphenomenalism  should  be  dismissed  from  interpretations  of  Spinoza. 
9'  Richard  Taylor,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 
64 mental  aspect  less  prominent.  Here,  a  problem  arises,  since  it  is  contradictory  to 
Spinoza's  view  of  equality  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  The  first  premise  in  this 
chapter  is  that  the  weighting  of  thought  and  extension  is  equal,  and  therefore  we 
can  give  greater  weight  neither  to  the  body  nor  to  the  mind.  Materialism,  even 
Hampshire's  modified  version,  is  thus  dfflicult  to  consider  as  an  adequate 
interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
From  my  point  of  view,  Spinoza  tries  to  keep  a  clear  course  between 
materialism  and  idealism; 
-and  this  course  is  posited  on  a  reality  comprising  an 
order  which  is  both  material  and  mental,  both  having  equal  weight.  In  other  words, 
there  is  only  one  and  the  same  reality  which  is  both  the  mind  and  the  body,  and  this 
reality  is  a  single  substance.  For  Hampshire,  the  physical  aspect  is  more  coherent 
and  Riller  than  the  mental;  he  sees  Spinoza  as  a  (non-reductive)  materialist. 
Therefore,  it  is  problematic  to  adopt  Hampshire's  interpretation  as  Spinoza's  mind- 
body  theory. 
For  Spinoza,  both  thought  and  extension  are  legitimate,  so  that  we  should 
not  underestimate  or  abandon  one  or  the  other.  Spinozistic  identity  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  should  be  found  in  that  which  encompasses  both  the  mental  and 
physical;  we  should  say  that  one  thing  is  describable  either  as  mental  or  as  physical. 
I  think  that  this  is  what  Spinoza  means  when  he  says  that  the  mind  and  the  body 
are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Since  there  is  one  thing  with  two  Oferent  descriptions 
in  Spinoza's  system  and  these  descriptions  do  not  have  Merent  power  or  weight 
but  only  different  functions,  Spinoza's  theory  should  be  regarded  as  monism 
without  materialism  or  idealism,  This  kind  of  monism  belongs  to  the  realm  of  the 
double  aspect  theory,  which  I  shall  explain  in  chapter  five. 
65 Chapter  Three 
Parallelism One  of  the  popular  interpretations  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is 
parallelism.  Parallelism  is  based  on  the  distinction  between  the  mind  and  the  body 
which  results  from  the  distinction  between  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension. 
I  shall,  in  section  1,  describe  the  general  outlook  of  the  traditional  paraffelistic 
interpretation  and  compare  it  with  Spinoza's  parallelism,  in  order  to  show  how 
Spinoza's  theory  differs  from  the  former  position.  In  section  2,1  shall  explore 
Bennett's  and  Della  Rocca's  more  sophisticated  arguments  in  which  parallelism 
can  seem  to  entail  identity  of  mind  and  body.  The  main  issue  I  shall  consider  in 
section  3  is  the  problems  of  the  parallelist  interpretation  by  appeal  to  the  identity  of 
the  mind  and  the  body.  I  shall  also  refer  to  the  problems  of  "the  ideas  of  the  mind" 
with  which  parallelism  is  confronted  in  interpreting  the  relationship  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  in  Spinoza. 
1.  Outlook  of  the  Parallefist  Interpretation 
(1)  Traditional  Parallelism  and  Spinoza's  Parallelism 
Writing  of  parallelism,  I  Shaffer  states:  "[T]he  mind  and  the  body  are  too 
utterly  different  to  be  able  to  interact  causally  with  each  other.  So  the  parallelist 
holds  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  like  two  clocks,  each  with  its  own  mechanism 
and  with  no  causal  connection  between  thein,  yet  always  in  phase  keeping  the  same 
time.  "I  Literally,  parallelism  posits  that  the  mind  is  parallel  with  the  body  because 
they  are  entirely  different  in  nature  and  they  have  their  own  activities  unfolding  at 
the  same  rate.  Therefore  the  basis  of  parallelism  is  that  the  mind  is  distinct  from  the 
body. 
At  this  stage,  one  may  think  that  it  is  impossible  to  regard  Spinoza's  theory 
as  parallelism  owing  to  the  fact  that  for  him  the  mind  and  the  body  are  identical. 
However,  for  Spinoza,  parallelism  ought  rather  to  be  argued  within  an  identity 
doctrine.  Unlike  traditional  parallelism,  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  presents  the 
1  Jerome  A.  Shaffer,  Philosopkv  ofMind  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-11all,  1968),  pp.  37-3  8. 
67 identity  of  mind  and  body.  Spinoza  does  not  conceive  that  the  mind  and  the  body 
are  mysteriously  unfolded  inducing  a  parallel  process  with  each  other.  There  exists 
one  process  alone  which  appears  to  be  thought  (inwardly)  and  to  be  extended 
(outwardly).  Whereas  traditional  parallelism  argues  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
parallel  because  they  are  entirely  different  in  nature,  Spinoza  argues  that  the  mind 
and  the  body  are  parallel  becauve  they  are  identical  with  each  other.  Parallelism 
arose  from  dissatisfaction  with  Descartes'  interactionism.  between  mind  and  body, 
and  is  historically  associated  with  a  dualistic  position.  Thus,  it  is  initially  surprising 
that  parallelism  is  argued  for  within  an  identity  theory,  and  that  it  can  be  used  to 
support  an  identity  theory. 
The  following  problem  may  arise:  parallelism  has  to  be  argued  for  as 
relating  to  two  substances  or  two  orders  of  events,  but  if  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
identical  then  there  exists  only  one  thing:  how  is  it  possible  to  argue  parallelism 
while  arguing  an  identity  theory?  It  is  clear  that  traditional  parallelism  needs  two 
things  or  two  orders  of  events.  But  in  Spinoza's  realm  of  thought,  it  is  not 
necessary  for  parallelism  to  be  argued  in  two  substances  or  two  orders  of  events. 
Although  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  since  they  have  their 
different  properties  or  descriptions  we  can  still  argue  the  parallelistic  relationship 
between  these  two  concepts:  one  thing  which  is  given  a  mental  description  and  the 
very  same  thing  which  is  given  a  physical,  More  significantly,  the  mind  and  the 
body  must  be  identical  for  a  parallel  relationship  to  exist  between  them.  For 
Spinoza's  parallelism  it  is  integral  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  ontologically 
identical  with  each  other,  since  their  parallelistic  relationship  is  derived  from  the 
fact  that  they  are  identical. 
As  it  is  well  known,  Descartes'  mind-body  theory  is  of  a  substance  dualism, 
which  regards  the  mind  and  the  body  as  two  distinct  substances.  Descartes  explains 
their  relationship  by  interactionism,  and  by  doing  so,  he  tries  to  argue  the  union  of 
the  mind  and  the  body.  Owing  to  the  fact  that  he  regards  the  mind  and  the  body  as 
substances,  he  falls  into  difficulty  in  establishing  the  union  of  the  two.  Spinoza 
sees  this  problem  in  Descartes'  mind-body  theory,  and  establishes  the  relationship 
between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  a  different  way. 
68 Now  we  can  see  how  Spinoza's  parallelism  differs  from  traditional 
parallelism.  According  to  the  traditional  view,  parallelism  is  basically  a  dualistic 
position,  but  in  Spinoza's  view,  it  is  a  monistic  position.  That  is  to  say,  traditional 
parallelism  is  substance  dualism,  while  Spinoza's  parallelism  is  conceptual  or 
property  dualism  within  substance  monism.  It  follows  that  we  ought  not  to 
consider  Spinoza's  parallelism  in  an  ontological  sense,  but  in  a  semantic  sense, 
since  for  Spinoza  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  is  ontologically 
one  and  the  same  and  therefore  we  cannot  claim  that  they  are  parallel.  Spinoza's 
parallelism  is  derived  from  one  substance  and  one  order  of  events,  so  his 
parallelism  should  be  understood  in  the  sense  that  the  mental  description  of  one 
event  is  parallel  to  the  physical  description  of  the  same  event. 
(2)  The  Sources  of  the  Parallelist  Interpretation 
Some  commentators  understand  that  the  relationship  between  the  attributes 
of  thought  and  extension  in  Spinoza  is  that  they  are  strictly  parallel  to  each  otber. 
Hence,  according  to  them,  this  implies  that  the  mind  and  the  body  which  are  modes 
under  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  respectively,  are  also  parallel  to  each 
other.  Joel  Friedman  describes  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  by  saying  that 
"whatever  happens  modally  in  the  physical  world  must  have  an  exact  parallel  in  the 
mental  world,  and  conversely.  952  That  is  to  say,  he  apparently  takes  it  that  in 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  the  mental  process  is  strictly  (non-identical  but) 
parallel  to  the  physical  process.  This  might  suggest  that  the  relationship  between 
the  mental  realm  and  the  physical  realm  in  Spinoza's  metaphysics  is  to  be  regarded 
as  one  of  paralleliSM.  3  Now  if  this  parallelism  is  taken  to  be  an  accepted  fact  about 
the  world,  it  seems  highly  remarkable,  a  strange  coincidence,  which  would  need  to 
be  explained. 
Fundamentaffy,  a  paraRelist  interpretation  relies  on  Spinoza's  assertion  that 
there  is  no  causal  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  while  there  is  a 
2  Joel  Friedman,  "Spinoza's  Problem  of  Other  Minds,  "  Synthese,  vol.  56  (1983),  p.  103. 
1  in  fact,  Friedman  is  arguing  for  property  parallelism.  See  below. 
69 causal  relationship  within  each  of  the  mental  and  physical  realms.  The  main  theses 
of  parallelism  are  that  (1)  there  is  no  causal  relation  between  mental  events  and 
physical  events,  (2)  mental  events  exist  in  a  causal  relation  with  mental  events,  and, 
similarly,  physical  events  with  other  physical  events,  and  (3)  there  is  a  one-to-one 
correspondence  between  mental  events  and  physical  events.  Spinoza's  assertion  of 
the  causal  relationship  is  compatible  with  points  (1)  and  (2).  Concerning  this, 
Spinoza,  states  that  "[t]he  body  cannot  determine  the  mind  to  thought,  neither  can 
the  mind  determine  the  body  to  motion  nor  rest,  nor  to  anything  else  if  there  be 
anything  else"  (E,  111,  Prop  2).  As  to  point  (3),  this  interpretation  is  based  on  the 
following  statements,  which  are  not  good  sources  in  my  view  since  the  statements 
strongly  suggest  identity  rather  than  mere  parallelism. 
A  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  one  and  th.,  -  same 
thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways.  (E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol) 
The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  things.  (E,  H,  Prop  7) 
The  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  conceived  at  one 
time  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  Linder  that  of 
extension.  (E,  HI,  Prop  2.  Schol) 
Let  us  consider  the  parallelist  interpretation  in  relation  to  these  quotations. 
Regarding  the  second  and  third  statements,  Hubbeling  asserts  that  "This  is  rooted 
in  his  doctrine  of  parallelism.  For  although  thinking  does  not  influence  extension 
and  vice  versa  and  the  body  does  not  influence  the  soul  and  vice  versa  the 
processes  in  each  attribute  (mode)  run  parallel,  so  that  the  quantitative  magnitudes 
,  -)4 
in  the  attribute  of  extension  have  their  exact  parallels  in  the  attribute  of  cogitatio. 
This  kind  of  interpretation  might  be  correct  if  it  were  argued  with  the  view  that 
Spinoza's  parallelism  is  rooted  in  the  doctrine  of  identity  between  the  mind  and  the 
body. 
H.  G.  Hubbefing,  Spinoza's  Methodology  (Assen:  van  Gorcum,  1964),  p.  25. 
70 With  respect  to  the  first  statement,  Friedman  does  precisely  this.  He  claims 
that  "Given  this  passage,  I  argue  that  there  can  be  no  exceptions  whatever  to  the 
parallelism.  For  there  is  only  one  substance,  together  with  its  modifications,  each 
expressible  in  inf.  initely  many  ways,  i.  e.,  under  ininitely  many  attributes"  (my 
italics).  '  Thus  the  modification  of  substance,  the  set  of  events,  which  is  expressed 
as  my  body  is  also  expressed  as  my  mind.  However,  some  parallelistic  interpreters 
merely  ascribe  parallelism  to  Spinoza  without  explaining  the  basis  of  the 
parallelism:  identity.  Further,  they  infer  parallelism  from  statements  in  Spinoza 
which  imply  identity  rather  than  simply  parallelism,  like  Hubbeling  above.  We  can 
see  that  the  third  quotation  explicitly  asserts  "identity"  (mind  and  body  as  one  and 
the  same  thing)  and  the  first  also  talks  of  "one  and  the  same  thing.  "  The  second 
quotation  is  perhaps  more  ambiguous,  but  compatible  with  there  being  one  set  of 
events.  Furthermore,  Spinoza  mentions  "identity"  in  many  places  in  Ethics  and  in 
his  other  writings.  Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  parallelistic  interpreters  are  confronted 
with  strong  evidence  of  Spinoza's  belief  in  identity  of  mind  and  body,  and  they 
should  not  ignore  it.  If  commentators  assert  parallelism  without  considering 
identity  of  mind  and  body,  their  interpretations  are  not  adequate  when  applied  to 
Spinoza's  system.  However,  some  commentators,  like  Friedman,  explain  the 
parallelism  by  appeal  to  identity  (one  substance  doctrine).  This  seems  to  me 
correct. 
Traditional  parallelism  holds  the  view  that  the  mind  and  body  run  parallel 
with  one  another  and  never  converge  nor  diverge.  However,  when  we  consider 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  we  should  do  so  along  with  his  ontological  theory. 
We  should  not  discuss  Spinoza"s  mind-body  theory  without  considering  his  whole 
metaphysical  system,  especially  substance  monism,  and  we  should  strive  to  make 
his  mind-body  theory  compatible  with  his  whole  system. 
Ibid 
71 2  Identity  and  the  Separation  ofAltributes 
There  is,  however,  a  problem  about  asserting  identity,  raised  by  Delahunty. 
This  is  the  problem  of  whether  an  identity  theory  is  compatible  with  the  strict 
prohibition  on  causal  interactions  between  the  mental  and  the  physical.  Delahunty's 
argument,  as  expressed  by  Della  Rocca,  is  this: 
(1)  There  are  causal  relationships  between  mental  events,  as  there  are  also  between 
physical  events:  a  mode  of  thought  causes  another  mode  of  thought  and  a 
mode  of  extension  causes  another  mode  of  extension.  In  other  words,  mental 
"A"  can  be  the  cause  of  mental  "B"  and  bodily  "Aý'  is  the  cause  of  bodily  "B. 
(2)  According  to  the  identity  interpretation,  a  mental  event  is  identical  with  a 
physical  event.  Thus,  for  example,  mental  A  is  identical  with  physical  Aý,  and 
mental  B  with  physical  B'. 
(3)  Hence,  it  follows  that  a  mental  event  can  be  the  cause  of  a  bodily  event  (which 
=a  mental  event)  and  a  bodily  event  can  be  cause  of  a  mental  event  (which  =a 
bodily  event).  Thus,  for  example,  mental  A  can  cause  mental  B  which  is  the 
same  as  physical  B:  there  is  the  causal  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the 
body.  6 
The  above  inference  owes  much  to  Donald  Davidson's  argument  in  Mental  Events. 
To  comment  briefly  on  the  above  inference,  it  is  a  particular  instance  of  the  law  of 
identity:  i.  e.  if  Fa  and  a=b,  then  Fb.  '  Here,  we  can  see  that  the  conclusion  that 
physical  event  Aý  causes  mental  event  B  (=  physical  event  B)  is  contradictory  to 
Spinoza's  denial  of  causal  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Therefore, 
from  this  perspective,  it  is  difficult  to  regard  the  identity  interpretation  as  Spinoza's 
position. 
6  Rý  J.  Delahunty,  Spinoza  (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1985),  p.  197;  Michael  Delta 
Rocca,  "Causation  and  Spinoza's  Claim  of  Identity,  "  History  of  Philosophy  Quarterly,  vol.  8 
(1991),  p.  266. 
7  Let  'T"  =  "causes  c.  " 
72 Bennett  raises  a  more  general  objection.  '  It  is  more  or  less  along  similar 
lines  to  Delahunty's;  the  difference  between  them  is  that  Bennett  argues  that  the 
relationship  between  mental  and  physical  is  from  within  the  relationship  between 
natura  naturans  and  natura  naturata,  the  attributes  and  their  modes,  whereas 
Delahunty  argues  it  purely  within  natura  naturata.  Bennett's  objection  is  as 
f0flows: 
(1)  The  mind  involves  the  attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  involves  the  attribute 
of  extension. 
(2) On  the  identity  interpretation,  the  mind  is  numerically  identical  with  the  body. 
(3)  Hence,  it  follows  that  the  mind  involves  extension  and  the  body  involves 
thought;  then  therefore  every  mode  involves  every  attribute. 
In  this  case,  conclusion  (3)  is incompatible  with  Spinoza's  position  that  each  mode 
involves  the  concept  of  its  own  attribute,  but  not  of  another  one;  that  mind  cannot 
involve  extension  and  the  body  cannot  involve  thought.  This  argument  can  be 
expressed  formally  in  the  same  manner  as  Delahunty's  argument:  if  a=b  and  a  is  F 
(mental,  say)  then  b  is  F,  and  there  can  not  be  strict  separation  of  mental  and 
physical.  Again,  we  can  see  the  problems  concerning  the  identity  interpretation  and 
its  place  in  Spinoza's  theory. 
(1)  Bennett  and  the  Separation  ofAttributes 
Bennett  thinks  that  mind-body  parallelism  needs  justification.  If  mental 
events  and  physical  events  are  distinct  and  not  causally  linked,  however,  what 
keeps  them  in  step?  Why  assume  that  mental  events  and  physical  events  are 
synchronised,  unless  we  can  show  causal  connections  between  them?  If  they  are 
not  kept  in  step  by  causality,  it  seems  to  be  a  huge  coincidence;  it  is  easier  to  deny 
the  synchrony  or  to  assume  that  there  is  causal  interaction.  However,  Bennett 
Jonathan  Bennett,  A  Study  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  (London:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984),  p. 
14  1,  and  'Tight  Questions  about  Spinoza,  "  in  Yirmiyahu  Yovel  (ed.  ),  Spinoza  on  Knowledge  and 
the  Human  Mind  (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill,  1994),  p.  18;  Ntichael  Della  Rocca,  "Causation  and 
Spinoza's  Claim  of  Identity,  "  pp.  269-270 
73 thinks  that  Spinoza's  theory  offers  a  better  justifleation  of  parallelism.  Let  us 
examine  the  most  iirnportant  steps  in  his  interpretation. 
There  are  three  theses  which  Bennett  takes  as  central  in  Spinoza's  theory. 
They  are  (A)  the  one-substance  doctrine,  (B)  the  mode  identity  thesis,  and  (C) 
parallelism.  (A)  is  based  on  the  statement  that  "substance  thinking  and  substance 
extended  are  one  and  the  same"  (E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol).  (B)  is  based  on  the 
statement,  "a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  one  and  the  same 
thing"  (E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol)-which  Bennett  thinks  cannot  be  taken  at  face  value. 
(C)  is  based  on  the  statements,  The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as 
the  order  and  connection  of  things"  (E,  11,  Prop  7),  or  "whether  we  think  of 
Nature  under  the  attribute  of  extension  or  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  ...  we 
shall  discover  one  and  the  same  order  or  one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes" 
(E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol).  9 
Bennett  argues  that  Spinoza  used  (A)  substance  monism  and  (B)  the  mind- 
body  identity  thesis-suitably  interpreted-to  explain  (C)  parallelism.  In  other 
words,  for  Spinoza,  the  reason  why  (C)  is  true  is  because  (A)  and  (B)  are  true. 
Bennett  infers  this  argument  from  the  following  passage. 
For  example,  the  circle  existing  in  Nature  and  the  idea  that  is in  God  of 
an  existing  circle  are  one  and  the  same  thing  which  is  manifested 
through  different  attributes;  and,  therefore  [ideo],  whether  we  think  of 
Nature  under  the  attribute  of  extension  or  under  the  attribute  of  thought 
or  under  any  other  attribute  whatever,  we  shall  discover  one  and  the 
same  order  or  one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes,  that  is  to  say,  in 
every  case  the  same  sequence  of  things.  (E,  H,  Prop  7,  Schol) 
According  to  Bennett,  the  term  "ideo  "10  suggests  that  Spinoza  is  offering  an 
explanation  of  parallelism  from  the  identity  thesis  (and  substance  monism),  since 
the  statement  before  this  term  stands  for  the  doctrine  of  identity,  the  statement 
9  Bennett,  A  Study  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  p.  142. 
10  Bennett  takes  "ideo  "  as  meaning  "for  that  reason"  or  "on  that  account"  so  that  his  translation 
of  it  is  -that  is  why"  (ibid.  ). 
74 after  this  term  implies  parallelism  and  this  term  links  the  two  doctrines,  the  former 
being  the  reason  for  the  latter.  It  seems  that  Bennett  treats  paranelism.  as  being 
derived  from  identity  of  mind  and  body  (together  with  one  substance  doctrine),  and 
thus  his  interpretation  explains  the  above  three  doctrines  in  a  reconcilable  manner. 
In  this  context,  Bennett  is  more  progressive  than  some  commentators  who 
interpret  Spinoza's  theory  as  either  parallelism  or  identity  theory.  In  my  view,  since 
Spinoza  claims  both  identity  theory  and  paraflelisyn,  we  should  interpret  Spinoza's 
mind-body  theory  as  retaining  both  doctrines  rather  than  as  dropping  one  or  the 
other.  Bennett  seems  to  interpret  Spinoza  as  retaining  both  doctrines  and  also 
argues  that  one  substance  doctrine  is  related  to  mind-body  theory  as  Spinoza 
argues.  But  Bennett  finds  this  defence  of  paraflelism.  implausible  and  (B)  the  mind- 
body  identity  above  incredible,  taken  at  face  value,  and  thinks  it  needs  a  better 
justification.  Bennett  in  effect  rejects  the  mind-brain  identity  doctrine  and  claims  a 
partial  qualitative  identity.  He  rejects  numerical  identity  of  mind  and  body  in 
Spinoza,  on  the  grounds  that  such  an  identity  would  threaten  the  separation  of 
attributes:  I  submit  that  that  is  Spinoza's  doctrine:  his  thesis  about  the  identity  of 
physical  and  mental  particulars  is  really  about  the  identity  of  properties.  He 
[Spinoza]  cannot  be  saying  that  physical  P,  =  mental  Mi;  that  is  impossible  because 
they  belong  to  different  attributes.  "'  1 
Bennett  hopes  to  provide  a  better  justification  for  identity  and  parallelism 
by  introducing  the  term  "trans-attribute  differentiae"  which  are  the  most 
fundamental  modes.  Now,  I  shall  describe  Bennett's  interpretation,  as  I  understand 
it.  12 
(1)  The  most  basic  properties  of  the  one  substance  are  not  attributes  but  the  trans- 
attribute  modes,  since  the  attributes  do  not  constitute  the  essence  of  substance 
but  merely  express  it. 
(2)  Trans-attribute  modes  are  combined  with  the  attributes.  Consequently  there  are 
two  kinds  of  modes,  i.  e.  trans-attribute  modes  and  attribute-confined  modes. 
11  Bennett,  A  Study  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  p.  14  1. 
12  See  ibid.,  pp.  143-15  1. 
75 (3)  The  former  are  modes  which  are  not  modes  of  extension,  of  thought  or  of  any 
other  attribute;  that  is  to  say,  trans-attribute  modes  are  combinable  with  the 
attribute  of  extension  and  are  also  combinable  with  the  attribute  of  thought. 
(4)  Therefore,  according  to  Bennett,  if  a  trans-attribute  mode,  F,  combines  with 
extension,  it  becomes  "extension  and  P:  a  mode  combined  with  the  attribute 
of  extension.  And  if  a  trans-attribute  mode,  F,  combines  with  thought,  it 
becomes  "thought  and  P:  a  mode  combined  with  the  attribute  of  thought. 
(5)  Consequently,  the  mind  is  "thought  and  P  and  the  body  is  "extension  and  F.  " 
Mode-identity  turns  out  to  concern  identity  of  properties.  "  Here,  it  comes  out 
that  F  not  only  explains  the  identity  of  the  mind  and  body  but  also  gives  the 
reason  why  attribute-confined  modes  i.  e.  "thought  and  F"  (mind)  and 
"extension  and  P(body)  are  parallel  to  each  other.  There  is  a  common 
property  possessed  by  the  underlying  reality,  substance,  which  keeps  them  in 
step. 
(6)  It  is  impossible  for  any  mind,  however  powerful,  to  have  the  concept  of  F,  a 
trans-attribute  mode,  in  abstraction  from  thought  or  extension  or  any  other 
attribute.  No-one  can  grasp  or  conceive  the  trans-attributive  differentiae. 
In  this  way,  Bennett  considers  parallelism,  in  terms  of  modes  confined  within 
attributes,  whereas  he  considers  the  explanation  of  the  parallelism  of  the  mind  and 
body  to  lie  in  the  trans-attribute  modes.  As  to  the  problem  of  the  attributes  and 
parallelism,  he  resolves  it  by  treating  trans-attribute  modes  (rather  than  the 
attributes)  as  the  basic  properties  of  substance,  due  to  his  view  that  the  distinct 
attributes  do  not  constitute  the  essence  of  substance  but  fix  and  express  it.  He  says, 
"I  say  that  Nature  really  has  extension  and  thought,  which  really  are  distinct  from 
one  another,  but  that  they  are  not  really  fundamental  properties,  although  they 
must  be  perceived  as  such  by  any  intellect.  "  He  offers  an  analogy.  A  circle  is  a 
figure  whose  points  all  lie  equidistant  ftom  a  central  point  (property  F)  in  two 
dimensions.  A  sphere  is  the  same  property  F  in  three  dimensions.  The  different 
dimensions  constitute  the  different  attributes;  the  common  F  the  trans-attribute 
mode.  (In  the  analogy,  but  not  in  reality,  F  is  knowable). 
13  Ibid.,  p.  14  1. 
76 For  Spinoza,  each  mode  must  be,  as  we  have  seen,  conceived  through  each 
attribute,  so  how  can  there  exist  such  a  trans-attribute  mode?  Bennett  was  aware 
of  this  problen-4  but  he  argues  that  if  we  ascribe  this  concept  to  Spinoza,  we  can 
get  an  advantage,  that  is,  we  are  able  to  remove  conflict  between  identity  between 
the  mind  and  the  body  and  the  separation  of  the  attributes. 
However,  even  though  we  ascribe  the  concept  of  trans-attribute  mode  to 
Spinoza,  this  cannot  justify  Spinoza's  claim  of  identity:  since  no  one  can  grasp  the 
trans-attribute  modes,  there  is  no  possible  concept  of  any  such  mode,  and  so  they 
cannot  mediate  a  connection  between  mind  and  body.  Therefore,  it  seems  that 
Bennett's  interpretation  can  explain  Spinoza's  argument  that  the  mental  and  the 
physical  modes  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  but  only  by  appeal  to  unknowables. 
That  is  to  say,  since  no  one  can  have  the  concept  of  F,  F  cannot  be  applied  to 
(mental)  a  and  (physical)  b  where  a=b. 
Even  if  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  involved  with  the  same  trans- 
attribute  mode,,  they  cannot  be  numerically  identical  (one  and  the  same  thing) 
through  the  trans-attribute  mode,  since  neither  the  mental  nor  the  physical  is 
identical  to  the  trans-attribute  mode.  At  best,  as  Delia  Rocca  points  out,  this  offers 
only  a  partial  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  14  Bennett  takes  the  mind  and 
the  body  to  be  attribute-confined  modes  and  thus  the  mind  is  "thought  and  P  and 
the  body  is  "extension  and  F.  "  This  does  not  give  sufficient  reason  for  their 
identity.  The  mental  and  the  physical  are  still  different  kinds  of  attribute-confined 
mode,  even  if  not  fundamental  properties.  The  fact  that  they  have  'T"  in  common 
does  not  lead  to  their  identity  but  only  to  their  partial  identity. 
One  may  argue,  in  favour  of  Bennett,  that  the  common  properties  are  not 
so  much  meant  to  secure  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  as 
to  keep  them  in  step  with  each  other  and  that  the  mental  and  the  physical 
properties  do  not  have  to  be  numerically  identical  in  property  parallelism  (which 
requires  one  thing  or  one  event  with  two  sorts  of  properties,  m-properties  and  p- 
properties).  But,  this  is  not  Bennett's  case:  he  does  not  argue  for  identity  between 
14  Delia  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza  (New  York:  Oxford 
University  Press,  1996),  p.  160. 
77 the  mental  and  the  physical  events.  Bennett  regards  modes  as  Properties  of 
substance.  Since  Spinoza  argues  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  modes  and  that 
they  are  identical  (Bennett  accepts  this),  we  have  to  explain  identity  in  sucb  a  way 
that  these  two  modes  are  identical.  Now  for  Bennett's  Spinoza,  modes  are 
properties.  If,  as  Bennett  claims,  the  mental  properties  and  the  physical  properties 
(the  mind  and  the  body)  are  not  identical,  then  Spinoza's  argument  that  the  mental 
and  the  physical  modes  are  identical  to  each  other  cannot  be  justified  by  Bennett's 
interpretation. 
Bennett's  perspective  is  criticised  by  many  commentators  as  being  alien  to 
Spinoza's  thinking.  For  example,  according  to  Edwin  Curly,  "I  find  his  [Bennett's] 
explanation  of  the  mind-body  identity  extremely  implausible,  ""  and  he  goes  on  to 
say  that  "Bennett  thinks  he  can  explain  why  Spinoza  affirms  this  identity,  but  I  find 
his  explanation  (§§  34-36)  incredible.  I  cannot  see  Spinoza  granting  the  existence 
of  trans-attribute  differentiae  which  cannot  be  grasped  by  any  inteRect"--even 
God.  16  Even  if  Bennett's  concept  of  trans-attribute  differentiae  were  compatible 
with  Spinoza's  position,  this  would  not  explain  Spinoza's  argument  that  the  mental 
and  the  physical  modes  are  one  and  the  same,  but  would  only  explain  a  partial 
identity,  as  we  have  just  seen. 
Bennett's  interpretation,  that  of  a  partial  identity  of  properties,  has  another 
problem.  Although  Bennett's  alternative  identity  of  mind  and  body  can  explain  the 
three  doctrines  (one  substance  doctrine,  identity  of  mind  and  body,  and  parallelism) 
in  a  reconcilable  manner,  I  do  not  think  that  it  can  be  taken  as  Spinoza's  real 
intention.  Bennett's  account  of  such  an  identity  is  textually  problematic.  To 
establish  his  interpretation  of  identity,  Bennett  asserts  that  for  Spinoza  mind-body 
identity  is  not  inferred  from  one-substance  doctrine  by  treating  the  Latin  word  sic 
as  not  "therefore"  or  "thus"  but  as  "likewise.  "  Let  us  consider  the  relevant  passage. 
[S]ubstance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same 
substance,,  which  is  now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now 
15  E.  M.  Curley,  Behind  the  Geometrical  Method:  A  Reading  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1988),  p.  158,  note  38. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  156,  note  26. 
78 under  that.  Sic  [ThuslLikewise],  also,  a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea 
of  that  mode  are  one  and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different 
ways.  (E,  H,  Prop  7,  Schol) 
Since  Bennett  translates  sic  as  "likewise,  "  he  takes  the  above  passage  not  as 
inferential  but  as  comparative.  This  allows  him  to  argue  that  Spinoza's  claim  of 
identity  of  mind  and  body  is  not  the  claim  of  a  numerical  identity  but  that  of  a 
partial  qualitative  identity. 
However,  even  if  Bennett  is  right  in  reinterpreting  "sic"  as  "likewise,  "  there 
is  an  obstacle  to  Bennett's  interpretation  of  a  partial  qualitative  identity.  That  is, 
Bennett's  interpretation  cannot  justify  Spinoza's  usage  of  the  tenns  "one  and  the 
same"  and  "thing"  in  the  above  passage.  He  may  treat  the  term  "thing"  not  as 
meaning  "particular"  but  as  an  otiose  word.  But,  Spinoza  later  informs  us  that  the 
term  "thing"  in  this  context  means  "particular.  "  Spinoza  writes:  "[T]he  mind  and 
the  body,  are  one  and  the  same  individuaP'  (E,  11,  Prop  21,  Schol;  my  italics). 
Secondly,  Bennett's  partial  qualitative  identity  is  not  enough  to  justify  the  term 
44one  and  the  same.  "  And  thirdly,  on  Bennett's  reading,  Spinoza's  comparison 
between  substance  identity  and  mode  identity  as  similarly  seems  strained  because 
the  two  cases  are  very  different.  So,  Bennett  would  have  to  argue  that  Spinoza 
expresses  himself  very  badly  concerning  the  terms  "one  and  the  same"  and  "thing.  " 
But  I  would  rather  say  that  Bennett  digresses  from  the  text  in  order  to  make  sense 
of  Spinoza.  It  is  implausible  to  argue  that  Spinoza  expresses  himself  badly  to  such 
an  extent. 
According  to  Bennett,  instead  of  his  partial  qualitative  identity,  we  might 
treat  the  above  passage  as  follows:  "[WIhen  he  [Spinoza]  said  that  my  mind  and 
my  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing  he  had  forgotten  that  my  mind  and  my  body 
are  modes,  iý17  and  Bennett  rejects  this  assumption  saying  that  it  should  not  be 
entertained  "unless  we  run  into  disaster  by  interpreting  the  texts,  as  I  am  doing,  in 
a  less  intrusive  and  more  accepting  manner.  ""  But,  Bennett's  interpretation  has  the 
same  problem.  Since  Bennett  regards  modes  as  properties,  he  would  have  to 
17  Bennett,  A  Study  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  p.  14  1. 
18  Ibid. 
79 suppose  that  when  Spinoza  said  that  my  mind  and  my  body  are  one  and  the  same 
thing  he  had  forgotten  that  they  are  only  partially  identical  and  that  modes  are  only 
properties;  this  is  why  Spinoza  says  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same 
thing.  This  is  an  implausible  position. 
The  reason  that  Bennett  interprets  Spinoza's  identity  of  mind  and  body  as  a 
partial  qualitative  identity  is  to  save  Spinoza  from  the  threat  of  collapse  of  attribute 
dualism.  However,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  Spinoza  saw  any  such  threat. 
Although  his  interpretation  can  hold  a  kind  of  identity  without  collapsing  the 
separation  of  the  attributes,  it  has  costs:  Spinoza's  claim  that  the  mode  of 
extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  the  same  becomes  difficult  to  interpret  and 
justify.  To  say  mode  identity  is  property  identity  makes  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  worse,  not  better,  from  Bennett's  point  of  view.  One  way  of  maintaining 
identity  could  be  to  argue  that  thought  and  extension  are  not  really  distinct,  but  just 
mistakenly  different  ways  of  seeing  the  one  F.  This  is  what  Wolfson  thought,  but 
Bennett  specifically  rejects  this,  and  insists  on  the  reality  of  the  attributes.  Bennett 
argues  that  mind  and  body  must  be  kept  causally  distinct  because  causation  implies 
an  intellectual  grasp  of  a  connection.  19 
As  we  shall  see  at  some  length  later,  if  we  regard  modes  as  things  or  events 
rather  than  properties,  we  are  able  to  explain  Spinoza's  argument  that  the  mental 
and  the  physical  modes  are  one  and  the  same  without  collapsing  the  separation  of 
the  attributes.  In  that  case,  event-identity  covers  the  fact  that  the  mental  and  the 
physical  modes  are  identical,  and  properties  do  not  have  to  be  identical:  properties 
should  not  be  identical,  as  the  attributes  are  really  distinct.  This  gives  a  version  of 
the  double  aspect  theory  in  a  sense  of  token  identity  theory,  as  we  shall  see  in 
chapter  flive. 
(2)  Delia  Rocca  on  Identity  and  Parallelism 
There  is  another  account  which  attempts  to  explain  Spinoza's  concept  of 
identity  through  his  parallelism  and  the  separation  of  attributes.  Nfichael  Della 
19  Ibid.,  p.  145. 
80 Rocca  has  recently  claimed  that  Spinoza's  denial  of  the  transparency  of  causal 
context  provides  support  for  the  identity  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory.  On  the  basis  of  this  argument,  he  attempts  to  find  this  identity  in  the 
concept  of  a  neutral  property  based  on  Spinoza's  argument  of  parallelism;  he  labels 
this  identity  "trans-attribute  mode  identity.  "  Della  Rocca's  concept  of  neutral 
property  has  basically  a  similar  format  to  Bennett's  trans-attribute  modes. 
However,  in  my  view,  unlike  Bennett's  trans-attribute  modes,  Dena  Rocca's 
"neutral  properties"  point  to  a  better  case  for  making  the  mind  and  the  body 
identical,  Let  us  consider  how  he  holds  the  concept  of  a  neutral  property  and 
formulates  trans-attribute  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body;  by  doing  so,  we 
can  determine  whether  or  not  his  arguments  would  be  acceptable  to  Spinoza. 
a.  Referential  Opacity 
As  we  have  seen,  objections  have  been  raised  to  the  identity  interpretation 
of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  The  objections  assert  that  this  interpretation  is 
incompatible  with  his  belief  in  a  non-causal  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the 
body.  If  so,  and  given  the  firmness  of  Spinoza's  rejection  of  mind-body  causation, 
it  seems  scarcely  possible  to  hold  the  identity  interpretation  as  presented  by 
Spinoza.  However,  Della  Rocca  claims  that  the  above  problem  can  be  solved. 
Let  us,  firstly,  consider  Delahunty's  argument  (given  on  p.  72)  and  Della 
Rocca's  suggested  solution.  A  shared  basic  premise  is  that  it  is  clear  that  Spinoza 
denies  causal  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body  (and,  more  generally, 
between  thought  and  extension).  But,  according  to  Delahunty,  we  cannot  hold  the 
identity  interpretation  because  it  turns  out  that  this  interpretation  is  incompatible 
with  the  denial  of  mind-body  causation.  However,  Della  Rocca  attempts  to  solve 
this  obstacle  to  the  identity  interpretation.  His  argument  relies  on  the  concept  of 
"referential  opacity"  which  we  must  now  explain. 
We  can  characterise  referential  transparency  by  saying  that  F  is  transparent 
if,  if  Fa  and  a=b  then  Fb.  Thus  "is  red-headed"  is  transparent,  as  are  most 
predicates.  On  the  other  band  some  predicates,  sucb  as  "is  believed  by  Tom  to  be 
81 red-headed"  are  not  transparent,  but  opaque.  The  above  inference  does  not  carry 
through  in  such  cases.  For  example,  if  Nigel  is  believed  by  Tom  to  be  redheaded 
and  Nigel  is  Mary's  bother,  then  it  does  not  follow  that  Torn  believes  Mary's 
bother  is  red-headed:  Tom  might  not  realise  that  Nigel  is  Mary's  brother.  Since 
Delahunty's  objection  to  identity  theory  is  posited  on  the  basis  that  causal  contexts 
are  referentially  transparent,  it  follows  that  if  there  is  no  referential  transparency  in 
Spinoza's  causal  contexts  then  Delahunty's  objection  to  the  identity  interpretation 
can  be  dismissed,  and  then  the  view  that  identity  holds  between  the  mind  and  the 
body  is  still  available  . 
20  Let  us  consider  Della  Rocca's  arguments  concerning 
Spinoza's  denial  of  referential  transparency. 
With  respect  to  causation,  substance  as  thinking  causes  mode  of  thought  x, 
while  substance  as  extended  cannot  cause  mode  of  thought  x,  even  if  the  thinking 
substance  is  identical  with  extended  substance.  Likewise,  regarding  transitive 
causation,  extended  mode  x  causes  extended  mode  y,  while  thinking  mode  w 
cannot  cause  extended  mode  y,  even  if  thinking  mode  w  is  identical  with  extended 
mode  x.  From  these  explanations,  Della  Rocca  draws  the  conclusion  that  Spinoza 
denies  referential  transparency  in  a  causal  context,  so  that  we  can  resolve 
Delahunty's  objection.  Thus,  the  numerical  identity  interpretation  is,  he  argues,  still 
acceptable  within  Spinoza's  theory.  21  Della  Rocca  says  that  from  the  separation  of 
causal  relations  and  explanatory  relations,  we  could  say  that  Spinoza  does  not  deny 
causation,  but  he  denies  there  are  explanations  between  the  mind  and  the  body: 
"The  idea  would  be  that  a  mode  considered  as  physical  must  be  explained  only  in 
terms  of  other  modes  considered  as  physical,  whereas  that  same  mode  considered 
as  mental  must  be  explained  only  in  terms  of  other  modes  considered  as  mental. 
According  to  this  view,  then,  explanatory  contexts  are  opaque,  but  causal  contexts 
are  not.  For  this  reason,  on  this  view  the  explanatory  separation  of  the  mental  and 
the  physical  does  not  by  itself  commit  one  to  the  denial  of  causal  interaction 
20  Della  Rocca  mentions  another  option  to  deal  with  Delahunty's  objection.  We  can  treat 
Delahunty's  objection  as  recognising  inconsistency  in  Spinoza;  for  example,  "Spinoza  did  not 
realise  that  there  is  such  a  conflict.  "  However,  Della  Rocca  does  not  accept  this  option  (Della 
Rocca,  "Causation  and  Spinoza's  Claim  of  Identity,  "  pp.  266-267). 
21  Ibid.,  pp.  268-269. 
82 between  the  mental  and  the  physical;  even  if  there  are  no  explanatory  relations 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  there  can  still  be  causal  relations.  ""  But  Della 
Rocca  argues  that  this  is  not  acceptable  to  Spinoza,  because  Spinoza  did  not 
distinguish  between  these  two  relations. 
Della  Rocca  turns  to  Bennett's  argument  (given  on  p.  73)  and  offers  a 
rebuttal  of  Bennett's  objection  to  the  numerical  identity  interpretation.  It  is  also 
made  on  the  basis  of  the  concept  of  "referential  opacity.  "  Beforehand,  Dena  Rocca 
needs  to  develop  one  more  aspect  in  relation  to  Bennett's  use  of  the  term  "involve" 
in  step  (1)  of  his  argument  (on  p.  73):  "[T]he  mind  involves  the  attribute  of 
thought  and  the  body  involves  the  attribute  of  extension.  "  Dena  Rocca  points  out 
that  for  Spinoza,  with  respect  to  attributes,  "the  notions  of  x  involving  the  concept 
of  y"  is  equated  to  "x  being  conceived  through  y";  for  example,  saying  that  the 
body  (or  the  substance)  involves  the  attribute  of  extension  is  the  same  as  saying 
that  the  body  (or  the  substance)  is  conceived  through  extension.  23  Then,  Della 
Rocca  regards  the  term  "x  is  conceived  through  y"  as  implying  causation  by 
attributing  the  proposition  "x  is  conceived  through  y  only  if  x  is  caused  by  Y"  to 
Spinoza;  i.  e.  "only  if  x  must  be  conceived  through  y,  does  y  cause  x.  " 
Subsequently,  the  argument  of  the  denial  of  referential  transparency  of  causal 
context  can  also  be  used  in  Bennett's  objection;  in  other  words,  the  opacity  of 
causal  context  is  also  available  regarding  Bennett's  objection.  Speaking  in  detail,  to 
rebut  Bennett's  objection,  we  have  to  show  that  the  context  "x  is  caused  by  y"  like 
the  context  "x  is  conceived  through  y"  is  opaque.  As  Dena  Rocca  argues,  given 
that  the  context  "x  is  caused  by  y"  is  opaque,  and  given  that  the  proposition  "x  is 
conceived  through  y  only  if  x  is  caused  by  y"  is  true,  it  follows  that  the  context  "x 
22  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza,  P.  124. 
21  This  proposition  is  inferred  from  the  following  statement  of  Spinoza's: 
"Those  things  which  have  nothing  mutually  in  common  with  one  another  cannot  through 
one  another  be  mutually  understood,  that  is  to  say.,  the  concept  of  the  one  does  not  involve 
the  concept  of  the  other"  (E,  1,  Ax  5). 
"Each  attribute  is  conceived  by  itself  and  without  any  other  (Prop  10,  pt.  1).  Therefore  the 
modes  of  any  attribute  involve  the  conception  of  that  attribute  and  of  no  other,  and 
therefore  (Ax  4,  pt.  1)  have  God  for  a  cause  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under  that 
attribute  of  which  they  are  modes,  and  not  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under  any  other 
attribute"  (E,  11,  Prop  6,  Demon). 
83 is  conceived  through  y"  is  also  opaque;  the  opacity  of  the  causal  context  is 
transmitted  to  the  opacity  of  the  other  context  if  the  latter  entails  the  former.  24 
Thus,  events  are  conceived  as  thought  or  conceived  as  extension.  Although  they 
are  the  same  events,  they  are  not  conceived  as  being  the  same.  This  fact  underlies 
DeRa  Rocca's  attempt  to  defend  the  numerical  identity  interpretation  from 
Bennett's  objection.  25 
In  this  way,  against  Delahunty's  and  Bennett's  objections,  Della  Rocca 
holds  that  the  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  is  compatible  with  the 
separation  of  attributes  if  we  do  not  attribute  referential  transparency  in  a  causal 
context  to  Spinoza;  he  plausibly  argues  that  Spinoza  denies  referential  transparency 
in  a  causal  context;  so  that  we  can  resolve  Delahunty  and  Bennett's  objections.  On 
the  basis  of  the  argument  of  opacity,  Della  Rocca  further  unfolds  his  arguments 
concerning  numerical  identity  in  Spinoza's  theory. 
b.  Neutral  Properties 
On  the  grounds  of  referential  opacity,  Della  Rocca  divides  properties  into 
intensional  properties  and  extensional  properties.  The  former  are  properties  which 
have  opacity  in  attribute  context,  and  the  latter  are  all  other  properties  which  have 
transparency.  Being  thinking  and  being  extended  are  opaque  (intensional):  even 
though  the  thinking  substance  =  the  extended  substance,  it  does  not  follow  that 
being  thinking  =  being  extended.  He  tries  to  ground  the  mind-body  identity  in  the 
24  Della  Rocca  makes  this  more  formally,  and  he  calls  it  "the  Opacity  Transmission  Principle": 
if 
(i)  for  any  term  "t,  "  "F(t)"  entails  "G(t)" 
(ii)  there  are  possible  situations  in  which  G(t),  t=  t*,  and  -G(t*),  and 
(iii)  in  at  least  some  of  those  situations  F(t), 
then 
there  are  possible  situations  in  which  F(t),  t=  t*,  and  -F(t*) 
From  this,  we  can  confirm  that  the  context  "t  is  conceived  through  extension  (thought)"  and  the 
context  "t  is  extended  (thinking)"  are  opaque,  since  for  Spinoza  those  contexts  entail  "t  is  caused 
by  the  extended  substance  (the  thinking  substance)"  and  in  at  least  some  situations  t  is  conceived 
through  extension  (thought)  or  t  is  extended  (thinking)";  the  entailment  of  causal  context  is  found 
in  E,  11,  Prop  6,  and  its  demonstration. 
25  Della  Rocca,  "Causation  and  Spinoza's  Claim  of  Identity,  "  pp.  270-271. 
84 transparent  properties.  To  support  this,  be  applies  Leibniz's  principles:  one 
principle  is  "if  a=b,  then  they  have  all  their  (transparent)  properties  in  common,  " 
and  the  other  converse  principle  is  "a  =b  if  a  and  b  have  al-I  their  (transparent) 
properties  in  common.  9926 
What  are  the  transparent  properties  for  Spinoza?  They  must  be,  first  of  A, 
neutral,  which  does  not  presuppose  either  being  thinking  or  being  extended.  We 
can  discover,  according  to  Della  Rocca,  what  these  properties  are  and  why  the 
mind  and  the  body  share  them  in  ten-ns  of  Spinoza's  paraffelistic  argument,  which  is 
"the  order  of  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things" 
(E,  11,  Prop  7).  Further  we  can  derive  neutral  properties  from  the  fact  that  the 
order  and  connection  in  the  two  series  are  the  same.  It  seems  to  me  that  he  regards 
the  neutral  properties  as  something  which  suffices  to  make  these  orders  the  same; 
one  example  of  the  neutral  feature  is  "having  five  immediate  effects.  "  It  follows 
that  if  the  mind  and  the  body,  which  are  the  parallel  counterparts  of  each  other, 
have  the  same  order  and  connection,  the  mind  and  the  body  share  an  the  neutral 
properties.  The  parallelism  of  the  modes  reflects  the  sameness  of  order  and 
connection,  the  neutral  properties,  which  are  shared  by  the  parallel  modes. 
Therefore,  he  argues  that  we  can  infer  mind-body  identity  in  terms  of  his  Leibnizian 
principle  that,  if  all  (transparent)  properties  are  the  same,  then  a=b.  In  this  way, 
Della  Rocca  finds  the  identity  thesis  in  Spinoza's  parallelism;  Della  Rocca  states 
that  "[Spinoza]  would  have  to  see  the  sharing  of  these  neutral  properties  as  a 
sufficient  basis  for  determining  that  these  modes  are  identical.  "2'  He  calls  this 
trans-attribute  mode  identity.  To  sum  up  the  argument  of  this  identity: 
(1)  There  are  the  neutral  properties  F  by  virtue  of  the  sameness  of  the  order  and 
connection  of  parallel  modes. 
(2)  The  mind  and  the  body  share  F,  so  that  F  is  seen  in  two  different  ways  (haNe 
different  opaque  properties) 
26  Della  Rocca,  "'Spinoza's  Argument  for  the  Identity  Theory,  "  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  102 
,  pp.  195-196.  (1993), 
27  Jbid,  p.  207. 
85 (3)  It  follows  that  the  mind  presents  F  taken  as  tbinking,  and  the  body  presents  IF 
taken  as  extended. 
28 
(4)  Therefore,  the  mind  is  identical  with  the  body,  but  seeing  something  as  mind  is 
distinct  from  seeing  it  as  body. 
Della  Rocca  also  mentions  another  neutral  property,  which  is,  the  property 
of  "being  a  complex  individual.  "  Owing  to  the  fact  that  certain  modes  unite  into  a 
single  individual  in  both  mental  and  physical  realms,  mind  and  body  share  these 
neutral  properties.  This  fact  is  also,  according  to  Della  Rocca,  based  on  parallelism, 
for  example,  if  the  human  body  is  composed  of  several  parts,  then  the  idea  of  that 
body  is  composed  of  these  several  ideas  of  the  parts  (E,  11  Prop  15,  Demon). 
3.  The  Problems  of  Identity  in  Parallelism 
(1)  Trans-Attribute  Modes  and  Neutral  Properties 
Apart  from  Bennett's  and  DeRa  Rocca's  arguments  on  paral-lelism,  I  shall 
consider  whether  Bennett's  concept  of  trans-attribute  modes  and  Della  Rocca's 
concept  of  neutral  property  are  compatible  with  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  identity 
between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Bennett's  and  Della  Rocca's  position  is  that  we 
can  better  explain  Spinoza's  doctrine  in  terms  of  the  concept  of  trans-attribute 
modes  and  the  concept  of  neutral  property,  even  though  Spinoza  did  not  mention 
28  Since  it  is  not  clear  for  Della  Rocca  whether  all  properties  are  neutral  or  not,  his  position  might 
be  that  there  are  specific  mental  and  physical  properties,  as  well  as  neutral  ones.  This  depends  on 
whether  the  intensional  properties  are  real  or  unreal;  if  it  is  the  former,  there  are  distinct 
intensional  properties.  However,  an  overall  picture  of  his  argument  is  that  intensional  properties 
are  not  real  enough  since  those  properties  are  the  properties  when  neutral  properties  are  seen  in 
the  mental  way  and  in  the  physical  way.  Thus,  there  is  identity  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  properties  and  there  is  also  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  events.  I  shall 
consider  the  problem  of  his  concept  of  intensional  properties  in  chapter  five.  In  this  chapter,  I 
deal  with  his  argument  on  the  basis  of  the  view  that  intensional  properties  are  unreal  and  thus 
that  there  are  not  specific  intensional  (mental  and  physical)  properties. 
86 those  concepts.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  difference  between  the  features  of  their 
concepts,  as  Della  Rocca  himself  points  out: 
Although  there  are  no  trans-attribute  modes  on  the  numerical  identity 
interpretation,  there  are  ways  of  describing  modes  in  neutral  terms,  that  is, 
terms  that  do  not  presuppose  any  particular  attributes.  ... 
But  the 
possibility  of  such  descriptions  does  not  make  the  modes  trans-attribut[ive] 
in  the  sense  that  they  would  be  neither  modes  of  extension  nor  modes  of 
thought.  On  the  numerical  identity  interpretation,  the  same  mode  that  is 
neutrally  specifiable  is  identical  with  a  mode  of  thought  as  well  as  identical 
with  a  mode  of  extension.  29 
The  difference  is  that  Bennett  thinks  that  trans-attribute  modes  have  to  exist 
separately  from  the  mental  and  the  physical  in  order  to  make  the  mind  and  the  body 
parallel,  whereas  Della  Rocca  thinks  that  this  kind  of  mode  does  not  exist.  I  think 
that  my  earlier  statements  in  the  discussion  of  Bennett  and  Dena  Rocca  give  help 
on  this  point:  for  Bennett,  the  mind  is  "thought  and  P  and  the  body  is  "extension 
and  F,  "  whereas  for  Della  Rocca,  the  mind  presents  F  taken  as  thinking,  and  the 
body  presents  F  taken  as  extended.  For  Bennett,  there  exist  the  trans-attribute 
modes  which  cannot  be  spoken  of  But  for  Della  Rocca,  there  exist  only  the  neutral 
properties  (those  which  are  notspecifically  thought  or  extension). 
Both  Bennett  and  Della  Rocca  are  trying  to  see  how  Spinoza  could  both 
accept  mind/body  identity  and  also  treat  mind  and  body  as  both  causally  and 
conceptually  separate.  They  are  trying  to  explain  how  given  identity,  we  can  keep 
the  attributes  as  distinct  as  Spinoza  wants;  that  is,  bow  we  guarantee  that 
parallelism  holds  without  the  collapse  of  the  attributes,  as  identity  threatens  to  do. 
Spinoza  may  not  have  even  seen  the  problem,  so  we  have  to  guess  how  he  would 
have  handled  it  or  even  could  have  handled  it,  (  if  be  was  not  just  inconsistent). 
Although,  both  their  attempts  to  get  Spinoza  out  of  trouble  are  ingenious  and 
worthwhile,  I  think  that  Della  Rocca's  argument  is  more  compatible  with  Spinoza 
in  arguing  that  trans-attribute  modes  do  not  exist  and  that  there  is  not  a  partial 
29  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza,  p.  159. 
87 identity  but  a  numerical  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  modes 
(things).  However,  I  do  not  think  such  a  compatibility  leads  to  an  accurate 
interpretation  of  Spinoza's  doctrine.  The  problem  arises  from  the  fact  that  he 
attempts  to  infer  identity  from  parallelism. 
(2)  The  Relationship  between  Identity  Theory  and  Parallelism 
Della  Rocca  holds  that  Spinoza  is  committed  to  identity.  For  Della  Rocca's 
Spinoza,  (1)  parallelism  entails  "sharing  the  neutral  properties"  and  (2)  "sharing  the 
neutral  properties"  entails  the  identity  theory.  Here  are  Della  Rocca's  statements 
concerning  these:  (1)  "Spinoza  explicitly  claiirns  that  parallelism  guarantees  that 
modes  of  extension  and  modes  of  thought,  share  a  wide  range  of  neutral 
properties.  ýý30  (2)  'Tor  this  sharing  of  all  neutral  properties  to  guarantee  that 
parallel  modes  are  identical,  we  need  to  show  that  the,  neutral  properties 
encompass  all  the  extensional  properties.  ,  31  Consequently,  he  says  that  "[flor 
Spinoza  to  treat  parallelism  as  entailing  the  identity  thesis,  he  would  have  to  see  the 
sharing  of  these  neutral  properties  as  a  sufficient  basis  for  determining  that  these 
*de  'cal.  iý32  Della  Rocca  states:  modes  ar  %W-ý  a  are  J.  nt-i- 
But  parallelism  goes  well  beyond  such  a  claim  [one-to-one 
correspondence].  For  Spinoza,  the  fact  that  the  order  and  connection 
within  the  two  series  is  the  same  entails  that  certain  neutral 
properties  are  shared  by  parallel  modes.  "  (my  italics) 
In  this  way,  Defla  Rocca  argues  that.  Spinoza  would  have  to  accept-  that  parallelism 
inn-plies  the  identity  theory  (given  Leibniizz's  law),  One  of  DelLa  Rocca's  aims  in  his 
article  is  to  show  that  we  can  argue  the  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in 
30  Ibid.,  p.  199.  Della  Rocca  also  writes  that  "All  of  these  neutral  features  are,  by  virtue  of 
parallelism,  shared  by  each  mode  and  its  parallel  counterpart"  (ibid.,  p.  198). 
31 
Ibid.,  p.  203. 
32 
Ibid.,  p.  207. 
33  Della  Rocca,  "Spinoza's  Argument  for  the  Identity  Theory,  "  p.  198. 
88 Spinoza's  theory  without  relying  on  his  one  substance  doctrine.  Thus  for  Della 
Rocca,  Spinoza  would  have  to  see  in  parallelism  the  implication  of  identity. 
Parallelism  can-not  be  the  reason  for  identity,  since  the  sameness  of  the 
order  and  connection  in  two  series,  the  sharing  of  the  neutral  properties  does  not 
guarantee  identity.  Suppose  there  are  two  clocks  which  indicate  the  same  time,  at 
every  moment,  the  order  of  connections  within  clock  A  being  the  same  as  the  order 
of  connections  within  clock  B.  However,  this  sameness  of  order  and  connection 
does  not  imply  the  identity  of  clocks  A  and  B,  but  only  offers  the  fact  that  the  two 
orders  are  parallel  to  each  other  and  A  and  B  have  a  one-to-one  correspondent 
relationship.  It  might  be  objected  that  Spinoza's  doctrine  is  not  the  case  of  two 
clocks,  but  one,  clock,  so  that  the  case  of  two  clocks  ought  to  be  ruled  out. 
However,  when  one  infers  identity  from  parallelism,  one  can-not  presuppose  that 
there  is  one  clock.  Since  the  conclusion  one  wants  to  prove  is  the.  existence  of  one 
clock  (identity),  one  cannot  presuppose  this  fact  as  the  premise  of  the  inference 
without  circularity. 
Della  Rocca  gives  us  two  examples  of  the  neutral  properties,  which  are, 
"having  five  immediate  effects"  and  "being  a  complex  individual.  "  Without 
parallelism  those  properties  cannot  be  shared  by  the  mind  and  the  body,  since  they 
are  derived 
-from  the  sameness  of  the  order  and  connection.  However,  even  if  the, 
neutral  properties  are  such  as  are  mentioned  above,  I  do  not  think  that  they  can 
provide  identity;  they  are  --merely  a  repetition  of  parallelism-  Even  if  the  sameness  of 
the  order  and  connection  in  two  series  provides  the  fact  that  two  modes  share  all 
the  -neutral  properties,  this  does  not  provide  identity,  but  only  indicates  that  the 
order  and  connection  in  two  series  are  parallel  and  that  they  correspond  to  each 
other.  it  does  not  follow  that.  there  is  one  order  of  events.  DeLla  Rocca  argues  thaA 
Spinoza  regards  the  sameness  of  order  and  connection  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  as  providing  a  sUfficient  ground  for  the  claim  of  identity,  and  that  this  is 
why  parallelism  guarantees  the  argument  of  identity.  But,  the  sameness  of  order 
and  connection  only  provide  a  sufficient  ground  for  parallelism,  and  identity 
theory  makes  parallelism  necessary,  since  the  sameness  of  order  and  connection  is 
inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  mental  and  the  physical  events  are  one  and  the.  same 
89 thing  and  that  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  express  the  so-me  essence  of  a 
thing  (the  essence  of  the  same  thing)  in  an  orderly  way. 
Considering  this  explanation  and  the  clock  analogy  above,  it  is  evident  that 
we  cannot  infer  identity  from  Spinoza's  parallelism  without  presupposing  identity, 
whereas  we  can  infer  parallelism  from  identity  without  presupposing  parallelism. 
The  reason  why  we  can  infer  identity  from  Spinoza's  parallelism  (property 
parallelism)  is  because 
-his  parallelism  is  derived  from  his  identity  theory  i.  e. 
because  identity  is  already  presupposed  in  his  parallelism.  We  cannot  infer  identity 
theory  from  parafleffism  in  Spinoza  without  circularity;  for  Spinoza,  identity  theory 
is  prior  to  parallelism  since  parallelism  is  the  coin-sequence  of  identity  theory.  It 
follows  that  we  can-not  explain  Spinoza's  mind-body  identity  without  relying  on  his 
one  substance  doctrine.  The  claim  that  we  can  infer  identity  from-  parallelism  still 
looks  suspect,  unless  we  can  see  how  Spinoza  might  have  inferred  identity  from 
parallelism. 
One. 
-may  argue  that  we  can  infer  identity  from  paraflelism,  so  long  as  the 
identity  of  indiscernibles  holds.  And,  as  Della  Rocca  argues,  34  Spinoza  seems  to 
say  that  where  there  are  two  things  there  must  be  a  difference  in  quality  between 
these  two  things:  the  identity  of  indiscernibles.  Thus,  if  the  only  real  qualities  are 
the  neutral  ones,  then  identity  follows  from  conceptual  parallelism.  Hence,  we  can 
infer  identity  from  Spinoza's  parallelism  in  conjunction  with  the  identity  of 
indiscernibles,  whereas  we  cannot  do  this  from  traditional  parallelism  alone.  This  is 
why  Della  Rocca  argues  that  identity  follows 
-from  conceptual  parallelism. 
However,  even  if  by  assuming  the  identity  of  indiscer-nibies  Della  Rocca  can. 
go  from  parallelism-  to  identity,  for  Della 
-Rocca's 
Spinoza-,  we  can  also  go  ftom 
identity  to  parallelism:  the  inference  between  them  is  reciprocal.  Della  Rocca 
complements  his  argument  in  his  book  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body 
Problem  in  Spinoza  a  few  years  later.  He  alleges,  in  his  book,  that  Spinoza  also 
infers  parallelism  from  identity,  so  that  for  Della-  Rocca's  Spinoza,  the  inference 
between  identity  theory  and  parallelism  is  reciprocal.  This  reciprocity  is  dependent 
upon  the  equivalence  between  parallelism  and  identity.  Della  Rocca  writes:  "Here 
34  Ibid.,  pp.  194-207. 
90 Spinoza  seems  to  regard  the  thesis  of  parallelism  as  equivalent  to  the  claim  of 
identity  of  modes  across  attributes. 
ýý35  Thus  he  argues  that  "[s]o  the  equivalence 
between  parallelism  and  mode  identity  puts  Spinoza  in  a  position  to  infer 
parallelism  from  mode  identity  and  to  infer  mode  identity  from  paraRelisM.  "36 
Be  this  as  it  may,  some  passages  strongly  suggest  that  the  inference  goes 
from  identity  to  parallelism: 
[T]he  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  conceived  at  one 
time  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of 
extension.  For  this  reason,  the  order  or  con-catenation  of  things  is  one, 
whet-her  Nature  be  conceived  under  this  or  under  that  attribute,  and 
consequently  the  order  of  the  state  of  activity  and  passivity  of  our  body 
is  coincident  in  Nature  with  the  order  of  the  state  of  activity  and 
passivity  of  the  mind.  (E,  HI,  Prop  2,  Schol;  my  italics) 
The  passage  supports  identity  as  prior  to  parallelism.  We  should  pay  attention  to 
the  fact  that  Spinoza  begins  with  identity  and  derives  one  order  and  concatenation 
of  things  -from 
it,  and  also  to  his  use  of  the  term  "consequently":  the  fact  that  the 
order  of  the  body  is  parallel  to  the  order  of  the  mind  is  consequent  upon  the 
identity  (one  order  of  things).  Thus,  we  can  see  that  for  Spinoza,  the  doctrine  of 
identity  is  more  fundamental  than  parallelism,  and  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory 
35  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza,  p.  13  8.  The  source  of  this 
equivalence  is  the  following  statement  of  Spinoza:  "[W]hether  we  conceive  nature  under  the 
attribute  of  extension,  or  under  the  attribute  of  Thought.  or  under  any  other  attribute,  we  shall 
find  one  and  the  same  order,  or  one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes,  i.  e.  [hoc  est],  that  the 
same  things  follow  one  another"  (E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol).  *  Della  Rocca's  argument  that  the 
inference  between  identity  and  parallelism  is  reciprocal  relies  on  the  term  hoc  est.  The  inference 
from  the  same  order  to  the  same  things  ordered  looks  a  bit  quick. 
*  This  passage  is  quoted  from  Edwin  Curley  for  the  sake  of  clarity  (The  Collected  Works  of 
Spinoza,  [Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1985],  p.  451).  James  Gutmann's  translation  is 
as  follows:  "...  that  is  to  say  [hoc  est],  in  every  case  the  same  sequence  of  things.  " 
36  Ibid.,  p.  139.  He  also  states:  "The  argument  contends  that,  given  other  aspects  of  Spinoza's 
system,  the  fact  that  parallelism  holds  entails  that  the  idea  of  a  given  mode  of  extension  is 
identical  with  that  mode  of  extension.  And,  of  course,  this  entailment  works  in  the  other  direction 
as  well:  Identity  of  modes  across  attributes  entails  sameness  of  order  and  connection"  (ibid.,  p. 
138). 
91 should  be  treated  as  an  identity  theory  which  leads  to  parallelism.  Despite  Della 
Rocca's  excellent  arguments,  his  attempt  to  derive  identity  from  parallelism  rests 
ultimately  on  the  identity  of  indiscernibles,  which  is  somewhat  controversial.  In 
fact,  Della  Rocca  does  not  have  to  derive  identity  from  parallelism,  if  the  aim.  is  to 
rescue  Spinoza.  Tt  is  enough  if  he  can  show  that  Spinoza  could  consistently  hold 
both  identity  of  mind  and  body  and  the  separation  of  attributes.  That  was  the 
original  objective  of  Della  Rocca's  argument.  Della  Rocca's  attempt  to  show  that 
we  can  explain  Spinoza's  mind-body  identity  without  relying  on  his  one-substance 
doctrine  is  unnecessary. 
There  is  another  problem  for  Della  Rocca  concerning  the  argument  of 
identity.  For  Della  Rocca,  since  intensional  properties  are  irrelevant  in  deciding 
identity,  only  extensional  (neutral)  properties  are  relevant  to  the  issue  of  identity. 
As  long  as  both  the  mind  and  the  body  have  these  extensional  properties,  the  mind 
is  identical  with  the  body.  Della  Rocca  argues  that  parallelism  provides  the  fact  that 
the  mind  and  the  body  share  these  neutral  properties,  since  the  sameness  of  the 
order  and  connection  within  the  two  series  entails  that  the  neutral  properties  are 
shared  by  both  the  mind  and  the  body.  However,  although  it  is  true  that  both  the 
mind  and  the  body  have  the  neutral  properties  by  virtue  of  parallelism,  in  order  to 
discover  this  fact  we  have  to  rest  upon  intensional  properties,  because  the  mental 
and  the  physical  properties  are  intensional  properties  and  they  are  our  only  access 
to  neutral  properties;  we  can  only  see  neutral  properties  through  intensional 
properties.  Hence,  we  need  to  depend  on  intensional  properties  in  deciding  identity 
between  the  mind  and  the  body.  But,  according  to  Della  Rocca,  intensional 
properties  are  irrelevant  in  deciding  this  issue. 
To  sum  up:  in  principle,  the  issue  of  identity  between  A  and  13  should  be 
determined  by  neutral  (extensional)  properties;  they  are  only  relevant  in 
dete  ii  identity.  To  discover  whether  a  neutral  property,  say,  "having  five 
rMMMg 
effects"  is  a  property  of  A  and  B  both  have,  we  need  to  rest  that  A  has,  say,  five 
mental  effects  and  B  also  have  five  physical  effects.  But  "having  mental  effects" 
and  "having  physical  effects"  are  intensional  and  they  are  irrelevant  to  identity  of  A 
and  B.  In  this  way,  for  Della  Rocca,  without  intensional  properties  we  cannot 
92 discover  that  neutral  properties  are  shared  by  the  mind  and  the  body;  but  this  is 
incompatible  with  the  argument  that  intensional  properties  are  irrelevant  in 
determining  identity. 
(3)  Della  Rocca  and  the  Asymmetry  in  the  Scholium  of  Proposition 
Thirteen 
It  is  clear  that  Spinoza  holds  both  the  identity  doctrine  and  parallelism,  and 
that  parallelism  of  the  mind  and  the  body  is  derivable  from  his  doctrine  of  identity. 
However,  there  is  a  problem  with  Della  Rocca's  account  of  the  relationship 
between  the  mind  and  the  body:  that  is,  his  treatment  of  the  asymmetry  which 
appears  in  the  scholium  of  proposition  13  in  Part  11. 
Della  Rocca  argues  that  according  to  parallelisný  not  only  the  fact  that 
body  has  a  certain  degree  of  reality  entails  that  mind  has  the  same  degree  of  reality, 
but  also  vice  versa,  and  he  treats  this  entailment  as  representing  the  structural 
similarity  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  Thus,  for  Delia  Rocca,  this  entailment 
which  is  one  of  the  features  in  parallelism  does  not  conflict  with  Spinoza's  claim  of 
the  explanatory  barrier.  37 
Next,  Della  Rocca  considers  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the 
body  in  the  scholium.  of  proposition  13,  and  he  admits  an  asymmetry  as  Barker, 
Hampshire,  and  Curley  did  (see  earlier  discussion  in  chapter  two,  sections  3  and  4). 
Nevertheless,  he  argues  that  it  does  not  violate  the  explanatory  barrier  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  in  the  following  way:  we  can  still  hold  Spinoza's  clairn  that  the 
mind  must  be  explained  only  by  mental  terms  and  the  body  must  be  explained  only 
by  physical  terms  in  spite  of  the  asymmetry  that  "our  ability  to  assign  a  certain 
degree  of  reality  to  the  mind  is  somehow  posterior  to  our  ability  to  assign  that 
degree  of  reality  to  the  body";  this  asymmetry  is  compatible  with  Spinoza's  claim. 
of  explanatory  barrier.  " 
"  Ibid.,  p.  20. 
38  lbid.,  p.  2  1. 
93 Della  Rocca  may  be  right  in  maintaining  both  that  the  entailment  does  not 
conflict  with  the  explanatory  barrier  and  that  the  asymmetry  does  not  damage  the 
explanatory  barrier.  However,  I  think  that  his  treatment  of  this  asymmetry  does  not 
solve  the  problem;  that  it  conflicts  with  parallelism.  Although  there  is  no  conflict 
between  the  entailment  and  the  explanatory  barrier  nor  between  the  asymmetry  and 
the  explanatory  barrier,  there  is  a  conflict  between  the  symmetry  of  the  entailment 
in  parallelism  and  the  asymmetry  in  the  scholium  of  proposition  13.  Della  Rocca 
seems  to  be  aware  of  the  latter  problem.  He  says,  "by  virtue  of  parallelism,  we  can 
also  say  that  the  fact  that  a  mode  of  thought  has  a  certain  degree  of  reality  entails 
that  the  parallel  mode  of  extension  has  the  same  degree  of  reality.  ,  39But,  Dena 
Rocca  admits  that  this  is  not  possible  according  to  the  scholium  of  proposition  13: 
"However,  what  Spinoza  says  in  2pl3s  does  point  to  some  kind  of  asymmetry 
between  modes  of  thought  and  modes  of  extension.  900  He  goes  on  to  say, 
"[a]lthough  Spinoza  says  here  that  in  order  for  us  to  assign  a  certain  degree  of 
reality  to  the  mind,  we  must  know  the  degree  of  reality  of  the  body,  it  does  not 
seem  that  he  would  also  say  that  in  order  for  us  to  come  to  know  the  degree  of 
reality  of  the  body,  we  must  know  the  degree  of  reality  of  the  mind.  Thus,  Spinoza 
seems  in  2p  13  s  to  claim  that  our  ability  to  assign  a  certain  degree  of  reality  to  the 
mind  is  somehow  posterior  to  our  ability  to  assign  that  degree  of  reality  to  the 
body.  9ý41 
In  this  way,  Della  Rocca  realises  the  problem,  but  he  does  not  attempt  to 
solve  it.  He  merely  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  asymmetry  does  not  violate  the 
explanatory  barrier.  Presumably,  since  Della  Rocca  was  concentrating  on  the 
problem  of  the  explanatory  barrier,  he  failed  to  see  another  problem;  or  he  seems 
to  think  that  if  he  shows  that  the  asymmetry  is  not  a  problem  in  the  explanatory 
barrier,  then  it  does  not  conflict  with  parallelism.  But,  although  the  asymmetry  is 
not  a  problem  for  the  explanatory  barrier,  the  asyrnmetry  may  still  be  problematic 
in  his  parallelistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  As  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter, 
some  interpreters  do  not  treat  the  asymmetry  as  violating  the  explanatory  barrier, 
39  ibid. 
40  ibid. 
41  ibid. 
94 but  do  see  it  as  leading  to  a  materialistic  interpretation.  So,  the  more  important 
task  is  not  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  explanatory  barrier,  but  to  solve  the  problem 
of  mind's  dependence  on  the  body  in  the  sense  that  physical  explanations  are  prior 
to  mental  ones,  since  the  latter  is  a  crucial  point  in  defending  parallelism  from  the 
materialistic  interpretation  of  Spinoza. 
Since  Della  Rocca  admits  this  asymmetry,  what  he  should  have  shown  is 
not  only  that  this  asymmetry  does  not  damage  the  explanatory  barrier,  but  also  that 
this  asymmetry  does  conflict  with  parallelism.  To  complete  the  latter  task,  Della 
Rocca  has  to  know  the  reason  why  Spinoza  argues  this  asymmetry,  but  he  does  not 
have  the  answer  to  this:  "What  remains  unclear,  however,  is  why  Spinoza  asserts 
this  asyrmnetry.  That  is  why  does  Spinoza  claim  that  our  grasp  of  certain  features 
of  minds  requires  our  prior  grasp  of  certain  features  of  body?  I  do  not  know  the 
answer  to  this  question  and,  fortunately,  my  purposes  in  this  chapter  do  not  require 
that  I  venture  a  solution  to  this  perplexing  problem.  9542 
Since  Della  Rocca  does  not  know  the  reason  for  it,  he  cannot  be  sure  that 
this  asymmetry  does  not  conflict  with  parallelism,  and  moreover,  if  he  cannot  show 
the  compatibility  between  them,  it  is  then  difficult  for  him  to  maintain  a  parallelistic 
interpretation.  He  says,  "my  purposes  in  this  chapter  do  not  require  that  But,  I 
do  think  that  Della  Rocca  is  required  to  solve  this  problem,  since  even  though  the 
asymmetry  is  not  the  problem  in  the  explanatory  barrier  it  is  a  problem  in 
parallelism,  and  since  he  is,  in  this  chapter,  43  unfolding  Spinoza's  theory  as 
parallelism. 
When  I  criticised  the  materialistic  interpretation  in  the  previous  chapter 
(see,  pp.  59-63),  1  argued  that  this  asymmetry  does  not  lead  to  materialism,  since 
this  asymmetry  is  an  accident  of  history  and  that  one  day  we  shall  have  just  as  good 
mental  explanations  as  physical  ones.  So,  the  asymmetry  should  be  treated  as  the 
asymmetry  in  our  temporary  position  which  does  not,  in  effect,  imply  the  body's 
dominance  over  the  mind:  it  follows  that  the  asymmetry  does  not  damage  the 
parallelism.  I  argued  there  that  this  apparent  asymmetry  was  not  genuine  and  that 
Spinoza  is  claiming  that  our  understanding  of  the  mind  is  secondary  to  our 
42  Ibid.,  p.  22. 
43  The  title  of  the  chapter  is  'Tarallelism  and  Individuals.  " 
95 understanding  of  the  body  as  far  as  our  gaining  knowledge  up  to  the  present  day  is 
concerned.  This  asymmetry  exists  only  in  our  temporary  understanding  of  the 
present  day  because  our  provisional  understanding  of  the  body  is  better  than  that  of 
the  mind  owing  to  the  fact  that  science  is  not  yet  enough  developed  for  us  to  know 
what  the  mind  is.  For  Spinoza,  in  reality,  there  exists  a  symmetry  between  the  mind 
and  the  body:  "[T]he  object  cannot  be  changed  unless  the  idea  is  also  changed,  and 
vice  versa.  ý04  In  this  way,  we  should  treat  this  asymmetry  as  saying  that  the  best 
way  of  discovering  mental  Merences  now-though  not  necessary  always-is  by 
studying  physical  differences,  and  therefore  we  can  still  argue  for  parallelism 
without  the  obstacle  which  Della  Rocca  has. 
(4)  The  Idea  of  the  Mind  and  the  Mind 
If  the  idea  of  the  mind  is  identical  with  the  mind,  and  it  is  the  very  same 
relationship  as  between  mind  and  body,  then  we  can  make  an  argument  for 
supporting  identity  of  mind  and  body  by  using  what  Spinoza  says  about  the  idea  of 
the  mind.  In  this  section,  I  shall  show  how  this  may  be  done. 
The  main  theses  of  traditional  parallelism  are,  as  we  have  seen  in  section  1, 
that  (1)  there  is  no  causal  relation  between  mental  events  and  physical  events,  (2) 
mental  events  do  exist  in  a  causal  relation  with  other  mental  events,  and,  similarly, 
physical  events  with  other  physical  events,  and  (3)  there  is  a  one-to-one 
correspondence  between  mental  events  and  physical  events.  But  these  explanations 
conflict  with  Spinoza's  "the  idea  of  the  mind"  argument. 
Spinoza  holds  that  "[flhis  idea  of  the  mind  is  united  to  the  mind  in  the  same 
way  as  the  mind  itself  is  united  to  the  body"'  (E,  11,  Prop  21).  Just  as  the  body  is  the 
object  of  the  mind,  so  the  mind  is  the  object  of  the  idea  of  the  mind.  The 
relationship  between  the  idea  of  the  mind  and  the  mind  must  be  the  same  as  the 
relationship  between  the  n-find  and  the  body.  In  the  theory  of  parallelisrn,  the  mind 
is  the  counterpart  of  the  body  and  vice  versa.,  therefore,  the  mind  and  the  body 
44  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  on  God,  Man,  and  His  Well-Being,  Part  H,  Chapter  XX,  note  c,  #  10  in 
Edwin  Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  I  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1985),  p.  136. 
96 correspond  to  each  other.  If  so,  the  relationship  between  the  idea  of  the  mind  and 
the  mind  is  also  a  one-to-one  correspondence,  since  for  Spinoza  their  relationship 
is  the  same  as  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body.  It  follows  that  the  one  mental 
event  has  correspondence  to  the  other  mental  event.  If  we  regard  the  relationship 
between  the  mind  and  the  body  as  parallelism,  the  relationship  between  the  idea  of 
the  mind  and  the  mind  must  also  be  regarded  as  parallelism. 
We  have  seen  that  mental  events  exist  in  a  causal  relationship  with  other 
mental  events.  But,  for  Spinoza,  if  there  is  no  causal  relationship  between  mental 
events  and  physical  events,  there  is  also  no  causal  relationship  between  the  mental 
events  constituting  the  mind  and  idea  of  those  mental  events,  the  idea  of  the  mind. 
Paraflelists  cannot  say  that  the  mind  causes  the  idea  of  the  mind,  given  E,  11,  Prop 
21.  There  seem  to  be  two  other  possible  responses. 
Firstly,  one  might  treat  I(I(b)),  the  idea  of  idea,  as  the  mode  of  the  3rd 
unknown  attribute,  and  treat  (I(I(b))  as  the  mode  of  the  4th  unknown  attribute  and 
so  on  ad  infinitum.  Or,  secondly,  one  might  distinguish  different  levels  of  mental 
event;  the  level  of  I(b)  and  of  I(I(b)).  The  same  consequences  follow  from  both 
hypotheses:  there  is  no  causal  relation  between  b  and  I(b)  or  between  I(b)  and 
I(I(b)),  etc.,  since  they  are  all  either  in  different  attributes  or  on  different  levels, 
whereas  things  in  the  same  attribute  or  on  the  same  level  are  causally  related,  for 
instance,  b,  causes  b2 
, 
I(b),  causes  I(b)2  ,  and  I(I(b)),  causes  1(1(b))2  etc.  It  follows 
that  ideas  cause  other  ideas,  but  not  ideas  of  ideas.  This  argument  is  consistent 
with  the  theses  of  parallelism  (1)  and  (2)  above,  and  consequently  one  can 
integrate  Spinoza's  argument  concerning  "the  idea  of  the  mind"  into  parallelism, 
thus  making  parallefistic  interpretation  still  valid. 
Of  these  two  arguments,  the  first  is  not  plausible.  The  mode  of  the  3rd 
unknown  attribute  cannot  be  mental,  but  I(I(b))  must  be  mental.  For  Spinoza, 
I(I(b))  is  a  mode  which  is  conceived  under  the  attribute  of  thought  like  I(b)  is.  Of 
this,  Spinoza  states  as  follows:  "[T]he  idea  of  the  mind,  therefore,  and  the  mind 
itself  are  ...  considered  under  one  and  the  same  attribute,  that  of  thought"  (E,  11, 
Prop  21,  Schol).  Hence,  it  is  evident  that  we  cannot  regard  I(I(b))  as  the  mode  of 
the  third  unknown  attribute. 
97 The  second  argument,  claiming  a  one-to-one  correspondence  between  ideas 
and  ideas  of  ideas,  is  more  plausible.  However,  it  is  ruled  out  by  the  full  statement 
of  the  passage  above:  "[T]he  idea  of  the  mind,  therefore,  and  the  mind  itself  are 
one  and  thesame  thing,  which  is  considered  under  one  and  the  same  attribute,  that 
of  thought"  (E,  11,  Prop  21,  Schol;  my  italics).  He  goes  on: 
it  follows,,  I  say,  that  the  idea  of  the  mind  and  the  mind  itself  exist  in 
God  from  the  same  necessity  and  from  the  same  power  of  thought.  For, 
indeed,  the  idea  of  the  mind,  that  is  to  say,  the  idea  of  the  idea,  is  nothing 
but  the  form  of  the  idea  in  so  far  as  this  is  considered  as  a  mode  of 
thought  and  without  relation  to  the  object,  just  as  a  person  who  knows 
anything  by  that  very  fact  knows  that  he  knows,  and  knows  that  he 
knows  that  he  knows,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum.  (E,  11,  Prop  2  1,  Schol) 
This  makes  it  plain  that  there  is  no  real  difference  between  the  idea  of  idea  and  the 
idea,  just  a  difference  in  the  way  it  is  conceived,  and  Spinoza,  as  we  have  seen, 
clearly  holds  that  the  relationship  between  the  idea  of  the  idea  and  the  idea  is  the 
same  as  the  relationship  between  the  idea  and  the  body.  If  this  is  an  example  of 
how  the  relationship  between  mind  and  body  should  be  conceived,  then  Spinoza  is 
claiming  that  mind  is  identical  with  body. 
98 Chapter  Four 
One  Single  Substance  and  Two  Attributes: 
the  Subjective  and  the  Objective 
Interpretations Before  we  decide  which  interpretation  is  the  most  adequate  one  to 
represent  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  we  need  to  work  on  Spinoza's  conception 
of  the  attributes.  Without  discussing  the  notion  of  the  attributes,  we  can  hardly 
define  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  Spinoza:  the  attributes  are 
closely  related  to  the  mind-body  theory  as,  for  instance,  the  mind  (thinking  mode) 
is  the  mode  of  the  substance  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  the  body  (extended 
mode)  is  the  mode  of  the  substance  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  Therefore  it  is 
necessary  to  discuss  the  notion  of  the  attributes. 
1.  The  Subjective  and  the  Objective  Interpretation 
ofAttributes 
There  have  been  basically  two  kinds  of  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  position 
regarding  the  attributes  in  relation  to  substance  which  have  remained  controversial 
in  the  history  of  philosophy.  In  Spinoza's  works,  the  status  of  the  attributes  could 
be  explained  in  terms  of  a  subjective  interpretation,  which  is  based  on  the  view  that 
attributes  are  in  intellectu,  or  in  terms  of  an  objective  interpretation,  based  on  the 
view  that  they  are  extra  intellectum.  1  The  former  view  is  emphasised  by  H.  A. 
Wolfson,  and  the  latter  by  F.  S.  Haserot,  A.  Wolf,  and  most  commentators. 
Discussion  of  this  issue  is  one  of  the  central  tasks  in  any  treatment  of  Spinoza's 
viewpoint  on  attributes,  and  is,  as  was  said  above,  divided  into  two  groups;  the 
subjective  and  the  objective  interpretation. 
Each  interpretation,  of  course,  has  a  rationale  and  validity  based  on 
distinctive  passages  in  the  text,  and  provides  advantages  as  well  as  disadvantages  in 
attempting  to  explain  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system  as  a  whole  and  in  connecting 
with  other  important  doctrines.  Although  it  is  quite  right  to  say  that  these 
interpretations  are  incompatible  with  each  other,  it  is  necessary  to  identify  their 
advantages  and  disadvantages  within  Spinoza's  system.  Thus  I  intend  to  explore 
'  FL  A.  Wolfson,  The  Philosophy  ofSpinoza,  vol.  I  (New  York:  Schocken  Books,  1969),  p.  146. 
100 these  two  interpretations  regarding  the  attributes,  and  to  consider  their  merits  and 
defects.  In  outlining  the  possibilities,  I  shall  follow  Haserot's  discussion  of  the 
text.  2  In  so  doing,  I  hope  to  arrive  at  a  clearer  understanding  of  Spinoza's  notion 
of  the  attributes. 
(1)  Th  e  Status  of  th  eA  itrib  utes 
I  shall  begin  by  describing  the  subjective  argument.  The  main  assertion  of 
the  subjective  interpretation  is  that  the  attributes  are  nothing  but  a  concept  of  the 
human  intellect  which  we  ascribe  to  substance  as  if  they  constituted  its  essence;  as 
is  argued  by  H.  A.  Wolfson.  This  subjective  interpretation  emphasises  Spinoza's 
claim  made  on  the  basis  of  the  Ethics  part  1,  demonstrations  of  Proposition  4  and 
of  proposition  15-that  the  only  things  extra  intellectum  are  substances  and 
modes.  It  is  posited  on  the  view  that  the  attributes  are  in  intellectum,  having  no 
existence  outside  the  mind.  3 
With  this  interpretation,  there  are  no  independent  attributes.  There  is  only 
our  conceptions  of  essence.  That  is  to  say,  attributes  exist  as  concepts,  while 
essence  (of  substance)  exists  as  the  reality  which  these  concepts  pick  out. 
Accordingly,  as  to  the  distinction  between  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought, 
the  subjective  interpretation  disposes  of  the  distinction  by  explaining  that  our 
thought-concept  differs  from  our  extension-concept,  although  they  do  not  differ 
from  each  other  in  reality  due  to  the  fact  that  they  are  our  illusion  of  the  essence  of 
substance.  Furthermore,  Wolfson  claims  that  Spinoza  is  in  favour  of  the  subjective 
position  held  in  the  medieval  period  which  "endeavour[s]  to  reconcile  the  apparent 
contradiction  between  the  plurality  of  attributes  and  the  simplicity  of  essence,  "  by 
reducing  "all  the  different  attributes  to  one.  '4  Wolfson's  perspective  on  the 
subjective  interpretation  can  be  well  presented  by  the  following  statements:  "The 
2  Francis  S.  Elaserot,  "Spinoza's  Definition  of  Attribute,  " 
Spinoza  (London:  University  of  California  Press),  pp.  28-42 
3  ibid.,  p.  146. 
4  Ibid,  p.  154. 
in  S.  Paul  Kashap  (ed.  ),  Studies  in 
101 two  attributes  must  therefore  be  one  and  identical  with  substance,  "5  "The  two 
attributes  appear  to  the  mind  as  being  distinct  from  each  other.  In  reality,  however, 
,,  6 
they  are  one. 
It  is,  therefore,  clear  that  subjectivists  are  not  obliged  to  establish 
whether  substance  is  identical  with  all  its  attributes  or  not,  since  the  attributes  are 
concepts  which  originate  in  our  mind.  Instead,  they  can  argue  that  substance  is 
identical  with  its  attributes  in  the  sense  that  substance  is  the  objective  reality  or 
essence  of  our  concepts  of  the  attributes,  and  they  can  further  argue  that  substance 
is  different  from  its  essence  only  in  the  sense  that  "substance"  suggests  a  thing,  and 
"essence"'  the  defining  properties  of  that  thing. 
Next,  the  objective  interpretation,  in  contrast  to  the  subjective  one,  is 
posited  on  the  view  that  attributes  for  Spinoza  are  extra  intellectum:  they  exist 
outside  the  mind.  7  According  to  this  interpretation,  Spinoza  argues  that  substance 
has  a  plurality  of  attributes  and  that  this  is  reconcilable  with  the  position  that  the 
totality  of  attributes  is  identical  with  substance.  Thus  the  attributes  of  intellect  and 
extension  are  "ultimate  characteristics  of  reality,  in  the  sense  that  neither  can  be 
reduced  to  the  terms  of  the  other.  "'  This  interpretation,  therefore,  is  characterised 
by  saying  that  each  attribute  constitutes  the  essence9  of  substance  and  it  has  real 
existence.  'O  Now,  let  us  examine  the  above-mentioned  two  kinds  of  interpretation 
in  some  more  detail  with  respect  to  the  definition  of  the  attributes. 
5  Ibid,  p.  156. 
6  Ibid 
7  Ibid.,  p.  146. 
8  H.  H.  Joachim,,  A  Study  ofSpinoza's  Ethics  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1901),  p.  22. 
91  shall  consider  the  relation  between  the  attribute  and  the  essence  and  substance  in  some  length 
later. 
10  Further,  the  objective  interpretation  holds  that  even  though  attributes  are  defined  with  respect 
to  what  the  intellect  perceives,  according  to  definition  4  of  Ethics  part  1,  they  are  still  objectively 
related  to  substance  and  each  other. 
102 (2)  The  Issues  in  Relation  to  Definition  Four 
The  two  interpretations  exist  due  to  some  ambiguities  in  the  use  of  the 
terms  in  the  definition  of  the  attributes  in  Ethics. 
By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance 
as  (tanquam)  constituting  its  essence.  (E,  1,  Def  4;  my  italics) 
From  this,  some  ambiguities  which  can  arise  are  as  f6flows: 
(1)  The  problem  of  the  correct  translation  of  the  Latin  word  "tanquam"  which 
could  be  translated  as  either  "as  if'  or  "as.  " 
(2)  The  problem  of  the  weighting  between  the  two  phrases  "which  the  intellect 
perceives  of  substance"  and  "constituting  its  essence";  does  the  former 
outweigh  the  latter  or  vice  versa? 
(3)  The  issue  of  the  meaning  of  the  term  "intellect";  what  does  the  "intellect"  refer 
to?  i.  e.  does  it  mean  "human  intellect"  or  "the  infinite  intellect  of  God"'? 
I  shall  deal  with  these  three  issues  in  turn. 
lReegarding  the  first  problem,  the  objectivist  and  subjectivist  views  rely  upon 
the  translation  of  "tanquam"  (either  by  "as"  or  "as  if  ").  If  it  is  translated  as  "as  if,  " 
it  supports  the  subjective  interpretation,  because  it  is  suggested  that  the  intellect 
does  not  perceive  substance  as  it  is  in  itself,  and  that  attributes  are  not  real  but 
merely  concepts  to  the  intellect.  If,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  translated  as  "as,  "  it  could 
be  understood  that  the  attributes  really  do  constitute  the  essence  of  substance  and 
they  exist  in  reality.  They  are  not  merely  thought  to  constitute  the  essence  of 
substance.  They  do  constitute  the  essence.  The  translation  of  tanquam  as  "as,  " 
therefore,  tends  to  the  objective  interpretation.  " 
However,  whenever  the  term  "tanquam"  is  translated  as  "as  if'  or  "as,  15 
each  is  an  accurate  translation  from  the  grammar  of  Latin,  since  "tanquam"  has  a 
dual  use  in  Latin.  Hence,  the  task  of  translating  this  term  as  one  or  the  other  is  not 
conclusive,  compared  with  the  task  of  examinmg  whether  the  attributes  have  reality 
11  The  translation  "as"  would  not  rule  out  the  subjective  interpretation,  whereas  the  translation 
"as  if'  does  rule  out  the  objective  interpretation. 
103 or  are  merely  concepts.  The  former  task,  of  giving  a  good  translation,  is  dependent 
on  the  result  of  the  latter.  According  to  the  solution  of  the  latter,  it  can  be  decided 
whether  it  is  "as  if'  or  "as.  "  Hence,  we  should  pay  attention  to  the  task  which 
reveals  whether  the  attributes  really  exist  or  not  rather  than  the  problem  of  the 
translation  of  "tanquam.  " 
Let  us  move  on  to  the  second  issue.  In  definition  4,  there  are  two  main 
phrases;  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance"  and  "constituting  its  essence.  " 
Which  one  carries  the  greater  weight?  If  the  former  is  highlighted,  the  status  of  the 
attributes  for  Spinoza  is  interpreted  as  subjectivism,  while,  on  the  contrary,  if  the 
latter  phrase  is  emphasised,  it  can  be  claimed  that  the  attributes  exist  objectively. 
Wolfson  comments  on  this  as  follows: 
If  the  expression  "which  the  intellect  perceives"  is  laid  stress  upon,  it 
would  seem  that  the  attributes  are  only  in  intellectu.  Attributes  would 
thus  be  only  a  subjective  mode  of  thinking  expressing  a  relation  to  a 
perceiving  subject  and  having  no  real  existence  in  the  essence.  12 
He  further  adds  that  "to  be  perceived  by  the  mind  means  to  be  invented  by  the 
mind  .... 
"13  In  fact,  definition  4  does  not  tell  us  whether  Spinoza  means  that  the 
attributes  exist  in  the  intellect,  or  outside  the  intellect.  Wolfson,  however, 
interprets  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought  as  the  "inventions"  of  the  human 
intellect  i.  e.  the  mind,  and  not  "discoveries"  by  the  mind.  He  pays  particular 
attention  to  the  phrase  '*hich  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance"  rather  than  "as 
constituting  its  essence.  "  And  consequently,  his  translation  of  the  term  tanquam  is 
not  "as"  but  "as  if7--"as  if  constituting  it  essence.  "  If  the  attributes  were  really 
constitutive  of  its  essence,  Wolfson  argues,  the  simplicity  of  substance  could  not  be 
saved.  I  shall  discuss  this  point  in  the  next  section. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  objective  interpretation  puts  the  emphasis  on  the 
phrase  "as  constituting  its  essence.  "  From  this,  it  can  be  inferred  that  attributes 
have  a  certain  kind  of  real  existence  in  the  essence  of  God.  Hence,  on  this  view, 
12 
Ibid.,  P146. 
13  ibid. 
104 definition  4  supports  the  view  that  the  attributes,  like  substance,  exist  outside  the 
intellect.  And  the  objective  interpretation  treats  the  first  phrase  "which  the  intellect 
perceives  of  substance"  as  implying  no  more  than  the  fact  that  each  attribute 
constitutes  the  essence  of  substance  and  are  not  the  modifications  of  substance. 
That  is  to  say,  in  the  objective  interpretation,  the  first  phrase  does  not  give  us  any 
ground  for  thinking  that  attributes  are  illusory. 
In  addition  to  definition  4,  in  Ethics  there  are  some  statements  which  can 
provide  support  for  each  of  the  interpretations.  Regarding  the  subjective 
interpretation,  we  ought  to  consider  the  statement  "[e]verything  which  is,  is  either 
in  itself  or  in  another"  (E,  1,  Ax  1).  We  can  infer  that  the  former  is  substance  and 
the  latter  are  modifications  from  the  following  statement  of  Spinoza;  he  says  that 
"in  Nature  there  is  nothing  but  substances  and  their  modifications"  (E,  1,  Prop  6, 
Corol),  or  repeatedly  he  states  that  "besides  substances  and  modes  nothing  is 
assumed"  (E,  1,  Prop  15,  Demon).  These  statements  may  be  taken  as  clear 
evidence  of  the  subjective  interpretation,  since  attributes  do  not  exist  according  to 
these  statements.  However,  Spinoza  sometimes  identifies  attributes  with  substance, 
we  cannot  take  these  as  supporting  the  subjective  interpretation.  Once  we  believe 
the  objective  interpretation  is  the  right  one,  we  can  use  these  statements  as 
supporting  the  view  that  for  Spinoza  the  attributes  are,  in  some  sense,  the  same  as 
substance.  We  shaH  shortly  consider  the  relationship  between  substance  and 
attributes. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fbHowing  statement  seems  to  support  the  objective 
interpretation: 
The  more  reality  or  being  a  thing  possesses,  the  more  attributes 
belong  to  it.  (E,  1,  Prop  9) 
Each  attribute  of  a  substance  must  be  conceived  through  itself  (E,  I, 
Prop  10) 
105 By  God  I  understand  Being  absolutely  infinite,  that  is  to  say, 
substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  each  one  of  which 
expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence.  (E,  1,  Def  6) 
Taken  together  with  definition  4,  these  different  interpretations  are  still 
controversial.  In  this  way,  the  above  issues  do  not  make  any  change  to  the 
argument  of  the  subjective  versus  the  objective  interpretation,  nor  give  any  clue  to 
this  matter.  In  order  to  determine  the  status  of  the  attribute  for  Spinoza,  we  need 
to  concentrate  on  the  third  issue  which  I  shall  discuss  next. 
The  "intellect"  in  definition  4  is  also  controversial  regarding  whether  it  is 
referring  to  the  infinite  intellect  of  God,  or  the  finite  human  intellect.  H.  A. 
Wolfson,  who  is  a  subjectivist,  argues  that  the  term  "intellect"  has  to  be  regarded 
as  the  finite  human  intellect.  Wolfson  argues  this  point  as  follows: 
By  the  term  "intellect'  '  in  this  definition  [definition  4,  part  1]  Spinoza 
means  the  finite  human  intellect.  When  he  says  in  Ethics,  H,  Prop  VII, 
Schol,  that  "we  have  already  demonstrated,  that  everything  which  can  be 
perceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as  constituting  the  essence  of  substance 
pertains  entirely  to  one  substance,  and  consequently  that  substance 
thinking  and  the  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same  substance, 
which  is  now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now  under  that,  "  it 
is  not  to  be  inferred  that  an  attribute  of  substance  is  that  which  can  be 
conceived  only  by  the  "infinite  intellect.  "  What  the  Passage  means  to  say 
is  that  "everything  which  can  be  conceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as 
constituting  the  essence  of  substance"-and  the  infinite  intellect  can 
conceive  of  an  infinite  number  of  things  as  constituting  the  essence  of 
substance-is  only  an  attribute  of  substance  and  not  a  substance  itself, 
and  consequently  extension  and  thought,  which  alone  can  be  conceived  by 
the  finite  human  intellect  as  constituting  the  essence  of  substance,  are 
only  attributes  of  substance  and  not  substance  themselves.  14 
14  H.  A.  Wolfson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  1,  p.  153,  note  2 
106 I  take  his  argument  (from  the  second  sentence)  to  defend  the  subjective 
interpretation  from  the  objection  that  one  may  raise  by  taking  that  passage  of 
Spinoza's  as  the  evidence  of  the  fact  that  "intellect"  in  definition  4  is  only  "infinite 
intellect.  "  However,  what  Wolfson  is  actually  obliged  to  do  is  not  to  explain  why 
the  term  "intellect"  in  definition  4  is  not  only  "infinite  intellect"  but  to  explain  why 
the  term  "intellect"  cannot  include  "infinite  intellect"  since  he  asserts,  in  the  first 
sentence,  that  by  the  term  "intellect"  Spinoza  means  the  finite  human  intellect.  If  it 
is  not  only  the  infinite  intellect,  it  can  be  also  the  finite  intellect.  But  I  do  not  see 
why  this  fact  is  a  justification  for  the  interpretation  of  "the  finite  intellect";  it  can  be 
only  a  justification  of  the  interpretation  of  "any  intellect.  "  Thus,  whether  all  the 
other  sentences  are  the  explanations  of  the  first  sentence  or  not,  Wolfson  does  not 
have  any  justification  for  the  interpretation  of  "finite  intellect"  (only),  despite  the 
fact  that  he  claims  it. 
In  fact,  for  the  subjective  interpretation,  it  is  integral  to  argue  that  it  is  the 
finite  human  intellect.  If  it  is  the  infinite  intellect,  the  subjectivists  cannot  argue  that 
the  attributes are  mistakenly  conceived  by  the  intellect,  since  God  (the  infinite 
intellect)  cannot  be  mistaken.  Thus,  the  subjectivists  have  to  offer  a  justification  for 
the  view  that  the  term  "intellect"  means  only  the  finite  intellect.  But,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  Wolfson  fails  to  offer  it,  and  I  do  not  see  any  reason  for  that. 
Rather,  we  can  find  a  justification  for  the  view  that  the  term  "intellect" 
means  the  infinite  intellect  as  follows.  It  is  clear  that  the  finite  intellect  cannot 
perceive  the  other  attributes  besides  thought  and  extension.  But,  Spinoza's 
definition  4  is  not  the  definition  of  only  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  but  the 
definition  of  the  attributes  in  general,  which  are  infinitely  many.  Thus,  as  long  as 
the  defirfition.  talks  about  the  attributes  in  general,  the  intellect  has  to  be  the  infirlite 
one  due  to  the  fact  that  the  finite  intellect  can  only  perceive  only  two  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension.  it  follows  that  the  attributes  are  not  an  illusion  but  they 
really  exist,  since  God  cannot  be  mistaken.  This  is  what  the  objectivists  commonly 
argue  against  the  subjectivists.  "  As  long  as  the  subjectivists  cannot  offer  the  reason 
"  However,  even  if  it  was  only  the  finite  intellect,  there  would  be  no  guarantee  for  supporting  the 
subjective  interpretation.  There  is  only  a  possibility  that  the  attributes  could  be  the  invention  of 
our  mind  i.  e.  a  belief  in  more  than  one  attribute.  In  this  case,  there  is  also  another  possibility  that 
107 why  it  has  to  be  the  finite  intellect,  the  subjective  interpretation  is  not  justified,  and 
thus  we  should  conclude  that  the  objective  interpretation  is  more  plausible  than  the 
subjective  one. 
2  Comparison  between  the  Subjective  and  the 
Objective  Interpretations 
(1)  The  Problems  of  the  Different  Interpretations 
As  we  have  seen  above,  the  interpretation  of  definition  4  is  perplexing  in 
understanding  Spinoza's  view  of  attributes.  Moreover,  with  respect  to  the  issue  of 
the  subjective  and  objective  interpretations,  it  is  also  controversial.  In  both  cases 
there  are  some  difficulties  in  adducing  their  argument  concerning  the  relationship 
between  substance  and  the  attributes,  and  each  interpretation  has  advantages  and 
disadvantages  in  explaining  Spinoza's  view.  Now,  I  shall  give  an  outline  of  these 
problems  raised  by  many  interpreters  of  each  interpretation. 
Regarding  the  subjective  interpretation,  the  problem  is  as  follows.  Spinoza 
says  that  bodies  are  modifications  of  the  attribute  of  extension.  If  there  are  no  real 
attributes,  where  do  the  modes  come  from?  If  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension  are  invented  by  the  finite  human  mind  as  Wolfson  argues,  it  is  difficult  to 
answer  this  question.  If  extension  is  only  an  "inventiod'  of  the  human  mind,  the 
problem  arises  regarding  the  reality  of  a  material  world.  Again,  if  there  is  only  an 
invention  of  the  human  mind,  how  can  the  mind  do  that  unless  it  in  some  way 
issued  from  substance?  In  this  case,  there  is  no  mind  nor  body  since  mind  and  body 
cannot  be  distinguished  from  one  another  due  to  the  fact  that  the  attributes  lose 
the  attributes  are  not  an  illusion  of  our  mind,  as  long  as  the  human  mind  can  have  an  adequate 
idea  of  the  essence  of  God:  `fhc  human  mind  possesses  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  eternal  and 
infinite  essence  of  God"  (E,  H,  Prop  47).  Thus,  I  do  not  see  why  is  it  taken  for  granted  that  the 
attributes  are  an  illusion  of  the  human  mind.  Therefore,  even  if  the  intellect  is  the  finite  human 
intellect,  this  does  not  necessary  support  the  subjective  interpretation  nor  counts  against  the 
objective  interpretation. 
108 their  reality.  Furthermore,  if  the  intellect  in  definition  4  is  the  finite  intellect  which 
can  only  perceive  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  we  cannot  explain 
Spinoza's  doctrine  that  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  attributes. 
Next,  in  the  objective  interpretation,  the  problem  arises  of  the  compatibility 
between  simplicity  of  substance  and  the  plurality  of  attributes  because  Spinoza 
holds  that  substance  is  simple  and  indivisible  (E,  1,  Prop  13).  Here  we  ought  to 
notice  the  fact  that  if  attributes  have  reality,  then  they  are  really  distinct.  Therefore, 
the  following  questions  should  be  asked: 
If  Spinoza's  attributes  are  regarded  as  objective,  how  can  the  attributes 
constitute  the  nature  of  the  substance  which  is  single?  i.  e.  how  can  one 
indivisible  substance  have  many  distinct  natures  which  have  real  existence?  16 
(2)  How  can  an  objectivist  explain  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect 
f5  perceives  o 
It  is  difficult  to  answer  the  above  questions  under  the  objective  interpretation.  In 
addition  to  this,  concerning  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance,  " 
I  would  ask  an  objectivist  why  Spinoza  puts  this  phrase  in  definition  4  unless  it 
means  something. 
(2)  Bennett's  View  on  Attributes 
There  is  an  interesting  point  of  view  on  Spinoza's  attributes  presented  by  J. 
Bennett.  He  interprets  the  attributes  from  an  objective  perspective,  but  in  another 
way.  in  Bennett's  view,  (i)  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  are  real,  (ii)  they 
are  reaUy  distinct  from  one  another,  (iii)  the  attributes  do  not  reafly  constitute  the 
essence  of  substance.  17  The  statements  (i)  and  (ii)  are  the  same  as  the  other 
objective  interpretations,  but  (iii)  is  different.  Taken  together  with  definition  4, 
16  There  is  a  ftirther  problem:  how  ultimately  can  a  reality  be  one  and  indivisible  if  there  are 
many  attributes?  I  shall  say  no  more  about  this,  except  that  it  is  not  obvious  that  Spinoza  thinks 
all  division  is,  as  Wolfson  argues,  illusory:  is  the  deceived  mind  different  from  the  reality  which 
it  misunderstands?  But  this  topic  would  take  us  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis. 
17  Jonathan  Bennett,  A  Study  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  (London:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1984),  p. 
147. 
109 proposition  9  of  part  I  seems  to  imply  that  attributes  do  constitute  the  essence  of 
substance:  "By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of 
substance  as  constituting  its  essence"  (E,  1,  Def  4),  and  "[t]he  more  reality  or  being 
a  thing  possesses,  the  more  attributes  belong  to  it"  (E,  1,  Prop  9).  Bennett  resists 
the  implication.  His  reason  for  denying  that  the  attributes  constitute  the  essence  is 
as  follows: 
(1)  The  sense  of  Latin  word  "constituere"'  does  not  always  mean  "constitute.  " 
Bennett  states  that  "Latin  dictionaries  permit  this  by  associating  the  verb  with 
'fix%  'define'.  'determine'  and-almost-'  stake  out'  "  and  it  does  not  necessarily 
imply  the  sense  of  identity.  " 
(2)  The  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance  as  constituting  its 
essence"  can  be  taken  to  suggest  that  the  intellect  is  mistaken.  Bennett  seems  to 
treat  this  phrase  as  if  Spinoza  puts  it  in  in  order  to  indicate  that  attributes  do 
not  actually  constitute  the  essence  of  substance.  Hence,  he  argues  that 
attributes  are  not  basic  properties.  This  means  that  Spinoza  does  not  think  that 
the  attributes  constitute  the  essence  but  that  theyfix  the  essence.  '9 
Due  to  facts  (1)  and  (2),  Bennett  prefers  to  use  "express"  instead  of  "constitute.  " 
This  interpretation  promises  a  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  ontological  status  of 
attributes  and  modes.  It  maintains  the  objective  interpretation,  as  well  as  also 
having  the  solution  in  relation  to  the  problem  of  the  compatibility  of  "one  and 
many"  because  the  attributes  do  not  really  constitute  the  essence  in  this 
interpretation.  In  spite  of  these  advantages,  however,  Bennett's  interpretation 
cannot  be  identified  as  Spinoza's  view  on  the  attributes. 
Bennett  regards  "the  intellect"  as  referring  to  the  infinite  intellect  as  well  as 
to  the  finite  intellect.  20  Now  one  of  the  criticisms  of  Wolfson's  view  is  that  Spinoza 
states  that  "[a]H  ideas,  in  so  far  as  they  are  related  to  God,  are  true"(E,  11,  Prop 
"  Ibid.,  p.  65. 
19  Ibid.,  pp.  146-147.  Spinoza's  definition  of  essence  is  as  follows:  II[T]o  the  essence  of  anything 
pertains  that,  which  being  given,  the  thing  itself  is  necessarily  posited,  and,  being  taken  away,  the 
thing  is  necessarily  taken;  or,  in  other  words,  that  without  which  the  thing  can  neither  be  nor  be 
conceived,  and  which  in  its  turn  cannot  be  nor  be  conceived  without  the  thing"  (E,  11,  Def  2). 
20  Ibid.,  p.  62;  p.  146. 
Ito 32).  All  of  God's  ideas  are  true  and  God  cannot  be  mistaken  about  his  own  essence 
in  Spinoza's  theory,  and  therefore  Wolfson  is  not  accurate  in  his  interpretation  of 
Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the  attributes  if  Wolfson  intends  by  "the  intellect  perceives 
of'  to  refer  to  infinite  intellect.  ObjectiVists  criticised  Wolfson's  subjective 
interpretation  on  this  ground.  Bennett  was  aware  of  this,  but  does  not  seem  aware 
of  the  danger  to  his  own  position.  He  states:  "But  the  gunfire  aimed  at  Wolfson's 
interpretation  goes  wide  of  mine.  I  say  that  Nature  really  has  extension  and 
thought,  which  really  are  distinct  from  one  another,  but  that  they  are  not 
fundamental  properties,  although  they  must  be  perceived  as  such  by  any  intellect" 
(my  italics).  21 
It  is  clear  from  this  that  for  Bennett,  too,  God  has  erroneous  ideas,  contrary 
to  E.  11,  Prop  32.  God  believes  wrongly  that  thought  and  extension  are 
fimdamental.  For  Wolfson,  there  might  be  an  escape  route  in  saying  that  the 
intellect  has  to  be  regarded  as  the  human  intellect,  so  that  Spinoza's  view  that  God 
cannot  be  mistaken  about  his  own  essence  becomes  irrelevant.  Since  Bennett  says 
explicitly  that  "the  intellect"  includes  the  infinite  intellect,  there  is  no  such  escape. 
Further,  there  is  the  following  problem:  how  could  Spinoza  (or  Bennett) 
know  that  the  attributes  are  not  really  fundamental,  since  they  have  to  see  them  as 
fundamental?;  can  anyone  both  perceive  attributes  as  fundamental  and  know  that 
they  are  not?  So,  Bennett's  statement  is  a  little  like  saying:  "that  is  the  truth  but 
nobody  knows  it.  "  Then,  how  does  he  know  it? 
From  the  above  criticisms,  we  can  see  that  Bennett's  interpretation  is  not 
sufficient  to  solve  the  problem. 
The  Correspondence  between  De  Vries  and  Spinoza 
As  to  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  the  attributes  to  substance,  Simon  De 
Vries,  who  was  a  friend  of  Spinoza,  brought  this  issue  up  in  a  letter  to  Spinoza. 
21  Jonathan  Bennett,  op.  cit.,  p.  147. 
III Finally,  at  the  beginning  of  P8S3  22  you  write: 
From  these  [propositions]  it  is  evident  that  although  two  attributes 
may  be  conceived  to  be  really  distinct  (i.  e.,  one  may  be  conceived 
without  the  aid  of  the  other),  they  do  not,  on  that  account,  constitute 
two  beings  or  two  different  substances.  The  reason  is  that  it  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  substance  that  all  of  its  attributes  (I  mean  each  of  them) 
should  be  conceived  through  themselves,  since  they  have  [always] 
been  in  it  together. 
In  this  way  you  seem,  Sir,  to  suppose  that  the  nature  of  substance  is  so 
constituted  that  it  can  have  more  than  one attribute,  which  you  have  not 
yet  demonstrated,  unless  you  depend  on  the  fffffi2'  definition  of  an 
absolutely  infinite  substance,  or  God.  Otherwise  if  I  should  say  that  each 
substance  has  only  one  attribute,  and  if  I  had  the  idea  of  two  attributes,  I 
could  rightly  conclude  that,  where  there  are  two  different  attributes, 
24  there  are  two  different  substances  . 
In  this  way,  De  Vries  points  out  the  problem  of  the  compatibility  between  one 
substance  and  two  attributes  (at  least  two).  Spinoza's  view  of  this  problem  was 
that  distinct  attributes  could  constitute  the  same  substance.  De  Vries  seems  to  take 
attribute  as  essence;  he  perhaps  relies  on  definition  4,  without  taking  the  phrase 
"that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of'  too  seriously. 
Now  let  us  consider  how  Spinoza  replies  to  De  Vries'  question. 
Nevertheless,  you  want  me  to  explain  by  an  example  how  one  and 
the  same  thing  can  be  designated  by  two  names  (though  this  is  not 
necessary  at  all).  Not  to  seem  niggardly,  I  offer  two:  (i)  I  say  that  by 
22  Scholium  of  Proposition  10  in  Part  1;  Curley  offers  the  information  that  scholium  of 
Proposition  10  in  the  Ethics  is  related  to  scholium  3  of  proposition  8  of  an  earlier  stage  in  the 
development  of  Ethics  (Edwin  Curley,  Ae  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  I  [Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1985],  p.  192,  note  62). 
23  DeRnition  6  in  part  1;  Curley  also  offers  the  information  that  the  sixth  definition  of  the  Ethics 
part  I  was  the  fifth  definition  of  an  earlier  stage  in  the  development  of  Ethics  (ibid). 
24  Letter  8  in  Curley,  ibid.,  p.  192. 
112 .  1-  -  me  name  Israel  I  understand  the  third  patriarch;  I  understand  the 
same  by  the  name  Jacob,  the  name  which  was  given  to  him  because 
he  had  seized  his  brother's  heel;  (ii)  by  flat  I  mean  what  reflects  all 
the  rays  of  light  without  any  change;  I  understand  the  same  by  white, 
except  that  it  is  called  white  in  relation  to  a  man  looking  at  the  flat 
[surface].  25 
I  feel  these  analogies  are  not  sufficient  in  replying  to  De  Vries'  question.  The 
reason  is  that  as  Donagan  points  out,  the  different  names  denote  not  attributes  but 
modes.  26  But,  the  analogy  has  to  be  regarded  as  an  analogy,  so  we  should  attempt 
to  find  the  point  which  Spinoza  wants  to  make  by  these  examples.  They  imply  that 
it  is  possible  for  substance  to  be  conceived  under  the  distinct  attributes  and  that  the 
attributes  are  related  to  a  single  subject  in  the  sense  that  the  names  "Israer'  and 
"Jacob"  differ  in  sense,  though  both  denote  the  same  thing,  the  third  Patriarch. 
However,  all  we  can  know  from  this  letter  is  that  many  attributes  can  constitute 
one  substance  for  Spinoza,  and  he  does  not  offer  in  this  answer  whether  this  occurs 
in  the  manner  of  the  subjective  interpretation  or  the  objective  interpretation,  or  how 
it  can  occur  on  the  objective  interpretation. 
There  is  a  possibility  that  we  may  infer  the  existence  of  distinct  attributes 
from  the  letters.  We  can  assume  the  following  point.  It  is  certain  that  De  Vries 
raises  the  question  from  an  objective  point  of  view.  In  this  case,  if  Spinoza  thought 
that  attributes  did  not  really  exist  and  did  not  really  constitute  the  essence  of  the 
substance,  he  would  inform  De  Vries  of  this  rather  than  offering  the  analogies.  If 
Spinoza  had  the  subjective  point  of  view,  he  would  answer  by  saying  that  the 
attributes  do  not  really  constitute  the  essence  of  the  substance  rather  than  seeking 
25  Letter  9  in  Curley,  ibid.,  pp.  195-196;  the  square  blankets  are  the  translator's. 
26  Alan  Donagan  writes:  "Yet  in  both  Spinoza's  examples,  his  different  names  designate  modes, 
not  attributes.  In  the  first,  being  the  third  Patriarch,  and  grasping  his  brother's  heel,  are  different 
modes  of  the  man  called  'Israel'  and  'Jacob,  '  and  not  attributes  constituting  his  essence.  The 
second  example  is  in  even  worse  case.  For,  taking  plane  as  a  mode  of  matter,  and  white  as  a 
mode  of  a  perceiving  mind,  the  names  'plane  and  'white'  cannot  be  supposed  to  designate  even 
modes  of  the  same  substance"  ("Essence  and  the  Distinction  of  Attributes  in  Spinoza's 
Metaphysics,  "  in  Marjorie  Grene  [ed.  ],  Spinoza:  A  Collection  of  Critical  Essays  [New  York: 
Anchor  Books,  1973],  p.  168). 
113 to  explain  how  they  constitute  the  essence  of  the  substance.  That  is  to  say,  because 
Spinoza  has  the  view  that  distinct  attributes  exist,  he  attempts  to  explain  the  "one 
and  many.  "  If  so,  this  is  a  legitimate  reason  for  denying  that  Spinoza  held  a 
subjective  view. 
Nevertheless,  the  analogies  are  not  still  decisive  as  between  the  subjective 
and  the  objective  interpretations.  I  think  that  from  the  analogies,  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  decide  which  one  is  Spinoza's  position;  the  analogies  do  not  directly 
concern  this  matter.  Thus,  we  ought  to  decide  this  matter  from  Spinoza's  other 
texts,  and  we  have  seen  that  the  objective  interpretation  should  be  ascribed  to 
Spinoza.  What  we  should  concentrate  on  from  the  analogies  is  not  to  find  whether 
Spinoza  is  a  ob  ectivist  or  a  subjectivist,  but  to  find  how  it  is  possible  that  there  are  j 
many  attributes  for  one  substance  under  the  objective  interpretation.  That  is  to  say, 
if  the  fact  is  true  that  Spinoza  is  an  objectivist,  we  should  treat  the  analogies  as 
Spinoza's  explanation,  in  the  objective  interpretation,  of  how  it  is  possible  that 
there  are  many  attributes  for  one  substance.  Once  we  accept  the  objective 
interpretation,  the  analogies  teach  us  in  what  sense  we  should  argue  an  objective 
interpretation. 
In  my  view,  the  analogies  tend  to  suggest  that  two  attributes  afford  two 
different  ways  of  referring  to  the  same  essence  (two  ways  of  picking  out  the  same 
thing)  and  that  the  attributes  do  really  exist,  as  affording  Merent  ways  of 
conceiving  the  same  thing;  for  example,  "being  the  third  patriarch"  and  "being  the 
seizer  of  his  heel"  each  exist  in  some  sense  and  they  express  the  same  person  in  its 
own  way.  Spinoza's  answer  by  the  analogies  is  that  although  we  have  the  idea  of 
two  attributes,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  are  two  substances,  since  the  attributes 
express  the  same  substance  in  its  own  way  as  the  same  person  or  the  same  thing  is 
expressed  in  Oferent  ways.  What  the  analogies  show  us  is  how  it  is  possible  that 
many  attributes  express  the  same  essence. 
In  addition  to  this,  I  think  De  Vries  is  asking:  "how  can  there  be  more  than 
one  essence  of  a  substance?  "  He  is  claiming  that  two  objects  should  imply  two 
attributes,  and  vice  versa.  Wby-9  If  he  is  thinking  of  attributes  as  essences  then  this 
makes  sense.  A  thing  cannot  have  two  separate  essences.  He  says  "if  I  had  the  idea 
114 of  two  attributes  I  should  rightly  conclude  different  substances.  "  If  he  is  thinking  of 
attributes  as  qualities  in  general,  why  does  he  ask  this  rather  than,  "if  I  had  the  idea 
of  two  attributes  should  I  be  committed  to  pluralityT  But,  Spinoza  does  not  seem 
to  treat  attribute  as  the  same  as  essence,  since  he  treats  attributes  as  ways  of 
conceiving  the  essence  of  the  same  thing.  However,  since  the  analogies  stiff  do  not 
supply  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  problem  of  "one  and  many,  "  we  need  to  discuss 
further  the  relationship  between  substance  and  essence  and  attribute  to  solve  this 
problem. 
3.  A  Proposed  Solution  to  the  Problems  of  the  Objective 
Interpretation 
The  arguments  of  the  ob  ective  interpretation  are  mostly  contained  in  the  j 
following  way:  (1)  the  intellect  in  definition  4  cannot  be  the  finite  intellect  because 
there  are  infinite  attributes  in  Spinoza's  doctrine  (E,  1,  Def  6;  Prop  11)  and  the 
finite  intellect  cannot  perceive  them  all  (Letter  64);  (2)  the  infinite  intellect  is  not 
mistaken;  all  ideas  in  the  infinite  intellect  are  true  (E,  11,  Prop  32);  (3)  therefore,  it 
follows  that  the  attributes  really  exist  and  that  they  are  really  distinct.  27  In  this  way, 
the  objective  interpretation  has  textual  backing  unlike  the  subjective  interpretation. 
Thus,  in  some  ways,  it  is  the  obvious  interpretation.  However,  as  I  have 
mentioned,  there  are  two  main  problems  in  this  objective  interpretation  which  are 
commonly  raised  by  Spinoza's  commentators.  Let  us  recall  thern. 
(1)  If  Spinoza's  attributes  are  regarded  as  objective,  how  can  distinct  attributes  A 
constitute  the  nature  or  essence  of  the  substance  which  is  single? 
27  To  support  the  objective  interpretation,  Delahunty  informs  us  of  the  ten  textual  facts,  which  are 
pointed  out  by  him  and  others.  The  facts  are  mostly  related  to  proving  the  above  points  (1)  and 
(2).  See  R-  I  Delahunty,  Spinoza,  (London:  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul,  1985),  pp.  116-117. 
115 (2)  How  can  an  objectivist  explain  the  fact  that  Spinoza  introduces  attributes 
through  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  as  (constituting  the  essence 
of  substance)"  in  definition  4  of  part  11  and  elsewhere? 
I  think  that  the  above  problems  should  not  lead  us  to  hold  the  subjective 
interpretation.  If  we  succeed  in  solving  them,  we  can  hold  that  Spinoza's 
interpretation  is  coherent  instead  of  holding  together  incoherent  stands.  I  shall 
attempt  to  offer  the  solution  to  these  problems.  To  complete  this  task,  it  is  essential 
to  consider  the  relationship  between  substance  and  essence  and  attribute  from 
Spinoza's  other  statements. 
(1)  The  Problem  of  "One  and  Many" 
a.  The  Relationship  between  Substance  and  Essence  and  Attribute 
In  order  to  achieve  a  clear  understanding  of  Spinoza's  notion  of  the 
attributes  and  to  solve  the  problem  of  "one  and  many,  "  it  is  necessary  to  examine 
the  relationship  between  substance  and  essence  and  attribute.  With  these  terms,  the 
following  options  are  available  to  understand  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  attribute. 
(i)  Substance,  essence,  and  attribute  are  all  identical  with  each  other. 
(ii)  Substance  is identical  with  attribute,  but  essence  is  not  identical  with  either  of 
them. 
(iii)  Neither  substance,  essence,  nor  attribute  are  identical  with  each  other. 
(iv)  Substance  is  not  identical  with  either  essence  or  attribute,  but  essence  and 
attribute  are  identical  with  each  other. 
(v)  Attribute  is  not  identical  with  either  substance  or  essence,  but  substance  is 
identical  with  essence. 
To  decide  which  option  is  Spinoza's,  I  shall  review  some  theses  of  attributes  which 
are  commonplace  in  the  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  philosophy. 
(1)  Substance  monism:  there  exists  only  one  single  substance. 
(2)  Attribute  pluralism:  there  are  infinite  numbers  of  attributes.  (Attribute  dualism 
is  relevant  to  the  mind-body  theory) 
116 I  believe  that  it  is  beyond  dispute  that  Spinoza  holds  the  two  doctrines  above, 
whereas  the  relationship  between  substance  and  essence  and  attribute  is  still 
controversial.  Now,  from  an  understanding  of  the  above  two  doctrines,  we  can  be 
suspicious  of  a  couple  of  the  options  -  (i)  and  (ii). 
As  to  the  first  option,  (i)  "substance,  essence,  and  attribute  are  all  identical 
with  each  other,  "  it  is  hardly  possible  to  ascribe  this  to  Spinoza's  system,  since  it  is 
not  compatible  with  the  two  doctrines,  substance  monism  and  attribute  pluralism. 
If  essence  is  identical  with  attribute  as  well  as  substance,  it  is  apparent  that  the 
number  of  essences  is  self-contradictory.  Given  that  substance  monism  and 
attribute  pluralism  is  true,  essence  has  to  be  either  just  one  or  more  than  two.  That 
is  to  say,  essence  can  only  be  identical  with  either  substance  or  attribute,  but 
cannot  be  identical  with  both  of  them  at  once. 
IR  egarding  the  second  option  i.  e.  (ii)  "substance  is identical  with  attribute,  -L,  -%;; 
but  essence  is  not  identical  with  either  of  then-4"  the  problem  of  the  incompatibility 
between  the  number  of  substances  and  the  number  of  attributes  stiH  remains,  so 
this,  too,  faUs. 
Before  we  examine  the  other  options,  we  need  to  consider  what  the  essence 
of  substance  is  for  Spinoza.  By  doing  so,  we  can  begin  to  determine  the  number  of 
essences,  so  that  we  can  come  close  to  an  understanding  of  the  relationship 
between  substance  and  essence  and  attribute.  Spinoza's  statements  about  the 
essence  are  as  f6flows: 
To  the  essence  of  anything  pertains  that,  which  being  given,  the  thing 
itself  is  necessarily  posited,  and,  being  taken  away,  the  thing  is 
necessarily  taken;  or,  in  other  words,  that  without  which  the  thing  can 
neither  be  nor  be  conceived,  and  which  in  its  turn  cannot  be  nor  be 
conceived  without  the  thing.  (E,  111,  Def  2) 
By  cause  of  itself  I  understand  that  whose  essence  involves  existence,  or 
that  whose  nature  cannot  be  conceived  unless  existing.  (E,  1,  Def  1) 
117 The  essence  of  that  thing  which  can  be  conceived  as  not  existing  does 
not  involve  existence.  (E,  1,  Ax  7) 
It  pertains  to  the  nature  of  substance  to  exist.  (E,  1,  Prop  7) 
Demonstration.  There  is  nothing  by  which  substance  can  be  produced 
(Corol  Prop  6).  It  will  therefore  be  the  cause  of  itself,  that  is  to  say  (Def 
1),  its  essence  necessarily  involves  existence,  or,  in  other  words,  it 
pertains  to  its  nature  to  exist. 
God  or  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  each  one  of  which 
expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence,  necessarily  exists.  (E,  1,  Prop  11). 
Demonstration.  If  this  be  denied,  conceive,  if  it  be  possible,  that  God 
does  not  involve  existence.  But  this  (Prop  7)  is  absurd.  Therefore  God 
necessarily  exists. 
From  the  above  statements,  we  can  see  that  the  essence  of  the  substance  involves 
its  existence  and  that  Spinoza's  notion  of  essence  is  not  different  from  the 
conventional  notion:  the  essence  is  the  most  fundamental  quality  of  a  thing,  or  that 
which  makes  a  thing  what  it  is.  It  seems  that  there  is  only  one  essence  for  one 
thing;  there  is  one  essence  for  one  substance,  insofar  as  the  essence  is  the  most 
fundamental  quality.  So,  for  Spinoza,  if  there  is  one  essence,  there  must  be  one 
substance,  and  vice  versa.  Therefore,  it  follows  that  we  should  not  identify 
attribute  with  essence,  whereas  we  should  think  that  there  is  the  one  essence  for 
the  one  substance  and  in  this  sense  we  can  identify  essence  with  substance. 
This  line  of  Spinoza's  thought  on  "essence"  does  not  allow  us  to  take  (1) 
an  argument  that  denies  identity  between  substance  and  essence  or  to  take  (2)  an 
argument  that  makes  the  number  of  essences  plural  by  identffijing  essence  with  the 
infinite  numbers  of  attributes.  Thus,  we  ought  to  turn  down  all  the  options  (i)-(v) 
above  except  the  fifth  option  that  "the  attribute  is  not  identical  with  either 
substance  or  essence,  but  substance  is  identical  with  essence";  the  option  (i)  entails 
the  second  argument,  the  options  (ii)  and  (iii)  entail  the  first  argument,  and  the 
option  (iv)  entails  both  arguments.  By  substance  monism  and  attribute  pluralism 
118 we  can  reject  options  (i)  and  (ii),  and  by  Spinoza's  assertion  of  the  concept  of 
essence,  we  can  reject  options  (i),  (ii),  (m)  and  (iv).  So,  it  appears  that  only  option 
(v)  is  adequate  as  an  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  substance  and 
essence  and  attribute.  Since  for  Spinoza  the  attribute  is  not  treated  as  the  essence, 
it  does  not  follow  that  there  are  many  essences  for  one  substance,  but  that  there  is 
the  one  essence  and  many  attributes  for  the  one  substance.  Thus,  we  are  led  to  the 
view  that  there  is,  one  single  substance,  one  essence,  and  an  infinite  number  of 
attributes  in  Spinoza's  system.  Bearing  in  mind  this  idea,  we  should  consider  how 
they  are  related  to  each  other. 
b.  An  Implication  ofIdentity  in  the  Term  "Constituere" 
If  attributes  are  not  essences  as  is  concluded  above,  the  problem  of  "one 
and  many"  seems  to  be  solved.  Insofar  as  attributes  are  not  essences  but  qualities  in 
general,  it  is  not  a  problem  to  claim  that  many  attributes  constitute  one  substance. 
However,  several  passages  of  Spinoza's  provide  an  obstacle  to  this  conclusion. 
The  problem  passages  are  as  follows: 
By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of 
substance  as  constituting  its  essence.  (E,  1,  Def  4) 
The  more  reality  or  being  a  thing  possesses,  the  more  attributes 
belong  to  it.  (E,  1,  Prop  9) 
It  is  far  from  absurd,  therefore,  to  ascribe  to  one  substance  a  number 
of  attributes,  since  nothing  in  Nature  is  clearer  than  that  each  being 
must  be  conceived  under  some  attribute,  and  the  more  reality  or 
being  it  has,  the  more  attributes  it  possesses  expressing  necessity  or 
eternity  and  infinity.  (E,  1,  Prop  10,  Schol) 
119 By  Substance  I  understand  what  is  in  itself  and  conceived  through 
itself,  i.  e.,  whose  concept  does  not  involve  the  concept  of  another 
thing.  I  understand  the  same  thing  by  attribute,  .... 
28 
We  have  already  considered  Bennett's  reasons  for  resisting  the  conclusion  that  an 
attribute  is  that  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  substance.  Taken  all  together, 
the  above  passages  apparently  lead  to  the  view  that  a  substance  can  have  many 
essences.  One  may  identify  essence  with  attribute  while  abandoning  the  standard 
meaning  of  the  term  "essence.  "  In  this  case,  there  can  be  many  attributes  (essences) 
for  the  one  substance.  Of  course,  the  possibility  of  this  depends  on  the  concept  of 
attribute.  But  at  least  there  is  not  the  problem  derived  from  the  doctrine  that  there 
must  be  one  essence  for  one  substance.  It  would  follow  that,  for  Spinoza,  essence 
is  nothing  but  attribute,  but  essence  here  is  different  from  essence  in  the  usual 
sense.  However,  it  is  very  unlikely  that  Spinoza  holds  this  position.  Spinoza's 
assertion  of  essence  which  we  have  seen  so  far  clearly  conflicts  with  this. 
It  is  necessary  to  look  more  closely  at  the  route  taken  by  Bennett  for  us  to 
avoid  the  conflict,  at  the  translation  of  "constituere"  and  at  the  phrase  "which  the 
intellect  perceives  ...  as.  "  But  we  shall  not  be  taking  Bennett's  route  out,  of 
supposing  that  there  are  trans-attribute  modes  which  cannot  be  comprehended  in 
their  pure  form.  Spinoza  says  that  the  attributes  are  what  the  intellect  perceives  as 
constituting  the  essence.  In  definition  6  of  Part  1,  he  refers  to  attributes  expressing 
the  essence. 
The  Latin  term  "constituere"  means  determine,  arrange,  and  flx,  and  so  on. 
Thus,  Bennett  suggests,  we  should  say  that  the  attributes  fix  or  characterise  the 
essence  of  the  substance.  Of  course,  we  can  translate  this  term  into  "constitute"  in 
English,  but  we  have  to  be  wary  that  the  English  "constitute"  has  all  the  meanings 
which  the  Latin  dictionaries  indicate;  the  Oxford  English  Dictionary  tells  us  that 
the  term  "constitute"  has  7  kinds  of  meanings  and  that  last  is  "make  Up.  q129 
Speaking  briefly,  the  Latin  term  "constituere"  should  be  translated  to  "constitute" 
28  Letter  9  in  Curley,  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1,  p.  195. 
29  The  Oxford  English  Dictionary:  A  New  English  Dictionary  on  Historical  Principles,  vol.  2 
(Oxford:  The  Clarendon  Press,  1933/1961),  pp.  875-876. 
120 in  English.  However,  as  there  are  many  meanings  for  the  Latin  term,  so  there  are 
many  meanings  for  the  English  term;  these  two  ten'ns  are  equivalent.  It  follows  that 
there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  meaning  is  "make  up.  "  Moreover,  most  Latin 
dictionaries  do  not  say  this  term  has  the  meaning  of  "make  up.  "'O  In  this 
circumstance,  "constitute"  need  not  be  taken  as  implying  identity. 
'0  According  to  the  dictionaries,  the  literal  sense  of  the  term  constituere,  is  "to  settle,  "  'to  found,  " 
or  "to  set  up,  "  etc.,  and  the  transferred  sense  of  this  term  is  'to  appoint,  "  "Ifix  upon,  1)"  44arrange,  " 
"'establish,  "  'to  decide,  "  etc.  However,  they  do  not  mention  "constituere"  as  "constitute,  "  and 
there  is  not  even  a  translation  like  "constitute"  (i.  e.  "  make  up").  Moreover,  English-Latin 
dictionaries  inform  us  that  when  "constitute"  means  'to  make  up,  "  this  is  translated  as  either 
componere  or  efficere  in  Latin,  whereas  when  "constitute"  means  "to  establish,  "  constituere  is 
one  of  the  terms  which  it  can  be  translated  as.  In  the  discussion  of  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the 
attributes,  however,  "constitute"  is  universally  translated  and  used  in  the  sense  of  "to  make  up,  " 
and  in  similar  contexts  in  mediaeval  philosophy  it  is  the  same.  (Only  one  dictionary  of  those  I 
consulted  contains  the  meaning  "make  up"  as  well  as  the  several  other  meanings:  P.  G.  W. 
Glare,  Oxford  Latin  Dictionary,  Oxford:  The  Clarendon  Press,  1982.  ) 
I  searched  the  following  dictionaries: 
D.  P.  Simpson  (ed.  ),  Cassell's  Latin-English-Latin  Dictionary,  Cassell  Ltd.,  1959. 
J.  I-L  Baxter  and  Charles  Johnson  (eds.  ),  Medieval  Latin  Word-List,  London:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1934. 
Charlton  T.  Lewis  and  Charles  Short  (eds.  ),,  4  Latin  Dictionary,  Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1879. 
William  Smith  (ed.  ),  Latin-English  Dictionary,  London,  1866. 
-  The  New  Latin  and  English  Dictionary,  1  st  ed.,  London,  1770 
Elisha  Coles  (-  1640?  -  1680),  A  Dictionary:  "English-Latin  and  Latin-English"  9th  ed., 
London,  1719. 
Thomas  Holyoake  (1616?  -  1675),  A  Large  Dictionary  in  Three  Parts. 
Another  way  to  confirm  this  fact  is  looking  up  the  word  "constitute"  in  English-Latin 
dictionaries.  The  dictionaries  inform  us  that  when  "constitute"  means  the  essence  of  a  thing  such 
as  "to  make  up,  "  "form,  "  or  "compose,  "  this  is  translated  as  either  componere  or  efficere  in 
Latin,  whereas  when  "constitute"  means  "to  establish,  "  "fix,  "  and  so  on,  constituere  is  one  of  the 
proper  Latin  terms  which  it  can  be  translated  as.  r1bat  is  to  say,  even  though  constituere  can  be 
translated  as  "to  constitute"  meaning  "establish,  "  it  cannot  be  translated  as  "to  constitute" 
meaning  "make  up.  "  I  shall  adduce  the  definitions  in  the  English-Latin  Dictionaries: 
constitute,  v.  Transit.  (1)  =  to  form,  make  up,  componere,  efficere.  (2)  =  to  establish,  arrange 
statuere,  constituere,  designare.  (3)  =  to  appoint,  creare,  jacere.  -  D.  P.  Simpson  (ed.  ),  Cassell's 
Latin-English-Latin  Dictionary  (Cassell  Ltd.,  1959),  p.  681. 
constitute:  1.  To  set,  ffix,  establish  :  consitituo  statuo,  instituo,  ordino,  designo  :  see  TO 
ARRANGE,  APPOINT.  H..  To  fonn  or  compose  (the  essence  of  a  thing)  :  cmpono,  conficio  : 
V.  To  CONVOSE..  111.  To  appoint:  1.  lego,  I:  to  appoint  as  a  deputy:  V.  TO  DEPUTE. 
2.  Creo,  facio  :  of  elections  :  V.  TO  ELECT.  -  William  Smith  (ed.  ),  A  Copious  and  Critical 
English-Latin  Dictionary  (London,  1870),  p.  15  1.  *  my  underlining. 
121 Now,  I  shall  consider  the  fact  that  Bennett  runs  into  problems  concerning 
"constituere.  " 
(1)  Bennett  claims  that  "constituere"  should  be  translated  as  "fix,  "  "define,  " 
"determine"  etc.  31  Therefore,  for  Bennett's  Spinoza,  the  attributes  do  not 
constitute  the  substance,  but  theyfix  the  substance. 
(2)  Bennett  treats  the  phrase  "the  intellect  perceives  of'  as  if  Spinoza  uses  it  in 
order  to  indicate  that  attributes  do  not  actually  constitute  the  essence  of 
substance.  32 
The  above  two  points  seem  to  be  the  plausible  rationales  or  grounds  for  arguing 
that,  for  Spinoza,  attributes  do  not  really  constitute  the  substance  (the  essence  of 
substance),  so  long  as  we  consider  each  point  separately.  However,  if  we  consider 
two  points  together,  there  is  a  problem. 
Spinoza's  claim  in  definition  4  of  part  I  is  that  "the  intellect  perceives  the 
attributes  as  constituting  the  essence  of  the  substance.  "  Whether  our  or  God's 
intellect  is  involved,  Bennett  takes  it  that  there  is  an  illusion  here:  the  attributes  do 
not  constitute  the  essence  of  substance,  although  they  are  perceived  even  by  God 
as  doing  so.  The  natural  way  to  express  this  is  to  say  that  the  attributes  fix  the 
essence  but  are  taken  to  constitute  the  essence.  But  this  implies  that  "constituere" 
is  sometimes  used  to  mean  "constitute.  " 
Bennett  translates  "constituere"  as  fix  or  characterise  in  scholium  of 
proposition  10.33  But,  in  definition  4  he  seems  to  translate  "constituere"  not  as 
"fix,  "  but  as  "constitute"  as  in  the  ordinary  translation.  Bennett  may  claim  that 
since  the  Latin  term  "constituere"  has  several  meanings,  we  can  or  should  translate 
it  differently  according  to  the  context.  However,  both  these  statements  have  the 
same  context  concerning  the  translation.  The  statement  which  Bennett  translates  as 
"flx7'  is  that:  "[I]t  is  evident  that,  though  two  attributes  are  conceived  as  distinct- 
that  is,  one  without  the  help  of  the  other-yet  we  cannot  conclude  from  this  that 
31  Jonathan  Bennett,  op.  cit.,  p.  65. 
32  Ibid.,  pp.  146-147. 
33  Bennett  also  regards  "constituere"  as  "apply  to"  or  "are  instantiated  by"  ("A  Note  on  Descartes 
and  Spinoza,  "  Philosophical  Review,  vol.  74  [1965],  p.  380). 
122 they  constitute  two  entities  or  two  different  substances  ....  It  is 
... 
far  from  an 
absurdity  to  ascribe  several  attributes  to  one  substance"  (E,  1,  Prop  10,  Schol;  my 
italics).  And,  the  statement  which  he  seems  to  leave  as  "constitute"  is  that:  "By 
attribute,  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of  substance  as 
constituting  its  essence"  (E,  1,  Def  4;  my  italics).  Bennett  should  translate 
"constituere"  in  both  statements  as  either  only  "constitute"  or  only  "fix.  " 
(2)  The  Meaning  of  the  Phrase  "  Which  the  Intellect  Perceives  of' 
Now,  the  problem  is  that  although  we  solve  the  problem  of  "one  and 
many"-one  essence,  many  attributes-we  are  still  confronted  with  solving  the 
problem  of  the  sense  of  the  phrase  "  the  intellect  perceives  of  "I  shall  cite  the 
definition,  again. 
By  attribute,  I  understand  that  which  the  inteflect  perceives  of 
substance  as  constituting  its  essence.  (E,  1,  Def  4) 
Why  does  Spinoza  put  the  phrase  '*hich  the  intellect  perceives  ...  as"  in  his 
definition  of  the  attributes?  In  other  words,  by  this  phrase  what  does  Spinoza  want 
to  ascribe  to  features  of  the  attributes?  We  can  say  that  the  intellect's  perception, 
whether  it  is  infinite  or  finite,  is  somehow  related  to  expression.  Definition  6  uses 
"express"  where  definition  4  uses  "constituere":  "By  God  I  understand  Being 
absolutely  infinite,  that  is  to  say,  substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes,  each 
one  of  which  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essence"  (E,  I  Def,  6;  my  italics). 
We  can  also  infer  this  point  from  the  following  statements  of  Spinoza, 
which  I  have  quoted  once  when  I  have  explained  the  problem  of  "one  and  many"  in 
the  attributes. 
By  substance  I  understand  what  is  in  itself  and  conceived  through 
itself,  i.  e.,  whose  concept  does  not  involve  the  concept  of  another 
thing.  I  understand  the  same  thing  by  attribute,  except  that  it  is  called 
123 attribute  in  relation  to  the  intellect,  which  attributes  such  and  such  a 
definite  nature  to  substance. 
34 
Here,  we  can  see  that  attribute  is  related  to  the  intellect,  which  attributes  such  and 
such  a  definite  nature  to  substance,  and  that  this  is  the  same  meaning  as  what 
definition  4  offers:  "By  attribute  I  understand  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of 
substance  as  constituting  its  essence"  (E,  1,  Def  4). 
In  this  way,  if  we  take  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  as 
constituting"  along  with  "express,,  "  I  believe  we  can  explain  Spinoza's  doctrine. 
Furthermore,  as  I  have  mentioned  earlier,  we  can  make  the  definition  more 
complete  and  comprehensive,  since  in  this  case,  the  defmition  offers  us  sufficient 
information  on  what  attribute  is,  which  Spinoza  asserts  throughout  Ethics.  In  fact, 
Spinoza  informs  us  that  definition  4  is  related  to  the  concept  "express"  when  he 
uses  this  definition  to  demonstrate  proposition  19  and  20  of  part  1.  He  uses  the 
term  "express"  or  "manifest"  instead  of  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  as 
constituting.  "  Here  is  the  textual  evidence: 
Again,  by  the  attributes  of  God  is  to  be  understood  that  which  (Def  4) 
expresses  the  essence  of  the  divine  substance,  that  is  to  say,  that  which 
pertains  to  substance.  It  is  this,  I  say,  which  the  attributes  themselves 
must  involve.  But  eternity  pertains  to  the  nature  of  substance  (Prop  7). 
Therefore,  each  of  the  attributes  must  involve  eternity,  and  therefore  all 
are  eternal.  (E,  1,  Prop  19,  Demon;  my  italics) 
Agair4  in  the  demonstration  of  proposition  20,  he  states  as  f6flows: 
God  (Prop  19)  and  all  His  attributes  are  eternal,  that  is  to  say  (Def  8), 
each  one  of  His  attributes  expresses  existence.  The  same  attributes  of 
God,  therefore,  which  (Def  4)  manifest  the  eternal  essence  of  God,  at 
the  same  time  manifest  His  eternal  existence,  that  is  to  say,  the  very 
34  Letter  9  in  Curley  (ed.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1,  P.  195.  This  is  the  third 
definition  of  an  earlier  stage  in  the  development  of  Ethics. 
124 same  thing  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  God  constitutes  at  the  same 
time  His  existence,  and  therefore  His  existence  and  His  essence  are  one 
and  the  same  thing.  (E,  1,  Prop  20,  Demon;  my  italics) 
I  think  that  we  have  now  arrived  at  the  sense  of  the  phrase  '1he  intellect  perceives 
of.  "  In  definition  4  and  throughout  Ethics,  Spinoza's  real  intention  about  the 
concept  of  the  attributes  is  that  there  are  infinite  ways  of  expressing  the  essence  of 
the  substance;  attributes  express  the  essence  of  the  substance  each  in  its  own 
distinctive  way.  (How  this  is  to  be  explained  in  detail  will  be  taken  up  in  chapter 
five  and  discussion  will  be  deferred  until  then.  ) 
(3)  What  Is  Structurally  Common  to  All  the  Attributes:  Essence 
Now,  the  question  is  how  we  treat  Spinoza's  statement  which  identifies 
attribute  with  substance-1  understand  the  same  thing  by  attribute.  "  There  have 
been  some  suggestions  about  this  point.  Bennett  regards  the  attribute  as  not 
constituting  (as  meaning  "making  up")  but  only  expressing  the  substance,  so  there 
does  not  exist  any  sort  of  identity  between  substance  and  attribute.  We  have 
already  seen  that  this  interpretation  runs  into  Miculties.  Curley  suggests  that  the 
substance  is  not  identical  with  any  one  attribute,  but  must  be  identical  with  the 
totality  of  the  attributes.  "  Wolf  also  suggests  that  "Substance  (or  Nature  or  God) 
is  the  unified  totality  of  Attributes.  ,  36  But  what  I  think  Spinoza  means  is  that  the 
attribute  itself  is  identical  with  the  substance,  so  that  any  one  attribute  must  be 
identical  with  substance.  By  solving  this  problem,  we  can  arrive  at  a  clearer 
understanding  of  how  the  attributes  can  constitute  the  essence  of  the  substance  (or 
the  substance). 
35  Edwin  Curley,  Behind  the  Geometrical  Method.,  A  Reading  of  Spinoza's  Ethics  (Princeton: 
Princeton  University  Press,  1984),  p.  28. 
36  A.  Wolf,  "Spinoza's  Conception  of  the  Attributes  of  Substance,  "  in  S.  Paul  Kashap  (ed.  ), 
Studies  in  Spinoza:  Critical  and  Interpretive  Essays  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press, 
1972),  p.  17. 
125 I  think  that  we  can  argue  some  sense  of  identity  between  substance  and 
attribute  consistently  with  what  Spinoza  said.  This  depends  on  what  kind  of 
identity  we  argue.  I  claimed  when  arguing  against  Bennett  that  the  substance  (the 
essence)  is  not  beyond  each  attribute,  and  this  is  why  each  attribute  constitutes  and 
expresses  the  essence  of  the  substance.  To  explain  Spinoza's  view  that  attribute  is 
identified  with  substance,  we  should  bear  this  point  in  our  mind:  the  essence  of  the 
substance  is  not  beyond  each  attribute. 
If  we  take  essence  of  the  substance  as  "what  is  structurally  common  to  all 
the  attributes,  "  we  can  explain  identity  between  substance  and  attribute.  Since  the 
attributes  constitute  and  express  the  essence  of  the  same  substance  (or  the  same 
essence  of  substance),  there  must  be  something  common  in  all  the  attributes  as 
there  is  what  is  structurally  common  in  the  ways  of  expressing  the  same  thing; 
what  is  structurally  common  is  expressed  in  all  infinite  numbers  of  attributes  or 
ways.  This  common  structure  in  all  the  attributes  is  nothing  but  the  essence  of 
substance.  This  is  why  it  appears  that  the  attribute  is,  on  the  one  hand,  the  same 
thing  as  substance  and  on  the  other  hand,  all  the  attributes  are  different  from 
substance  for  Spinoza.  If  what  is  structurally  common  to  all  the  attributes  is  the 
essence  and  in  each  attribute  there  is  this  which  is  common,  then  the  many 
attributes  can  constitute  the  essence  and  they  (whether  each  attribute  or  many 
attributes)  are,  in  some  sense,  identical  with  the  essence  of  the  substance  (or  the 
substance)  . 
37  This  can  be  understood  in  the  following  way:  the  numbers  1/ 
2ý 
2/4 
ý 
3/6 
4  /8 
ý  ...  can  be  regarded  as  different  expressions  of  the  same  rational  number.  The 
same  rational  number  can  be  expressed  in  any  of  these  infinite  different  ways.  For 
the  purpose  of  rational  numbers  4/8  is  the  same  as  '/10;  they  form  an  equivalence- 
set. 
37  Spinoza  states  once  that  attributes  constitute  the  essence  of  the  substance,  and  at  another  time, 
that  attributes  constitute  the  substance.  However,  I  regard  both  statements  in  the  same  context.  If 
the  attribute  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  substance  and  the  essence  is  the  most  fundamental 
property,  we  can  say  that  the  attributes  constitute  the  substance.  Strictly  speaking,  when  Spinoza 
says  that  the  attributes  constitute  the  substance,  he  means,  in  fact,  that  they  constitute  the  essence 
of  the  substance  as  Alan  Donagan  observes;  he  regards  "constitute  the  substance"  as  a  natural 
ellipsis  for  "constitute  the  essence  of  the  substance"  CA  Note  on  Spinoza,  Ethics,  1,10,  " 
Philosophical  Review,  vol.  75  [1966],  p.  38  1). 
126 Again,  a  second  analogy  can  help  us  to  explain  how  each  attribute 
constitutes  and  expresses  the  essence  of  the  substance:  let  us  suppose  that  there  is 
a  tune  and  that  this  tune  can  be  played  on  the  piano,  hummed,  whistled,  written  in 
musical  notation,  inscribed  on  bits  of  plastic,  or  fixed  on  tape  by  magnetism;  it  is 
clear  that  all  of  these  media  express  the  same  tune.  When  we  apply  Spinoza's  sense 
of  the  substance  to  the  tune,  there  are  infinite  ways  of  expressing  the  tune;  the 
essence  of  the  tune  is  what  is  structurally  common  to  all  these  ways,  but  is  not  a 
way  of  expression  itself.  Hence,  the  infinite  ways  of  expression  are  one  and  the 
same,  since  they  all  express  the  same  tune,  and  they  are  Merent  since  they  have 
their  own  ways  of  expressing  it.  If  we  ask  someone  "what  tune  did  she  sing?,  "  that 
tune  can  be  given  in  several  ways.  The  differences  between  humming,  written 
notation,  etc.,  do  not  matter.  They  all  give  the  tune. 
Just  as  in  this  example,  in  Spinoza's  system,  there  are  Mmite  ways  of 
expressing  the  essence  of  substance,  and  these  ways  are  attributes  which  express 
the  essence  of  substance  in  their  own  ways.  I  think  that  this  is  Spinoza's  real 
intention.  Furthermore,  the  above  analogy  does  help  us  to  solve  the  problem  of 
"how  many  attributes  can  constitute  the  essence"  by  treating  "essence"  as  "what  is 
structurally  common  to  all  attributes.  "  Thus,  if  we  consider  both  of  them,  we  can 
better  explain  the  relationship  between  the  attributes  and  the  substance  in 
Spinoza's  system.  38 
The  perspective  that  what  is  structurally  common  in  the  ways  which 
express  the  same  tune  is  the  essence  of  the  tune  (or  the  tune)  gives  a  clearer 
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  attribute  and  substance  (essence).  If  the 
"  Returning  to  the  correspondence  between  De  Vries  and  Spinoza.  I  think  that  De  Vries 
understands  Spinoza's  concept  of  attribute  as  essence.  That  is  why  De  Vries  argues  that  each 
attribute  has  only  one  attribute  and  that  if  there  are  two  different  attributes  there  are  two  different 
substances.  If  De  Vries  was  aware  that  for  Spinoza  the  concept  of  attribute  is  not  essence  but  the 
definite  nature  which  the  infinite  intellect  ascribes  to  the  substance,  he  would  not  raise  this 
question.  Spinoza's  position  is,  as  we  have  seen,  that  any  of  the  attributes  (thought,  extension, 
etc.  )  are  equivalent  expressions  of  the  essence,  and  all  of  them  are  basic  expressions  of  the 
essence.  There  is  only  one  essence  for  one  substance,  and  that  is  what  is  structurally  common  to 
all  infinite  attributes.  In  this  sense,  attributes  are  identical  with  the  essence,  and  that  is  why  there 
can  be  many  attributes  for  one  substance.  If  De  Vries  understood  Spinoza's  system  in  the 
perspective  in  this  section,  he  would  not  ask  this  question. 
127 attributes  express  the  essence  of  the  substance,  the  attributes  are  each  conceived  as 
constituting  the  essence.  How  can  many  different  things  each  constitute  the 
essence?  This  is  because  the  essence  is  what  all  these  things  have  structurally  in 
common.  So,  we  cannot  say  what  the  essence  is,  but  we  can  show  what  it  is,  just  as 
we  can  display  the  tune  by  humming  it,  whistling  it,  writing  it  down,  etc.  Since  the 
tune  is  not  something  beyond  the  humming  and  whistling,  but  it  is  in  them  as  what 
they  have  in  common,  they  can  constitute  the  tune. 
As  we  have  seen,  Bennett  thinks  each  of  the  attributes  fixes  or 
characterizes  the  essence,  but  for  his  interpretation  of  Spinoza,  the  real  essence  is 
beyond  the  attributes  which  are  mistakenly  seen  (even  by  God)  as  fundamental.  In 
contrast,  my  view  is  that  the  essence  is  that  which  is  structurally  common  to  all  the 
attributes.  Since  the  two  positions  are  at  first  glance  similar  it  might  help  to 
contrast  thenL39  Bennett  says  that  if  P,  is  systematically  linked  with  M,  (a  non- 
identity)  then  P,  is  extension-and-F,  M,  is  thought-and-F,  for  some  differentiating 
property  F  . 
40  He  offers  an  analogy:  a  circle  is  two-dimensionality  plus  being- 
bounded-by-points-equidistant-from-one-point  and  a  sphere  is  three-dimensionality 
plus  that  property.  However,  in  the  case  of  thought  and  extension,  the  common  F 
is  unknowable  on  its  own,  even  by  God4l-otherwise,  Bennett  thinks,  the 
separation  of  attributes  would  be  threatened.  42  In  contrast,  I  hold  that  there  is 
nothing  unknowable  here,  though  the  essence  cannot  be  grasped  independently  of 
any  attribute.  On  the  analogy  of  the  tune,  we  cannot  give  the  tune  without  giving  it 
in  some  way-whistling  it,  writing  it  down,  etc.  The  essence  cannot  be  given 
without  being  expressed  in  some  way. 
The  perspective  which  I  have  suggested  in  this  chapter  may  help  us  to 
understand  better  Spinoza's  concept  of  the  attributes.  It  allows  for  one  essence, 
many  attributes,  no  illusion  while  explaining  how  the  attributes  constitute  the 
substance  (the  essence  of  substance),  and  also  while  explaining  how  they  are 
identical  to  each  other  and  how  distinct  from  each  other.  It  also  allows  us  to 
'9  This  is  done  more  fully  in  chapter  five  (pp.  159-161). 
40  Betmett,  A  Study  ofSpinoza's  Ethics,  p.  141. 
41  Ibid.,  p.  144. 
42,  bid.,  p.  145. 
128 answer  the  meaning  of  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of'  and  to  answer 
the  problem  of  "one  and  many,  "  while  not  making  Spinoza  self-contradictory  and 
while  holding  the  objective  interpretation  which  is  plausible  and  has  more 
advantages.  Thus,  from  this  kind  of  interpretation,  we  achieve  a  better  and  clearer 
understanding  of  Spinoza's  notion  of  the  attributes. 
129 Chgpter  Five 
One  Thing  and  Two  Descriptions  in 
Spinoza:  the  Double  Aspect  Theory I  have  explored,  in  chapters  two  and  three,  some  interpretations  and  have 
pointed  out  that  they  are  troublesome  to  apply  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
Then,  besides  these,  what  is  Spinoza's  real  tendency  with  respect  to  the 
relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body?  I  would  like  to  suggest  the  double 
aspect  theory  and  representationalism  as  the  interpretations  which  can  be  regarded 
as  Spinoza's  real  thought.  In  the  following  two  chapters,  I  shall  consider  those 
theories  within  Spinoza's  realm  of  thought;  I  shall  discuss  double  aspect  theory  in 
this  chapter  and  representationalism  in  the  next  chapter. 
1.  Statement  of  the  Double  Aspect  Theory 
(1)  One  Thing  Which  Is  Described  Either  As  Mental  or  As  Physical 
a.  Textual  Evidences  concerning  Double  Aspect  Theory 
I  shall  adduce  some  of  Spinoza's  statements  with  respect  to  double  aspect 
theory. 
[S]ubstance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same 
substance,  which  is  now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now 
under  that.  Thus,  also,  a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are 
one  and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways.  (E,  H,  Prop  7, 
Schol) 
[T]he  idea  of  the  body  and  the  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop  13,  pt,  pt.  2), 
the  mind  and  the  body,  are  one  and  the  same  individual  which  at  one 
time  is  considered  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  under 
that  of  extension.  (E,  H,  Prop  21,  Schol) 
For  example,  the  circle  existing  in  Nature  and  the  idea  that  is  in  God  of 
an  existing  circle  are  one  and  the  same  thing  which  is  manifested 
131 through  different  attributes;  and,  therefore,  whether  we  think  of  Nature 
under  the  attribute  of  extension  or  under  the  attribute  of  thought  or 
under  any  other  attribute  whatever,  we  shall  discover  one  and  the  same 
connection  of  causes,  that  is  to  say,  in  every  case  the  same  sequence  of 
things.  ýE,  H,  Prop  7,  Schol)' 
The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is  the  same  as  the  order  and 
connection  of  things.  (E,  H,  Prop  7) 
All  the  above  statements  are  encapsulated  in  the  main  point  of  the  double  aspect 
theory  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  parallel  manifestations  of  one  and  the  same 
thing.  The  first  and  the  second  quotations  establish  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
one  and  the  same  thing  manifested  under  the  two  different  attributes  (thought  and 
extension,  respectively).  The  third  quotation  tells  us  that  since  the  mind  and  the 
body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  we  shall  find  one  and  the  same  order  or  one  and 
same  connection  of  causes.  Hence,  it  follows  that  since  there  is  one  order,  Spinoza 
tells  us,  as  in  the  last  quotation,  that  the  order  and  connection  of  minds  is  the  same 
as  the  order  and  connection  of  bodies. 
Speaking  briefly,  (1)  "identity  in  double  aspect  theory":  the  mind  and  the 
body  are  one  and  the  same  thing  manifested  in  two  different  ways.  Therefore,  (2) 
there  is  one  order  and  connection  of  causes.  Consequently,  (3)  "parallel 
manifestations  in  double  aspect  theory":  the  order  of  the  mind  is  the  same  as  the 
order  of  the  body.  Here  we  can  see  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  nothing  but 
the  double  aspect  theory,  which  combines  identity  with  parallel  relationship.  2 
1  Spinoza  also  states,  in  this  scholium,  that  "when  things  are  considered  as  modes  of  thought  we 
must  explain  the  order  of  the  whole  of  Nature  or  the  connection  of  causes  by  the  attribute  of 
thought  alone,  and  when  things  are  considered  as  modes  of  extension,  the  order  of  the  whole  of 
Nature  must  be  explained  through  the  attribute  of  extension  alone,  and  so  with  other  attributes" 
(E,  II,  Prop  7,  Schol). 
2  For  Spinoza,  if  the  identity  doctrine  is  not  true,  the  other  doctrine  is  also  not  true,  because  the 
latter  relies  on  the  former.  Thus,  identity  is  the  most  important  argument  in  his  theory. 
132 b.  Substance  Monism  and  the  Mind-Body  Theory 
For  Spinoza,  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  is  inferred  from  the 
one-substance  doctrine.  The  first  quotation  above  initially  informs  us  of  how  his 
substance  doctrine  is  related  to  his  mind-body  theory;  the  quotation  obliges  us  to 
infer  his  position  on  the  identity  of  the  mind  and  the  body  from  his  substance 
monism.  If  substance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same  thing, 
the  mode  mentally  (the  mind)  and  the  mode  physically  (the  body)  are  one  and  the 
same  thing.  Now,  the  question  is:  why  substance  thinking  and  substance  extended 
are  one  and  the  same  substance  and  consequently  why  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
one  and  the  same?  The  answer  is  rooted  in  the  doctrine  that  there  exists  only  one 
substance.  Since  the  mind  is  a  mode  of  the  substance  under  the  attribute  of 
thought,  and  the  body  is  the  same  mode  of  the  substance  under  the  attribute  of 
extension,  a  single  individual  thing  is  at  one  time  a  mode  mentally  and  at  another  a 
mode  physically  which  both  express  the  substance  in  a  certain  and  determinate 
manner,  just  as  a  single  substance  is  a  substance  thinking  as  well  as  a  substance 
extended  according  to  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  The  former 
relationship  is  only  a  special  case  of  the  latter. 
At  this  stage,  we  need  to  consider  Spinoza's  notion  of  "mode"  in  some 
more  detail,  since  we  are  exammimig  his  doctrine  of  the  relationship  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  and  Spinoza  regards  the  mind  and  the  body  as  modes.  Spinoza 
defines  modes  as  follows: 
By  mode  I  understand  the  modifications  of  substance,  or  that  which 
is  in  another  thing  through  which  also  it  is  conceived.  (E,  1,  Def  5) 
If  we  consider  this  definition  with  substance  monism,  both  the  mind  and  the  body 
are  modes  of  the  same  substance.  However,  the  notion  of  the  term  "mode"  is 
ambiguous  due  to  the  fact  that  Spinoza  sometimes  denotes  the  mind  and  the  body 
not  as  the  modes  of  the  substance  but  as  the  modes  of  the  attributes.  Spinoza 
states: 
133 Every  mode  which  exists  necessarily  follow  either  from  the  absolute 
nature  of  some  attribute  of  God  or  from  some  attribute  modified  by  a 
modification  which  exists  necessarily  and  infinitely.  (E,  1,  Prop  23) 
The  modes  of  any  attribute  have  God  for  a  cause  only  in  so  far  as  He 
is  considered  under  that  attribute  of  which  they  are  modes,  and  not 
in  so  far  as  He  is  considered  under  any  other  attributes.  (E,  U,  Prop 
6) 
Individual  things  are  nothing  but  modifications  or  modes  of  God's 
attributes,  expressing  those  attributes  in  a  certain  and  determinate 
manner.  This  is  evident  from  Prop  15  and  Def  5.  (E,  1,  Prop  25, 
Corol) 
The  above  three  quotations  lead  to  the  thought  that  the  mind  is  the  mode  of  the 
attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  is  the  mode  of  the  attribute  of  extension.  In  this 
case,  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body  is  not  derived  from  there 
being  one  substance,  but  their  relationship  follows  from  the  relationship  between 
the  attribute  of  thought  and  the  attribute  of  extension. 
However,  when  Spinoza  says  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  the  modes  of 
attributes,  we  should  understand  him  as  meaning  that  the  mind  is  the  mode  which 
expresses  the  essence  of  the  substance  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  the  body 
is  the  mode  which  expresses  the  essence  of  the  very  same  substance  under  the 
attribute  of  extension.  Spinoza's  definition  of  body  makes  clear  this  understanding. 
By  body  I  understand  a  mode  which  expresses  in  a  certain  and 
determinate  manner  the  essence  of  God  in  so  far  as  He  is  considered 
as  the  thing  extended.  (E,  H,  Def  1) 
Spinoza  does  not  give  a  corresponding  definition  of  the  mind.  However,  Spinoza 
would  have  to  define  the  mind  in  the  same  manner  as  the  definition  of  the  body. 
Considering  this  definition  with  there  being  one  substance,  we  can  see  that  the 
134 mind  and  the  body  are  not  the  modes  of  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension, 
but  they  are  the  modes  of  the  one  unique  same  substance  through  the  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension  respectively.  The  mind  is  the  mode  of  the  substance  in 
mental  descriptions  (attribute  of  thought),  and  the  body  is  the  mode  of  the  same 
substance  in  physical  descriptions  (attribute  of  thought).  Just  as  substance  as 
thinking  thing  and  substance  as  extended  thing  is  one  and  the  same  substance 
which  is  comprehended  under  the  two  different  attributes,  so  the  mode  of  the 
former  (mind)  and  the  mode  of  the  latter  (body)  are  one  and  the  same  mode 
conceived  in  two  different  ways  or  descriptions. 
The  fact  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  modes  of  the  one  substance  under 
the  different  attributes  suggests  that  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the 
body  follows  the  relationship  between  substance  conceived  under  thought  and 
substance  conceived  under  extension.  If  the  mind  and  the  body  are  modes  of  the 
one  same  substance,  we  can  hardly  deny  that  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and 
the  body  is  derived  from  the  substance  as  thing  thinking  and  the  same  substance  as 
thing  extended.  Humans  are  manifested  in  the  mode  of  the  mind  through  the 
attribute  of  thought  as  well  as  in  the  mode  of  the  body  through  the  attribute  of 
extension.  Since  the  mind  and  the  body  are  not  the  modes  of  the  attributes,  but  are 
modes  of  the  one  substance  considered  at  one  time  under  the  attribute  of  thought 
and  at  another  under  the  attribute  of  extension,  it  is  clear  that  the  mind  (the  mode 
of  the  one  substance  under  thought)  and  the  body  (the  mode  of  the  one  substance 
under  extension)  are  identical.  The  mind  is  the  modification  of  the  substance 
conceived  as  thing  thinking  and  the  body  is  the  modification  of  the  very  same 
substance  as  thing  extended.  Substance  monism  guarantees  identity  between  the 
mind  and  the  body,  so  mental  events  and  physical  events  are  not  two  different  sets 
of  events  but  are  one  set  of  events,  differently  described. 
Now  we  can  see  that  since  the  mind  is  the  mode  of  the  substance  under 
mental  descriptions  (attribute  of  thought)  and  the  body  is  the  mode  of  the  same 
substance  under  physical  descriptions  (attribute  of  thought),  they  are  one  and  the 
same  thing.  This  should  be  considered  as  the  core  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
For  Spinoza,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  not  two  different  things,  but  rather  one 
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muividual  with  two  different  aspects;  it  f6flows  that  there  is  one  order  of  events, 
not  two. 
c.  Parallelism  Between  the  Mental  and  the  Physical 
As  we  saw  in  chapter  three,  Spinoza  argues  parallelism  on  the  basis  of 
identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body:  for  Spinoza,  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
parallel  because  they  are  identical  with  each  other.  But  when  Spinoza  claims  that 
the  mind  and  the  body  are  identical  and  that  they  are  parallel,  does  he  refer  to 
mental  and  physical  events  or  mental  and  physical  properties?  For  Spinoza  there  is 
an  identity  between  events  whereas  there  is  no  identity  between  properties  (unless 
the  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes  is  right). 
The  fact  that  there  is  an  identity  between  mental  and  physical  events  is  the 
reason  that  "the  event  under  mental  descriptions"  (mind)  and  "the  same  event 
under  the  physical  descriptions"  (body)  are  parallel  with  each  other.  As  I 
mentioned  in  chapter  three,  although  the  mental  and  the  physical  events  are 
identical,  since  they  have  their  different  properties  or  descriptions,  we  can  still 
argue  a  parallel  relationship  between  these  two  sets  of  concept:  one  event  which  is 
given  a  mental  description  and  the  very  same  event  which  is  given  a  physical 
description.  This  is  Spinoza's  conceptual  parallelisn-4  or,  if  you  like,  semantic 
parallelism,  since  it  is  not  argued  in  two  substances  or  two  different  events  but  in 
two  sorts  of  concept  of  one  event. 
Apart  from  conceptual  parallelism,  there  is  property  parallelism  in 
Spinoza's  system.  We  can  simply  explain  that  the  reason  why  there  is  conceptual 
parallelism  is  because  the  two  sorts  of  concept,  mental  and  physical,  pick  out  one 
set  of  events.  But  since  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  are  not  identical,  this 
reason  is  not  enough  to  explain  the  parallel  relationship  between  properties.  Then, 
why  are  they  parallel  to  each  other?  We  saw  in  the  previous  chapter  that  the 
essence  is  "what  is  differently  expressed  by  all  the  attributes"  (or  "what  is 
structurally  common  to  all  the  attributes")  and  that  there  is  one  order  and 
connection  of  causes  due  to  the  fact  that  there  is  one  substance.  It  follows  that  the 
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essence  of  the  event)  in  an  orderly  way.  This  is  why  there  is  a  systematic 
connection  between  the  two  properties.  Since  there  is  one  set  of  events,  there  is 
one  order  of  events?  Then,  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  express  the 
event  according  to  one  order  and  connection  of  causes.  Thus,  property  parallelism 
is  also  argued  on  the  basis  of  identity  between  mental  and  physical  events. 
In  this  way,  if  the  mental  and  the  physical  event  are  one  and  the  same  event 
conceived  in  two  different  ways  and  if  there  is  a  parallel  relationship  between  the 
mental  and  the  physical  event  as  well  as  the  mental  and  the  physical  property  due 
to  identity  of  events,  we  should  regard  Spinoza's  doctrine  as  a  version  of  the 
double  aspect  theory,  since  the  double  aspect  theory  entails  both  identity  and  a 
parallel  relationship  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  as  we  shall  see  as  follows. 
(2)  Double  Aspect  Theory  Entailing  Identity  and  Property 
Parallelism 
Spinoza's  identity  doctrine  is  different  from  identity  theories  in 
contemporary  philosophy,  in  the  sense  that  he  avoids  versions  of  materialism  (and 
versions  of  idealism).  4  At  first,  I  take  this  difference  as  being  derived  from  the  fact 
'  Concerning  this  Spinoza's  states  as  follows: 
"[Tlhe  circle  existing  in  Nature  and  the  idea  that  is  in  God  of  an  existing  circle  are  me 
and  the  same  thing  which  is  manifested  through  different  attributes;  and  therefore, 
whether  we  think  of  Nature  under  the  attribute  of  extension  or  under  the  attribute  of 
thought  or  under  any  other  attribute  whatever,  we  shall  discover  one  and  the  same  order  or 
one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes,  that  is  to  say,  in  every  case  the  same  sequence  of 
things"  (E,  II,  Prop  7,  Schol;  my  italics). 
"[T]he  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  conceived  at  one  time  under  the 
attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of  extension.  For  this  reason,  the  order  or 
concatenation  of  things  is  one,  whether  Nature  be  conceived  under  this  or  under  that 
attribute,  and  consequently  the  order  of  the  state  of  activity  and  passivity  of  our  body  is 
coincident  in  Nature  with  the  order  of  state  of  activity  and  passivity  of  our  mind"  (E,  HI, 
Prop  2,  Schol;  my  italics). 
4  Douglas  Odegard  points  out  the  difference  between  the  identity  doctrine  in  Spinoza  and 
contemporary  identity  theories  ("The  Body  Identical  with  the  Human  Mind:  A  Problem  in 
Spinoza's  Philosophy,  "  in  Eugene  Freeman  and  Maurice  Mandelbaum  [eds.  ],  Spinoza:  Essays  in 
Interpretation  [LaSalle:  Open  Court,  1975],  pp.  61-83).  Stuart  Hampshire  also  talks  about  a 
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contemporary  identity  theory  alleges  that  there  exist  only  physical  events,  whereas 
for  Spinoza,  there  is  one  thing  which  can  be  described  either  as  mental  or  physical: 
the  same  set  of  events  admits  of  two  equally  good  and  equally  comprehensive 
descriptions.  The  main  point  in  Spinoza's  identity  theory  is  that  the  mind  and  the 
body  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  and  this  theory  does  not  fall  into  materialism  or 
idealism  because  the  thing  can  be  described  as  mental  or  physical  equivalently.  This 
is  why  Spinoza's  identity  theory  differs  from  contemporary  identity  theories. 
Speaking  more  accurately,  since  Spinoza's  assertion  of  identity  between  the  mind 
and  the  body  is  posited  on  the  double  aspect  theory  which  holds  not  only  identity 
but  also  parallel  manifestations,  his  claim  of  identity  is  distinct  from  the 
contemporary  one.  It  may  be  argued  that  there  is  another  version  of  the  double 
aspect  theory  (the  one-and-a  half  aspect  theory),  posited  in  the  view  that  there  are 
two  sorts  of  description,  but  the  physical  one  is  best,  so  that  when  one  thing  is 
described  as  physical  it  is better  than  when  the  same  thing  is  described  as  mental 
(and  some  contemporary  versions  of  the  double  aspect  theory  are  also 
materialistic).  However,  the  original  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory  is  posited 
in  the  view  that  both  aspects  are  equal:  the  parallelistic  double  aspect  theory,  as  I 
would  call  it.  Whenever  I  use  the  term  "double  aspect  theory"  in  my  thesis,  I  mean 
the  original  version  unless  it  is  indicated.  Now,  let  us  consider  the  double  aspect 
theory  with  respect  to  identity  and  parallelism. 
First  of  all,  I  would  like  to  point  out  that  the  equivalence  between  the  mind 
and  the  body  in  the  double  aspect  theory  indicates  that  the  double  aspect  theory  is 
closely  related  to  property  parallelism.  From  this  indication,  we  can  assume  that 
similar  point:  "There  are  two  respects  in  which  Spinoza's  doctrine  is  altogether  different  from 
that  of  the  ordinary  scientific  materialist:  first,  Spinoza  held  that  there  was  a  peculiar  feature  of 
psychic  causality,  which  sets  it  apart  from  physical  causality,  namely,  that  a  man's  thought  about 
the  causes  of  his  thoughts  modifies  the  original  thoughts:  secondly,  that  the  operations  of  the 
mind,  when  employed  on  its  proper  business  of  pure  thought,  are  not  to  be  explained  in  the 
common  order  of  nature  and  by  transient  causes;  the  mind  is  capable  of  following  an  entirely 
rational  order  of  thought,  and  of  being  altogether  independent  of  external  causes"  ("Spinoza's 
Theory  of  Human  Freedom,  "  in  ibid.,  pp.  44-45). 
138 double  aspect  theory  entails  both  identity  and  property  parallelism.  5  If  the 
fundmental.  feature  of  the  double  aspect  theory  is  identity,  and  identity  theory 
entails  property  paraRelism,  it  follows  that  the  double  aspect  theory  entails  not  only 
identity  but  also  parallelism.  The  following  definitioný  of  the  double  aspect  theory 
sheds  light  on  this  point. 
Double  Aspect  Theory: 
... 
The  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  and  the 
body,  which  teaches  that  mental  and  bodily  facts  are  parallel  manifestations  of  a 
single  underlying  unity.  (my  italics) 
The  double  aspect  theory  acknowledges  the  incomparability  of  material  and 
conscious  processes,  and  maintains  the  impossibility  of  reducing  the  one  to  the 
other,,  in  terms  either  of  materialism  or  idealism  (spiritualism).  It  professes  to 
overcome  the  onesideness  of  these  two  theories  by  regarding  both  series  as  only 
different  aspects  of  the  same  reality,  like  the  convex  and  the  concave  views  of  a 
curve  (G.  H.  Lewes);  or,  according  to  another  favourite  metaphor,  the  bodily  and 
the  mental  facts  are  really  the  same  facts  expressed  in  different  language.  The 
most  characteristic  feature  of  the  theory  is  its  strenuous  denial  of  the  possibility 
of  the  causal  interaction  between  the  body  and  mind,  or  vice  versa,  in  deference 
to  the  supposed  necessities  of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  For 
interaction  it  substitutes  parallelism  or  concomitance.  Each  side  seems  to  "get 
along  by  itself,  "  or  rather,  as  Bain  puts  it,  "we  have  always  a  two-sided  cause. 
The  line  of  causal  sequence  is  not  mind  causing  body,  and  body  causing  mind, 
but  mind-body  giving  birth  to  mind-body"  (  Mind  and  Body,  132).  This  doctrine 
of  "a  double-faced  unity,  "  as  Bain  calls  it,  has  more  recently  appropriated  to  itself 
the  name  of  MONISM. 
5  Parallelism  can  be  the  doctrine  that  mental  events  are  distinct  from,  but  run  in  step  with, 
physical  events.  This  is  not  a  plausible  interpretation  of  Spinoza  (see  chapter  three,  pp.  67-71 
above).  Property  parallelism  involves  one  set  of  events,  equivalently  describable. 
6  James  Mark  Baldwin  (ed.  ),  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  vol.  I  (New  York: 
Macmillan,  1901),  p.  295-296. 
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theory  is  the  double  aspect  theory.  7  If  one  has  a  proper  understanding  of  what  the 
double  aspect  theory  is,  one  can  hardly  fail  to  ascribe  this  theory  to  Spinoza.  We 
should  ascribe  the  double  aspect  theory  to  Spinoza  while  being  aware  that  double 
aspect  theory  is  the  identity  theory  with  (conceptual  or  property)  parallelism. 
(3)  Spinoza  as  a  Double  Aspect  Theorist 
a.  A  Numerical  Identity  ofEvents:  One  Event  with  Two  Properties 
Spinoza's  claim  of  the  numerical  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body 
can  be  understood  either  as  clafinffig  (1)  the  mental  and  the  physical  event  are 
identical  (are  one  and  the  same  event),  or  (2)  the  mental  and  the  physical  property 
are  identical  (are  one  and  the  same  property  differently  grasped). 
If  we  put  these  claims  in  terms  of  his  metaphysics,  (1)  is  that  "the  thinking 
substance  and  the  extended  substance  are  one  and  the  same  substance,  "  and  (2)  is 
that  "the  attribute  of  thought  and  the  attribute  of  extension  are  one  and  the  same 
property.  "  In  the  case  of  (2),  to  argue  the  numerical  identity,  we  would  have  to 
hold  a  somewhat  sub  ective  view  of  the  attributes:  the  difference  between  the 
mental  and  the  physical  property  only  reflects  differences  in  our  belief-contents,  not 
in  the  facts  targeted  by  those  beliefs,  and  thus  they  are  different  ways  of  describing 
one  property.  Moreover,  we  cannot  ascribe  a  real  existence  to  these  ways  of 
conceiving  the  property.  Thus,  these  ways  in  the  case  (2)  are  treated  as  being 
derived  from  a  subjective  view.  This  argument  is  simply  that  in  order  to  explain 
that  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  property  a  subjective 
interpretation  of  the  attributes  must  be  given.  We  saw,  in  the  previous  chapter,  that 
7  The  French  and  German  equivalents  of  the  term  "double  aspect  theory"  show  some  connection 
with  identity  and  parallelism,  respectively.  "Ger.  psycho-physischer  Parallelismus  [psycho- 
physical  parallelism]  (not  an  adNuate  Nuivalent,  unless  connected  with  the  identfty  them  o 
mind  and  )ody-K.  G.  );  Fr.  Theorie  de  Punite  a  deux  faces  [double  aspect  unity  theory];  Ital. 
teoria  del  doppio  aspetto  [double  aspect  theory]"  (ibid.,  p.  295;  my  underlining).  However,  the 
terminological  problem  of  the  term  "double  aspect  theory"  is  only  a  minor  one.  The  important 
thing  is  to  be  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  double  aspect  theory  denotes  "the  identity  theory  with 
property  para  e  sm. 
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for  Spinoza  there  is  no  (numerical)  identity  between  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension.  It  follows  that  we  have  to  take  Spinoza's  claim  of  identity  between  the 
mind  and  the  body  as  presenting  only  an  identity  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  event.  In  my  view,  the  relationship  between  the  substance  and  the 
attributes  of  thought  and  extension  is  the  same  as  the  relationship  between  event 
(or  individual)  and  the  properties  of  mental  and  physical.  This  leads  consequently 
to  the  perspective  that  the  mental  and  the  physical  event  are  one  and  the  same 
event  with  different  properties  or  descriptions,  just  as  the  thinking  and  the 
extended  substance  are  one  and  the  same  substance  with  different  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension. 
Spinoza  regards  the  mind  as  the  mode  (the  modification)  of  the  substance 
under  the  attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  as  the  mode  (the  modification)  of  that 
substance  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  Namely,  the  mind  is  the  modification  of 
the  substance  conceived  as  a  thinking  thing  and  the  body  is  the  modification  of  the 
very  same  substance  as  the  thing  extended.  If  the  mind  and  the  body  are  not  the 
modes  of  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  but  the  modes  of  the  one  same 
substance  through  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  respectively,  we  can 
argue  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  while  holding  an  objective 
interpretation  of  the  attributes.  For  Spinoza,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  not  two 
different  things,  but  rather  one  thing  with  two  different  properties  or  descriptions. 
In  my  view,  the  identity  which  Spinoza  wants  to  claim  is  not  type  identity 
but  token  identity.  For  Spinoza,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  identical  to  each  other 
because  they  are  one  and  the  same  individual  while  the  mental  and  the  physical 
properties  do  not  count  against  an  identity;  we  just  leave  them  as  different  types. 
To  discuss  this  issue,  a  comparison  between  type  identity  and  token  identity  should 
be  considered.  A  reductive  type  identity  claims  initially  that: 
(1)  There  is  one  and  the  same  individual  (event)  apparently  having  both  mental  and 
physical  properties. 
(2)  There  is  a  systematic  connection  between  these  two  apparent  sorts  of  property. 
it  is  subsequently  argued. 
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(4)  So,  there  is  only  one  sort  of  property,  the  physical. 
To  be  any  kind  of  type  identity  theorist,  it  is  integral  to  hold  (1),  (1),  and  in 
addition  to  hold  that  there  is  one  sort  of  propriety.  If  a  type  identity  theory  is 
physicalist  one  it  maintains  (3)  and  (4)  in  addition,  and  if  it  is  subjective  one'  it 
holds  (1),  (2),  and  (4)  which  is  modified:  (4)1  there  is  only  one  sort  of  property 
which  can  be  seen  as  mental  or  physical. 
To  be  a  token  identity  theorist,  it  is  necessary  to  deny  (3)  and  (4),  but  to 
hold  (1).  As  to  point  (1),  it  is  not  necessary  for  a  token  identity  theorist  to  deny 
this  point;  it  is  compatible  with  token  identity.  Although  Davidson's  token  identity 
theory  (anomalous  monism)  does  not  maintain  point  (2),  it  is  not  integral  for  token 
identity  to  deny  those  points. 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  maintains  points  (1)  and  (1),  and  denies  (3) 
and  (4),  and  thus  his  theory  can  perhaps  best  be  classified  as  a  token  identity 
theory,  9  Spinoza's  argument  of  a  systematic  connection  between  the  mental 
property  and  the  physical  property  may  lead  us  to  think  that  his  theory  is  a  kind  of 
type  identity  theory.  However,  that  argument  is  irrelevant  to  such  a  type  identity 
theory,  since  the  reason  for  a  systematic  connection  is  not  on  account  of  the 
reduction  of  the  mental  to  the  physical  property  as  type  identity  argues.  For 
Spinoza,  there  is  no  such  identity  between  them. 
The  fact  that  Spinoza  holds  substance  monism  and  property  dualism 
(attribute  dualism)  which  is  given  an  objective  interpretation  suggests  that 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  a  kind  of  token  identity  theory.  Since  Spinoza  does 
not  assert  that  the  identity  between  the  attribute  of  thought  and  the  attribute of 
extension,  but  rather  maintains  the  separation  of  the  attributes,  it  is  hardly  possible 
to  argue  that  the  mental  and  the  physical  property  are  identical  to  each  other.  The 
8  By  a  subjective  type  identity  theory,  I  mean  the  theory  is  presented  by  claiming  that  there  are  no 
mental  nor  physical  properties,  but  there  are  only  the  (neutral)  properties  which  are  seen  as 
mental  or  physical;  if  the  subjective  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  concept  of  the  attributes  were 
right,  we  would  have  to  interpret  Spinoza  as  a  subjective  type  identity  theorist. 
9  If  the  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes  were  adequate,  Spinoza's  theory  would  be 
subjective  type  identity  theory. 
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between  the  mind  and  body  not  as  the  same  type  but  as  the  same  individual. 
Whenever  Spinoza  claims  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  he 
suggests  their  identity  as  an  individual  or  a  thing  and  leaves  the  attributes  as  the 
different  types: 
Tbus,  also,  a  mode  of  extension  and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  one 
and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways.  (E,  11,  Prop  7, 
Schol;  my  italics) 
[T]he  mind  and  the  body,  are  one  and  the  same  individual  which  at 
one  time  is  considered  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another 
under  that  of  extension.  (E,  H,  Prop  2  1,  Demon;  my  italics) 
These  statements  make  it  quite  clear  that  even  though  there  are  differences 
between  the  mind  and  the  body,  they  are  one  and  the  same  thing  with  two  different 
aspects.  In  other  words,  the  mental  event  and  the  physical  event  are  one  and  the 
same  event  although  the  mental  properties  are  different  from  the  physical 
properties.  In  this  way,  if  we  argue  the  identity  theory  while  holding  the  objective 
interpretation,  our  arguments  should  be  tied  up  with  the  substance  monism  and 
property  dualism. 
b.  Token  Double  Aspect  Theory 
I  classify  the  above  theory  of  Spinoza's  as  the  version  of  the  double  aspect 
theory  which  maintains  both  an  identity  and  a  parallel  relationship.  However,  we 
need  to  specify  this  double  aspect  theory  if  we  are  to  entertain  Spinoza's  double 
aspect  theory.  We  can  think  of  two  kinds  of  double  aspect  theory: 
(1)  Token  double  aspect  theory:  this  is  posited  on  an  objective  interpretation  of  the 
attributes.  The  mental  and  the  physical  event  are  one  and  the  same  event 
expressed  in  the  Merent  aspects:  here  "aspect"  is  used  as  a  metaphor  for  the 
properties  or  attributes  which  express  or  describe  the  essence.  And  there  is  a 
143 parallel  relationship  between  the  (apparent)  mental  and  the  (apparent)  physical 
event  as  well  as  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  (two  aspects):  the 
former  is  conceptual  parallelism  in  events  and  the  latter  property  parallelism  (or 
ontological  parallelism  in  properties). 
(2)  Type  double  aspect  theory:  this  is  posited  on  a  subjective  interpretation  of  the 
attributes.  The  mental  and  the  Physical  properties  are  one  and  the  same 
property  expressed  in  the  different  aspects:  here  "aspect"  is  used  in  the  literal 
sense,  a  point  of  view.  The  one  (neutral)  property  is  seen  as  mental  and 
physical.  And  the  property  seen  as  mental  and  the  property  seen  as  physical  are 
parallel  to  each  other  (due  to  the  fact  that  they  are  identical).  This  parallelism  is 
not  property  parallelism  (or  ontological  parallelism  in  properties),  but 
conceptual  parallelism  in  properties!  0 
Certainly,  Spinoza  claims  the  first  one,  token  double  aspect  theory,  as  he 
holds  an  objective  view  of  the  attributes.  Unlike  Davidson's  anomalous  monism,  a 
token  identity  theory,  Spinoza's  token  double  aspect  theory  argues  not  only  an 
identity  of  individuals  but  also  a  systematic  connection  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  properties.  (Furthermore,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  Spinoza  also 
claims  representationalism  in  his  mind-body  theory).  Unlike  the  reductive  type 
identity  theory  (and  the  subjective  type  identity  theory),  Spinoza  does  not  argue 
identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties.  He  claims  only  a 
systematic  connection  between  two  properties.  Before  Davidson,  Spinoza  had 
already  distinguished  token  from  type  identity  and  had  claimed  token  identity 
(although  he  did  not  use  the  term  nor  did  he  formulate  the  concept  clearly).  In  this 
way,  Spinoza  argues  that  there  is  one  event  with  different  sorts  of  mental  and 
physical  properties,  and  that  these  two  sorts  of  properties  are  systematically 
connected.  Thus,  his  mind-body  theory  should  be  regarded  as  the  double  aspect 
theory  based  on  the  token  identity  of  events,  and  for  this  reason,  if  we  need  a  label 
for  his  theory,  I  should  like  to  call  it  a  token  double  aspect  theory.  " 
10  Concerning  events,  it  is  also  conceptual  parallelism  in  events. 
11  Alternatively,  we  can  call  it  a  systematic  token  identity  theory-,  one  might  wish  to  call  it  a  non- 
reductive  type  identity  theory,  but  this  is  misleading.  As  we  have  seen,  although  for  Spinoza  there 
144 2  Some  Criticisms  of  the  Douhle  Aspect  Interpretation 
There  have  been  objections  to  the  double  aspect  interpretation  of  the 
attributes  and  of  the  mind-body  theory  in  Spinoza.  In  the  following  two  sections,  I 
shall  consider  those  criticisms.  In  this  section,  I  shall  explore  J.  B.  Bakker's 
objection  which  is  raised  in  his  article  "Did  Spinoza  Have  a  Double  Aspect 
Theory?,  "  and  in  the  next  section,  I  shall  consider  all  the  other  criticisms  which  I 
have  detected  so  far.  Bakker's  article  is  intended  to  raise  two  objections  to  the 
double  aspect  theory:  firstly,  an  objection  to  the  terms  used  in  the  argument 
("double,  "  "aspect")  and  secondly,  to  the  argument  itself.  I  shall,  in  subsection  1, 
describe  Bakker's  arguments,  and  in  subsection  2,1  shall  criticise  some  points  of 
his  argument. 
(1)  Bakker's  Rejection  of  the  Double  Aspect  Theory 
a.  The  Terms  "Double  I't  and  "Aspect" 
In  his  article,  Bakker  asserts  that  the  expression  of  attribute  is  the  most 
important  part  in  interpreting  Spinoza's  metaphysics  and  the  mind-body  theory. 
Following  this,  in  section  11,  he  moves  on  to  reject  the  double  aspect  theory  by 
pointing  out  the  inadequacy  of  the  term  "double"  and  "aspect.  " 
First  of  all,  he  deals  with  the  term  "double.  "  He  argues  that  the  double 
aspect  interpretation  is  misleading  because  Spinoza's  attributes  are  not  two  but 
infinite.  He  tries  to  make  this  point  clear  by  showing  that  even  if  humans  know 
only  two  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  and  do  not  know  the  other  attributes, 
we  express  more  than  two  i.  e.  the  infinite  attributes  (aspects).  Due  to  the  above 
fact,  he  claims,  placing  the  double  aspect  label  on  Spinoza  is  mistaken,  because 
"double"  suggests  only  two  aspects  unlike  the  infinite  aspects  in  Spinoza's 
is  a  systematic  connection  (a  parallel  relationship)  between  mental  and  physical  properties,  since 
one  is  not  reduced  to  the  other,  there  is  no  identity  between  two  sorts  of  properties  or  types. 
145 system.  12  This  objection  does  not  upset  the  basic  strength  of  the  interpretation;  if 
anything  it  shows  only  that  the  label  could  be  misleading  if  we  are  thinking  of  God 
rather  than  humans.  Regarding  the  first  problem  of  the  terms,  it  seems  to  be  right 
to  say  that  the  terms  are  misleading  although  it  is,  as  Bakker  admits,  a  minor  point. 
Perhaps  the  term  "double"  is  not  compatible  with  Spinoza's  claim  that  there  are 
not  two  attributes  but  infinite  attributes,  and  therefore  it  should  be  infinite  aspects 
rather  than  two  aspects.  However,  I  think  that  since  Spinoza  mostly  talks  of  just 
two  attributes  it  is  a  permissible  way  of  speaking. 
Next,  he  moves  on  to  the  more  substantial  point  with  respect  to  the  term 
"aspect.  "  After  he  points  out  the  term  "aspect"  is  not  used  by  Spinoza,  he 
maintains  that  "aspect"  is  not  an  accurate  term  to  explain  Spinoza's  metaphysical 
system.  The  reason  is  that  the  term  44aspect"  cannot  refer  to  "the  whole"  but  refers 
only  to  "the  part":  Spinoza's  attributes  express  the  essence  of  the  one  substance 
while  the  term  "aspect"  implies  that  it  cannot  express  the  essence  of  that  substance 
since  it  is  only  a  partial  appearance.  "  Thus,  he  states  "it  would  be  equally 
nonsensical  to  argue  that  one  part  of  a  thing  could  constitute  its  essence.  ,  14  AIS05 
just  as  it  is  not  possible  to  regard  the  attributes  as  different  aspects  of  one 
substance,  so  the  mind  and  the  body  cannot  be  regarded  as  different  aspects  of  a 
single  human  being.  At  this  stage,  Bakker  is  maintaining  that  a  mode  cannot  be  an 
aspect  which  is  a  partial  appearance,  because  a  mode  is  the  complete  expression  of 
a  substance  within  an  attribute.  "  He  recognises  a  possible  objection  to  the  above 
point:  "[The  mind  and  the  body]  do  only  imperfectly  express  the  essence  of 
substance.  ,  16  Against  this,  he  defends  his  view  by  arguing  that  his  point  concerns 
not  substance  but  person:  either  the  mind  or  the  body  expresses  the  essence  of  the 
person,  but  if  the  mind  and  the  body  are  aspects  of  the  person,  they  cannot  express 
the  essence  of  the  person  because  aspects  are  not  an  essential  but  merely  a  partial 
"  Jonathan  Bushnell  Bakker,  "Did  Spinoza  Have  a  Double  Aspect  Theory?  "  International 
Studies,  vol.  14  (1982),  p.  5. 
13  Ibid.,  pp.  5-6. 
14  Ibid.,  p.  6. 
15  Jbidy  pp.  6-7. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  7. 
146 appearance.  17  In  his  words,  "though  the  person,  understood  either  as  a  mind  or  as  a 
body,  is,  as  a  mode,  an  incomplete  expression  of  substance,  it  does  not  follow  that 
mind  and  body  is  an  incomplete  expression  of  what  the  person  is.  ""  Therefore,  his 
point  is  that  with  respect  both  to  thought  and  extension  of  substance  and  to  the 
mind  and  the  body  of  person,  the  term  "aspect"  is  not  appropriate  and  should  be 
avoided,  since  "aspect"  is  not  a  sufficient  term  to  represent  Spinoza's  attributes- 
doctrine  and  the  mind-body  theory. 
b.  Equivalence-Identity 
Bakker,  in  section  111,  suggests  that  we  should  use  the  term  "identity 
theory"  as  a  substitute  for  the  term  "double  aspect  theory"  as  being  a  more 
appropriate  term.  His  main  argument  for  identity  theories  is  as  follows:  in 
Spinoza's  system,  each  attribute  equivalently  constitutes  as  well  as  equivalently 
expresses  the  essence  of  the  one  same  substance,  hence  all  the  attributes  are 
identical  in  substance.  As  with  the  attributes,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  also 
identical  with  each  other  because  they  equivalently  express  the  same  person  and 
also  the  same  substance  through  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  Thus,  he 
designates  this  relation  as  an  "equivalence-identity"  and  he  emphasises  that  this 
identity  is  a  non-reductive  identity  unlike  traditional  materialism  and  many  other 
contemporary  identity  theories  which  hold  that  the  mind  is  a  part  of  the  body.  19 
Regarding  the  theory  of  "equivalence-identity,  "  he  states  that  "the  mind  and  the 
body  must  be  understood  as  independent,  but  nevertheless  equivalent,  expressions 
of  the  essence  and  existence  of  the  person.  9120 
He  tries  to  make  clear  the  difference  between  the  double  aspect  theory  and 
the  theory  of  "equivalence-identity"  by  using  the  analogy  of  a  concavo-convex 
object.  For  instance,  the  concave  surface  and  the  convex  surface  of  a  lens  are  not 
the  same  surface  although  they  are  surfaces  (aspects)  of  the  same  lens,  whereas  a 
17  ibid., 
pp.  7-8. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  7. 
19  Ibid.,  pp.  9-10. 
20  ibid.,  P.  i  i. 
147 curved  line  is  one  and  the  same  line  which  is  at  once  both  concave  and  convex; 
therefore  the  concave  is  one  and  the  same  line  as  the  convex  .2'  According  to 
Bakker,  the  former  is  an  analogy  of  the  double  aspect  theory  and  the  latter  is  an 
analogy  of  the  equivalence-identity  theory:  "[A]  concavo-convex  line  is  therefore 
a  good  example  of  the  identity  of  mind  and  body  for  which  Spinoza  argued.  -)922 
From  the  analogies,  I  take  his  point  as  meaning  that  in  the  case  of  the  former  the 
concave  and  the  convex  are  only  partial  characterizations  of  the  same  lens,  while  in 
the  latter  they  are  essential  and  complete  expressions  of  the  same  line.  With  this 
analogy,  he  describes  his  perspective  on  Spinoza's  theory  as  follows. 
Just  as  two  different  descriptions  of  the  same  concavo-convex  line  may 
appear  to  be  descriptions  of  two  different  lines  to  someone  ignorant  of 
the  nature  of  lines,  in  the  same  way  mind  and  body  appear  to  be 
different  entities  because  we  are  ignorant  of  the  nature  of  individual 
diings,  what  Spinoza  called  "modes.  ,,  23 
In  this  way,  Bakker  argues  that  we  should  pay  more  attention  to  the  concept  of 
expression  in  Spinoza's  system.  We  can  summarise  his  claim  as  follows:  Spinoza 
has  an  identity  theory  as  to  attributes  and  mind/body,  and  this  theory  is  based  on 
the  concept  of  expression  within  which  each  attribute  equivalently  expresses  the 
essence  of  substance.  Thus  according  to  Bakker,  we  should  call  this  theory  an 
equivalence-identity  theory  rather  than  a  double  aspect  theory. 
(2)  Remarks  on  Bakker  Is  Arguments 
Bakker  claims  that  the  term  "aspect"  is  an  inadequate  word  for  explaining 
the  essential  expression,  since  this  term  refers  only  to  partial  expression  of 
substance.  Bakker  says  that  this  point  is  more  substantial  than  the  problem  of  the 
term  "double.  "  However,  even  if  he  is  right  about  the  term  "aspect,  "  it  is  not 
21 
bid.,  P.  11-12. 
22  Ibid.,  P.  12. 
23  Ibid,  P.  14. 
148 substantial  but  still  only  a  minor  point.  As  long  as  it  concerns  merely  the  misleading 
choice  of  the  term  "aspect"  it  does  not  affect  the  theory  as  we  have  expressed  it;  it 
is  only  the  problem  of  the  usage  of  the  term. 
Bakker  speaks  of  two  theories  in  his  article,  and  these  are  as  follows. 
(1)  a  double  aspect  theory:  he  criticises  this  for  not  expressing  the  essence  of  the 
substance  but  only  referring  to  a  partial  aspect  . 
(2)  an  equivalence-identity  theory:  he  introduces  this  theory  as  a  new  interpretation 
of  Spinoza  or  as  an  improvement  of  the  double  aspect  theory,  i.  e.  the 
equivalence-identity  theory;  which  he  thinks  is  an  adequate  interpretation  of 
Spinoza's  attribute-doctrine  and  mind-body  theory  since  this  theory  refers  to 
an  essential  expression  of  substance  unlike  the  double  aspect  theory. 
However,  the  former  is  not  the  commonly-held  version  of  the  double  aspect 
theory.  Rather,  the  latter  is  what  the  double  aspect  theory  holds.  In  fact,  the  former 
perhaps  represents  Bennett's  position,  whereby  there  are  fundamental  trans- 
attributive  modes  comb'  i  with  thought  and  extension.  The  double  aspect  theory  Ming 
as  normally  expounded  does  not  argue  for  the  partial  appearance  or  expression  of 
the  basic  properties  of  a  person,  but  that  the  attributes  express  as  well  as  constitute 
those  basic  properties,  not  partially  but  completely  and  equivalently.  Thus, 
Bakker's  equivalence  identity  interpretation  is  not  a  new  interpretation  but  only  the 
repetition  of  the  argument  of  double  aspect  theory  under  another  name. 
Indeed,  the  analogy  of  the  concavo-convex  line  which  Bakker  uses  is 
actually  used  in  the  definition  of  the  double  aspect  theory,  as  by  Baldwin.  24 
Another  point  which  Bakker  stresses  is  the  complete  and  essential  expression  of 
substance  in  each  of  the  attributes.  But  we  can  find  this  point  in  the  double  aspect 
theory,  too.  W.  von  Leyden,  who  holds  what  he  calls  a  double  aspect  interpretation 
of  Spinoza,  claims:  "In  its  own  sphere  each  of  the  two  phenomena  would  seem  to 
24  Baldwin  writes:  "[The  double  aspect  theory]  professes  to  overcome  the  onesidedness  of  these 
two  theories  [materialism  and  idealism]  by  regarding  both  series  as  only  different  aspects  of  the 
same  reality,  like  the  convex  and  the  concave  views  of  a  curve  (G.  H.  Lewes);  or,  according  to 
another  favourite  metaphor,  the  bodily  and  the  mental  facts  are  really  the  same  facts  expressed  in 
different  language,  (Baldwin  [ed.  ],  op.  cit.,  vol.  1,  p.  295). 
149 be  a  complete  and  true  expression  of  one  and  the  same  underlying  reality.  "25 
Therefore,  it  is  evident  that  Bakker's  interpretation  is  nothing  but  the  contents  of 
the  double  aspect  theory  under  another  name.  In  fact,  we  entirely  agree  with  the 
content  of  his  article  and  take  it  (terminology  apart)  as  supporting  the  double 
aspect  theory. 
Wallace  1.  Matson  similarly  criticises  the  term  "aspect": 
The  other  label  that  one  finds  in  the  text  books,  "double  aspect  theory,  " 
presumably  derives  from  the  remark  just  quoted,  "one  and  the  same  thing 
expressed  in  two  different  ways"  ("una  eademque  est  res,  sed  duobus 
modis  expressa").  But  this  says  nothing  of  two  aspects,  only  of  two 
expressions.  The  difference  is  important.  Two  aspects  require  two 
observers,  or  at  least  two  observation  points;  and  what  might  those  be?  That 
is  how  mythological  entities  proliferate.  26 
From  one  point  of  view,  Matson  does  not  criticise  the  double  aspect  interpretation 
of  Spinoza,  but  merely  criticises  the  terminology  of  the  double  aspect  theory;  he 
interprets  "aspect"  very  literally.  As  I  have  already  argued  in  the  last  section,  the 
term  "aspect"  is  related  to  "expressions,  "  "explanations,  "  or  "descriptions"  in  the 
argument  of  the  double  aspect  theory  of  Spinoza.  27  In  fact,  one  of  the  main 
concepts  in  the  double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza  is  the  concept  of 
expressions.  On  the  other  hand,  Matson  may  be  indicating  that  there  is  no  need  to 
infer  two  sets  of  properties  from  two  descriptions.  This  brings  us  on  to  the 
subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes. 
25  W.  von  Leyden,  Seventeenth  Century  Metaphysics  (London:  Gerald  Duckworth,  1968),  p.  193. 
26  Wallace  1.  Matson,  "Spinoza's  Theory  of  Mind,  "  in  Eugene  Freeman  and  Maurice  (eds.  ), 
Spinoza:  Essays  in  Interpretation  (LaSalle:  Open  Court,  1975),  pp.  55-56. 
27  The  phrase  "considered  under  the  attribute  of.  .  ." 
is  another  phrase  which  Spinoza  uses. 
150 3.  Attributes  and  the  Double  Aspect  Theory 
(1)  The  Subjective  Interpretation 
Next,  to  the  double  aspect  theory  and  subjective  interpretation,  which  R.  J. 
Delahunty  briefly  states  as  follows. 
On  this  interpretation,  'the  double  aspect  theory  "explains"  psycho-physical 
correlations  by  saying  that  one  and  the  same  event,  which  is  neither  mental 
or  physical,  may  be  apprehended  introspectively  or  perceptively:  insofar  as  it 
is  apprehended  in  the  former  way  it  is  mental,  insofar  as  it  is  apprehended  in 
28  the  latter  way,  it  is  physical'  . 
We  need  not  tarry  long  over  this  interpretation;  it  commits  at  least  three 
straightforward  errors,  all  of  them  involving  the  mistaken  'subjectivist' 
account  of  the  attributes.  First,  in  supposing  that  the  attributes  are  'aspect', 
it  implies  that  they  depend  on  being  perceived  (Yesey  (1),  29  P.  146)-5 
second,  it  asserts  that  for  Spinoza  things  in  themselves  are  unknowable 
(which  he  denies)  and  neither  mental  nor  physical  (when  he  holds  they  are 
both);  third,  it  takes  Spinoza  to  claim  that  the  'mental'  is  the  introspectible, 
and  the  physical  the  perceptible  (which  in  Spinoza's  terms  would  be  to 
make  the  attributes  derive  from  introspecting  and  perceiving,  when  these 
are  only  modes  of  thought).  30 
If  the  double  aspect  theory  is  held  on  the  basis  of  the  subjective  interpretation  of 
the  attributes  and  the  subjective  interpretation  is  not  an  adequate  point  of  view  of 
Spinoza,  as  Delahunty  states,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  regard  Spinoza's  theory  as  a 
double  aspect  theory.  Now  I  shall  deal  with  the  above  criticisms  in  turn. 
Among  the  above  criticisms,  the  first  point  is  more  or  less  along  the  same 
line  as  Matson's  criticism  as  to  the  requirement  of  two  observation  points.  Here,  I 
28This  is  Pap's  double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  See  A.  Pap,  The  Elements  of  Analytical 
Philosophy  (Now  York,  1972),  pp.  278-279. 
29  G.  Vesey,  "Agent  and  Spectator:  the  Double  Aspect  Theory,  "  in  The  Royal  Institute  of 
Philosophy  Lectures,  vol.  1  (London:  MacMillan,  1968),  pp.  139-159. 
'0  Rý  J.  Delahunty,  Spinoza  (London:  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul,  1985),  pp.  194-195. 
151 agree  with  Delahunty's  statement  regarding  attributes  and  aspects  within  the 
double  aspect  theory.  However,  I  would  question  the  implication  he  draws  from 
this,  namely  that  they  depend  on  being  perceived  as  in  the  next  phrase.  In  our 
ordinary  sense  of  the  term  "aspect,  "  an  "aspect"  implies  a  point  of  view.  On  the 
subjective  interpretation,  the  same  is  true,  since  the  human  mind  perceives  the 
attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  However,  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term 
44aspect"  is  not  important  in  the  double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  We  have 
to  remember  that  the  term  "aspects"  is  a  metaphor.  W.  von  Leyden  who  holds  the 
double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza  states  44[i]n  its  own  sphere  each  of  the  two 
phenomena  would  seem  to  be  a  complete  and  true  expression  of  one  and  the  same 
underlying  reality,  ""  and  he  also  says:  "We  should  now  consider  some  of  the 
details  of  the  double-aspect  theory.  The  doctrine  is  that  an  God's  attributes,  among 
them  thought  and  extension,  are  irreducible  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  real 
reality,  and  while  each  is  always  found  together  with  the  others  they  an  express 
reality  or  any  part  of  it  in  fiffl  measure  by  themselves  separately.  "32 
Next,  concerning  the  second  criticism,  I  do  not  think  that  this  point  can  be 
applied  to  the  double  aspect  theory  of  Spinoza.  Delahunty  asserts  that  the  point 
that  things  are  neither  mental  nor  physical  is  contrary  to  Spinoza's  position  because 
Spinoza  holds  they  are  both.  However,  this  point  does  not  belong  to  the  double 
aspect  theory  of  Spinoza.  In  fact,  for  Spinoza,  things  are  both  mental  and  physical 
as  Delahunty  states  in  the  bracket,  and  this  is  what  the  double  aspect  interpretation 
holds.  In  different  versions  of  the  double  aspect  theory,  things  can  be  both  mental 
and  physical  or  neither  mental  nor  physical;  Delahunty  assumes  that  a  double 
aspect  theory  must  hold  the  latter,  but  it  is  hard  to  see  the  reason  why.  It  is 
certainly  a  misunderstanding  of  Spinoza's  theory.  It  is  evident  that  Spinoza  holds 
that  substance  is  mental  as  well  as  physical:  "Thought  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or 
God  is  a  thinking  thing"  (E,  11,  Prop  1),  "Extension  is  an  attribute  of  God,  or  God 
is  an  extended  thing"  (E,  11,  Prop  2).  Therefore,  even  if  some  double  aspect 
interpretations  hold  that  things  are  neither  mental  nor  physical  as  in  Pap's  point  of 
31  W.  von  Leyden,  op.  cit.,  P.  193. 
32  Ibid.,  p.  192. 
152 view  cited  by  Delahunty,  and  even  if  some  general  definitions  of  double  aspect 
theory  also  hold  the  same  explanation,  when  we  talk  about  Spinoza's  case  it  has  to 
be  posited  that  things  are  both  mental  and  physical.  With  respect  to  an  inadequate 
double  aspect  interpretation,  Delahunty's  second  criticism  is  right,  but  regarding  an 
adequate  interpretation,  his  criticism  is  not  valid.  "  A  more  adequate  interpretation 
is  available  as  follows. 
We  can  find  an  adequate  double  aspect  interpretation  from  Leyden's 
perspective.  I  shall  quote  his  statements:  "[E]very  finite  mode  of  substance,  i.  e. 
every  individual  object  or  person,  must  likewise  be  characterizable  in  terms  of  all 
the  attributes  of  substance,  certainly  of  the  two  known  ones,  thought  and 
extension.  ý134  He  also  states  that  "any  of  the  finite  things  that  make  up  reality  must 
at  one  and  the  same  time  both  have  a  mind,  or  at  least  be  a  thought  or  an  idea,  and 
also  have  a  body,  or  at  least  be  extended,  ,  3'  and  "every  mode  of  existence  must  be 
characterizable  by  extension  as  well  as  thought.  ýý36  Kenneth  Blackwell  also  holds 
this  point  of  view:  "Thus  what  Spinoza  holds  is  a  double-aspect  theory-as  Russell 
says,  every  event  is  both  a  physical  and  a  mental  event,  as  well  as  an  infinity  of 
other  kinds  of  events,  since  there  are  an  infinite  number  of  attributes  (E  1P  11).  iý37 
From  the  above  statements,  we  can  see  that  the  second  criticism  cannot  be  applied 
to  an  adequate  double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza. 
As  to  the  third  criticism,  that  the  introspectible  and  the  perceptible  are  both 
only  modes  of  thought,  the  same  explanation  can  be  attached.  That  is  to  say,  it 
cannot  be  available  within  an  adequate  double  aspect  theory  such  as  Leyden's 
interpretation.  It  is  not  the  mode  of  apprehension,  but  what  is  apprehended  that 
matters.  The  problem  for  Delahunty  is  that  he  only  considers  Pap's  interpretation 
of  the  double  aspect  theory  and  does  not  address  any  alternative  interpretation. 
33  Even  though  he  mentions  that  there  are  more  plausible  double  aspect  interpretations  such  as 
Vesey  and  Leyden,  he  does  not  describe  or  criticize  these  interpretations  but  merely  mentions  the 
fact  that  "[t]here  are,  of  course,  forms  of  the  Dual  Aspect  Theory  which  are  more  plausible  than 
Pap's"  (R-  I  Delahunty,  op.  cit.,  p.  195). 
34  W.  von  Leyden,  op.  cit.,  p.  192. 
35  ibid. 
36  ibid. 
37  Kenneth  Blackwell,  The  Spinozaistic  Ethics  ofBertrand  Russell  (London:  George  Allen  and 
Unwin,  1985),  p.  86. 
153 Due  to  this  fact,  all  his  three  criticisms  are  very  limited.  But  these  criticisms  apply 
only  to  Pap's  (and  related)  explanations  and  not  to  other  more  valid  explanations. 
When  the  double  aspect  interpretation  is  posited  on  the  objective  interpretation  of 
the  attributes,  those  criticisms  are  not  valid. 
(2)  The  Compatibility  between  the  Double  Aspect  Theory  and  the 
Objective  Interpretation 
Is  the  subjective  interpretation  of  attributes  integral  to  the  double  aspect 
interpretation  of  Spinoza?  I  think  not.  The  double  aspect  interpretation  does  not 
have  to  be  posited  on  the  subjective  interpretation,  according  to  which  attributes 
are  illusory  and  there  is  no  real  Merence  between  mind  and  body. 
Those  who  think  that  the  double  aspect  theory  must  be  given  a  subjective 
interpretation  argue  that  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  are  identical  to  each 
other,  whereas  for  Spinoza  there  is  no  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical 
property:  for  Spinoza  what  is  identical  is  the  mental  and  the  physical  event.  This  is 
compatible  with  the  objective  interpretation  of  the  attributes.  We  should  not 
confuse  the  property  with  the  substance  double  aspect  theory.  The  double  aspect 
interpretation  is  compatible  with  not  only  the  subjective  interpretation  of  attributes 
but  also  the  objective  interpretation. 
Now,  I  shall  give  another  approach  to  my  explanation  of  this  compatibility. 
Because  the  term  "aspect"  is  regarded  as  a  way  of  conceiving  or  looking  at  a  single 
substance,  this  theory  can  be  misunderstood  if  it  is  taken  to  be  only  posited  on  the 
subjective  interpretation.  However,  I  should  like  to  recall  the  fact  that  this  is  a 
metaphor  to  explain  that  each  attribute  expresses  the  essence  of  substance  in  its 
own  way.  When  we  define  the  attributes  as  existing  outside  our  mind  in  the 
objective  interpretation,  the  double  aspect  theory  can  still  be  held.  In  this  case, 
44aspects"  are  not  the  concept  in  our  mind  or  the  concept  from  our  percelvmg,  but 
what  express  the  essence  of  substance.  Therefore,  whether  the  attributes  are 
subjective  or  objective  does  not  depend  upon  the  double  aspect  theory;  if  one  has 
the  subjective  point  of  view  of  the  attribute  one  can  claim  the  double  aspect  theory, 
154 and  if  one  has  the  objective  interpretation,  one  can  also  claim  the  double  aspect 
theory.  The  double  aspect  theory  is  compatible  with  the  objective  interpretation. 
The  most  common  reason  people  do  not  take  the  double  aspect  theory  as 
an  adequate  interpretation  of  Spinoza  is  because  they  think  that  this  theory  must  be 
given  a  subjective  interpretation.  Why  must  this  theory  be  given  such  an 
interpretation?  The  term  "aspect"  leads  them  to  think  so.  Just  as  two  aspects  are 
posited  on  the  subjective  view,  so  are  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  which 
are  equivalent  to  the  term  "aspect,  "  posited  on  the  subjective  view.  But  the  fact 
that  the  double  aspect  theory  must  be  given  a  subjective  interpretation  cannot  be 
derived  from  a  literal  meaning  of  the  term  "aspect,  "  since  it  is  used  as  a  metaphor. 
Thus  we  can  interpret  Spinoza  as  a  double  aspect  theorist  whilst  holding  an 
objective  interpretation. 
The  attributes  in  the  double  aspect  theory  under  the  objective 
mterpretation,  can  be  explained  from  our  familiar  analogy  of  the  tune,  which  is 
played  on  the  piano,  hummed,  written  in  musical  notation,  inscribed  on  bits  of 
plastic,  or  fixed  on  tape  by  magnetism.  The  infinite  ways  of  expression  are 
equivalent,  since  they  express  the  essence  of  the  same  tune,  and  they  are  different 
since  they  have  their  own  ways  of  expressing  it.  Just  as  in  this  example,  so  there 
actually  exist  infinite  ways  of  expressing  the  essence  of  substance,  and  these  ways 
correspond  to  the  attributes.  They  exist  not  merely  in  our  mind  but  exist  outside 
our  mind  i.  e.  exist  objectively.  The  above  explanation  can  be  classified  as  the 
objective  interpretation.  And,  the  "aspects"  in  the  double  aspect  interpretation 
should  be  understood  in  the  same  sense  as  that  the  attributes  are  the  ways  of 
expressing  the  essence  of  substance;  therefore,  we  can  designate  these  attributes  as 
44aspects.  "  In  this  way,  the  double  aspect  theory  can  be  posited  on  the  objective 
interpretation. 
Consequently,  if  there  is  one  substance  and  there  are  ways  of  expressing  the 
essence  of  this  substance  as  in  the  double  aspect  interpretation  of  Spinoza,  the 
ways  can  exist  in  our  mind  as  in  the  subjective  interpretation,  and  the  ways  can  also 
exist  outside  our  mind  as  in  the  objective  interpretation.  Hence,  we  can  say  that 
there  is  no  problem  in  maintaining  the  compatibility  between  the  double  aspect 
155 interpretation  and  the  objective  interpretation,  and  therefore  the  double  aspect 
interpretation  cannot  be  criticised  in  terms  of  criticisms  of  the  subjective 
interpretation  as  long  as  it  can  hold  the  objective  interpretation. 
4.  Bennett  and  Delia  Rocca 
(1)  Properties  and  Events:  Partial  and  Numerical  Identity 
Apart  from  my  view  i.  e.  a  token  double  aspect  theory,  the  following 
interpretations  are  possible  of  Spinoza's  claim  of  identity  between  the  mental  and 
the  physical. 
(1)  Bennett:  there  is  (partial)  identity  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  property 
in  terms  of  F,  trans-attribute  mode,  and  this  is  what  Spinoza  regards  as  identity 
between  the  mind  and  the  body. 
(2)  Della  Rocca:  there  is  a  single  set  of  transparent  (extensional)  properties  which 
are  conceived  as  mental  or  physical;  the  same  properties  (for  example,  "having 
five  immediate  effects"  and  "being  a  complex  individual")  are  conceived  in 
different  ways.  There  is  also  a  numerical  identity  between  mental  and  physical 
events;  the  former  identity  i.  e.  identity  between  properties  implies  the  latter 
identity  i.  e.  identity  between  events,  as  type  identity  implies  token  identity. 
(This  view  can  be  regarded  as  a  type  double  aspect  theory).  " 
Regarding  Bennett's  interpretation,  the  partial  identity  is  not  what  Spinoza 
wants  to  claim.  Of  course,  by  partial  identity  through  the  concept  of  'T,  "  Bennett's 
aitn  is  not  to  explain  identity  between  properties  but  to  explain  property 
parallelism.  But  the  problem  for  Bennett  is  that  he  does  not  claim  a  genuine 
identity  such  as  a  numerical  identity  between  events  or  properties.  As  Della  Rocca 
says  in  criticism,  Bennett  wrongly  rules  out  event-identity,  and  he  considers  that 
the  partial  identity  between  properties  is  what  Spinoza  wishes  to  claim.  However, 
38  The  interpretations  of  Bennett  and  Della  Rocca  were  examined  in  chapter  three. 
156 for  Spinoza,  the  mind  and  the  body  are  one  and  the  same  thing  or  individual,  and 
thus  we  have  to  explain  Spinoza's  argument  of  identity  in  terms  of  some  kind  of 
numerical  identity  between  events. 
Next,  Della  Rocca's  numerical  interpretation  of  both  events  and  properties 
has  the  following  problem.  Della  Rocca  explains  a  numerical  identity  of  properties 
by  claiming  that  the  mental  properties  are  neutral  properties  seen  as  mental  and  the 
physical  properties  are  the  same  properties  seen  as  physical.  If  this  is  what  Della 
Rocca  claims,  this  is  apparently  no  more  than  a  subjective  interpretation.  In  other 
words,  he  has  to  hold  a  subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes,  which  is 
implausible  in  the  interpretations  of  Spinoza.  We  cannot  argue  a  numerical  identity 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical  property  without  a  subjective  interpretation  of 
the  attributes. 
Could  we  regard  Della  Rocca  as  arguing  that  the  intensional  properties  are 
real  and  distinct  properties,  but  ones  which  do  not  count  against  an  identity  of 
events?  In  that  case,  Della  Rocca  need  not  be  arguing  for  the  identity  ofproperties, 
since  intensional  properties  would  stiff  be  real  properties  although  insignificant  in 
claiming  identity. 
Let  us  consider  Della  Rocca's  problem  in  some  more  detail.  In  brief,  the 
elements  of  Della  Rocca's  position  are  as  follows: 
(1)  Event-identity:  there  is  an  identity  between  mental  and  physical  events. 
(2)  Property-identity:  there  is  an  identity  between  mental  and  physical  properties. 
(3)  The  objective  interpretation  of  the  attributes:  each  attribute  distinctly  exists. 
Now,  as  we  have  seen,  Della  Rocca's  position  on  the  reality  of  properties  is 
ambiguous  due  to  the  fact  that  his  treatment  of  intensional  properties  is  unclear. 
His  position  could  be  explained  in  the  following  two  ways. 
(A)  There  are  only  neutral  properties,  which  can  be  approached  in  a  mental  way 
and  a  physical  way:  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties  are  intensional 
properties.  Intensional  properties  are  not  real  properties  and  thus  there  are  no 
real  mental  and  physical  properties.  There  are  no  mental  properties  as  such: 
only  mental  ways  of  seeing  the  neutral  properties.  The  mental  and  the  physical 
157 are  but  two  ways  of  conceiving  the  same  properties.  The  same  properties  are 
conceived  in  different  ways.  This  is  in  effect  what  I  have  been  caffing 
conceptual  parallelism. 
(B)  Not  only  extensional  properties  but  also  intensional  properties  (mental  and 
physical  properties)  are  real  properties.  But,  these  intensional  properties  are 
strange  properties  which  do  not  count  against  the  identity  of  things  possessing 
one  of  those  properties  and  not  another:  intensional  properties  do  not  affect 
the  scope  of  identity  between  things  or  events.  39 
I  think  that  Della  Rocca  is  unclear  and  perhaps  inconsistent  concerning  two 
positions,  but  in  my  reading  of  him,  his  intention  is  normaRy  to  maintain  (A). 
'9  1  shall  offer  Della  Rocca's  statements  concerning  (A)  and  (B).  Apart  from  Della  Rocca's 
argument  of  "referential  opacity"  in  causal  context  and  of  its  transmission  to  attribute  context,  we 
can  find  the  fact  that  he  holds  (A)  from  the  following  statements:  "Throughout  this  chapter  I  have 
relied  on  the  view  that,  for  Spinoza,  various  kinds  of  properties  are  intensional.  As  I  mentioned  in 
the  preface,  this  intensionality  involves  a  kinds  of  relativity:  An  object  has,  for  example,  the 
property  of  being  physical  only  relative  to  a  certain  manner  of  conceiving  or  describing  it.  This 
conception-  or  description-relativity  of  mental  and  physical  properties  in  general  is  additional  to 
the  mind-relativity  of  content  in  particular"  (Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body 
Problem  in  Spinoza,  p.  139). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  statements  which  lead  us  to  thinking  that  Della  Rocca  holds  (B)  are  as 
follows:  "There  are  certain  kinds  of  properties  that  are  such  that  the  fact  that  a  has  properties  of 
that  kind,  and  b  does  not,  does  not  by  itself  undermine  the  claim  that  a=b.  The  properties  not 
included  within  the  scope  of  the  above  principle  are,  of  course,  the  intensional  properties"  (ibid., 
p.  130),  and  again  "According  to  Leibniz's  Law,  we  can  determine  whether  a  mode  of  extension 
and  the  idea  of  that  mode  are  numerically  identical  by  determining  whether  they  have  all  their 
extensional  properties  in  common.  Intensional  properties  are  irrelevant  in  deciding  the  issue  of 
identity"  (ibid.,  p.  132). 
However,  the  last  two  quotations  concerning  (B)  do  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  holding  (A):  we 
can  still  maintain  (A)  in  these  quotations,  whereas  we  cannot  maintain  (13)  in  the  first  quotation. 
In  the  case  of  (A),  if  the  neutral  property  is  (say)  "having  five  effects,  "  the  intensional  properties 
are  (say)  "having  five  mental  effects"  and  "having  five  physical  effects"  since  these  properties  are 
the  neutral  properties  described  in  the  mental  and  the  physical  ways,  respectively.  When  the 
neutral  properties  are  seen  as  mental  or  physical  these  properties  are  (become)  intentional 
properties  and  thus  they  should  not  be  included  within  the  scope  of  identity-,  they  should  be 
irrelevant  in  determining  the  issue  if  identity.  When  these  mental  or  physical  descriptions  peel  off 
the  intensional  properties  are  (become)  the  neutral  properties  and  thus  we  can  determine  identity 
of  the  mind  and  the  body  by  determining  whether  the  mind  and  the  body  have  all  these  neutral 
properties  in  common.  Thus,  the  last  two  quotations  can  be  understood  as  follows:  in  determining 
identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  we  have  to  rule  out  these  properties  when  they  are  seen 
as  mental  or  as  physical,  and  we  need  to  accept  these  properties  when  they  are  not  described  in 
any  way. 
158 However,  whether  Della  Rocca's  position  is  (A)  or  (B),  he  has  the  following 
problems.  In  the  case  of  (A),  it  is  incompatible  with  point  (3)  i.  e.  the  objective 
interpretation:  the  argument  (A)  has  to  be  given  a  subjective  interpretation  of  the 
attributes.  And  in  the  case  of  (B),  it  destroys  point  (2)  i.  e.  property-identity. 
If  Della  Rocca's  argument  is  that  there  is  a  numerical  identity  between 
events  and  properties,  his  interpretation  ought  to  be  regarded  as  a  version  of 
double  aspect  theory  in  the  sense  of  type  identity  (which  should  be  posited  on  the 
subjective  interpretation  of  the  attributes);  and  if  his  argument  is  that  there  is 
identity  between  events,  and  that  there  is  no  identity  between  properties,  his 
interpretation  is  a  version  of  a  token  double  aspect  theory,  which  should  be  given 
the  objective  interpretation,  as  does  my  interpretation  of  Spinoza.  In  both  cases, 
there  is  a  problem  concerning  the  relation  of  neutral  properties  to  essence  of 
substance.  Those  two  concepts  are  not  argued  in  a  consistent  manner  as  we  shall 
see  in  the  following  section,  despite  the  fact  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory 
follows  his  one  substance  doctrine,  and  that  Della  Rocca  accepts  this  view. 
(2)  Trans-Attribute  Modes,  Neutral  Properties,  and  "What  Is 
Structurally  Common" 
To  consolidate  a  grasp  of  the  Oferences  among  Bennett,  Della  Roeea,  and 
my  view,  it  is  worthwhile  to  compare  interpretations  of  essence  in  Spinoza's 
theory:  trans-attribute  modes  for  Bennett,  neutral  properties  for  Della  Rocca,  and 
"what  is  structurally  common"  for  my  view.  Spinoza  does  not  explicitly  claim  any 
one  of  those  concepts.  However,  we  have  to  infer  some  concept  from  the 
contextual  sense,  if  we  hope  to  make  sense  of  Spinoza.  Let  us  firstly  compare 
Bennett's  concept  of  "trans-attribute  mode"  with  my  concept  of  "what  is 
structurally  common.  " 
a.  Bennett 
Bennett  claims  the  concept  of  trans-attributes  mode  on  the  basis  of  the  fact 
that  the  essence  (the  most  fundamental  property)  is  not  the  attributes.  This  fact  is 
159 inferred  from  his  reading  of  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  of  '  as 
referring  to  something  illusory:  consequently,  the  attributes  do  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  the  substance  and  thus  the  essence  is  something  beyond  the  attributes 
i.  e.  "the  trans-attribute  differentiae  or  modes.  " 
The  source  of  my  concept  of  "what  is  structuraRy  common"  is  somewhat 
like  Bennett's  F,  trans-attribute  Merentiae:  both  concepts  rely  on  the  fact  that  the 
most  fundamental  properties  are  not  attributes  but  the  essence.  However,  in  my 
view,  unlike  that  of  Bennett,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  attributes  constitute  the 
essence;  there  is  no  illusion  for  the  infinite  intellect.  The  reasons  why  the  attributes 
are  disregarded  as  the  essences  in  my  view,  as  we  saw  in  the  preceding  chapter,  are 
as  follows:  firstly,  Spinoza's  assertion  of  essence  does  not  allow  us  to  consider 
many  essences  for  one  substance,  and  secondly,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the 
person  humming  and  the  person  whistling  are  doing  the  same  thing-they  are  both 
g  lvmg  . 
40  And  the  essence  as  what  is  structurally  common  to  all  the  ii  the  same  tune 
attributes  is  not  beyond  the  attributes,  but  is  in  them,  whereas  Bennett's  essence  as 
trans-  attribute  mode  is  beyond  essence  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  attributes  do  not 
constitute  the  essence.  The  difference,  consequently,  makes  the  different  fon-nats  of 
the  mental  and  physical  property  in  the  following  way. 
We  have  already  seen  that  Bennett  introduces  the  concept  of  "trans- 
attribute  mode"  and  tries  to  explain  parallelism  by  means  of  these  trans-attribute 
modes;  in  Bennett's  interpretation,  therefore,  there  are  "thought  +  F,  "  and 
"extension  +F.  "  Bennett  tries  to  clarify  this  by  means  of  an  analogy.  A  circle  is  a 
two-dimensional  figure  having  all  its  points  equidistant  from  a  given  point;  a  sphere 
is  a  three-dimensional  figure  having  all  its  points  equidistant  from  a  central  point. 
On  the  analogy,  the  property  of  having  all  points  equidistant  from  a  given  point  is 
F,  incapable  of  being  grasped  on  its  own.  Circularity  (two-dimensionality)  and 
Sphericity  (three-ditnensionality)  correspond  to  the  attributes,  which  are  taken  as 
fundamental  (even  by  God)  but  are  not  really  so.  F  guarantees  a  correspondence 
between  circles  and  spheres. 
40  For  the  tune  analogy,  see  pp.  127-128  in  chapter  four. 
160 My  view  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  somewhat  similar.  The  tune  can  be  expressed 
on  many  instruments,  or  written  down,  or  whistled.  But  there  is  nothing  we  fail  to 
grasp.  The  tune  is  not  something  whose  pure  nature  is  hidden  behind  the  hummed 
or  trumpeted  notes.  We  perceive  what  they  have  in  common,  a  that  there  is  to 
perceive,  when  we  match  these  trumpeted  sounds,  these  whistled  sounds,  these 
marks  on  paper,  these  grooves  on  plastic.  It  is  true  that  in  this  analogy  what  these 
things  share  is  obvious.  Whereas  parallelism  of  the  mental  and  the  physical  is  not 
(though  Spinoza  seems  to  have  been  conceived  of  it).  Furthermore,  in  my  view,  the 
essence  is  shown  in  each  attribute  as  the  tune  is in  them,  whereas  for  Bennett,  the 
essence  is  a  separate,  indescribable  property:  F  is  in  principle  separable  from  the 
two-dimensionality  and  the  three-dimensionality,  though  even  God  cannot  separate 
it  in  thought.  From  this,  we  can  consequently  see  that  why  Bennett  presents  the 
mental  and  the  physical  as  "the  attribute  of  thought-and-F"  and  "the  attribute  of 
extension-and-P  to  explain  parallelism.  In  contrast  with  this,  on  my  interpretation, 
there  is  nothing  which  God  fails  to  do  in  separating  the  essence,  any  more  that  one 
fails  if  one  cannot  give  a  tune  without  humming  it  or  writing  it  down,  or  whistling 
it,  etc.  The  mental  and  the  physical  property  correspond  to  the  attributes  of 
thought  and  extension,  since  my  concept  of  essence  is  in  them,  as  what  they  both 
express.  We  cannot  say  what  that  is,  but  we  can  show  what  it  iS.  41 
b.  Della  Rocca 
Next,  let  us  compare  Della  Rocca's  concept  of  neutral  property  and  my 
concept  of  what  is  structurally  common.  On  interpretation  (A)  above,  the 
difference  lies  in  that  Della  Rocca's  neutral  property  involves  numerical  identity 
between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties,  whereas  for  me  "what  is 
structurally  common7'  does  not  involve  numerical  identity  (even  partial  identity) 
between  them;  it  only  covers  identity  between  mental  and  physical  events.  In  my 
interpretation,  unlike  that  of  Della  Rocca,  one  property  is  not  seen  as  a  mental 
41  it  is  as  if  one  could  not  state,  but  only  show,  what  the  circle  and  spherre  have  in  common. 
161 property  or  a  physical  property,  although  one  event  is  seen  as  mental  or  physical. 
On  interpretation  (B)  above,  this  difference  would  disappear,  but  others  remain. 
Another  difference  is  that  I  see  "what  is  structurally  commoW'  as  essence, 
while  for  Della  Rocca,  the  relation  of  the  neutral,  transparent  properties  to  essence 
is  not  clear:  he  does  not  seem  to  identify  essence  with  these  neutral,  transparent 
properties.  In  my  case  "what  is  structurally  common"  is  derived  from  the 
relationship  between  essence  and  attribute,  whereas  Della  Rocca  asserts  the 
opacity  of  causality  permits  neutral  properties.  However,  the  difference  concerning 
the  source  is  not  so  important,  if  Della  Rocca's  concept  of  neutral  property  is 
compatible  with  Spinoza's  position.  The  point  is  that  although  Della  Rocca  does 
not  infer  this  concept  from  the  relationship  between  essence  and  attribute  (and  this 
is  his  aim,  to  show  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  without  relying  on  the 
one  substance  doctrine),  this  concept  should  be  compatible  with  Spinoza's  doctrine 
of  essence. 
However,  Della  Rocca  runs  into  trouble  on  this  point,  as  follows.  When 
Della  Rocca  interprets  the  mind-body  theory  of  Spinoza,  he  argues  that  there  is  a 
neutral  way  to  describe  the  substance  and  this  is  why  there  are  neutral  properties. 
He  claims  that  "[a]lthough  there  are  no  trans-attribute  modes  on  the  numerical 
identity  interpretation,  there  are  ways  of  describing  modes  in  neutral  terms,  that  is, 
terms  that  do  not  presuppose  any  particular  attribute.  -A2  This  leads  us  to  think  that 
the  essence  can  be  described  in  a  neutral  way.  The  individual  is  not  confined  to  one 
attribute:  there  is  mind-body  identity.  Hence,  one  would  suppose,  what  it  is  to  be 
an  individual  must  be  something  not  confined  to  the  mental  or  the  physical,  and 
neutral  properties  seem  to  fit  the  bill.  However,  when  Della  Rocca  considers  the 
essence  of  the  substance,  he  explains  it  not  in  terms  of  attribute-neutral  properties 
but  in  an  infinite  way  i.  e.  the  way  of  having  all  attributes.  He  states: 
But  there  is  an  important  way  of  describing  God  under  which  we  have  not  as 
yet  specified  God's  essence.  Here  God  is  not  described  as  the  thinkirýg 
substance  in  particular,  or  as  the  extended  substance  in  particular,  but  rather 
42  Della  Rocca.,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Bocýy  Problem  in  Spinoza.,  p.  159. 
162 as  God  simpliciter.  As  ldef6  points  out,  God  is  defined  as  the  substance  of 
infmitely  many  (that  is,  all)  attributes.  Thus,  to  describe  the  substance  simply 
as  God  is  equivalent  to  describing  it  as  the  substance  of  infinitely  many 
attributes.  Under  this  description,  God's  essence  cannot  be  constituted  solely 
by  thought  or  solely  by  extension.  ... 
It  seems,  then,  that  under  the 
descriptions  "God"  or  "the  substance  of  infinitely  many  attributes,  "  the 
essence  of  God  is  either  constituted  by  all  the  attributes  together  or  is  not 
constituted  by  any  of  the  attributes.  43 
He  goes  on: 
[I]t  follows  that  the  essence  of  God  under  this  description  is  to  be  such  that 
for  each  attribute  X,  God  is  describable  in  such  a  way  that  X  constitutes  that 
substance's  essence.  So  the  essence  of  God  (simpliciter)  is,  in  some  sense,  a 
second-order  essence:  an  essence  that  makes  reference  to  the  essence  of  the 
substance  (under  other  descriptions  of  the  substance).  44 
In  this  way,  Della  Rocca  does  not  regard  essence  as  being  described  in  the  neutral 
way,  but  as  being  described  in  infinite  ways  i.  e.  the  way  of  having  all  attributes.  It 
is  clear  that  for  Della  Rocca  there  is  an  essence  for  each  attribute.  The  essence  of 
God  is  to  have  an  essence  in  each  attribute  but  first-order  essence  is  attribute- 
bound.  Traditionally,  "essence"  is  closely  related  to  identity.  Hence,  if  one  and  the 
same  individual  is  both  mental  and  physical  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  could  have  an 
essence  in  each  attribute.  It  would  mean  that  one  individual  would  have  more  than 
one  essence,  and  we  are  back  with  De  Vries'  worry  (p.  112). 
What  applies  to  God  presumably  applies  to  humans:  they  have  an  essence 
in  each  of  two  attributes,  thought  and  extension.  It  is  not  that  the  essence  is  made 
up  partly  of  mental  properties  and  partly  of  physical  properties  (as  man  was 
sometimes  held  to  be  rational  and  an  animal),  but  each  essence  is  complete  on  its 
own.  If  the  essence  says  what  it  is  to  be  an  individual  of  a  certain  sort,  attribute- 
43 
Ibid.,  p.  167. 
44  ibid. 
163 bound  essences  can  only  give  what  it  is  to  be  an  individual  looked  at  in  a  certain 
way.  My  view  is  that  the  essence  of  a  human  being  is  what  is  structurally  the  same 
in  the  mental  and  physical  descriptions,  and  from  this  point  of  view  Della  Rocca's 
neutral  properties  look  interesting.  But  Della  Rocca's  neutral  properties  can  be 
stated;  we  have  said  that  my  structurally  common  properties  cannot,  but  (like  the 
tune)  are  seen  in  the  different  modes  of  expression. 
The  neutral  properties  of  Della  Rocca  are  not  the  right  sort  of  properties  to 
pertain  to  essence.  He  instances  "being  at  time  C  but  Spinoza  says  that  having  a 
beginnmig  in  time  is  not  part  of  a  human's  essence.  The  other  properties:  "having 
five  immediate  causes,  "  "having  three  immediate  effects"  would  not  seem  enough 
to  establish  an  identity.  In  any  case,  there  is  no  general  concept  of  causation  in 
things  only  physical  causation  and  mental  causation  from  which  these  structural 
properties  are  extrapolated.  So,  while  Della  Rocca's  neutral  properties  are  similar 
to  the  essential  properties  in  being  structurally  common,  they  are  not  the  right  sort 
of  structural  property. 
Why  does  Della  Rocca  confine  essence  to  the  attributes?  Perhaps  he 
realised  the  inadequacy  of  his  neutral  properties  to  serve  as  essence.  In  any  case, 
even  if  it  seems  reasonable  to  define  God  as  the  being  with  infinite  essences  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  this  can  be  extended  to  modes.  Presumably  humans  are  things 
(modifications  of  substance)  with  essences  in  thought  and  extension. 
5.  The  Douhle  Aspect  Theory,  Determinism,  and 
Morality 
(1)  Determinism 
Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism  could  open  the  way  in  seeking  a 
solution  to  his  account  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body.  I  have  attempted,  in 
chapter  two,  to  rule  out  epiphenomenalism  and  hylomorphism  as  interpretations  of 
164 Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  in  terms  of  his  metaphysical  determinism.  Now  what 
else  can  be  obtained  from  his  determinism  in  seeking  a  solution  to  Spinoza's  mind- 
body  theory?  I  would  suggest  that  his  determmilism  together  with  his  monism  can 
support  the  double  aspect  theory.  Thus,  after  I  describe  Spinoza's  metaphysical 
determinism,  I  shall  then  try  to  find  a  clue  to  the  solution  of  his  mind-body  problem 
through  his  determniuism. 
a.  The  Outlook  ofDeterminism  in  Spinoza 
Richard  Taylor  described  determhuism  as  "...  in  the  case  of  everything  that 
exists,  there  are  antecedent  conditions,  known  or  unknown,  given  which  that  thing 
could  not  be  other  than  it  is.  That  is  an  exact  statement  of  the  metaphysical  thesis 
of  determinism.  More  loosely,  it  says  that  everything  is  not  only  determinate  but 
causally  determined.  "4'  Further,  he  also  defines  this  in  Edwards'  Encyclopedia: 
"[D]eterminism  is  the  general  philosophical  thesis  which  states  that  for  everything 
that  ever  happens  there  are  conditions  such  that,  given  them,  nothing  else  could 
happen.  9A6 
Where  does  Spinoza  mention  determinism?  We  can  find  determinism 
throughout  his  Ethics,  especially  in  part  1,  "Of  God.  "  One  of  the  most  exemplary 
and  strongest  statements  in  Spinoza  in  relation  to  determhusm  is  as  follows. 
in  Nature  there  is  nothing  contingent,  but  all  things  are  determined 
from  the  necessity  of  the  divine  nature  to  exist  and  act  in  a  certain 
manner.  (E,  1,  Prop  29) 
Things  could  have  been  produced  by  God  in  no  other  manner  and  in 
no  other  order  than  that  in  which  they  have  been  produced.  (E,  1, 
Prop  33) 
45  Richard  Taylor,  MetaphYsics  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall,  1974),  p.  39. 
kv  0  46  Richard  Taylor,  "Determinism,  "  in  Paul  Edwards  (ed.  ),  The  Enývclqpedia  ofPhilosop  ,v1.2 
(New  York:  Macmillan,  1967),  p.  359. 
165 It  is,  therefore,  beyond  doubt  to  say  that  Spinoza  claims  determinism  in  his 
metaphysics.  It  is  further  evident  that  one  of  the  formulations  of  determinism  is 
causality,  1.  e.  everything  has  its  cause,  even  if  the  analysis  of  his  notion  of  causality 
is  controversial.  For  Spinoza,  there  is  no  doubt  that  all  things  have  God,  substance, 
as  their  cause.  He  states  that  "God  is  the  immanent  and  not  the  transient  cause  of 
all  things"  (E,  1,  Prop  18).  Again,  he  reinforces  this  point,  "God  cannot  be  properly 
called  the  remote  cause  of  individual  things  ....  But  all  things  which  are  in  God, 
and  so  depend  upon  Him  that  without  Him  they  can  neither  be  nor  be  conceived" 
(E,  1,  Prop  28,  Schol).  We  can,  therefore,  see  Spinoza's  descriptions  of  strict 
determinist  causality,  and  from  this  fact  we  can  establish  the  presence  of 
determi'mism.  in  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system. 
In  Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism,  we  should  notice  that  God  is 
substance  consisting  of  infinite  attributes  and  that  humans  can  only  know  the 
attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  When  Spinoza  says  that  the  mind  and  body  are 
determined  by  God,  he  means  more  precisely  that  the  mind  is  determined  in  the 
attribute  of  thought  and  the  body  is  determined  in  the  attribute  of  extension;  when 
Spinoza  refers  to  "all  things,  "  this  involves  not  only  bodies  but  also  minds. 
Accordingly,  Spinoza's  metaphysics  of  determinism  can  be  described  as  follows. 
There  is  only  a  single  substance,  which  is  dlvm*e.  That  substance  is 
characterised  by  infinitely  many  attributes.  And  as  to  these  attributes,  we  only 
know  two,  which  are  thought  and  extension.  The  modes  follow  on  from  each 
attribute,  and  these  are  either  finite  or  hifinite.  If  they  are  infinite,  then  they  are 
either  immediate  or  mediate.  The  infinite  immediate  mode  of  extension  is  motion 
and  rest,  and  its  infinite  mediate  mode  is  "the  face  of  the  universe.  "  The  infinite 
immediate  mode  of  thought  is  the  infinite  intellect.  Further  there  are  the  finite 
modes,  minds  and  bodies  which  follow  from  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension.  And  all  this,  as  we  have  seen  above,  happens  in  a  certain  and 
determinate  manner.  In  other  words,  the  causes  of  the  mind  and  the  body  are  the 
attributes  of  thought  and  of  extension,  yet  their  ultimate  cause  is  God,  namely 
substance,  because  God  possesses  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension.  From 
this  fact,  we  can  see  that  Spinoza's  determinism  is  encapsulated  in  both  the  mental 
166 and  the  physical  realm,  and  I  believe  that  this  kind  of  metaphysical  deterrnmilism  can 
offer  some  insights  in  relation  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
b.  The  Mind  and  The  Body  Determined  by  One  Substance 
In  Spinoza's  system,  as  we  have  seen  above,  only  one  substance  determines 
both  the  mind  and  the  body.  Even  if  there  are  the  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension,  since  they  proceed  from  a  single  substance,  we  should  hold  that  the 
ultimate  cause  or  source  of  both  the  mind  and  the  body  is  one  substance.  We 
should  note  that  there  is  only  one  order  in  Spinoza's  deterministic  system.  This  one 
order  can  be  looked  at  1rom  two  points  of  view.  It  can  be  conceived  under  the 
attribute  of  thought  or  under  the  attribute  of  extension.  In  other  words,  even 
though  it  appears  that  there  are  two  orders  and  two  chains  of  causality,  in  reality 
there  is  only  one  order  and  it  can  be  conceived  by  us  in  two  ways.  Spinoza  writes: 
"[Wlhether  we  think  of  Nature  under  the  attribute  of  extension  or  under  the 
attribute  of  thought  or  any  other  attribute  whatever,  we  shall  discover  one  and  the 
same  order  or  one  and  the  same  connection  of  causes,  that  is  to  say,  in  every  case 
the  same  sequence  of  things"  (E,  11,  Prop  7,  Schol).  47 
The  parallelism  to  be  found  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  property- 
parallelism.  "Property-parallelism7'  can  be  claimed  as  falling  within  the  version  of 
the  double  aspect  theory.  Once  we  establish  the  formulation  that  the  mind  and  the 
body  are  both  aspects  of  the  same  entity  which  is  one  substance,  we  need  to  ask 
what  the  relationship  is  between  two  aspects,  and  then  our  answer  must  be  that 
there  is  a  parallelism.  Thus  I  believe  that  the  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory 
gives  us  the  whole  perspective  of  Spinoza's  system.  The  double  aspect  theory  of 
mind  and  body  is  consistent  with  his  determinism,  monism,  and  property 
parallelism.  Spinoza's  metaphysical  determinism  can  support  the  double  aspect 
theory. 
47  It  is  certain  that  one  substance  is  the  cause  of  the  mind  as  well  as  the  cause  of  the  body,  and 
therefore  the  ultimate  source  of  them  is  God,  substance.  We  can  regard  this  as  a  version  of  the 
double  aspect  theory.  Regarding  substance  monism,  Spinoza  states  that  "Besides  God  no 
substance  can  be  nor  can  be  conceived"  (E,  1,  Prop  14). 
167 (2)  Moral  Theory 
Spinoza's  determinism  pervades  his  account  of  moral  theory  in  part  4  of  the 
Ethics.  Thus  I  shall,  in  this  section,  draw  out  Spinoza's  point  of  view  on  "human 
bondage,  "  and  then  move  on  to  consider  how  the  moral  theory  can  provide  insight 
into  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body. 
a.  Human  Bondage 
Bondage  is,  for  Spinoza,  "[t]he  impotence  of  man  to  govern  or  restrain  the 
emotions"  (E,  IV,  Preface).  That  is  to  say,  our  lack  of  the  power  to  moderate  the 
emotions  is  caUed  bondage,  and  Spinoza's  assertion  of  this  kind  of  human  bondage 
can  be  found  in  the  following  statements. 
The  force  by  which  man  perseveres  in  existence  is  limited,  and 
infmitely  surpassed  by  the  power  of  external  causes.  (E,  IV,  Prop  3) 
It  is  impossible  that  a  man  should  not  be  a  part  of  Nature,  and  that  he 
should  suffer  no  changes  but  those  which  can  be  understood  through 
his  own  nature  alone,  and  of  which  he  is  the  adequate  cause.  (E,  IV, 
Prop  4) 
Hence  it  follows  that  a  man  is  necessarily  always  subject  to  passions, 
and  that  he  follows  and  obeys  the  common  order  of  Nature, 
accommodating  himself  to  it  as  far  as  the  nature  of  things  requires. 
(E,  IV,  Prop  4,  Corol) 
In  the  scholium  to  proposition  18,  we  can  see  Spinoza's  transition  from  the 
discussion  of  bondage  to  the  exposition  of  the  virtuous  life.  This  doctrine  of  virtue 
leads  us  to  the  understanding  of  moral  freedom.  Spinoza  equates  virtue  with 
endeavour  and  with  happiness.  Our  happiness  depends  upon  things  external  to  us 
because  we  are  finite  modes.  This  is  not  explored  in  detail  in  proposition  18,  but 
further  on;  Spinoza  argues  concerning  virtue  ftom  proposition  23. 
168 Spinoza  holds  that  we  can  only  be  said  to  possess  virtue  to  the  extent  that 
we  form  adequate  ideas  and  preserve  our  being  under  the  guidance  of  reason,  but 
what  we  essentially  endeavour  (in  accord  with  reason)  is  to  understand.  Since 
reason  considers  nothing  as  being  good  except  understanding,  true  good  and  evil 
are  what  aid  or  detract  from  the  exercise  of  understanding,  respectively.  Spinoza 
echoes  this  discussion  of  virtue  again  as  follows:  "There  is  no  single  thing  in 
Nature  which  is  more  profitable  to  man  than  a  man  who  lives  according  to  the 
guidance  of  reason"  (E,  IV,  Prop  35,  Corol  1).  Therefore,  for  Spinoza,  a  free  man 
is  "a  man  who  lives  according  to  the  dictates  of  reason  alone,  [and]  is  not  led  by 
the  fear  of  death  (Prop  63,  pt.  4),  but  directly  desires  the  good  (Corol  Prop  63,  pt. 
4),  that  is  to  say  (Prop  '74,  pt.  4),  desires  to  act,  to  live,  and  to  preserve  his  being  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  seeking  his  own  profit"  (E,  IV,  Prop  67,  Demon). 
Thus,  we  can  call  him  free  if  he  is  led  by  reason  alone.  48 
b.  Moral  Theory  and  Mind-Body  Theory 
Now,  I  shall  try  to  consider  the  relationship  between  the  above  account  of 
Spinoza's  moral  theory  and  Spinoza's  account  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the 
body.  We  have  seen  in  section  I  that  for  Spinoza,  humans  are  regarded  as  a  part  of 
Nature  and  nothing  besides.  When  Spinoza  says  that  we  are  a  part  of  Nature,  he 
does  not  refer  merely  to  the  physical  world,  but  his  term  "Nature"  is  also  related  to 
the  mental  world,  since  Nature  is  God  possessing  the  mental  as  well  as  the 
physical.  Therefore,  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  the  mind  follows  mental  laws, 
just  as  under  the  attribute  of  extension  the  body  follows  physical  laws.  Spinoza 
writes: 
All  efforts  which  we  make  through  reason  are  nothing  but  efforts  to 
understand,  and  the  mind,  in  so  far  as  it  uses  reason,  adjudges 
48  The  following  questions  can  be  raised  with  respect  to  the  connection  between  determinism  and 
morality.  is  it  predetermined  who  is  good  and  who  is  not?  if  I  have  got  the  right  kind  of 
contemplative  mind  I  seek  wisdom:  but  if  I  do  not  have  it  how  do  I  get  it?  Would  someone 
deserve  punishment  for  doing  wrong,  if  determinism  is  true?  But  this  topic  takes  us  beyond  the 
scope  of  this  thesis. 
169 nothing  as  profitable  to  itself  except  that  which  conduces  to 
understanding.  (E,  IV,  Prop  26) 
We  do  not  know  that  anyfl-ýing  is  certainly  good  or  evil  except  that 
which  actually  conduces  to  understanding,  or  which  can  prevent  us 
from  understanding.  (E,  IV,  Prop,  27) 
In  part  111,  proposition  6-8,  Spinoza  claims  self-preservation:  "Each  thing,  in  so  far 
as  it  is  in  itself,  endeavours  to  persevere  in  its  being"  (E,  111,  Prop  6).  Therefore, 
we  can  see  that  Spinoza  has  two  kinds  of  concept  regarding  endeavour:  one  is 
"persevere"  and  the  other  is  "understand.  "  That  is  to  say,  in  Spinoza's  theory,  there 
are  "the  endeavour  to  persevere"  and  "the  endeavour  to  understand";  the  former 
refers  to  the  body  and  the  latter  to  the  mind.  Hence,  it  comes  out  that  we 
endeavour  to  preservere  as  well  as  understand.  Now,  I  shall  consider  what  these 
concepts  refer  to  and  how  they  are  related  to  each  other  by  following  J.  Thomas 
Cook's  perspective. 
When  Spinoza  holds  self-preservation,  he  means  a  human  being's 
endeavour  to  Persevere  in  its  being  and  this  endeavour  is  the  very  essence  of  the 
individual 
. 
49And,  it  is  clear  that  for  Spinoza  man  is  a  physico-psychical  organism. 
On  the  one  hand  the  human  body  is,  on  the  physical  side,  characterised  by  the 
tendency  to  maintain  its  physical  integrity  through  being  affected  in  various  ways 
by  things  in  the  surrounding  environment.  On  the  other  hand,  this  same  individual 
is,  on  the  mental  side,  a  complex  idea  made  up  of  the  ideas  of  those  many  extended 
things  which  constitute  the  human  body.  And  this  mind  is  characterised  by  the 
tendency  to  understand,  which  consists  of  its  power  to  form  what  Spinoza  calls 
"adequate  ideas"  or  "common  notions"  which  are  ideas  of  things  which  all  bodies 
have  in  common  and  which  are  equally  in  the  whole  and  in  the  part  of  all  extended 
things.  The  mind's  endeavour  to  understand  is  an  endeavour  to  form  such  adequate 
ideas.  " 
"  Concerning  this,  Spinoza  states  that  "the  effort  by  which  each  thing  endeavours  to  persevere  in 
its  own  being  is  nothing  but  the  actual  essence  of  the  thin(.  ),  itself  '  (E,  HI,  Prop  7). 
'0  1  Thomas  Cook,  "Self-Knowledge  as  Self-Preservation"  in  Marjorie  Grene  and  Debra  Nails 
(eds.  ),  Spinoza  and  the  Sciences  (Dordrecht:  Reidel,  1986),  pp.  193-209. 
170 Therefore,  a  man  endeavours  to  maintain  his  integrity  as  a  complex  physical 
organism  when  viewed  as  a  body  under  the  attribute  of  extension,  and  he  also  has 
the  endeavour  to  form  adequate  ideas  when  viewed  as  a  mind  under  the  attribute  of 
thought.  Hence  it  follows  that  a  man's  endeavour  not  only  to  persevere  but  also  to 
understand  are  under  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought,  respectively.  Now  I 
can  suggest  that  the  body's  endeavour  to  maintain  its  integrity  as  a  complex 
physical  organism  can  be  equated  with  the  mind's  endeavour  to  form  adequate 
ideas.  That  is  to  say,  the  body's  endeavour  to  persevere  and  the  mind's  endeavour 
to  understand  are  one  and  the  same  endeavour,  conceived  under  the  two  attributes, 
extension  and  thought.  " 
I  take  this  formulation  as  the  same  paradigm  as  the  version  of  the  double 
aspect  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the  body.  in  parts  11  and  111,  Spinoza 
states  that  "substance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same 
substance,  which  is  now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now  under  that" 
(E,  11,  Prop  2,  Schol).  Further  he  also  states  that  "the  mind  and  the  body  are  one 
and  the  same  thing,  conceived  at  one  time  under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at 
another  under  that  of  extension7  (E,  111,  Prop  2,  Schol).  Here,  we  can  see  that 
Spinoza's  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory  is  consistent  with  his  metaphysical  as 
well  as  his  moral  theory,  in  particular  his  account  of  our  endeavour.  And 
subsequently,  this  account  can  offer  some  insight  in  interpreting  his  mind-body 
theory  as  the  double  aspect  theory. 
I  believe  that  the  double  aspect  interpretation  gives  us  a  whole  perspective 
on  Spinoza's  system.  The  double  aspect  theory  as  the  mind-body  theory  is 
consistent  with  Spinoza's  metaphysical  monism  and  determnifism,  with  his  concept 
of  the  attributes,  with  his  explanations  of  identical  and  parallel  relationship  between 
the  mind  and  the  body,  and  with  his  account  of  morality.  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  should  be  considered  within  the  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory.  Thus, 
we  can  say  that  the  double  aspect  interpretation  can  be  attributed  to  Spinoza's 
mind-body  theory  more  successfully  than  the  other  interpretations. 
51 
Ibid.,  p.  194. 
171 Chapter  Six 
The  Problem  of  Representation  in  Spinoza We  have  seen,  in  the  previous  chapter,  that  Spinoza's  account  of  the  mind 
and  its  relation  to  the  body  can  be  explained  by  means  of  the  double  aspect  theory, 
which  is  based  on  substance  monism  and  attribute  dualism.  However,  by  relying 
only  on  the  double  aspect  theory,  we  cannot  sufficiently  explain  Spinoza's  account 
of  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  So,  what  other  kind  of  concept 
or  theory  should  we  ascribe  to  Spinoza?  When  I  criticised,  in  chapter  two,  the 
interpretations  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  I  indicated  that  the  role  of 
representation  is  overlooked  in  the  interpretations  of  hylomorphism, 
epiphenomenalism  and  idealism.  Especially  concerning  the  idealistic  interpretation, 
I  pointed  out  that  the  role  of  representation  is  misunderstood  and  misinterpreted  by 
it;  the  ground  that  this  interpretation  really  rests  on  is  no  more  than 
representationalism,  and  this  concept  of  representation  is  based  on  "the  mind  as  the 
idea  of  the  body.  "  It  follows  that  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  involves  both  the 
double  aspect  theory  and  representationalism.  The  former,  it  seems  to  me,  involves 
an  ontological  thesis  about  the  mind-body  theory,  the  latter  an  epistemological  one. 
Thus,  in  this  chapter,  I  intend  to  examine  these  two  theses  concerning  the  mind- 
body  problem,  especially  the  concept  of  representation,  -and  to  explore  the  relation 
between  them.  In  so  doing,  I  hope  to  arrive  at  a  clearer  understanding  of 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
The  exploration  of  the  concept  of  representation  is  one  of  the  important 
tasks  to  be  undertaken  in  order  to  understand  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
However,  there  have  been  some  different  accounts  of  Spinoza's  concept  of 
representation,  so  that  it  is  difficult  to  identify  the  genuine  tendency  in  his  concept 
of  representation.  Recently,  Defla  Rocca  has  elucidated  Spinoza's  theory  of 
representation.  Thus  I  shall,  in  section  2,  explore  Defla  Rocca's  arguments  and 
point  out  some  problems  in  his  arguments  after  describing  the  general  outlook  of 
Spinoza's  notion  of  the  representation  in  section  1.  Then,  in  section  3,1  shall  move 
on  to  consider  the  compatibility  between  paraflefism  and  representationalism. 
173 1.  Spinoza  on  Representationalism 
(1)  The  Outlook  of  Spinoza's  Concept  of  Representation 
Spinoza's  concept  of  representation  is  differently  understood  by  the 
commentators  due  to  the  problems  of  its  compatibility  with  the  parallel  relationship 
between  mind  and  the  body  derived  from  their  identity.  The  basic  issue  is  Spinoza's 
claim  that  the  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body.  From  this,  the  following  problems  arise: 
(1)  whether  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  only  its  body  or 
both  its  body  and  other  affecting  external  bodies,  (2)  the  distinction  between  "the 
object  of  the  idea"  and  "the  object  which  that  idea  represents,  "  (3)  whether 
Spinoza  was  confused  between  the  parallel  and  the  representational  relationship. 
However,  we  ought  firstly  to  grasp  the  outlook  of  his  representationalism  without 
considering  the  compatibility  with  the  other  doctrine.  Then,  we  can  explore 
problems  (1)  to  (3)  and  redefine  his  representationalism. 
Spinoza  claims  that  the  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body,  and  the  object  of  the 
idea  is  the  body  and  nothing  else:  "The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
mind  is  the  body,  or  a  certain  mode  of  extension  actually  existing,  and  nothing 
else"  (E,  11,  Prop  13).  If  the  object  of  the  idea  is  what  is  represented  by  it,  this 
appears  on  the  face  of  it  matffestly  false,  since  we  think  about  other  things  than 
our  bodies.  However,  other  passages  suggest  his  overall  view  is  not  that  a  person's 
mind  is  an  idea  of  only  his  or  her  body.  Spinoza  also  holds  that  the  human  mind 
can  be  aware  of  external  bodies  but  only  through  their  effects  on  the  perceiver's 
body,  the  human  body.  In  Spinoza's  representationalism,  the  relationship  between 
the  human  body 
-and  the  external  bodies  as  the  objects  of  the  human-  Mind  is  qn 
undetachable  connection  by  means  of  what  he  terms  "modification7  i.  e.  the  way  in 
which  the  human  body  is  affected  by  external  bodies. 
Regarding  the  external  bodies,  firstly,  the  human  mind  can  have  knowledge 
of  external  bodies  only  by  means  of  their  effects  on  the  human  body.  The  human 
mind,  therefore,  "perceives  no  external  body  as  actually  existing  unless  through  the 
ideas  of  the  modifications  of  its  body'(E,  11,  Prop  26;  my  italics).  Hence,  in  so  far 
as  the  human  body  is  affected  by  any  external  body  the  human  mind  perceives  the 
174 external  body  and  in  so  far  as  the  human  body  is  not  affected  in  any  way  the  human 
mind  does  not  perceive  any  external  body. 
The  same  applies  to  a  human  mind's  knowledge  of  its  own  body.  When  its 
body  is  affected  by  the  external  body,  the  human  mind  can  perceive  its  body. 
Without  the  external  body's  effects  on  the  human  body,  the  human  mind  does  not 
know  its  own  body:  "The  human  mind  does  not  know  the  human  body  itself,  nor 
does  it  know  that  the  body  exists  except  through  ideas  of  modifications  by  which 
the  body  is  affected'  (E,  11,  Prop  19;  my  italics).  That  is  to  say,  the  way  in  which  a 
human  mind  perceives  its  own  body  is  available  through  the  external  body's  effects 
on  its  own  body.  Hence,  it  follows  that  the  human  mind  is  not  able  to  have  a 
knowledge  of  the  human  body  without  an  external  body,  and  also  is  not  able  to 
perceive  the  external  body  itself  or  the  affecting  external  body  without  its  own 
body.  A  human  mind  knows  neither  the  human  body  nor  the  affecting  external 
bodies  without  the  modifications  on  the  human  body.  Regarding  this  point, 
Spinoza  writes  as  follows: 
If  the  human  body  be  affected  in  a  way  which  involves  the  nature  of 
any  external  body,  the  human  mind  will  contemplate  that  external 
body  as  actually  existing  or  as  present,  until  the  human  body  be 
affected  by  a  modification  which  excludes  the  existence  or  presence 
of  the  external  body.  (E,  11,  Prop  17) 
Now,  from  this  it  appears  that  the  object  of  the  mind  is  not  only  the  human  body 
but  also  the  affecting  external  body,  so  that  the  mind  represents  or  perceives  the 
nature  of  both  the  affected  human  body  and  the  affecting  body  at  the  same  time. 
Spinoza  repeatedly  reminds  us,  in  Ethics  part  II  propositions  14-29,  of  this 
point,  that  firstly,  the  human  mind  has  knowledge  of  the  human  body  as  well  as 
external  bodies  only  through  the  modification  by  which  the  human  body  is  affected 
by  the  external  bodies.  The  following  statements  of  Spinoza  make  this  point  clear: 
175 The  idea  of  every  way  in  which  the  human  body  is  affected  by  external 
bodies  [modification]  must  involve  the  nature  of  the  human  body,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  nature  of  the  external  body.  (E,  H,  Prop  16)1 
Hence,  it  follows,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  human  mind  perceives  the 
nature  of  many  bodies  together  with  that  of  its  own  body.  (E,  11,  Prop 
16.  Coro]  1) 
Thus  it  seems  that,  for  Spinoza,  the  human  mind  perceives  two  kinds  of  bodies- 
the  human  body  and  external  bodies-at  the  same  time;  the  ideas  of  the 
modification  of  the  human  body  also  involve  the  nature  of  external  bodies. 
Let  us  consider  the  relationship  among  the  three  concepts  as  the  object  of 
the  idea:  the  human  body,  external  bodies,  and  modifications.  Here,  I  argue  that  the 
concept  of  modifications  (affections,  states)  plays  an  important  role  in  Spinoza's 
representationalism,  since  without  the  idea  of  modification  of  the  human  body,  the 
human  mind  cannot  have  an  idea  of  nor  represent  the  human  body  itself  or  the 
affecting  external  bodies.  In  Spinoza's  words,  a  modification  is  "every  way  in 
which  the  human  body  is  affected  by  external  bodies,  "  so  that  the  meaning  of 
"modification  of  the  human  body"  is  what  happens  in  the  human  body  when  it  is 
affected  by  the  external  body;  that  is  to  say,  events  or  changes  in  the  human  body 
affected  by  the  external  bodies.  Now,  I  shall  consider  the  process  of  representation 
concerning  the  modification  of  the  human  body.  When  the  human  body  is  affected 
by  the  external  bodies,  we  perceive,  in  the  first  place,  the  modification  before  we 
perceive  either  the  human  body  or  the  external  body.  That  is  to  say,  the  human 
mind  perceives  the  modification  at  the  first  stage,  and  then  perceives  the  human 
body  and  the  external  body  at  the  second  stage.  Hence,  it  follows  that  the  human 
mind  cannot  represent  either  the  human  body  or  the  external  body  before  it 
Spinoza  repeats  this  in  the  Ethics: 
"There  are  in  truth  (Prop  16,  pt.  2)  the  ideas  of  modifications  of  the  human  body  which  involve 
its  nature  as  well  as  the  nature  of  external  bodies"  (E,  11,  Prop  18,  Schol). 
"The  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the  human  body  involve  the  nature  both  of  external  bodies  and 
of  the  human  body  itself'  (E,  H,  Prop  2  8,  Demon). 
176 represents  the  modification  of  the  human  body.  As  to  this  point  Spinoza  states  as 
follows: 
The  human  mind  does  not  know  the  human  body  itself,  nor  does  it  know 
that  the  body  exists  except  through  ideas  of  modifications  by  which  the 
body  is  affected.  (E,  H,  Prop  19) 
The  human  mind  perceives  no  external  body  as  actually  existing  unless 
through  the  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  its  body.  (E,  H,  Prop  26) 
Now,  we  can  see  that  for  the  human  mind  to  represent  the  human  body  and  the 
external  body  it  has  to  firstly  represent  or  have  ideas  of  the  modifications  of  the 
human  body.  But,  the  processes  are  not  entirely  distinct:  one  and  the  same  idea 
which  represents  the  modification  of  the  human  body  also  represents  the  human 
body  and  the  external  body.  In  the  order  of  explanation,  the  modification  comes 
first  before  the  human  body  and  the  external  body.  2 
In  fact,  however,  once  one  idea  represents  the  modification,  since  this  idea 
involves  the  nature  of  the  human  body  and  of  the  external  body,  this  idea 
represents  both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body  (E,  11,  Prop  16). 
Representing  the  human  body  and  the  external  body  depends  on  representing  the 
modification  of  the  human  body.  For  example,  when  I  perceive  John,  there  is  the 
way  in  which  my  body  is  affected  by  John's  body  i.  e.  the  modification  of  my  body. 
At  the  first  stage,  my  mind  perceives  this  modification  (the  event  in  my  body)  and 
at  the  second  stage  my  mind  perceives  both  my  body  itself  and  John's  body.  That  is 
to  say,  without  having  the  idea  of  the  modification  of  my  body,  we  can  represent 
neither  my  body  nor  John's  body. 
The  following  statement  of  Spinoza's  confirms  this  two-stage  process  of 
representation. 
Spinoza  wants  these  stages  to  be  logically  distinct,  but  not  distinct  in  time. 
177 [T]he  human  mind  perceives  these  modifications  and,  consequently 
(Prop  16,  pt.  2),  the  human  body  itself  actually  existing  (Prop  17,  pt.  2). 
The  human  mind,  therefore,  perceives  the  human  body,  etc.  (E,  H,  Prop 
19,  Demon) 
Although  Spinoza  does  not  mention  the  external  body,  the  same  argument  should 
be  applied  to  it,  since  the  idea  of  the  modification  entails  the  nature  of  not  only  the 
human  body  but  also  the  external  body  and  thus  'the  human  mind  perceives  the 
nature  of  many  bodies  together  with  that  of  its  own  body"  (E,  11,  Prop  16,  Corol). 
Thus,  it  is  clear  that  by  virtue  of  the  fact  the  mind  has  the  idea  of  the  modification 
of  the  body,  ideas  in  the  human  mind  can  represent  the  human  body  and  the 
external  body. 
From  the  exposition  above,  in  Spinoza's  representationalism,  we  can  see 
that  there  are  the  following  four  items. 
(1)  The  human  body,  which  is  the  object  of  the  human  mind  and  is  affected  by 
external  bodies. 
(2)  External  bodies,  which  affect  the  human  body:  "The  individual  parts  composing 
the  human  body,  and  consequently  the  human  body  itself,  are  affected  by 
external  bodies  in  many  ways"  (E,  11,  Post  3).  3 
(3)  Modifications  (affections,  states)  of  the  body,  which  involve  the  nature  of  the 
body  as  well  as  of  the  external  bodies  affecting  it. 
(4)  The  human  mind,  which  is  the  complex  idea  composed  of  the  ideas  of  the  body 
and  of  the  affecting  external  bodies:  "The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal 
being  of  the  human  mind  is  not  simple,  but  it  is  composed  of  a  number  of 
ideas"  (E,  11,  Prop  15). 
(5)  The  ideas  which  represent  both  (1)  and  (2)  by  means  of  representations  of  (3). 
Now,  we  can  conclude  that  for  Spinoza,  the  cognitive  situation  requires  the 
presence  of  ideas,  which  are  contained  in  the  mind,  and  these  ideas  represent  the 
nature  both  of  its  own  body  and  of  external  bodies.  In  other  words,  there  is  a 
Before  proposition  14  in  part  11,  there  are  six postulates. 
178  1 representative  relationship  between  the  human  mind  and  its  body  or  external  bodies 
through  the  medium  of  ideas  which  represent  those  objects. 
(2)  The  Problems  of  Spinoza's  Representationalism 
One  problem  is  that  there  is  apparently  a  glaring  contradiction  between 
propositions  13  and  16  in  part  11.  Spinoza  alleges  that  the  human  mind  is  the  idea 
of  the  human  body  alone  in  proposition  13,  he  claims  that  the  human  mind 
represents  not  only  the  human  body  but  also  the  external  body  from  proposition 
16. 
The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  body,  or  a 
certain  mode  of  extension  actually  existing,  and  nothing  eZve.  (E,  H, 
Prop  13;  my  italics) 
The  idea  of  every  way  in  which  the  human  body  is  affected  by  external 
bodies  [modification]  must  involve  the  nature  of  the  human  body,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  nature  of  the  external.  (E,  H,  Prop  16) 
Is  Spinoza  really  intending  to  say  in  proposition  13  that  the  object  represented  by 
the  human  mind  is  only  the  human  body?  If  so,  how  can  we  account  for  the  later 
shift  in  proposition  16,  that  is,  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  represents  both  the 
human  mind  and  the  external  body? 
Some  commentators  such  as  Pollock,  Barker,  and  Taylor  argue  that  the 
problem  arises  owing  to  the  fact  that  Spinoza  is  confused  between  the  parallel  and 
the  representational  relationships  concerning  the  term  "idea.  51 
Pollock,  for  example,  recognises  that  Spinoza  uses  the  one  term  idea  in  the 
two  kinds  of  relation  and  complains  that  Spinoza  is  confused  between  these  two 
relations:  the  representational  and  the  parallel  relation.  Pollock  states: 
But,  Spinoza  makes  use  of  the  one  term  idea  to  denote  the  two  kinds  of 
relation,  and  we  have  to  find  out  by  the  context  which  he  means.  If  I  think  of 
179 Peter,  the  state  of  my  consciousness  in  an  idea  of  Peter  according  to  Spinoza's 
first  usage  of  term.  But  according  to  his  other  usage,  it  is  the  idea,  not  of  Peter, 
but  of  the  corresponding  state  of  my  own  brain  and  nerves,  or  such  parts  of 
them  as  are,  in  modem  language,  the  organs  of  that  particular  phase  of 
conscious  thought.  In  the  one  sense  the  object  of  the  idea  is  Peter,  in  the  other 
it  is  the  bodily  organism  correlated  to  the  thinkýg  mind.  And  it  is  important  to 
observe  that  in  this  other  sense  idea  has  a  far  wider  application  than  in  the  first 
and  more  familiar  sense.  The  material  correlate  which  is  called  the  object  of 
the  idea  may  be  a  living  organism,  but  also  it  may  not.  The  idea  may  coincide 
with  a  concept  in  a  conscious  mind,  or  with  a  conscious  mind  forming 
4  concepts,  but  also  it  may  not  . 
He  also  states  that  "[n]ow  a  man  can  easily  think  that  of  his  own  body,  but  he  is 
not  always  doing  so,  and  when  he  does  his  thought  will  not  be  accurate  unless  he 
has  learnt  something  of  physiology.  And  even  if  every  human  being  were  an 
accomplLshed.  physiologist,  the  constant  relation  of  the  mtind  as  a  whole  to  the  body 
as  a  whole  would  still  be  something  different  ftom  the  relation  of  the  knowing  to 
the  known.  "' 
A.  E.  Taylor  also  argues  the  similar  point-  "It  is  this  neglect  to  insist  on  the 
unique  character  of  all  -knowing  as  an  apprehension  of  an  object  by  a  subject  which 
explains  the  standing  and  apparently  unconscious  Spinozistic.  equivocation  by 
which  'the  idea  of  Peter'  may  mean  either  'the  mental  complex  which  corresponds 
to  Peter's  brain  and  nervous  system,  the  mind  of  Peter',  or  'the  mental  complex 
which  exists  when  Paul  thinks  of  Peter',  Paul's  'idea'  of  Peter,  or  -may  -mean 
both 
in  the  same  breath,  if  it  is  convenient  for  the  argument  that  it  should.  ý16 
Barker,  following  Pollock,  argues  the  similar  point,  and  points  to  the 
contradiction  between  propositions  13  and  16  as  the  result  of  Spinoza's  confusion. 
4  Frederick  Pollock,  Spinoza:  His  Life  and  Philosophy  (London:  Duckworth,  1899),  p.  125. 
5  Ibid.,  p.  124. 
6  Taylor,  "Some  Incoherences  in  Spinozism  (1),  "  in  S.  Paul  Kashap  (ed.  ),  Studies  in  Spinoza 
(Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press.,  1972),  p.  206. 
180 Such  a  case  presents  itself  in  11,13.  Spinoza  there  says,  in  terms  which  seem 
to  admit  of  no  dubiety,  that  the  object  of  the  mind's  knowledge  is  the  body, 
and  nothing  else  than  the  body. 
... 
[I]t  is  contradicted  by  Spinoza's  own 
statements,  for  example,  in  16  CI  (where  he  says  that  the  human  mind 
perceives  plurimorum  corporum  naturam  una  cum  sui  corporis  natura  7), 
and  in  17  (where  he  says  that,  when  the  body  is  affected  by  an  external  body, 
the  mind  idem  corpus  externum  ut  actu  existens  vel  ut  sibi  praesens 
contemplabitur  8) 
. 
How,  then.  could  he  assert  the  et  nihil  aliud  9  of  13?  10 
Barker's  answer  is  that  "[flhere  must,  then,  it  would  seem,  be  some  serious 
confusion  in  Spinoza  thought,  if  his  assertion  of  our  proposition  is  to  be 
explained.  ""  Spinoza's  confusion  is,  according  to  Barker,  as  follows: 
Spinoza  uses  offectiones  to  denote  the  bodily  process  or  facts,  and  speaks 
of  the  ideae  affectionum,  but  he  fails  apparently  to  see  that  the  ideae  which 
occur  in  the  mind  when  the  affectiones  occur  in  the  body  need  not  have  the 
affectiones  or  the  body  for  their  object.  Ideae  affectionum  may  mean  either 
ideas  which  correspond  to  the  affectiones,  or  ideas  which  are  aware  of  or 
know  the  affectiones,  but  Spinoza  apparently  identifies  the  two  meanings, 
that  is,  identifies  correspondence  and  cognition,  but  now  from  a 
physiological  rather  than  an  epistemological  point  of  view.  12 
Thus,  Barker  concludes  that  I  think,  then,  that  we  must  agree  with  Pollock  that, 
when  Spinoza-  speaks  of  the  mind  as  idea  sive  cognitio  corporis  [idea  or 
knowledge  of  the  body],  he  is  confused  and  is  using  the  word  idea  in  a  new  and 
strange  way.  "" 
7  "the  nature  of  many  bodies  together  with  that  [the  nature]  of  its  own  body" 
8  "will  contemplate  that  [the  same]  external  body  as  actually  existing  or  as  present" 
9  "and  nothing  else" 
10  H.  Barker,  "Notes  on  the  Second  Part  of  Spinoza's  Ethics,  "  in  S.  Paul  Kashap  (ed.  ),  Studies  in 
Spinoza  (Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1972),  pp.  136-137. 
11  Ibid.,  p.  137. 
12  Ibid.,  P.  142. 
13  Ibid.,  p.  143. 
181 Now,,  we  can  see  that  some  commentators  argue  that  owing  to  the  fact  that 
Spinoza  uses  the  ten-n  "idea7'  to  present  the  parallel  relationship  between  the  idea 
and  the  human  body  as  well  as  to  present  the  representational  relationship  between 
idea  and  the  external  bodies,  he  was  confused  between  the  two  relations.  As  a 
result,  Spinoza  confusedly  regards  the  term  "idea7  used  in  the  parallel  sense,  as 
presenting  the  representational  relationship.  This  is  why  Spinoza  thinks  that  the 
idea  in  the  human  mind  also  represents  the  human  body. 
2  Della  Rocca's  Interpretation  of  the  Concept  of 
Representation  in  Spinoza 
Della  Rocca  refuses  the  interpretation  which  ascribes  a  confusion  to 
Spinoza,  since  be  thinks  that  this  attribution  underestimates  Spinoza's  intelligence. 
An  important  point  for  him  in  solving  the  problem  is  the  mind-relativity  of  content, 
that  is,  ideas  insofar  as  they  are  in  the  human  mind  are  confused  and  the  same  ideas 
insofar  they  are  in  God's  mind  are  adequate.  Let  us  consider  his  argument  in  detail. 
(1)  Parallelism  and  the  Concept  of  Representation 
Della  Rocca  divides  parallelism  into  "bare  parallelism"  and 
"representational  parallelism,  "  and  ascribes  the  latter  to  Spinoza;  the  former  is 
parallelism  (in  the  semantic  or  conceptual  sense)  without  representation,  and  the 
latter  is  parallelism  with  it.  Della  Rocca's  tendency  is  to  combine  two  theories: 
representationalism  and  parallelism.  According  to  him,  Spinoza's  parallelism,  with 
respect  to  the  notion  of  minds,  requires  the  following  claims:  "(1)  The  idea  of  the 
effect  depends  on  the  idea  of  the  cause  (2)  There  is  an  idea  of  each  physical  object 
(3)  There  is  a  physical  object  for  each  idea  (4)  There  are  no  causal  relations  in 
182 thought  in  addition  to  those  that  mirror  the  causal  relations  in  extension.  ýi]4 
Therefore,  we  can  see  that  there  are,  in  Spinoza's  theory,  ideas  and  the  objects  of 
these  ideas,  and  that  they  are  parallel  to  each  other.  However,  Della  Rocca  treats 
the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  as  not  both  the  external  body 
and  the  human  body,  but  as  only  the  human  body,  although  he  argues  that  the  idea 
in  the  human  mind  represents  both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body.  It 
follows  that  the  ideas  which  are  contained  in  the  human  n-dnd  are  not  "ideas  that 
are  parallel  to  other  [external]  bodies,  "  but  "ideas  that  are  parallel  to  each  part  of 
the  human  body.  "" 
Next,  Della  Rocca  moves  on  to  explain  that  this  sort  of  collection  of  ideas 
is  a  single  individual  or  a  mind  instead  of  a  hodgepodge  of  ideas.  Owing  to  the  fact 
that  Spinoza  does  not  explain  complex  mental  individuals,  he  depends  on  Spinoza's 
account  of  complex  physical  individuals.  Thus  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  Spinoza's 
parallelism  entails  a  mirroring  of  complex  individuality  across  attributes,  Dena 
Rocca  argues  that  we  can  infer  the  human  mind's  individuality  from  the  body's. 
Therefore,  there  is  a  hierarchy  in  thinking  individuals,  as  in  extended  individuals: 
just  as  the  infinite  extended  mode  which  is  motion  and  rest  (the  immediate  in-finite 
mode)  and  the  face  of  the  universe  (the  mediate  infinite  mode)  is  a  complex 
physical  individual,  so  the  infinite  intellect  is  a  complex  mental  individual.  In  other 
words,  from  the  fact  that  Spinoza  regards  the  whole  universe  as  "an  all-inclusive 
extended  individual,  "  we  can  infer  that  the  infinite  intellect  is  an  all-inclusive 
thinking  individual. 
(2)  The  Containment  Thesis  and  the  Mind-Relativity  of  Content 
In  this  way,  we  have  just  seen  that  Della  Rocca  regards  the  infinite  intellect 
as  the  totality  of  all  finite  modes  of  thought  and  claims  that  this  totality  is  not  a 
hodgepodge  of  ideas  but  a  complex  individual  like  a  human  mind.  16  Hence  we  can 
14  Michael  Delia  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza  (New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1996),  p.  23. 
15  Ibid.,  pp.  26-27. 
16  Ibid,  pp.  30-40. 
183 see  that  the  human  mind  is  a  part  of  God's  mind  just  as  the  human  body  is  a  part  of 
the  whole  extended  individual.  The  human  mind  is  contained  in  God's  mind,  and 
accordingly  ideas  in  the  human  mind  are  identical  with  certain  ideas  in  God's  mind; 
Della  Rocca  names  this  "the  containment  thesis":  he  states  that  "we  can  consider 
an  idea  insofar  as  it  is  in  God's  mind  and  that  same  idea  (qua  particular  mental 
state  or  event)  insofar  as  it  is  in  my  mind.  5117  However,  the  contents  of  this  same 
idea  are  different  in  each  case:  the  content  of  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  is 
different  from  the  content  of  the  very  same  idea  in  God's  mind.  Thus  we  can  see 
that  there  is  a  difference  between  representation  in  God's  mind  and  representation 
in  the  human  mind;  Della  Rocca  names  this  "the  mind-relativity  of  content.  "" 
Della  Rocca  unfolds  his  own  views  as  follows.  Representation  in  God's 
mind  easily  explains  representational  parallelism,  since  each  idea  in  God's  mind 
represents  its  extended  counterpart.  Unlike  representation  in  God's  mind,  each  idea 
in  the  human  mind  represents  not  only  its  extended  counterpart,  i.  e.  the  parts  of  the 
human  body  which  are  causally  parallel  to  each  idea,  but  also  the  cause  of  that 
extended  counterpart,  namely  the  external  cause  of  that  counterpart.  19  Points  to  be 
noticed  are: 
(1)  He  combines  the  fact  that  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  is  parallel  to  its  extended 
counterpart  e,  with  the  fact  that  the  human  mind  represents  e,  so  that  "the  idea 
parallel  to  e  is  what  represents  e  in  the  human  mind";  20  this  combination  is  on  the 
basis  of  his  view  that  the  concept  of  representation  is  better  understood  in  terms  of 
parallelism. 
(2)  An  idea  in  the  human  mind  represents  not  only  e,  its  extended  counterpart,  but 
also  c,  the  cause  of  that  counterpart. 
(3)  However,  the  fact  that  an  idea  has  two  objects  (e  and  c)  does  not  imply  two 
different  senses  of  representation  nor  two  different  ideas  of  two  objects. 
17  Ibid,  p.  40. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  44. 
19  Ibid.,  pp.  44-47. 
20  Ibid.,  p.  47. 
184 (4)  Therefore,  a  single  idea  represents  both  extended  counterparts  and  external 
bodies  in  the  same  sense  of  representation. 
The  points  from  2  to  4,  Della  Rocca  argues,  are  explained  by  a  confusion  of  the 
human  mind.  One  and  the  same  idea  is  in  God's  mind  as  well  as  in  the  human  mind, 
but  the  content  of  this  idea  is  Merent  in  each  case  since  the  content  is  relative  to 
the  two  minds  and  there  are  some  differences  between  God's  mind  and  the  human 
mind.  One  difference  is  that  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  represents  both  e  and  c, 
and  another  is  that  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  is  confused;  these  notions  are 
coextensive.  Hence,  the  fact  that  the  idea  represents  its  object  confusedly  is 
associated  with  the  fact  that  the  idea  represents  both  e  and  c,  and  that  the  idea 
cannot  distinguish  these  objects.  It  follows  that  the  idea  represents  two  different 
objects  without  distinction  between  them.  Therefore,  in  this  case,  the  mind  cannot 
have  the  idea  of  e  or  c  alone,  but  can  only  have  a  blend  of  these  two,  namely  a 
confused  idea. 
In  this  way,  he  appeals  to  distinction  between  adequate  ideas  in  God's  mind 
and  inadequate  ideas  in  the  human  mind,  to  explain  why  there  is  the  duality  of 
represented  ob  ects,  (that  is,  why  the  ideas  insofar  as  they  are  in  the  mind  represent  j 
both  the  human  mind  and  the  external  bodies). 
(3)  The  Probleinfor  Della  Rocca's  Interpretation 
Della  Rocca  introduces  the  existing  interpretations  of  Spinoza's  concept  of 
representation  and  attempts  to  solve  the  problems  revealed  by  the  interpretations 
by  offering  his  own  interpretation.  In  his  treatment  of  Spinoza's  term  "idea  of'  as 
possessing  both  the  representational  and  the  parallel  feature  and  his  attempt  to 
integrate  the  concept  of  representation  into  parallelisn-4  he  is  more  advanced  than 
the  previous  interpreters.  However,  problems  still  remain. 
In  order  to  make  representationalism  compatible  with  parallelism,  Della 
Rocca  seems  to  appeal  to  the  distinction  between  adequate  ideas  in  God's  mind 
and  inadequate  ideas  in  the  human  mind.  According  to  him,  a  representational 
parallelism  does  not  occur  in  the  human  mind,  but  only  in  God"s  mind,  and  there 
185 occurs  only  a  bare  parallelism  in  the  human  mind,  since  the  ideas  in  the  human 
mind  are  inadequate  whereas  ideas  in  God"s  mind  are  adequate.  Thus, 
representation  in  the  human  mind  i.  e.  the  fact  that  one  idea  represents  two  objects 
does  not  violate  parallelism,  since  it  is  not  the  plain  truth:  in  principle,  one  idea 
(which  is  adequate)  represents  one  object.  The  imbalance  between  parallelism  and 
the  concept  of  representation  in  our  inadequate  ideas  does  not  violate  the  truth  of 
parallelism. 
Even  though  we  can  save  Spinoza  from  the  incompatibility  between 
parallelism  and  representationalism  by  appealing  to  inadequacy  and  confusion  of 
our  ideas  (rather  than  confusion  and  inadequacy  in  Spinoza),  this  cannot  help  us  to 
save  Spinoza  ftom  another  incompatibility  between  propositions  13  and  16,  since 
the  term  Spinoza  uses  in  proposition  13  is  "the  human  mind.  "  According  to  Della 
Rocca's  appeal  to  inadequacy  of  our  ideas,  since  ideas  in  the  human  mind  are 
inadequate  there  does  not  occur  a  representational  parallelism  in  the  human  mind 
and  thus  one  idea  represents  two  objects,  whereas  since  the  ideas  in  God's  mind 
are  adequate  there  occurs  a  representational  parallelism  and  thus  the  parallel 
relationship  always  runs  together  with  the  representational  relationship  in  God's 
mind.  If  so,  Della  Rocca  cannot  explain  Spinoza's  argument  in  proposition  13: 
"The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  human  botýW'  If  the 
ideas  in  the  human  mind  are  inadequate,  the  object  of  those  ideas  should  be  both 
the  human  body  and  the  external  body  as  they  represent  both.  The  terms  "human 
-mind"' 
together  with  "the  (human)  body"  in  proposition  13  tell  us  that  we  cannot 
appeal  to  a  distinction  between  adequate  ideas  in  God's  mind  and  inadequate  ideas 
in  the  human  mind,  in  order  to  solve  the  problems.  There  is  still  the  problem  of 
reconciling  proposition  13  and  proposition  16. 
r, 
186 3.  Parallelism,  Representationalism  and  Proposition 
rlr  1  11 
I  hirteen 
Are  there  alternative  readings  of  proposition  13  which  would  avoid  the 
problems  raised  so  far?  Here  are  some  suggestions. 
(1)  "A  Body"  Instead  of  "the  Body" 
The  Latin  word  "corpus"  in  E,  11,  Prop  13  allows  us  two  possible 
translations  which  are  "the  body"  and  "a  body";  it  means  the  human  body  in  the 
case  of  "the  body,  "  and  some  other  body  in  the  case  of  "a  body.  " 
The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  body  [a 
body],  or  a  certain  mode  of  extension  actually  existing,  and  nothing 
else.  (E,  H,  Prop  13) 
If  we  treat  "the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind"  in  proposition  13 
as  "a  body"  instead  of  "the  body,  "  we  might  make  it  fit  with  proposition  16.  The 
reasoning  is  as  follows.  If  the  object  is "a  body,  "  the  object  confusedly  represented 
is  both  human  body  and  the  external  body.  Thus,  Spinoza  might  regard  the  external 
body  as  well  as  the  human  body  as  the  object  of  the  idea  in  the  human  mind  in 
proposition  13  and  thus  when  he  says  that  the  human  mind  represents  not  only  the 
human  body  but  also  the  external  bodies  in  proposition  16,  there  is  no  clear 
contradiction.  Let  us  examine  whether  we  can  regard  "corpus"  as  "a  body"  (both 
the  human  body  and  the  external  bodies). 
Della  Rocca  supports  the  definite  article  translation,  "the  body,  " 
-as  most 
commentators  do.  The  reason  for  him  is  that  firstly,  the  term  "nothing  else"  in 
proposition  13  of  part  11  seems  to  indicate  that  it  is  the  human  body  (the  body  of 
the  person  having  the  idea),  since  if  it  is  some  other  body,  the  term  "nothing  else" 
would  be  unnecessary,  and  secondly,  the  fact  that  Spinoza  refers  to  the  human 
- 
LI 
body  in  some  statements  aner  proposition  13  can  make  proposition  13  refer  to  the 
human  body  in  particular,  and  this  indicates  a  definite  article  translation. 
187 However,  I  think  that  the  first  indicator  (the  term  "nothing  else")  is  not 
sufficient  in  supporting  the  definite  article  translation,  '1he  body,  "  although  I  agree 
with  this  translation  owing  to  the  second  reason.  If  Spinoza's  usage  of  the  term 
"nothing  else"  means  "nothing  else  but  the  (human)  body,  "  the  reason  that  Spinoza 
uses  this  term  is  to  exclude  external  bodies  from  the  object  of  the  human  mind. 
However,  if  it  does  not,  would  this  term  be  otiose  or  unjustified,  as  Della  Rocca 
argues?  I  think  that  it  would  not.  For  there  could  still  be  a  reason  for  using  this 
term.  Besides  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension,  there  are  infinite  numbers  of 
unknown  attributes,  so  that  there  are  unknown  modes  besides  the  mind  (the  mode 
of  thought)  and  the  body  (the  mode  of  extension).  It  follows  that  if  the  term 
"nothing  else"  means  "nothing  else  but  a  body,  "  the  reason  that  Spinoza  uses  this 
term  is  to  exclude  these  unknown  modes  from  the  object  of  the  human  mind;  what 
Spinoza  would  then  be  taken  as  saying  in  this  proposition  is  that  besides  the  mode 
of  extension,  nothing  else  can  be  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
nind,  Therefore,  the  term  "nothing  else"  does 
-not  rule  out  the  possib  of  "a  r  ility 
body.  "' 
in  in  fin  Furthermore,  we  can  &--d  a  possibility  of  interpreting  it.  as  de  ite 
body,  "a  body,  "  in  the  second  half  of  the  demonstration  of  this  proposition: 
Again-,  if  there.  were  also  any  other  object  of  the  mind  besides  [all 
body,  since  nothing  exists  from  which  some  effect  does  not  follow 
(Prop  36,  pt.  1),  the  idea  of  some  effect  produced  by  this  object 
would  necessarily  exist  in  our  mind  (Prop  11,  pt.  2).  But  (  A-x  5,  pt. 
2)  there  is  no  such  idea  [i.  e.  no  idea  of  unknown  modes],  and 
therefore  the  object  of  our  mind  is  [a]  body  existing,  and  nothing 
L 
else.  (E,  11,  Prop  13,  Demon;  my  italics) 
Where  Spinoza  says  that  "there  is  no  such  idea"  he  means  that  "there  is  no  such 
idea  except  for  ideas  of  bodies  and  of  minds":  'No  individual  things  are  felt  or 
perceived  by  us  except  bodies  and  modes  of  thought"  (E,  11,  Ax  5).  Here,  we  can 
see  the  possibility  that  Spinoza  is  excluding  the  modes  of  unknown  attributes  from 
the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind,  and  this  is  the  reason  why  he 
188 uses  the  term  "nothing  else,  "  That  is  to  say,  since  there  are  no  such  ideas  of  modes 
of  unknown  attributes,  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  has  to  be 
"a  body".  The  demonstration  can  be  restated  as  follows  in  the  case  of  "the  body": 
If  there  were  any  other  object  of  the  human  mind  besides  the  human 
body,  the  idea  of  that  object  would  have  to  exist  in  our  mind. 
However,  there  are  no  such  ideas  except  the  idea  of  the  human 
body  [i.  e.  there  are  no  such  ideas  of  external  bodies],  and  therefore 
the  object  of  our  mind  is  the  human  body  existing  and  nothing  else. 
This  would  support  the  claim  that  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
mind  is  not  the  human  body  but  a  body  (the  human  body  and  the  external  body).  21 
However,  despite  the  possibility  of  this  interpretation,  Spinoza's  later 
statements  concerning  proposition  13  make  clear  that  the  term  "corpus"  refers  to 
the  body  of  the  person  having  the  idea.  Also,  in  proposition  13  "...  or  a  certain 
mode  of  extension  ... 
"  does  not  fit  the  interpretation  "a  body,  "  and  does  -fit  "the 
body.  "  Let  us  consider  some  statements  concerning  this  point. 
The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal  being  of  the  -human  mind  is  the 
idea  of  [the/a]  body  (Prop  13,  pt.  2)  which  (Post  1)  is  composed  of  a 
number  of  individuals  composite  to  a  high  degree.  (E.  H,  Prop  15, 
Demon;  22  my  italics) 
In  the  quotation,  the  phrase  "[the/a]  body  (Prop  13,  pt,  2)  which  (Post  1)  is  composed 
of'  indicates  that  "corpus"  in  proposition  13  is  no  more  than  "corpus"  in-  postulate 
1,  and  the  postulate  specifically  states  that  "corpus"  is  the  human  body:  "The 
human  body  is  composed  of  a  number  of  individual  parts  of  diverse  nature,  each  of 
which  is  composite  to  a  high  degree"  (E,  11,  Post  1;  my  italics). 
21  Here,  I  am  not  supporting  the  interpretation  of  "a  body,  "  but  only  indicating  that  we  cannot 
take  the  term  "nothing  else"  as  a  sufficient  justification  for  the  interpretation  of  "the  body.  " 
22  The  proposition  is  as  follows:  "The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal  being  of  the  human  mind 
is  not  simplel,  but  is  composed  of  a  number  of  ideas"  (E,  11.,  Prop  15). 
189 There  is  more  evidence  to  clarify  the  interpretation  of  "the  body.  "  When 
Spinoza  uses  proposition  13  to  demonstrate  proposition  19  and  26  of  part  11,  he 
informs  us  that  "corpus"  in  proposition  13  is  not  "a  body"  but  "the  body.  "  He 
makes  clear  this  point  by  using  the  term"the  human  body.  " 
The  human  mind  is  the  idea  itself  or  the  knowledge  of  the  hiiman  body 
(Prop  13,  pt  2).  This  knowledge  (Prop  9,  pt.  2)  is  in  God  in  so  far  as  He 
is  considered  as  affected  by  another  idea  of  an  individual  thing.  (E,  11, 
Prop  19,  Demon;  my  ita-lics) 
Again,  in  the  demonstration  of  proposition  26,  he  states  as  Mows: 
If  the  -human 
body  is  in  no  way  affected  by  any  extern-  a!  body,,  then 
(Prop  7,,  pt.  2)  the  idea  of  the  human  body,  that  is  to  say  (Prop  13,  pt. 
2),  the  human  mind,  is  not  affected  in  any  way  by  the  idea  of  the 
existence  of  that  body,  nor  does  it  in  any  way  perceive  the  existence  of 
that  external  body.  (E,  H,  Prop  26,  Demon;  my  italicls) 
I  think  that  those  -statements  are  enough  evidence  to  support  the  interpretation  of 
"the  body.  "23  The  interpretation  of  "a  body"  can  only  rely  on  one  indicator  in  the 
demonstration  of  proposition  13,  that  is,  Spinoza's  appeal  to  axiom  5.  But,  it  is 
quite  likely  that  his  reference  was  the  sign  that  his  argument  is  confused  here. 
If  the  term  "corpus"  means  "the  human  body,  "  we  can  hardly  avoid  making 
Spinoza  inconsistent.  The  reason  is  that  when  Spinoza  explains  the  concept  of 
representation  in  proposition  16,  he  argues  that  an  idea  in  the  human  mind 
represents  both  e  and  c,  and  thus  this  idea  has  two  objects.  Either  Spinoza  should 
have  regarded  the  term  "body"  as  not  only  the  human  body  but  also  the  external 
body  as  long  as  he  argues  that  the  human  mind  represents  both  e  and  c,  or  that  he 
should  have  held  that  the  human  mind  represents  not  the  external  body  but  only  the 
human  body  (insofar  as  he  regards  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human 
"  The  corollary  of  proposition  13  and  the  demonstration  of  proposition  21  in  part  H  can  also  be 
taken  as  textual  %-,,  %4der.  ce. 
190 mind  as  only  the  human  body).  It  is  clear  that  Spinoza  maintains  these  two 
doctrines  which  are  difficult  to  make  compatible.  The  problem  may  be  connected 
with  the  fact  that  Spinoza  is  trying  to  establish  the  human  body  as  the  object  of  the 
human  mind  in  the  first  place  (up  to  proposition  13),  and  then-after  breaking  off 
to  discuss  the  motion  of  bodies-from  proposition  14,  onwards  he  starts  to 
address  our  knowledge  of  the  external  world.  Interpretations  of  Spinoza  are 
confronted  by  an  apparent  contradiction.  We  should  try  to  interpret  Spinoza  in  a 
consistent  manner  before  we  conclude  that  Spinoza  is  committed  to  a  self- 
contradiction.  Otherwise,  we  would  have  to  conclude  that  Spinoza  was  confused 
between  the  parallel  and  the  representational  relationship  as  some  commentators 
claim.  Here  are  some  further  suggestions  for  resolving  the  problem. 
(2)  The  Distinction  between  the  Parallel  Object  and  the 
Representational  Object 
There  is  the  possibility  that  we  could  argue  that  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  human  body  while  arguing  that  the  idea 
represents  both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body.  We  could  distinguish  "the 
object  of  the  idea"  from  "that  which  is  represented  by  the  idea.  "  Thus,  "the 
relationship  between  the  idea  and  its  object"  is  different  from  "the  relationship 
9ý24  between  the  idea  and  the  thing  represented  . 
It  f6flows,  that  "what  the  idea  is  of' 
is  the  human  body  and  "what  the  idea  represents"  is  both  the  human  body  and  the 
external  body;  the  parallel  object  of  the  idea  is  the  human  body  and  the 
representational  object  of  the  same  idea  is  both  the  human  body  and  the  external 
bod  Y.  25  This  distinction  between  "the  parallel  object  of  the  idea"  and  "the 
24  This  is  Daisie  Radner's  distinction  ("Spinoza's  Theory  of  Ideas,  "  The  Philosophical  Review, 
vol.  80  [1971],  p.  346). 
25For  Radner,  the  parallel  object  of  the  idea  is  the  human  body  the  representational  object  of  the 
same  idea  is  only  the  affecting  external  body,  since  for  her  interpretation  of  Spinoza  the  human 
mind  does  not  represent  the  human  body.  But  this  is  misleading:  Spinoza  attaches  the  same  terms 
such  as  'ýperceiving"  and  "knowing"  to  both  the  human  body  and  the  affecting  external  body,  and 
thus  if  the  external  body  is  represented  by  the  human  mind,  so  is  the  human  body.  Therefore  if 
there  is  this  distinction  for  Spinoza,  what  the  idea  represents  is  not  only  the  external  body.  but 
both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body. 
191 representational  object  of  the  idea  ýý26  may  allow  us  to  make  Spinoza  consistent  if 
we  can  claim  that  the  object  in  proposition  13  means  not  the  representational 
object  but  the  parallel  object.  In  this  case,  we  cam  argue  that  in  proposition  13, 
Spinoza  refers  to  the  parallel  object  of  the  idea,  whereas  he  refers  to  not  the 
parallel  but  the  representational  object  when  be  explains  the  knowledge  of  our 
mind.  This  is  why  the  object  of  the  idea  is,  at  one  time,  only  the  human  body  and  at 
another,  both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body:  the  object  which  is  parallel  to 
the  idea  is  the  human  body  and  the  object  which  is  represented  by  the  idea  is  the 
human  body  as  well  as  the  external  body,  This  kind  of  understanding  seems  to 
make  Spinoza  consistent. 
However,  there  is  no  sign  that  the  term  "the  object"  in  proposition  13 
means  only  the  parallel  object.  Rather,  we  can  find  proposition  13  is  related  to  the 
representational  object  as  follows.  For  Spinoza  "having  the  idea  of,  "  "knowing,  " 
27 
and  "perceiving"  are  all  representational  terms.  As  Della  Rocca  claims,  Spinoza 
uses  these  terms  interchangeably  as  the  representational  ten-ns.  By  virtue  of  the  fact 
that  "having  the  idea,  "  is  the  representational  term,  the  phrase  "the  human  mind  has 
(is)  the  idea  of  the  object"  implies  that  "the  human  mind  represents  the  object  of 
the  idea";  they  are  interchangeable.  If  so,  the  phrase  "the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind"  in  the  proposition  is  closely  related  to  the 
representational  object.  Therefore,  we  cannot  claim  that  the  term  "object"  in 
proposition  13  means  only  "the  parallel  object,  "  and  thus  the  distinction  between 
the  parallel  and  the  representational  object  does 
-not 
help  us  to  solve  the 
incompatibility.  This  argument  can  simply  be  understood  as  follows:  as  long  as  the 
idea  in  the  hum  an  mind  also  represents  external  bodies  the  human  mind  has  to 
somehow  contain  ideas  of  external  bodies,  and  therefore  it  is  not  plausible  to  argue 
that  the  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  does  not  include  external 
bo  di  e  s. 
One  might  argue  that  although  "perceiving"  and  "knowing"  are 
interchangeably  representational  terms,  "having  the  idea  of'  iss  not  a 
26  For  Radner,  this  term  would  be  "the  parallel  object  of  the  idea"  (the  human  body)  and  'the 
representational  object  of  the  same  idea"  (the  external  body). 
27  Spinoza  also  uses  "contemplating"  as  the  representational  term. 
192 representational  term  but  only  a  parallel  term.  Then,  one  can  still  argue  that  the 
term  "object"  in  proposition  13  means  only  the  parallel  object  (the  human  body), 
whereas  the  other  statements  where  Spinoza  uses  the  terms  "perceiving"  and 
"knowing"  are  related  to  the  representational  object  (the  human  body  and  the 
external  body).  Thus,  according  to  this  argument,  we  can  explain  why  "the  object" 
in  proposition  13  is  only  the  human  body  despite  the  fact  that  the  idea  represents 
both  the  human  body  and  the  external  body. 
But,  there  is  textual  evidence  for  the  argument  that  for  Spinoza  "perceiving 
it  is  synonymous  with  "having  the  idea  of  it.  "  For  example,  Spinoza  states  that 
"[w]e  perceive  that  a  certain  body  is  affected  in  many  ways"  (E,  11,  Ax  4;  my 
italics),  and  then  when  he  uses  this  axiom  in  the  demonstration  of  proposition  13, 
the  axiom  is  restated  as  follows:  "But  (Ax  4,  pt.  2)  we  have  ideas  of  the 
modifications  of  a/the  body,  therefore  ... 
"  (E,  11,  Prop  13,  Demon;  my  italics).  In 
this  way,  we  can  see  that  "having  the  idea  of  it"  is  also  a  representational  phrase, 
and  therefore  the  problem  remains. 
(3)  The  Expanded  Body:  The  Human  Body  As  Including  the 
External  Body 
It  seems  that  if  we  want  to  make  sense  of  Spinoza,  we  should  argue  that 
either  (1)  "the  object"  in  proposition  13  is  both  the  human  body  and  the  external 
body  or  (2)  the  doctrine  is  that  the  ideas  represent  in  some  sense  only  the  human 
body.  We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  solid  basis  against  point  (1),  and  thus  that  "the 
object"  has  to  be  only  the  human  body.  In  that  case,  perhaps  we  should  turn  to 
consider  point  (2).  We  can  perhaps  think  of  Spinoza's  view  as  being  that  in  the 
same  way  that  the  body  of  the  forest  includes  the  trees,  so  the  affecting  external 
bodies  are  parts  of  the  represented  body.  If  Spinoza  maintains  this  view,  it  might  be 
a  clue  to  solve  the  problem.  I  shall  show  that  Spinoza  holds  this  kind  of  view-that 
we  are  parts  of  a  wider  whole-and  examine  whether  it  is  implied  in  his  concept  of 
representation  (or  whether  we  can  connect  it  to  his  concept  of  representation).  I 
shall  start  with  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system  concerning  "individuals.  " 
193 a.  Part  of  the  Wider  Whole 
According  to  Genevieve  Lloyd,  for  Spinoza,  the  most  basic  individual 
bodies  are  composite  bodies  which  are  made  up  of  the  simplest  bodies  on  the  basis 
of  the  maintenance  of  the  ratio  of  motion  and  rest  among  the  simplest  bodies.  It 
follows  that  for  Spinoza  what  makes  a  body  an  individual  is  the  ratio  of  motion  and 
rest.  This  individual  body  is  unified  with  other  individual  bodies  in  the  larger  body 
which  itself  is  also  regarded  as  an  individual.  Therefore,  there  exists  a  hierarchy  of 
individuals  in  Spinoza's  metaphysical  system,  and  the  apex  of  the  hierarchy  is  the 
universe  as  a  whole.  Individual  bodies  in  Spinoza's  system  are,  according  to 
Lloyd's  critical  standpoint,  regarded  as  parts  of  wholes.  More  precisely,  for 
Spinoza,  an  individual  body  is  a  part  of  a  wider  whole,  and  this  wider  whole  is  also 
an  individual  body  as  a  part  in  relation  to  the  more  comprehensive  wider  whole.  In 
other  words,  for  Spinoza,  any  dimensional  body  which  is  part  of  the  wider  whole, 
28 
no  matter  how  large  it  is,  is  regarded  as  an  individual  . 
With  respect  to  the  individuality  of  minds,  she  argues  that  as  in  the  case  of 
bodies,  there  exists  a  relationship  between  the  part  and  whole  in  the  realm  of  the 
mind;  in  Lloyd's  own  words,  "the  mind  is  integrated  into  wider  systems  that 
correspond  in  their  totality  to  the  universe  as  a  unified  whole  . 
"29Hence,  a  human 
mind  becomes  a  part  of  God's  mind,  in  other  words  just  as  bodies  are  included  in  a 
totality  of  material  modes  so  the  human  mind  is  a  set  of  ideas  in  the  mind  of  God 
which  is  a  totality  of  ideas  as  modes  of  thought. 
From  Lloyd's  arguments  above,  we  can  see  that  there  exists  a  hierarchy  of 
individuals  in  the  mental  and  physical  realm  in  Spinoza's  system.  From  this,  we 
could  infer  that  when  the  human  body  is  affected  by  the  external  body,  there  is  a 
wider  body  which  includes  the  human  body  and  the  external  body.  We  can  regard 
this  wider  body  as  the  expanded  human  body  which  includes  the  affecting  external 
body  and  the  human  body  before  being  affected.  If  so,  when  Spinoza  argues  that 
the  human  mind  represents  the  external  bodies,  we  can  regard  the  external  bodies 
'  Genevieve  Lloyd,  Part  of  Nature:  Seýf-Knowledge  in  Spinoza's  Ethics  (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University  Press,  1994),  pp.  10-12. 
29  Ibid.,  P.  16. 
194 as  a  part  of  the  (expanding)  human  body.  This  can  make  Spinoza  consistent  as  it  is 
compatible  with  his  argument  in  proposition  13  that  "the  object"'  is  tb-e  body. 
Andrew  Collier's  arguments  shed  more  light  on  this  point, 
b.  Body-Actual  and  Body-Cosmic 
Collier  divides  the  concept  of  the  body  in  Spinoza  into  two  domains-.  one  is 
the  "body-actuaT  used  in  a  narrow  sense  and  the  other  the  "body-cosmic"  used  in 
a  wider  sense  . 
30  My  body-actual  is  the  "patch  of  the  attribute  of  extension  that  is 
bound  by  my  skin7  i.  e.  some  of  its  parts  such  as  "the  spleen,  lymph  and  so  on,  "  and 
my  body-cosmic  is  "the  whole  body  of  the  universe"  na  m-ely  ",,,  vorld  as  the  body" 
which  is  an  integrated  concept  involving  my  body-actual  and  its  outside  world  such 
as  "my  house,  my  bike,  rny  path  to  work  across  Southampton  Common,  and  so 
on";  therefore,  his  concept  of  my  body-actual  is  implied  in  the  concept  of  body- 
CoSmic.  31 
Collier  goes  on  to  apply  this  concept  of  the  body  to  the  relationship 
between  the 
-mind  and  the  body.  In  Spinoza's  system,  the  body  under  the  attribute 
of  extension  corresponds  to  the  mind  under  the  attribute  of  thought.  From  Collier's 
perspective,  for  Spinoza's  system,  regarding  the  former  as  "body-cosmic"  is  more 
plausible  than  regarding  it  as  "body-actual.  ýý32  If  my  body  is  body-actuaL  no 
external  thing  can  be  a  part  of  my  body  even  if  my  body-actual  causally  interacts 
with  the  outer  world.  But  if  my  body  is  body-costnic,  the  body-actual  as  well  as 
external  things  are  implied  in  my  body;  they  can.  be  parts  or  elements  of  my  body- 
'0  According  to  Collier,  it  is  something  like  Marx's  "inorganic  body,  "  however  he  regards  "body- 
cosmic"  as  the  more  accurate  term  (Andrew  Collier,  "The  Materiality  of  Morals:  Mind,  body  and 
interests  in  Spinoza's  'Ethics,  "  Studia  Spinozana,  vol.  7  [1991],  p.  73,  note  1). 
31  Andrew  Collier,  "The  Inorganic  Body  and  the  Ambiguity  of  the  Freedom,  "  Radical 
Philosop,  ky,  vol.  57  (1991),  p.  5. 
He  states  as  to  the  concept  of  the  body-cosmic  as  follows:  "Rather,  we  are  "more  perfect"  than 
other  organisms  in  that  we  are  able  to  affect  and  be  affected  by  more  of  nature  in  more  ways  than 
others.  In  a  sense,  we  spread  ourselves  more  thinly  over  nature,  but  in  a  sense  nature  is  more  part 
of  us  than  it  is  of  other  organisms.  It  is,  as  Marx  puts  it.  our  inorganic  body"  (Andrew  Collier, 
"The  Materiality  of  Morals,  "  p.  77). 
32  Collier  "The  Inorganic  Body  and  the  Ambiguity  of  Freedom,  "  pp.  5-6. 
195 cosmic:  "  "The  more  we  are  sensitive  to  the  world  around  us,  and  the  more  we 
control  it,  the  more  it  is  part  Of  US.,, 
34 
Collier  does  not  connect  this  sort  of  view  with  Spinoza's  concept  of 
representation  and  neither  does  Lloyd.  But  I  think  that  if  we  connect  the  concept 
of  "body-cosmic"  with  the  concept  of  representation,  it  offers  an  approach  to 
apprehending  Spinoza's  representationalism.  One  of  the  important  points  of  the 
concept  of  the  body-cosmic  is  that  this  is  an  integrated  concept  between  my  body 
and  the  external  bodies  (in  Collier's  words,  my  body-actual  and  its  outside  world). 
Let  us  take  an  example. 
When  1  walk  along  Byres  Road  in  Glasgow  there  is,  in  Spinoza's  theory,  a 
body-cosmic  (as  my  body  which  includes  Byres  Road).  The  human  body-actual  and 
the  affecting  external  body  is  integrated  into  the  concept  of  the  body-cosmic.  In 
this  case,  in  my  mind,  there  is  one  compound  idea  for  one  compound  body  wbicb  is 
my  body-cosmic,  and  also  two  simpler  ideas  for  two  simpler  bodies  (my  body- 
actual  and  Byres  Road)  which  constitute  the  compound  body.  Therefore,  the.  fact 
that  my  mind  has  the  idea  of  my  expanded  body  which  absorbs  Byres  Road  entails 
that  my  mind  has  the  idea  of  my  body  and  of  Byres  Road.  If  we  proceed  along  with 
this  line,  we  can  allege  that  there  is  compatibility  between  proposition  13  and 
proposition  16  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  human  mind  represents  the  external 
body  as  a  part  of  the  (expanded)  human  body.  Furthermore,  we  can  also  allege  that 
there  is  compatibility  between  parallelism  and  representationalism  by  virtue  of  the 
fact  each  idea  in  the  human 
-mind  matches  its  object;  one  idea  represents  one  object 
whether  it.  is  a  single  or  a  compound  individual. 
What  I 
-have  explained  is  that  from  this  kind  of  view,  we  might  get  a  clue  to 
solve  the  problem.  The  attraction  in  connecting  between  the  concept  of  "body- 
cosmic"  and  representationalism  is  the  hope  that  we  may  explain  Spinoza's 
contradiction  between  the  two  propositions.  But  does  Spinoza  really  understand 
"representing  the  external  body"'  or  "having  the  idea  of  the  external  body"  along 
with  this  line  of  thought?  To  say  "yeS.  "  we  are  faced  with  the  problems,  which 
33  For  Collier,  Spinoza's  perception  is  the  proprioception.  of  the  body-cosmic  rather  than  body- 
actual. 
34  Collier,  "The  Inorganic  Body  and  the  Ambiguity  of  Freedom,  "  p.  6. 
196 lead  us  to  concluding  that  we  cannot  ascribe  the  doctrine  of  "body-cosmic"  to 
representationalism. 
The  above  view  is  textuafly  problematic  in  connecting  this  doctrine  of 
Spinoza's  with  his  concept  of  representation,  since  Spinoza  argues  the  doctrine 
apart  from  representationalism,  and  the  doctrine  of  "body-cosmic"  seems  to  be 
irrelevant  to  the  concept  of  representation.  In  fact,  nothing  in  the  text  supports  this 
kind  of  view  of  Spinoza's  propositions  on  representation.  From  the  text,  we  can 
rather  find  some  indications  against  it.  Spinoza  writes: 
It  follows,  secondly,  that  the  ideas  we  have  of  external  bodies  indicate  the 
constitution  of  our  own  body  rather  than  the  nature  of  the  external  bodies. 
(E,  111,  Prop,  16,  Corol  2;  my  italics) 
The  concept  of  the  body-cosmic  is a  compound  of  the  body-actual  and  the  external 
bodies,  and  thus  this  doctrine  would  argue  that  the  ideas  we  have  of  external 
bodies  indicate  the  constitution  of  the  body-cosmic  rather  than  of  the  body-actual. 
But  what  Spinoza  says  in  the  quotation  is  that  those  ideas  indicate  the  constitution 
of  body-actual;  the  term  "our  own  body"  does  not  mean  the  "body-cosmic"  but  the 
"body-actual,  "  since  in  the  quotation,  Spinoza  clearly  takes  "external  bodies"  as 
bodies  other  than  our  (ordinary)  body.  Thus,  the  quotation  severely  damages  the 
"cosmic  body"  interpretation. 
The  concept  of  the  "cosmic  body"  in  interpreting  Spinoza.  on 
representationalism  has  another  problem:  it  can  be  objected  to  by  arguing  from 
Spinoza's  doctrine  of  error.  In  proposition  17  of  part  11,  Spinoza  is  explaining  how 
we  can  be  mistaken.  Our  bodies  are  affected  on  seeing  a  tree,  say.  If  the  tree  does 
not  continue  to  exist  but  the  affects  in  our  body  continue  we  wiU  continue  to 
suppose  the  tree  is  there.  So  even  though  on  the  disappearance  of  the  tree  the 
cosmic  body  contracts,  the  human  mind  stiU  has  the  idea.  of  the  tree;  that  is how 
error  is  possible.  According  to  the.  doctrine  of  the  cosmic  body,  if  the  tree  goes  out 
of  existence  but  the  affects  in  the  body  remain  we  ought  to  say  that  the  cosmic 
body  has  shrunk.  But  Spinoza  says  that  we  have  the  idea  of  the  external  object 
197 although  it  no  longer  exists.  If  the  human  mind  still  has  the  idea  of  the  tree  as  a  part 
of  the  expanded  human  body  despite  the  disappearance  of  the  tree,  this  does 
violate  the  argument  of  the  cosmic  body.  The  fact  that  for  Spinoza,  even  though 
the  tree  does  not  continue  to  exist  the  human  mind  has  the  idea  of  the  tree  makes 
the  concept  of  the  cosmic  body  incompatible  with  Spinoza's  representationalisrm 
In  this  way,  Spinoza's  account  of  error  does  not  fit  the  account  of  the  cosmic 
body,  so  that  we  cannot  rely  on  the  doctrine  of  the  cosmic  body  to  explain  the 
contradictions  between  the  two  propositions. 
(4)  The  Distinction  between  Adequate  Ideas  and  Inadequate  Ideas 
We  are  driven  back  to  Della  Rocca's  suggestion.  Spinoza's  doctrine  of 
"adequate  and  inadequate  ideas"  could  explain  why  the  idea  represents  two  objects 
(the  human  body  and  external  bodies)  despite  the  fact  that  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  is  only  the  human  body.  It  could  also  explain  why 
there  is  the  (apparent)  incompatibility  between  parallelism  and  representationalism. 
In  Spinoza's  view  (following  Della  Rocca),  ideas  in  the  human  mind  are 
inadequate  whereas  ideas  in  God's  mind  are  adequate.  Thus,  the  same  idea  can  be 
adequate  as  well  as  inadequate  depending  on  whether  it  is  in  the  human  mind  or  in 
God's  mind.  The  idea  of  the  human  body  in  the  human  mind  represents  both  the 
human  body  and  the  external  body  since  it  is  confused  and  inadequate,  although  the 
same  idea  in  God's  mind  represents  the  human  body  since  it  is  adequate.  This  can 
explain  why  there  is  the  apparent  incompatibility  between  parallelism  and 
representationalisn-L  Our  representative  knowledge  which  is  inadequate  does  not 
involve  strict  parallelism.  Only  the  adequate  knowledge  in  God's  mind  -implies 
strict  parallelism.  So,  we  should  distinguish  an  adequate  from  an  inadequate 
representation;  the  former  is  always  linked  with  parallelism,  whereas  the  latter  is 
not  because  it  is  confused.  The  incompatibility  between  parallelism  and 
an  mind  wl  ch  is  ideqi  te,  and  ts  representationalism  only  occuxs  in-  the  hum 
ý 
lui  ina  aa  hi 
incompatibility  results  from  confused  ideas.  Confused  ideas  do  not  count  against 
parallelism;  because  what  they  give  us  is  not  the  plain  truth.  As  we  saw,  Della 
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objects,  but  does  not  deal  with  the  contradiction  between  propositions  13  and  16. 
Nonetheless,  this  view  has  much  to  be  said  for  it,  and  will  be  retained  in  attempting 
to  reconcile  propositions  13  and  16. 
The  reason  why  Spinoza  claims  in  proposition  13  that  the  object  of  the  idea 
is  only  the  human  body  despite  his  later  argument  that  the  idea  represents  two 
objects  (the  human  body  and  external  bodies)  is  that  in  proposition  13  Spinoza 
refers  to  an  adequate  representation  while  he  refers  to  an  inadequate  representation 
in  the  later  argument.  Thus,  it  seems  that  if  we  distinguish  the  adequate 
representation  from  the  inadequate  representation,  not  only  the  incompatibility 
between  two  theories  but  also  the  incompatibility  between  his  claim  in  proposition 
13  and  his  later  argument  can  be  solved. 
However,  as  we  saw  when  examining  Della  Rocca's  interpretation,  there  is 
a  solid  obstacle  to  this  interpretation.  That  is,  in  proposition  13,  Spinoza  uses  the 
term  "human  mind":  "The  object  of  the  idea  constituting  the  human  mind  is  the 
[human]  bodjý'(my  italics).  For  Spinoza,  ideas  in  the  human  mind  are  not  adequate 
but  confused  and  inadequate.  If  so,  "the  object"  in  the  proposition  should  not  be 
just  the  body  (the  human  body)  but  the  external  body  as  well  as  human  body. 
(5)  The  Essence  of  the  Human  Mind 
Now,  we  might  be  inclined  to  think  that  due  to  the  fact  that  Spinoza  is 
confused  between  the  parallel  and  the  representational  relationship,  he  is 
committed  to  a  self-contradiction.  However,  I  still  think  that  it  is  more  than  an 
unconscious  or  confused  commitment,  because  Spinoza  says  it  repeatedly  in  many 
places.  Spinoza  should  have  a  reason  for  this,  and  thus  we  ought  to  try  to  find  it. 
We  can  think  of  Spinoza's  representationalism  in  the  following  way. 
Although  the  human  mind  has  the  idea  of  the  human  body  as  well  as  of  the  external 
bodies  (i.  e.  ideas  in  the  human  mind  represent  both  the  human  mind  and  the 
external  bodies),  the  idea  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  is  only 
the  idea  of  the  human  body.  In  proposition  13,  Spinoza  perhaps  refers  to  the 
199 essence  of  the  human  mind,  and  this  is  why  the  object  of  the  idea  in  the  proposition 
is  not  both  the  human  body  and  the  external  bodies  but  only  the  human  body.  To 
find  whether  this  is  Spinoza's  real  intention  or  not,  we  have  to  beforehand  ex-a-miLne 
whether  he  holds  this  distinction  among  ideas.  From  the  following  statements,  we 
can  see  that  Spinoza  certainly  maintains  it: 
[W]e  clearly  see  what  is  the  difference  between  the  idea,  for  example,  of 
Peter,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind  itself  of  Peter,  and  the  idea  of 
Peter  himself  which  is  in  another  man;  for  example,  in  Paul.  For  the  former 
directly  manifests  the  essence  of  the  body  of  Peter  himself,  nor  does  it  involve 
existence  unless  so  long  as  Peter  exists;  the  latter.,  on  the  other  hand,  indicates 
rather  the  constitution  of  the  body  of  Paul  than  the  nature  of  Peter;  and 
therefore  so  long  as  Paul's  body  exists  with  that  constitution,  so  long  will 
Paul's  mind  contemplate  Peter  as  present,  although  he  does  not  exist.  (E,  H, 
Prop  17,  Schol;  my  italics) 
In  this  way,  for  Spinoza  the  idea  of  Peter  in  Peter's  mind  constitutes  the  essence  of 
Peter's  mind,,  whereas  the  idea  of  Peter  in  Paul's  mind  does  not  constitute  the 
essence  of  Paul's  mind.  Here,  we  can  see  that  Spinoza  distinguishes  "ideas  which 
c  ideas  which  do  not  constitute  it": 
constitute  the  essence  of  the  human  mind"  from  "i 
the  former  is  the  idea  of  the  human  body,  the  latter  can  confusedly  represent 
external  bodies. 
Some  commentators  normally  regard  the  former  idem  as  presenting  the 
parafle!  relationship  and  the  latter  ideas  the.  representational  relationship,  -and  they 
continme  to  axgue  that  since  Spinoza  is  con-f4sed  between  two  kinds  of  ideas,  he 
clahm--,  that  ideas  in  the,  human  rnind  represent.  the,  hummn  bodya  But,  it.  iS  unlikely 
that  one  is  confused  if  one  -has  a  clear  distinction  between  two  sorts  of  idea,  As 
Deffa  Rocca  rightly  argues,  Spinoza  intentionally  regards  the  correspondence  as 
W  --- 
implyiing  (or  involvingg)  the  representation,  and  thus,  the  former  ideas  should  -he 
regarded  as  presenting  not  only  the,  parraflel  relationship  but  also  representational 
one.  This  is  why  Spinoza  consciously  argues  that  ideas  in  the  human  miW  also 
represent  the  hur-nan  body.  In  that  case,  the  foLlowing  problerns,  can  be  raised:  (1) 
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to-one  correspondence  in  parallelism,  (2)  how  we  can  explain  the  incompatibility 
between  the  two  propositions. 
The  distinction  between  adequate  ideas  in  God's 
-mind  and  inadequate  ideas 
in  the  -human  mind  could  explain  the  problem  of  (1):  the  reason  why  there  is  a 
duality  of  represented  objects  is  because  ideas  in  the  -human  mind  are  inadequate, 
and  concerning  adequate  ideas  in  God's  mind  a  duality  of  represented  objects  does 
not  happen.  Thus,  although  in  the  hum  an  mind  there  is  incompatibility  between  the 
duality  of  represented  objects  and  parallIelism,  there  is  no  such  incompatibility  in 
God's  mind.  We  can  explain  the  incompa-fibi-lity  by  appealing  to  adequate  ideas  in 
God's  mind.  Nevertheless,  as  we  have  seen,  thiss,  distinction  cannot  explain  the 
problem  of  (2). 
To  explain  this  problem,,  we  have  to  appeal  to  the  essence  of  human  mind:  r"r- 
the  proposition  13  ought  to  be  understood  as  giving  the  -nature  or  essence  of  the  i 
human  n-ýnnd.  What.  Spinoza  wants  to  claim  in-  the  proposition  is  that  the  essence  of 
the  hum  an  mind  is  constituted  by  the  idea  of  the  human  body.  The  corollary  to 
proposition  11  in  part  11  is  relevant  here:  "When  we  say  that  the.  human  mind 
perceives  this  or  that  thing,  we  say  nothing  else  than  that  God  has  this  or  that  idea 
... 
in  so  far  as  He  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  human  mind.  "  Just  before  this,,  in 
the  demonstration  to  proposition  11  he  says  "the  first  thing  which  constitutes  the 
actual  being  of  the,  htiman  mind  is  the  idea  of  an  individual  thing  actually  existing.  " 
And,  having  established  that  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  is  the  idea  of  the 
human  body,  Spinoza  goes  on,  in  the  rern--ai-nder  of  the,  corollary  to  propositio  n  1-  1- 
5 
to  make  the  distinction  between  clear  and  con--ftised  ideas  (the  latter  involving 
reference  to  external  objects), 
Therefore,  when  Spinoza  says  in  proposition  13  that  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  is  only  the  hLim-ant  body,  the.  phrase  "constituting  the 
human  mind")  means  "constituting  the  evvence  of  the  human  mind.  "  It  is !  likely  that 
Spinoza  just  omits  the  word  "essence.  ,  35  The  use  of  "constitute"  strongly  suggests 
35  Spinoza,  as  we  have  seen,  restates  proposition  13  in  many  places,  and  one  of  them  informs  us 
that  there  is  an  ellipse  of  the  term  "formal  being":  "The  idea  which  constitutes  the  formal  being 
of  the  human  mind  is  the  idea  of  the  body  (Prop  13,  Part  11)"  (E.,  H,  Prop  15,  Demon;  my  italics). 
201 this.  Where  Spinoza  talks  of  the  idea  of  external  bodies,  he  tends  to  use  "have,  "  for 
example,  "the  ideas  we  have  of  the  external  bodies"  (E,  11,  Prop  16,  Corol  2;  my 
italics).  So,  when  Spinoza  uses  the  term  "constitute"  in  relation  to  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind,  the  term.  "constitute"  should  be  taken  as  referring  to 
essence:  "[T]he  idea  constituting  [the  essence  offl  the  human  mind.  "  In  this  way, 
we  can-  explain  the  contradiction  between  propositions  13  and  16. 
This  fact  supports  our  view  that  proposition  13  ought  to  be  understood  as  giving  the  nature  or 
essence  of  the  human  mind. 
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Spinoza  and  Contemporary  Philosophy 
0 
of  Mind Some  contemporary  versions  of  the  mind-body  problem  are  in  some  way 
related  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  We  have  seen  that  the  -main  arguments  of 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  are  (i)  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  (ii)  the 
parallel  relationship  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  by  virtue  of  identity  (ffiii) 
the  concept  of  representation.  Of  these,  I  found  that  point  (i)  is  similar  to  versions 
such  as  Davidson's  anomalous  monism,  or  Strawson's  person  theory,  However, 
there  is  another  kind  of  version  that  holds  the  possibility  of  demonstrating  a 
connection  with  point  (iii)  on  the  basis  of  point,  (ii);  this  is  claimed  by  Lee  C.  Rice. 
He  has  put  forward  the  view  that  the  main  points  of  cognitive  science  theory  can 
be  closely  related  to  the  main  points  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  Therefore  I 
shall,  in  this  chapter,  examine  some  arguments  from  cognitive  science,  P.  F. 
Strawson  and  Donald  Davidson,  in  turn  in  order  to  consider  the  possibility  of 
whether  they  can  be  used  to  throw  light  on  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
1.  Cognitive  Science 
(1)  Rice's  Comparison  Between  Cognitive  Science  and  Spinoza 
According  to  Lee  C.  Rice,  a  comparison  with  cognitive  science  provides 
insight  into  Spinoza's  perspective  with  respect  to  the  relationship  between  the 
mind  and  the  body.  The  main  emphasis  in  his  article  is  the  framework  of  cognitive 
science,  emphasising  points  of  similarity  between  some  doctrines  of  cognitive 
science  and  Spinoza's  theory.  However,  it  should  be  said  that  Rice's  approach  to 
cognitive  science  is  coloured  by  a  sympathy  with  behaviourism,  and  is  to  that 
extent  atypical  of  cognitive  scientists'  ideas. 
First  of  all,  Rice  emphasises  that  Spinoza.  clearly  denies  that  there  is  a 
causal  connection  or  any  other  interaction  between  the  mind  and  the  body  as  the 
two  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  have  no  relationship  and  are  distinct,  and 
he  further  emphasises  the  argument  that,  for  Spinoza,  "the  representative  feature 
204 ...  could  play  no  role  in  the  physical  causal  account.  "'  His  interpretation  is  based 
on  Spinoza's  analogy  of  sleepwalkers:  2  "I  have  already  shown,  however,  that  they 
do  not  know  what  the  body  can  do,  nor  what  can  be  deduced  from  the 
consideration  of  its  nature  alone,  and  that  they  find  that  many  things  are  done 
merely  by  the  laws  of  Nature  which  they  would  never  have  believed  to  be  possible 
without  the  direction  of  the  mind,  as,  for  example,  those  things  which 
sleepwalkers  do  in  their  sleep,  and  at  which  they  themselves  are  astonished  when 
they  wake"  (E,  111,  Prop  2,  Schol).  Whatever  is  going  on  mentally  in  this  case,  a 
complete  explanation  is  possible  in  physical  terms  according  to  Spinoza. 
Spinoza's  assertion  that  there  is  a  complete  physical  explanation  seems  to 
run  counter  to  the  views  of  cognitive  science,  since  cognitive  scientists  claim  that 
any  account  of  human  behaviour  which  is  at  all  plausible  must  take  account  of  the 
way  in  which  a  subject  represents  to  himself  what  is  happening.  '  (It  is  no  good  a 
behaviourist  referring  to  "stimuli"  because  features  of  the  situation  are  not  stimuli 
until  they  are  attended  to.  )  Rice  stresses  the  view  that  Spinoza's  position  is  the 
same  as  the  perspective  of  cognitive  science  in  some  respects.  For  workers  in 
cognitive  science: 
The  semantics  of  representations  cannot  literally  cause  a  system  to  behave 
in  the  way  it  does.  This  point  is  exactly  the  same  as  Spinoza's  argument 
(against  Descartes  specifically,  and  against  any  form  of  dualism  generally) 
that  ideas  cannot  move  bodies,  nor  bodies  ideas  [E  2P53  S].  4  Only  the 
material  structure  of  the  representation  ... 
is  causally  efficacious.  ' 
Rice  rightly  points  out  that  in  Spinoza  the  cause  of  physical  behaviour  is  not  ideas 
but  physical  stimuli.  For  cognitive  science,  and  for  Spinoza,  the  content  of  a 
mental  representation  cannot  cause  physical  changes.  What  much  of  cognitive 
1  Lee  C.  Rice,  "Cognitivism:  A  Spinozistic  Perspective,  "  Studia  Spinozana,  vol.  8  (1990),  p.  2  10. 
2  Ibid.,  p.  211. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  213. 
4E  2P53S  is  presumably  a  misprint  for  E  3P2S,  since  there  is  no  proposition  53  in  the  Part  11  of 
the  Ethics  and  proposition  2  and  its  scholium  in  part  III  contain  that  argument. 
5Ibid.,  p.  215. 
205 science  hopes  is  that  some  kind  of  symbolic  coding  occurs.  6  The  physical 
properties  of  the  symbols  are  causally  efficacious,  and  inferences  between  the 
contents  of  ideas  correspond  to  physical  interactions  between  the  symbols.  The 
symbols  are  physical,  but  they  also  in  some  way  have  representative  content.  The 
representational  function  supervenes  on  the  physical  properties.  Rice,  therefore, 
regards  this  position  of  cognitive  science  as  the  same  as  paraflelism  in  Spinoza.. 
Whether  Rice's  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as 
parallelism  is  accurate  or  not,  when  restricted  to  the  point  of  Spinoza's  denial  of 
the  causal  relation  between  the  mind  and  the  body  he  is  certainly  correct.  Rice 
attempts  to  spell  out  the  connection  between  Spinoza  and  cognitive  science  by  the 
use  of  the  concept  of  a  transducer.  He  makes  this  point  as  follows. 
The  basic  role  which  transducers  play,  if  we  momentarily  step  out  of  the 
CS  [cognitive  science]  framework,  is  that  of  receiving  physical  stimuli 
from  the  environment  and  translating  these  into  primitive  symbolic 
representations.  The  primitive  output  from  the  transducers  is  the 
paradigm  of  spinozistic  parallelism:  it  is  a  simple  representational 
structure  (idea)  which  can  figure  in  subsequent  nonprimitive  operations 
of  the  semantic  engine. 
In  this  way,  Rice  argues  that  we  can  find  the  paradigm  of  cognitive  science  in 
Spinoza's  system.  Rice's  claim  seems  to  be  that  just  as  physical  stimuli  are 
translated  into  symbolic  representations  in  terms  of  the  transducer  in  cognitive 
science,  so,  in  Spinoza,  events  in  the  world  are  mapped  into  ide&-;  through  some 
means  or  device  fimctioning  as  a  transducer. 
6  Connectionists  are  less  hopeful.  See  Tim  Crane,  Ae  Mechanical  Mind  (London:  Penguin 
Books,  1995),  pp.  154-163. 
7  Ibid.,  p.  217. 
206 (2)  Similarities  and  Differences 
I  agree  with  this  point  of  Rice's  comparison  between  cognitive  science  and 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  in  terms  of  the  representational  features  based  on  (1) 
the  argument  of  a  non-causal  relationship  and  (2)  the  function  of  the  transducer. 
However,  in  applying  the  term  "transducer"  in  Spinoza  we  should  examine  this 
concept  in  some  more  detail,  since  Rice  does  not  explain  it  sufficiently.  According 
to  Pylyshyn,  generally  "a  transducer  is  a  device  that  receives  patterns  of  energy 
and  retransmits  them,  usually  in  some  altered  fonn.  Thus  a  typical  transducer 
simply  transforms  or  maps  physical  (spatiotemporal)  events  from  one  form  to 
another  in  some  consistent  way.  "'  In  cognitive  science,  "[a]  description  of  a 
transducer  function  shows  how  certain  nonsymbolic  physical  events  are  mapped 
into  certain  symbol  systems.  "9  We  can,  therefore,  see  that  the  function  of  the 
transducer  is  to  receive  physical  stimuli  and  send  them  on  in  altered  form.  As  Rice 
puts  it,  "transducers  are,  by  definition,  stimulus-bound"  that  is,  they  respond  to 
particular  changes.  'O  We  can  find  this  function  of  the  transducer  reflected  in 
Spinoza's  view  that  without  the  external  body's  effects  on  the  human  body,  the 
human  mind  can  represent  neither  its  own  body  nor  the  external  body  (E,  11,  Props 
19  and  26).  However,  there  are  some  differences  arising  from  Spinoza's 
parallel-isn-L  The  mapping  from  transducers  to  representations  does  not  lead  to 
representations  of  the  transducers  as  a  rule.  But  the  ideas  associated  with  parts  of 
the  body  are  of  parts  of  the  body  (albeit  confused  representations:  see  E,  11,  Prop 
28). 
Let  us  recall  Spinoza's  concepts  relevant  to  representationalisn4  which  I 
have  mentioned  in  chapter  six.  There  are  the  following  elements: 
(1)  The  human  body,  which  is  the  object  of  (represented  by)  the  human  mind  and 
is  affected  by  external  bodies. 
(2)  External  bodies,  which  affect  the  human  body. 
8  Zenon  W.  Pylyshyn,  Computation  and  Cognition:  I  bward  a  Egundation  for  Cognitive  Science 
(NET  Press,  1986),  p.  15  1. 
9  Ibid.,  p.  152. 
10  Rice,  op.  cit.,  p.  217 
207 (3)  Modiflcations  (affections,  states)  of  the  body  which  involve  the  nature  of  the 
body  as  well  as  of  the  external  bodies  affecting  it. 
(4)  The  human  mind,  which  is  the  complex  idea  composed  of  the  ideas  of  the  body 
and  of  the  affecting  external  bodies.  (That  is  to  say,  the  complete 
consciousness,  not  that  which  gives  the  essence  of  an  individual). 
(5)  The  ideas  which  represent  both  (1)  and  (2)  by  means  of  representations  of  (3), 
and  which  go  to  make  up  the  human  mind. 
From  the  above,  I  think  that  we  can  regard  (3)  the  modification  of  the  human 
body,  as  corresponding  to  the  concept  of  transducer. 
Let  us  put  it  in  the  following  way.  The  terms  in  cognitive  science  could  be 
translated  into  Spinoza's  terms,  using  Rice's  perspective:  physical  stimuli  are 
replaced  by  external  bodies,  the  human  body  is  the  engine  for  producing  thought, 
the  transducer  is  the  modiflcation  of  the  human  body,  and  the  output,  primitive 
symbolic  representations,  is  the  idea.  In  this  way,  regarding  the  term  "transducer,  " 
there  are  replaceable  or  comparable  terms  within  Spinoza's  theory.  Thus,  we  can 
find  that  in  Spinoza's  system  there  is  a  representational  feature  of  the  mind  with 
respect  to  the  body  which  is  the  same  paradigm  as  the  argument  of  cognitive 
science  that  certain  nonsymbolic  physical  events  are  mapped  on  to  certain 
symbolic  systems  or  that  physical  stimuli  are  translated  into  symbolic 
representations.  Both  of  them  have  the  same  format  of  representational  feature: 
the  formulation  of  cognitive  science  that  physical  stimuli  are  translated  into 
symbolic  representations  has  the  same  format  as  Spinoza's  formulation  that 
physical  events  are  mapped  into  ideas.  In  fact,  both  representational  features  are 
based  on  the  argument  of  a  non-causal  relationship  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  (the  argument  that  the  mental  cannot  cause  the  physical). 
However,  this  fact  does  not  offer  an  especially  fruitful  view  concerning 
similarities  between  Spinoza  and  cognitive  science,  since  the  place  of  mental 
representation  in  explaining  behaviour  is  quite  different.  Rice  claims  that 
c4cognitivists  are  unanimous  in  holding  that  any  account  of  human  conditioning 
which  makes  use  of  the  idea  that  a  subject  is  being  informed  of  what  is  happening 
will  provide  a  better  and  more  predictive  explanation  of  observed  phenomena  than 
208 one  which  is  based  more  narrowly  on  reinforcement  contingencies"  (my  italics).  " 
Thus,  we  must,  in  order  to  predict  behaviour,  attribute  to  bodies  mental 
representations  of  the  world.  Spinoza  denies  that.  Physical  explanations  are  in 
principle  self-contained,  for  him. 
Despite  appealing  to  the  importance  of  mental  representations  in 
explaining  behaviour,  defenders  of  cognitive  science  have  to  ward  off  the  threat  of 
epiphenomenalism.  Fodor  considers  the  threat:  (1)  the  causal  powers  of  an  event 
are  entirely  determined  by  its  physical  properties;  (2)  intentional  properties 
supervene  on,  but  are  not  identical  with,  physical  properties.  If  one  then  says  that 
(3)  a  property  is  causally  responsible  only  if  it  affects  causal  powers,  then 
intentional  properties  are  not  causally  responsible.  12  Fodor  does  not  accept  (3). 
In  spite  of  their  similarities,  we  can  find  a  Oference  in  so  far  as  Spinoza 
has  the  view  that  one  idea  straightforwardly  causes  another,  and  cognitive  science 
thinks  that  causation  between  ideas  is  derivative.  Fodor  presents  the  problem  in 
this  way  in  The  Elm  and  the  Expert.  Mental  processes  tend  to  be  truth  preserving: 
starting  from  true  statements,  people  tend  to  reason  in  ways  which  lead  to  true 
statements.  The  solution?  "Well,  as  Turing  famously  pointed  out,  if  you  have  a 
device  whose  operations  are  transformations  of  symbols,  and  whose  state  changes 
are  driven  by  the  syntactic  properties  of  the  symbols  that  it  transforms,  it  is 
possible  to  arrange  things  so  that,  in  a  pretty  striking  variety  of  cases,  the  device 
,,  13 
reliably  transforms  true  input  symbols  into  output  symbols  that  are  also  true. 
Even  if  there  is  causality  among  ideas,  it  rests  upon  physical  causality,  There  is  a 
normative  element  in  relations  between  ideas.  In  contrast,  Spinoza's  theory  gives 
equal  weight  to  the  mental  and  the  physical,  and  takes  rationality  and  mental 
causation  to  be  closely  identified.  Rice 
-argues  that  for  both  cognitivists  and 
Spinoza,  "[o]nly  the  material  structure  of  the  representation  (conceived  as  genetic, 
"  ]bid.,  p.  213. 
12  Jerry  A.  Fodor,  "Making  Mind  Matter  More,  "  Philosophical  Topics,  vol.  17  (1989),  pp.  15  1- 
152. 
"  Jerry  A.  Fodor,  The  Elm  and  the  Expert:  Mentalese  and  Its  Semantics  (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  MIT  Press,  1994),,  p.  9. 
209 neurological,  or  even  hormonal)  is  causally  efficacious.  1914  As  we  have  seen,  not  all 
defenders  of  cognitive  science  would  accept  this.  In  any  case,  it  is  far  different 
from  what  Spinoza  understands.  For  Spinoza  causation  in  the  mental  realm  is  not 
supervenient  on  causation  in  the  physical:  there  are  mental  and  physical  laws  of 
causation,  although  there  is  only  one  order  of  events  which  can  be  conceived  in 
both  ways.  The  mind  does  not  need  causation  in  the  body,  since  it  has  its  own 
causation.  There  is  no  such  a  causal  dependency  from  the  mind  to  body,  and  vice 
versa.  Spinoza's  view  that  the  mental  cannot  cause  the  physical  and  vice  versa, 
does  not  imply  that  only  the  material  structure  of  representation  is  causally 
efficacious,  but  implies  that  both  are  causally  independent. 
Another  related  difference  is  that  in  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory,  there  is  a 
prominence  given  to  consciousness,  whereas  cognitive  science  tends  not  to  discuss 
consciousness  at  any  length.  Spinoza  also  maintains  self-consciousness  of  the  mind 
in  his  argument  of  "the  idea  of  the  idea.  "  When  we  restrict  Spinoza's  mind-body 
theory  to  the  representational  feature  the  mind's  dependency  upon  the  body 
should  be  recognised,  since  "what  is  represented"  is  somehow  dependent  on  its 
object.  But  this  representational  feature  is  not  one  which  can  determine  the  body's 
priority  to  the  mind.  In  order  to  determine  the  matter  of  the  priority  between  the 
mind  and  the  body,  we  should  examine  the  concept  of  the  mind.  If,  for  Spinoza, 
the  mind  exists  not  only  objectively  but  also  formally,  his  theory  does  not  argue 
the  body's  priority  to  the  mind,  whereas  Rice's  Spinoza  and  cognitive  science 
claim  the  body's  priority  to  the  mind.  I  shall  consider  this  issue  in  some  more 
detail. 
if  the  mind  exists  only  objectively  and  only  the  body  exists  formally  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  deny  that  the  mind  depends  on  the  body,  and  therefore  we  can 
take  it  as  the  justification  for  physicalism.  In  other  words,  if  all  representing  is 
done  by  physical  things,  and  there  is  no  more  to  mind  than  representation,  then 
physicalism  holds  true.  From  this,  one  may  further  assume  that  any 
representationalism  arguing  that  the  mind  represents  the  body  actually  existing 
implies  the  ground  of  physicalism.  It  is  true  that  in  the  representational  relationship 
14  Fice,  op.  cit.,  p.  215. 
210 between  the  mind  and  the  body,  the  mind  as  the  idea  is  somehow  dependent  upon 
the  body  as  the  object.  But,  this  should  not  be  treated  as  leading  to  physicalism, 
since  it  is  simply  the  outcome  of  the  representational  function,  carrying  no 
ontological  implications. 
We  saw  in  chapter  two  that  Spinoza  gives  equal  ontological  weight  to  the 
mind  and  to  the  body.  Thus,  he  believed  that  the  mind  is  itself  active  and  the  mind 
exists  not  only  objectively  but  also  formally.  The  following  statements  of 
Spinoza's  lead  us  to  think  in  this  way. 
By  idea  I  understand  a  conception  of  the  mind  which  the  mind  forms 
because  it  is  a  thinking  thing. 
Explanation.  I  use  the  word  "conception"  rather  than  "perception" 
because  the  name  perception  seems  to  indicate  that  the  mind  is  passive 
in  its  relation  to  the  object.  But  the  word  conception  seems  to  express 
the  action  of  the  mind.  (E,  11,  Def  3) 
From  Spinoza's  reason  for  using  the  term  "conception,  "  we  can  see  that  Spinoza 
wants  to  confirm  the  activity  of  the  mind,  and  that  presumably  he  worries  that 
people  may  be  misunderstanding  his  theory:  that  is,  owing  to  the  representational 
relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  people  think  that  the  mind  does  not 
have  formal  reality  but  has  only  objective  reality. 
As  Alan  Donagan  notices,  for  Spinoza,  following  Descartes,  the  mind  has 
a  double  reality  (objective  and  formal).  Donagan  writes: 
Descartes  analysed  the  representativeness  of  ideas  as  the  medieval 
Aristotelians  did,  by  ascribing  two  kinds  of  esses  to  them:  essesformale, 
the  being  they  have  as  individual  modes  of  substance  under  the  attribute 
cogitatio  (which  corresponds  to  the  medievals'  esse  naturale),  and  esses 
objectivum,  the  being  they  have  as  being  of  something-as  representing 
something  (which  corresponds  to  the  medievals'  esses  inten-tionale)  (AT 
VH9  41-47).  As  E  HP8C  and  P48S[NS]  show,  Spinoza  accepted  this 
211 Cartesian  distinction  as  sound,  and  was  willing  to  make  express  use  of 
it.  15 
We  can  clarify  the  claim  that  for  Spinoza  the  mind  exists  objectively  and  also 
formally  from  his  following  statements: 
[T]he  object  cannot  be  changed  unless  the  Idea  is  also  changed,  and 
vice  versa  16 
As  thoughts  and  the  ideas  of  things  are  arranged  and  connected  in  the 
mind,  exactly  so  are  the  modifications  of  the  body  or  the  images  of 
things  arranged  and  connected  in  the  body.  (E,  V,  Prop  1,  Demon) 
If  the  mind  does  not  have  formal  reality,  those  quotations  would  be  unjustified.  In 
this  way,  since  the  mind  has  also  formal  reality,  there  is  no  possibility  of  treating 
Spinoza's  representationalism  as  leading  to  physicalism  or  materialisn-4  which  is 
the  implication  of  Rice's  position. 
To  sum  up,  when  we  restrict  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  to 
representationalism,  Spinoza  has  the  same  position  as  cognitive  science  has  in 
arguing  that  the  mind  exists  objectively  and  the  body  formally.  Furthermore,  both 
of  them  have  the  same  paradigm  of  representationalism  in  the  mental,  locating  it  in 
a  physical  part  of  the  human  body;  the  transducer  in  cognitive  science  and  the 
modification  of  the  human  body  in  Spinoza's  terminology.  But,  Spinoza's  overall 
picture  is  not  compatible  with  cognitive  science,  since,  as  we  have  just  seen,  for 
Spinoza  the  mind  exists  not  only  objectively  but  also  formally,  whereas  for 
15  Alan  Donagan,  "Homo  Cogitat,  "  in  Edwin  Curley  and  Pierre-Francois  Moreau  (eds.  ),  Spinoza: 
Issues  and  Directions  (Leiden:  E.  J.  Brill,  1990),  p.  105.  E,  R,  Prop  8,  Corol  are  as  follows: 
"Hence,  it  follows  that  when  individual  things  do  not  exist  unless  in  so  far  as  they  are 
comprehended  in  the  attributes  of  God,  their  objective  being  or  ideas  do  not  exist  unless  in  so  far 
as  the  infinite  idea  of  God  exists.  " 
16  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  on  God,  Man,  and  His  Well-Being,  Part  11,  Chapter  XX,  note  c,  4  10 
in  Edwin  Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  1  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1985),  p.  136. 
212 cognitive  science  the  mind  exists  only  objectively.  These  differences  are  related  to 
Spinoza's  argument  of  the  equality  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  and  this 
argument  separates  him  from  cognitive  science. 
In  summary,  one  might  say  that  there  are  perhaps  some  similarities 
between  Spinoza  and  the  programme  of  cognitive  science,  but  the  important 
differences  should  not  be  overlooked. 
2  Strawson's  Person  Theory 
In  contemporary  mind-body  theories,  there  is  a  version  which  attempts  to 
avoid  falling  into  materialism  or  idealism  by  holding  a  concept  besides  the  mind 
and  the  body,  which  is  the  ultimate  source  of  them;  this  is  theory  of  P.  F. 
Strawson.  Therefore,  in  comparing  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  with 
contemporary  theories,  it  is  worthwhile  to  consider  Strawson's  "person  theory,  " 
since  within  it  we  can  find  a  similar  framework  of  thought  to  that  of  Spinoza, 
despite  their  differences.  Therefore,  I  shall,  in  this  section,  examine  his  main 
argument  and  consider  the  possibility  of  whether  it  can  be  considered  as  being 
close  to  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
(1)  Person  Theory 
Strawson,  in  his  book  Individuals,  suggests  the  concept  of  "person"  to 
solve  the  n-ýind-body  problem.  According  to  Strawson,  "person7'  is  defined  as 
follows: 
What  I  mean  by  the  concept  of  a  person  is  the  concept  of  a  type  of 
entity  such  that  both  predicates  ascribing  states  of  consciousness  and 
213 predicates  ascribing  corporeal  characteristics,  a  physical  situation,  &c. 
are  equally  applicable  to  a  single  individual  of  that  single  type.  17 
In  this  way,  Strawson  describes  "person7'  as  an  entity  to  which  predicates  ascribing 
both  states  of  consciousness  and  corporeal  characteristics  are  applied.  Strawson's 
"person7  is  logically  prior  to  mental  experiences  or  bodily  events;  once  there  is  the 
concept  of  "person,  "  then  mental  or  bodily  states  can  be  attributed.  "Person7  is, 
therefore,  regarded  as  being  logically  prior  to  the  concepts  of  "mind"  and  "body" 
in  Strawson's  doctrine.  In  his  own  words,  "The  concept  of  a  person  is  logically 
prior  to  that  of  an  individual  consciousness.  The  concept  of  a  person  is  not  to  be 
analysed  as  that  of  an  animated  body  or  of  an  embodied  anima.  "" 
Strawson  divides  predicates  which  describe  a  person  into  two  groups.  One 
group  is  called  M-predicates  which  are  only  applied  to  material  bodies,  not 
consciousness,  and  the  other  is  P-predicates  namely  all  other  predicates  which  are 
applied  to  persons;  the  examples  of  the  former  are  "weighs  10  stone,  "  "is  in  the 
drawing-room,  "  and  so  on.  And  the  latter  "is  smiling,  "  "is  going  for  a  walk,  "  "is  in 
pain,  "  "is  thinking  hard,  "  "believes  in  God"  and  so  on.  '9  Strawson's  position  is 
that  the  concept  of  person  possesses  these  two  kinds  of  predicate.  From  his 
perspective,  the  mental  and  the  physical  should  be  distinguished  from  each  other, 
and  they  cannot  be  reduced  one  to  the  other.  Hence,  if  we  accept  somehow  the 
unity  of  the  person  as  well  as  the  logical  distinction  between  the  mental  and 
physical,  and  reject  one-sided  monism  such  as  any  variety  of  materialism  or 
idealism,  we  need  to  set  up  a  third  concept  as  the  primitive  or  ultimate  ground  to 
which  both  mental  events  and  bodily  events  are  ascribed,  and  we  can  see  that 
Strawson  designates  this  as  "person.  " 
Let  us  consider  the  concept  of  "person"  in  some  more  detail.  According  to 
Strawson,  having  the  concept  "person7'  in  our  ordinary  life  is  bound  up  with  the 
pronoun  "U'  With  respect  to  this  point,  Strawson  criticises  not  only  Cartesian 
dualism  but  also  the  no-ownership  doctrine.  There  are,  in  Cartesian  doctrine,  two 
17  P.  F.  Strawson,  Individuals  (London:  Methuen,  1959),  pp.  101-102. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  103. 
19  Ibid.,  p.  104. 
214 distinct  substances,  two  substances  of  different  types.  It  follows  that  there  are  two 
subjects,  one  thinking  and  the  other  extended,  and  "I"  is  used  in  two  senses. 
Strawson  argues  that  Descartes'  version,  in  which  the  subject  of  consciousness  is 
purely  immaterial  is  problematic,  and  that  holding  the  concept  ego  is  only  an 
li,  20  illusion.  He  points  out  that  this  is  an  error  which  occurs  in  Cartesian  dua  sm. 
Strawson  also  rejects  the  "no-ownership"  or  "no-subject"  doctrine,  that 
there  is  no  subject  to  which  our  states  of  consciousness  are  ascribed.  He  criticises 
Wittgenstein's  statements  in  Tractatus  (5.631-5.641)  such  as  "The  thinking, 
presenting  subject-there  is  no  such  thing.  "21  According  to  Strawson,  for 
example,  when  Smith  says  "John  is  in  pain7'  and  when  John  says  I  am  in  pain,  " 
they  refer  to  the  same  fact,  being  in  pain,  and  to  the  same  subject.  Hence,  we  have 
to  admit  the  existence  of  the  subject  which  possesses  the  pain,  which  is  in  pain.  22 
His  point  in  rejecting  Cartesian  dualism  and  "no-ownership"  doctrine  is 
that  we  can  overcome  the  problems  in  the  two  theories  by  regarding  the  term  "I" 
as  denoting  "the  persoW'  to  which  we  can  then  ascribe  both  mental  and  physical 
predicates;  that  is  to  say,  the  owner  of  consciousness  is  not  purely  inimaterial  or 
material  but  both  mental  and  physical,  and  this  is  the  very  concept  of  "person.  " 
Strawson's  "persorf'  is  described  by  saying  that  "Persons,  then,  are  distinct  from 
material  bodies,  but  they  are  not  therefore  itrunaterial  bodies  or  incorporeal 
20  ]bid.,  pp.  94-95;  pp.  100-101. 
21  P.  F.  Strawson,  "Persons,  "  in  David  M.  Rosenthal  (ed.  ),  The  Nature  of  Mind  (New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1991),  p.  104;  "Persons,  "  in  Donald  F.  Gustafson  (ed.  ),  Essays  in 
Philosophical  Psychology  (London:  Macmillan,  1967),  p.  377. 
The  other  statements  cited  are  as  follows:  "In  an  important  sense  there  is  no  subject,  "  "The 
subject  does  not  belong  to  the  world,  but  is  a  limit  of  the  world,  "  and  "There  is  [therefore]  really 
a  sense  in  which  in  philosophy  we  can  talk  non-psychologically  of  the  1.  The  I  occurs  in 
philosophy  through  the  fact  that  the  'world  is  my  world.  '  The  philosophical  I  is  not  the  man,  not 
the  human  body,  or  the  human  soul  of  which  psychology  treats,  but  the  metaphysical  subject,  the 
limit-not  a  part  of  the  world.  " 
22  Strawson,  'Tersons,  "  in  David  A  Rosenthal  (ed.  ),  Ae  Nature  of  Mind,  pp.  107-108; 
Versons,  "  in  Donald  F.  Gustafson  (ed.  ),  Esscys  in  Philosophical  Psychology,  pp.  386-387; 
Individuals,  pp.  104-105. 
215 nonbodies.  A  person  has  states  of  consciousness  as  well  as  physical  attributes  and 
is  not  merely  to  be  identified  with  one  or  the  other.  "" 
(2)  Spinoza  and  Strawson 
Person  theory  is  regarded  as  "a  modifled  version  of  the  double  aspect 
theory"  by  Jerome  A.  Shaffer.  He  interprets  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  as 
double  aspect  theory,  and  from  this  standpoint,  he  attempts  to  draw  a  connection 
between  Spinoza  and  Strawson.  Shaffer  makes  the  claim:  "The  historical  ancestor 
of  the  person  theorist  is  Spinoza,  the  Dutch  philosopher  of  the  seventeenth 
century.  9ý24  And  again,  he  says  that  "[fln  recent  philosophy,  a  modified  version  of 
the  double  aspect  theory  which  we  will  call  the  person  theory  has  been  presented 
by  P.  F.  Strawson.  i,  ý25  It  seems  that  Shaffer  treats  person  theory  as  a  sort  of  double 
aspect  theory.  According  to  him,  these  two  theories  are  the  same  in  the  sense  of 
holding  one  thing  which  has  both  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties. 
Furthermore,  Shaffer  claims  that  Strawson  rejects  both  materialism  and  Cartesian 
dualism  as  Spinoza  did  in  the  17th  century,  and  both  of  these  philosophers  attempt 
to  find  a  compromise  between  these  two  theories.  26 
I  basicafly  agree  with  Shaffer's  argument  in  the  sense  that  both  Spinoza 
and  Strawson  reject  materialism  as  weff  as  Cartesian  dualism,  and  that  both  of 
these  philosophers  attempt  to  avoid  onesideness  of  materialism  or  idealism. 
Douglas  Odegard  claims  this  sort  of  similarity  between  Spinoza  and  Strawson.  He 
writes: 
in  certain  respects  Spinoza's  view  is  similar  to  the  kind  of  position 
adopted  by  P.  F.  Strawson  in  "Persons,  "  according  to  which  a  human 
being,  or  person,  is  a  subject  of  both  mental  and  corporeal  predicates. 
23  Arthur  C.  Danto,  "Persons,  "  in  Paul  Edwards  (ed.  ),  yhe  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophy,  vol.  6 
(New  York:  Macmillan,  1967),  p.  112. 
24  Jerome  A.  Shaffer,  Philosophy  ofMind  (Englewood  Cliffs:  Prentice-Hall,  1968),  p.  5  1. 
25  Ibid.,  p.  52. 
26  Ibid.,  pp.  50-55. 
216 Like  Spinoza,  Strawson  dismisses  Cartesian  and  Humean  dualism9 
avoids  reductive  forms  of  materialism  and  immaterialism,  excludes 
neutral  monism,  claims  more  than  a  merely  contingent  connection 
between  mind  and  body  and  refrains  from  identi6ring  a  person  with  the 
central  nervous  system.  27 
So  as  to  make  identity  between  the  mind  and  the  body  (of  humans  for  Strawson 
and  of  everything  for  Spinoza),  both  Spinoza  and  Strawson  do  not  ignore  the 
mind  or  the  body  and  do  not  admit  the  reduction  of  one  to  the  other.  The 
fundamental  point  is  that  both  of  them  attempt  to  find  identity  between  the  mind 
and  the  body  not  in  the  onesideness  of  them  but  in  a  common  referent  of  the  mind 
and  the  body.  When  we  restrict  Strawson's  doctrine  to  humans,  Strawson's 
format  is  similar  to  Spinoza's:  they  both  attempt  to  reconcile  the  identity  of  the 
human  mind  and  the  human  body  by  suggesting  a  common  referent  for  the  mental 
and  the  physical.  From  this,  we  can  say  that  at  least  Strawson's  basic  paradigm  is 
the  same  as  Spinoza's. 
Even  so,  there  are  different  points  upon  which  Strawson  would  have  to 
disagree  with  Spinoza.  For  Spinoza,  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  in  principle 
conceptually  independent.  We  saw  in  chapter  two,  that  as  far  as  our  knowledge  up 
to  the  present  day  is  concerned,  our  understanding  of  the  mind  depends  upon  our 
understanding  of  the  body.  Thus,  for  Spinoza,  since  science  is  not  yet  enough 
developed  for  us  to  have  a  satisfactory  independent  science  of  the  mind,  our 
temporary  position  does  not  permit  us  to  obtain  knowledge  of  the  mind  without 
relying  on  knowledge  of  the  body.  Strawson  also  argues  for  a  dependency  of  the 
mental  on  the  physical,  but  this  time  a  logical  dependency: 
[O]ne  does  genuinely  ascribe  one's  states  of  consciousness  to  something, 
viz.,,  oneself,  and  ...  this  kind  of  ascription  is  precisely  such  as  the  theorist 
finds  unsatisfactory,  i.  e.,  is  such  that  it  does  not  seem  to  make  sense  to 
suggest,  for  example,  that  the  identical  pain  which  was  in  fact  one's  own 
27 
]bid.,  pp.  66-67. 
2  17 might  have  been  another's,  We  do  not  have  to  seek  far  in  order  to 
understand  the  place  of  this  logically  non-transferable  kind  of  ownership  in 
our  general  scheme  of  thought.  For  if  we  think  of  the  requirements  of 
identifying  reference,  in  speech,  to  particular  states  of  consciousness,,  or 
private  experiences,  we  see  that  such  particulars  cannot  be  thus 
identifyingly  referred  to  except  as  the  states  or  experiences  of  some 
identified  person.  28 
We  can  see  that  Strawson's  point  in  the  above  quotation  is  that  we  can  justify 
particular  states  of  consciousness  only  by  attributing  the  experiences  to  a 
"person.  "  Nevertheless,  even  though  both  Spinoza  and  Strawson  maintain  that  we 
can  gain  access  to  the  mental  by  giving  access  to  the  physical,  Spinoza  says  it  is  at 
present  true,  but  not  necessary,  while  for  Strawson  it  is  essential;  Spinoza  does  not 
really  make  the  mental  depend  on  the  physical  as  opposed  to  Strawson  who  argues 
for  a  logical  dependency  of  the  mental  on  the  physical. 
There  is  another  difference  concerning  the  causal  and  the  exploratory 
barrier.  Douglas  Odegard  presents  a  difference  between  Spinoza  and  Strawson  as 
follows: 
A  less  deeply  metaphysical,  but  more  interesting,  difference,  however,  lies 
in  the  distinction  between  the  Strawsonian  remark  "A  man  is  a  single 
subject  of  both  mental  and  corporeal  predicates"  and  the  Spinozistic 
remark  "A  man  is  a  subject  of  mental  predicates  when  conceived  under 
thought  and  a  subject  of  corporeal  predicates  when  conceived  under 
extension.  "  Both  remarks  imply  that  there  is  just  one  subject  throughlout, 
but  the  second  remark,  unlike  the  first,  warns  us  not  to  mix  our  mentalistic 
and  physicalistic  talk  indiscriminatel  Y.  29 
28  Strawson,  'Tersons,  "  in  David  A  Rosenthal  (ed.  ),  ]he  Nature  of  Mind,  pp.  106-107; 
"Persons,  "  in  Donald  F.  Gustafson  (ed.  ),  Essays  in  Philosophical  Psycholoýu,  p.  3  84. 
29Douglas  Odegard,  "The  Body  Identical  with  the  Human  mind:  A  Problem  in  Spinoza's 
Philosophy,  "  in  Eugene  Freeman  and  Maurice  Mandelbaum  (eds.  ),  Spinoza:  Essays  in 
Interpretation  (Lasalle:  Open  Court,  1975).  p.  67. 
"  18 This  non-MlXM,  g  of  the  attributes  in  Spinoza's  theory  is  not  compatible  with 
Strawson's  person  theory.  Spinoza  does  not  allow  causal  and  explanatory 
interconnection  between  the  mind  and  the  body  as  opposed  to  Strawson  who 
requires  it.  From  my  perspective,  this  is  a  crucial  difference  between  "double 
aspect  theory"  and  "person  theory,  "  and  therefore  this  is  why  Strawson  should  not 
be  classified  as  a  double  aspect  theorist.  Furthermore,  for  Strawson  some  P- 
predicates  are  involved  with  the  physical.  Strawson  counts  "...  is  smiling"  as  a  P- 
predicate,  for  example,  it  is  applied  to  others  on  the  basis  of  observation,  yet  it 
implies  the  existence  of  consciousness.  Not  all  P-predicates  are  like  this:  "...  is 
thinking  of  Christmas"  cannot  be  applied  to  others  on  the  basis  of  observation,  and 
in  that  sense  is  purely  mental.  Spinoza  would  not  allow  P-predicates  of  the  first 
kind. 
We  have  seen  that  according  to  Shaffer,  these  theories  of  Strawson  and 
Spinoza  are  the  same  in  the  sense  of  holding  that  there  is  one  thing  which  has  both 
mental  and  physical  characteristics.  They  both  rest  upon  a  common  referent  of  the 
mental  and  the  physical  in  arguing  for  their  monistic  theories.  In  Strawson  the 
referent  is  person.  In  my  view,  the  correct  analogue  in  Spinoza  is  mode  of 
substance  so  long  as  we  talk  of  what  has  both  mental  and  physical  predicates.  But 
it  is  not  so  good  an  analogue  when  Strawson  goes  on  to  talk  of  person  as  being 
prior  to  the  mental  and  the  physical.  Spinoza's  concept  of  mode  is  not  prior  to  the 
mental  and  the  physical.  Instead,  "mode"  is  physical  as  wen  as  mental. 
One  might  tend  to  suggest  that  what  best  corresponds  to  "person7  in 
Spinoza's  theory  is  not  mode  of  substance  but  substance,  and  thus  that  Spinoza  is 
similar  to  Strawson  in  arguing  that  the  common  referent  is  prior  to  the  mental  and 
the  physical;  in  Spinoza  it  is  substance  which  is  prior  to  modes;  in  Strawson  it  is 
person  which  is  primitive.  However,  if  substance  is  the  analogue  of  person  in 
Spinoza's  philosophy  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  issue  of  panpsychism.  Spinoza 
attributes  mind  to  everything  in  nature  (in  order  words,  a  very  large  number  of 
modes,  now  described  as  physical  and  now  as  mental),  whereas  Strawson  limits 
the  attribution  of  mind  to  humans.  Strawson  thinks  that  persons  are  distinctive 
219 among  physical  things,  but  Spinoza  thinks  that  everything  has  a  mental  aspect 
(although  in  very  different  degree).  30 
As  we  saw  in  chapters  three  and  five,  for  Spinoza  mind  and  body  are 
modes  of  substance  and  these  modes  are  things  or  events.  For  Spinoza,  there  is  an 
identity  between  mental  and  physical  events:  a  mental  event  is  an  event  as  given  by 
a  mental  description  and  the  physical  event  is  the  very  same  event  as  given  by  a 
corresponding  physical  description.  However,  for  Strawson,  mental  events  are  not 
identical  with  physical  events.  He  never  suggests  that  someone's  pain  is  identical 
with  a  physical  state  of  that  person.  As  we  have  seen  in  Strawson's  statement  (p. 
213-214),  he  describes  "person"  as  an  entity  to  which  predicates  ascribing  both 
states  of  consciousness  and  corporeal  characteristics  are  applied.  However,  there 
is  no  identity  between  events  in  consciousness  and  events  in  the  body.  Hence 
Strawson's  position  rests  upon  the  fact  that  these  distinct  sorts  of  event  are 
attributed  to  one  referent,  person.  But,  this  is  a  very  limited  monisn-4  not  to  be 
compared  with  Spinoza's  identity  theory.  The  frameworks  of  their  theories  are  not 
along  the  same  lines,  since  Spinoza  finds  identity  of  the  mental  and  physical  within 
tokens  or  events  as  opposed  to  Strawson  who  flnds  identity  within  a  primitive 
concept. 
As  we  have  seen,  Shaffer  states:  "The  historical  ancestor  of  the  person 
A-  -  -theorist  is  Spinoza,  the  Dutch  philosopher  of  the  seventeenth  century.  ",  and  again, 
"[fln  recent  philosophy,  a  modified  version  of  the  double  aspect  theory  which  we 
will  call  the  person  theory  has  been  presented  by  P.  F.  Strawson.  "  But  he 
overstates  the  similarity  between  Spinoza  and  Strawson  owing  to  his 
misinterpretation  of  Spinoza.  The  only  similarity  we  can  find  is  that  both  Spinoza 
and  Strawson  attempt  to  avoid  onesideness  of  materialism  or  idealism.  The 
similarities  of  the  two  theories  are  easily  exaggerated. 
30  This  has  been  explored  by  Thomas  Nagel,  but  lies  outside  the  scope  of  this  thesis;  Nagel 
presents  an  argument  for  dualism  of  properties,  but  also  suggests  that  perhaps  at  some  deeper 
level  proto-physical  properties  might  be  seen  as  identical  with  proto-mental  properties,  and  thus 
that  there  is  one  kind  of  ultimate  (fimdamental)  property  as  a  common  source  of  mental  and 
physical  properties  (Thomas  Nagel,  "Paripsychism,  "  in  his  Mortal  Questions  [Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1979],  pp.  181-195).  But  from  our  point  of  view  this  would  cut 
against  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  the  separation  of  the  attributes. 
220 3.  Davidson's  Anomalous  Monism 
One  philosopher  who  has  recently  found  identity  within  events  is,  as  well 
known,  Donald  Davidson  who  originates  token  identity  theory.  It  is  beyond  doubt 
that  Spinoza's  understanding  of  the  mind-body  theory  is  monistic.  His  monistic 
stance  follows  similar  lines  to  Davidson's  in  the  sense  that  they  claim  identity  of 
the  mental  and  physical  within  individuals.  Davidson's  theory,  in  my  opinion, 
shows  a  connection  with  Spinoza's  perspective  and  can  be  treated  as  an 
explanation  which  provides  a  link  with  Spinoza's  position,  although  some  details 
of  their  arguments  are  different.  Let  us  consider  Davidson's  token  identity  theory 
to  find  how  far  his  theory  is  similar  to  and  different  from  Spinoza's. 
(1)  Outline  of  Davidson's  View 
Davidson  defines  his  anomalous  monism  as  "monism,  because  it  holds  that 
psychological  events  are  physical  events;  anomalous,  because  it  insists  that  events 
do  not  fall  under  strict  laws  when  described  in  psychological  terms  .,, 
3  1  Here,  I  shall 
briefly  describe  his  theory  as  I  understand  it.  Anomalous  monism  starts  from  three 
principles  any  two  of  which  are  apparently  inconsistent  with  the  third.  They  are  as 
f  ll  WS.  32  00 
(1)  The  Principle  of  Causal  Interaction. 
Some  mental  events,  at  least,  cause  physical  events  and  vice  versa. 
(2)  The  Principle  of  the  Nomological  Character  of  Causality. 
Wherever  events  are  related  as  cause  and  effect,  there  must  be  a  strict 
deterministic  law. 
(3)  The  Anomalism  of  the  Mental. 
31  Donald  Davidson,  "Psychology  as  Philosophy,  "  in  his  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events  (Oxford: 
Claren.  Press,  1980),  p.  23  1. 
32  ibid. 
221 There  are  no  strict  laws  which  are  able  to  explain  and  predict  mental 
events.  That  is  to  say,  there  are  no  purely  psychological  or  psycho-physical 
laws. 
From  principles  I  and  2,  we  can  infer  that  mental  events  as  causes  or  effects  of 
physical  events,  are  under  strict  deterministic  laws.  But,  according  to  principle  3, 
there  are  no  such  kinds  of  laws.  If  so,  then  apparently  principles  I  and  2  are  in 
contradiction  with  principle  3.  Davidson,  however,  claims  that  there  is  no  inner 
contradiction.  To  substantiate  his  claim  he  maintains  that  "laws  are  linguistic", 
principle  1  is  "blind  to  the  mental-physical  dichotomy"  and  principle  3  "concerns 
events  described  as  mental.  ý933  On  the  basis  of  this  explanation,  Davidson  asserts 
that  the  demonstration  of  identity  follows  easily  from  these  three  principles. 
Now,  I  shall  consider  Davidson's  argument  for  identifying  mental  events 
and  physical  events  in  terms  of  the  above  principles.  34 
(i)  Suppose  m,  a  mental  event,  caused  p,  a  physical  event  (in  accordance  with 
principle  1). 
(ii)  They  are  under  strict  laws  (based  on  principle  2). 
(iii)  These  laws  are  neither  psychological  nor  psycho-physical  laws  but  purely 
physical  laws  (by  elimination  from  principle  3). 
(iv)  Only  in  the  case  of  using  a  physical  description,  are  strict  and  deterministic 
laws  possible. 
(v)  Hence,  m  falls  under  physical  laws. 
(vi)  Then,  m  must  be  describable  in  physical  terms.  In  order  words,  m  has  a 
physical  description. 
(vii)  Therefore,  m  is  a  physical  event,  in  addition  to  being  a  mental  event.  More 
precisely,  m  is  an  event  with  physical  properties  (a  physical  description)  in 
addition  to  mental  properties. 
From  the  above  explanation,  we  can  see  that  all  mental  events  that  are  invo  e  in 
causal  interactions  must  be  identical  with  physical  events.  There  must  be  some 
33  Donald  Davidson,  "Mental  Events,  "  in  his  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events,  p.  215. 
34jbid.,  p.  224. 
222 description  of  a  "mental"  event  which  instantiates  a  strict  law  and  this  description 
cannot  be  mental  but  must  be  physical,  since  only  physical  descriptions  can 
instantiate  strict  laws.  Therefore,  mental  events  that  causally  interact  with  physical 
events  admit  of  a  physical  description,  and  then  it  is  apparent  that  all  events  are 
physical  under  this  strict  law.  Thus,  Davidson's  anomalous  monism  can  be 
described  by  saying  that  mental  events  are  identical  with  physical  events,  but  no 
strict  laws  connect  the  mental  and  the  physicaL  or  the  mental  and  the  mental. 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  Davidson's  anomalous  monism  is  a  kind  of 
token  identity  theory  that  denies  "reduction  between  the  psychological  and  the 
physical,  "  "reductive  type-type  identities.  ,  35  Thus,  anomalous  monism  should  be 
understood  in  such  a  way  that  we  cannot  have  reductive  type-type  identities. 
Now,  I  shall  draw  out  some  obvious  implications  of  Davidson's  position 
so  as  to  compare  it  with  Spinoza's  accounts  of  the  relation  of  the  mind  to  the 
body. 
(1)  When  there  is  cause,  there  must  be  a  strict  law. 
(2)  There  is  a  lack  of  (strict)  psycho-physical  laws. 
(3)  There  is  a  lack  of  (strict)  purely  psychological  laws. 
(4)  Physical  descriptions  are  to  be  preferred  to  mental  descriptions,  since  only  the 
former  can  instantiate  strict  laws. 
(5)  The  reducibility  of  the  mental  to  the  physical  is  rejected. 
(6)  There  is  a  combination  of  materialism  and  dualism  of  descriptions: 
"Anomalous  monism  resembles  materialism  in  its  claim  that  all  events  are 
physical,  but  rejects  the  thesis,  usually  considered  essential  to  materialism, 
that  mental  phenomena  can  be  given  purely  physical  explanations.  ý936 
(7)  There  is  token  (event)  identity  theory:  unlike  the  type-type  identity  theory,  he 
sees  no  identity  of  mental  and  physical  types  (properties  or  descriptions),  but 
mental  events  are  identical  with  physical  events. 
35  Terence  Horgan  and  Michael  Tye,  "Against  the  Token  Identity  Theory,  "  in  Ernest  Lepore  and 
Brian  P.  McLaughlin  (eds.  ),  Actions  and  Events  (Oxford:  Basil  Blackwell,  1985),  p.  427.  See 
also  Brian  P.  McLaughlin,  "Anomalous  Monism  and  the  Irreducibility  of  the  Mental,  "  in  ibid., 
pp.  356-357;  Mark  Johnston,  "Why  Having  a  Mind  Matters,  "  in  ibid.,  p.  409. 
36  Davidson,  "Mental  Events,  "  p.  214. 
223 (8)  He  admits  psycho-physical  causation:  some  mental  events  cause  physical 
events  and  vice  versa. 
(2)  Similarities  and  Differences 
Davidson's  argument  requires  not  only  the  lack  of  the  psycho-physical 
laws  but  also  the  lack  of  psychological  laws.  But  Spinoza  explicitly  admits  of  the 
latter  kind  of  laws.  In  other  words,  there  is  only  one  set  of  strict  laws  in  Davidson, 
whereas  Spinoza  requires  two  sets  of  strict  laws.  Even  more  Spinoza  does  not 
give  greater  weight  to  either  one  or  the  other.  He  states  as  follows: 
God's  power  of  thinking  is  equal  to  His  actual  power  of  acting,  that  is  to 
say,  whatever  follows  formally  from  the  infinite  nature  of  God,  follows 
from  the  idea  of  God  [idea  Defl,  in  the  same  order  and  in  the  same 
connection  objectively  in  God.  (E,  H,  Prop  7,  Corol) 
We  should  pay  attention  to  the  fact  that,  for  Spinoza,  the  weighting  of  mental  and 
physical  is  equal.  We  have  seen,  in  chapter  two,  that  Spinoza  denies  that  the  mind 
is  dependent,  or  supervenient  on  the  body  and  vice  versa.  There  is  a  strict  law  in 
the  mental  and  the  physical  realm  respectively,  and  therefore  the  mind  is 
autonomous  in  so  much  as  the  body  iS.  37 
There  is  further  Oference  between  them  concerning  causation:  there  is,  for 
Spinoza,  a  causal  barrier  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  whereas  there  is  causal 
interaction  for  Davidson.  I  think  that  for  Spinoza  there  is  no  clear  distinction 
37  If  we  reject  the  materialistic  identity  of  the  mind  and  the  body  we  are  obliged  to  propose 
another  kind  of  identity,  because,  for  Spinoza,  the  mind  is  somehow  identical  with  the  body  and 
vice  versa.  So  far  as  I  am  aware  and  as  I  explained  in  chapter  five,  the  identity  of  the  mind  and 
the  body  can  be  derived  from  substance  monism  with  attribute  dualism.  We  can  explain  the 
identity  of  the  mind  and  the  body  in  terms  of  the  conjunction  of  substance  monism  with  property 
dualism:  "[S]ubstance  thinking  and  substance  extended  are  one  and  the  same  substance,  which  is 
now  comprehended  under  this  attribute  and  now  under  that.  Thus,  also,  a  mode  of  extension  and 
the  idea  of  that  mode  are  one  and  the  same  thing  expressed  in  two  different  ways"  (E,  11,  Prop  7, 
Schol). 
224 between  the  concept  of  cause  and  explanation,  whereas  Davidson  separates,  like 
other  contemporary  philosophers,  the  notions  of  the  explanatory  and  the  causal. 
We  saw  in  chapter  three  that  Spinoza's  identity  theory  is  compatible  with  a 
non-causal  relationship  between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  since  Spinoza  denies 
referential  transparency  in  a  causal  context.  But,  for  Davidson,  since  causation  is 
transparent,  if  we  deny  causal  interactions  between  the  mental  and  the  physical,  we 
cannot  hold  mind-body  identity.  In  other  words,  for  Davidson,  since  causation  is 
transparent  and  a  mental  and  a  physical  event  are  one  and  the  same  event,  there 
have  to  be  causal  interactions  between  the  mental  and  the  physical.  On  the  other 
hand,  for  Spinoza,  since  mental  and  physical  events  are  identical  and  there  is  no 
causal  interaction  between  them,  causation  has  to  be  opaque. 
In  spite  of  some  important  differences  between  their  positions,  both 
Davidson  and  Spinoza  claim  an  identity  theory  combined  with  the  view  that  the 
mental  is  not  reducible  to  the  physical.  That  is  to  say,  the  fact  that  they  hold  not 
only  the  identity  theory  but  also  the  irreducibility  of  the  mental  to  the  physical 
supports  a  feasible  connection  between  Spinoza  and  Davidson.  This  irreducibility 
entails  another  notable  similarity  between  Spinoza  and  Davidson.  Both  Spinoza 
and  Davidson  identify  mental  and  physical  events.  The  mental  event  is  an  event 
under  a  mental  description  and  the  physical  event  is  the  very  same  event  under  a 
physical  description  for  both  Spinoza  and  Davidson,  although  the  physical 
description  for  Davidson  is  paramount,  though  not  for  Spinoza.  Odegard's  view  of 
Spinoza's  identity  theory  very  briefly  talks  about  "event":  "He  [Spinoza]  identifies 
the  two  events  in  such  a  way  that  they  are  really  a  single  event  conceived  under 
two  attributes-under  thought  as  the  making  of  a  decision  and  under  extension  as  a 
bodily  event.  ""  Odegard  never  compares  Spinoza  to  Davidson,  "  however  I  think 
that  this  is  an  appropriate  statement  when  explaining  the  similarity  between 
Spinoza  and  Davidson. 
3813ouglas  Odegard,  op.  cit.,  p.  68. 
11  Possibly,  Odegard  was  not  acquainted  with  Davidson's  anomalous  monism,  since  Davidson's 
"Mental  Events"  was  written  in  1970  and  Odegard's  article  was  written  in  1971  when 
Davidson's  theory  was  not  yet  well-known. 
225 Della  Rocca  has  recently  pointed  out  a  similarity  between  Davidson  and 
Spinoza  concerning  explanatory  relation  between  the  mind  and  the  body. 
According  to  Della  Rocca,  both  Spinoza  and  Davidson  are  the  same  in  arguing 
explanatory  independence,  although  Davidson's  explanatory  barrier  is  weaker  than 
Spinoza's.  Furthermore,  Della  Rocca  regards  this  explanatory  independence  as  the 
important  feature  for  both  Davidson's  and  Spinoza's  theories.  40  Concerning  this 
point,  Della  Rocca  states  as  follows:  "Spinoza's  system  teaches  us  the  surprising 
lesson  that  the  radical  explanatory  separation  of  mental  and  physical  properties 
may  lead  to  (instead  of  preclude)  the  identity  of  mental  and  physical  particulars. 
One  philosopher,  however,  to  whom  this  lesson  would  come  as  no  surprise  is 
Donald  Davidson.  He,  too,  recognises  a  certain  kind  of  explanatory  independence 
of  mental  and  physical  properties,  and  he  argues  in  part  from  this  independence  to 
,  41  the  identity  of  mental  and  physical  particulars.  I  think  that  this  explanatory 
barrier  is,  for  both  Davidson  and  Spinoza,  the  fundamental  feature  in  establishing 
non-reductionism  in  their  identity  theories,  and  that  this  also  leads  them  to  find 
identity  of  mind  and  body  in  individuals. 
I  take  non-reductionism  and  token  identity  as  the  important  similarities 
between  them  since  these  kinds  of  identity  theory  contribute  insight  to 
contemporary  philosophy  of  mind.  The  mind  and  the  body  are  one  individual 
which  has  two  descriptions  for  both  Davidson  and  Spinoza.  Like  Davidson, 
Spinoza  also  regards  the  mind  and  the  body  as  the  same  individual:  "[T]he  mind 
and  the  body,  are  one  and  the  same  individual  which  at  one  time  is  considered 
under  the  attribute  of  thought,  and  at  another  under  that  of  extension7'  (E,  11,  Prop 
21,  Schol).  Therefore,  despite  the  fact  that  Spinoza's  monism  is  not  anomalous  as 
he  allows  strict  laws  involving  the  mental  (though  not  psycho-physical  laws),  it  is 
fair  to  say  that  what  Spinoza  thinks  about  a  pattern  of  identity  between  the  mental 
40  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza  (New  York:  Oxford 
University  Press,  1996),  pp.  152-155.  Della  Rocca  reveals  another  similarity  concerning  holism 
(ibid.,  pp.  155-156).  He  also  compares  Spinoza's  psychology  and  Davidson's  psychology 
("Spinoza's  Metaphysical  Psychology,  "  in  Don  Garrett  [ed.  ],  The  Cambridge  Companion  to 
Spinoza  [Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  19961,  pp.  209-210;  pp.  234-236). 
4'  Della  Rocca,  Representation  and  the  Mind-Body  Problem  in  Spinoza,  p.  153. 
226 and  the  physical  is  the  same  framework  as  that  of  Davidson's  anomalous  monism: 
both  philosophers  argue  identity  not  within  properties  or  descriptions  but  within 
individuals. 
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Conclusion My  purpose  in  this  study  has  been  to  unravel  the  meaning  behind  Spinoza's 
real  thoughts  on  the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  For  this  purpose, 
I  explored  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  begi  i  with  a  critique  of  the  diverse  InnIng 
interpretations  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory.  I  shall  summarise  these 
interpretations  and  the  reasons  why  they  cannot  belong  to  Spinoza's  realm  of 
thought. 
The  hylomorphic  interpretation  insists  upon  Aristotle's  influence  on 
Spinoza  through  the  medieval  Aristotelians.  As  we  saw  Wolfson  with  whom  this 
position  is  chiefly  associated,  ascribes  hylomorphism  from  the  following  angles: 
(1)  the  relation  of  mode  to  substance  can  be  explained  as  the  relation  of  species  to 
genus  in  Aristotle;  (2)  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  in  Spinoza  are  the 
translation  of  Aristotelian  matter  and  form;  (3)  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  "mind  as  the 
idea  of  the  body"  is  a  new  way  of  restating  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  the  soul 
as  the  form  of  the  body.  We  argued  that  there  are  fundamental  differences  in  each 
case:  (1)  a  substance  is  the  cause  of  mode  in  Spinoza  whereas  genus  is  not  the 
cause  of  species  in  Aristotle,  and  for  Aristotle  there  is  no  suggestion  that  a  genus 
is  more  real  than  (species  or)  individual  things,  whereas  for  Spinoza  the  individual 
thing  is  less  real  than  substance;  (2)  in  Spinoza,  the  concepts  of  extension  and 
thought  are  derived  less  from  Aristotle's  concepts  of  "matter  and  form"  than 
Descartes'  concepts  of  "extension  and  thought.  "-for  Aristotle  pure  matter  is  just 
potentiality  with  no  properties  at  all,  whereas  for  Descartes  and  Spinoza  extension 
is  the  essence  of  material  substance;  (3)  Spinoza's  two  uses  of  the  term  "idea" 
makes  his  theory  Merent  from  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  the  soul  as  the  form 
of  the  body.  For  Spinoza,  there  is  the  idea  of  Peter  which  constitutes  the  essence 
of  Peter's  mind,  and  the  idea  of  Peter  which  is  in  another  man.  Even  though  the 
former  idea  explains  the  essence  of  Peter's  body  as  in  Aristotle's  concept  of 
"form,  "  there  is  no  such  concept  of  the  latter  idea  in  Aristotle.  For  Spinoza,  the 
cognitive  situation  requires  the  presence  of  ideas  and  the  ideas  represent  both  the 
knower's  own  body  and  external  bodies.  This  role  of  the  idea  is  clearly  distinct 
from  the  role  of  the  form  in  Aristotle. 
229 The  idealistic  interpretation  is  fundamentaffy  dependent  upon  the 
dominance  of  the  attribute  of  thought  over  extension  and  the  other  attributes;  the 
attribute  of  thought  is,  following  this  interpretation,  highlighted  and  treated  as  the 
primary  one.  According  to  this  interpretation,  Spinoza's  infinite  attributes  are 
ordered  in  the  intellect,  and  thus  all  attributes  are  interpretable  in  terms  of  thought. 
In  God's  thinking  there  is  an  idea  of  the  modes  of  every  attribute,  and  it  follows 
from  this  that  the  attribute  of  thought  is  more  comprehensive  than  the  others.  But, 
even  if  thought  is  distinctive  or  singled  out  from  the  other  attributes  and  is  more 
comprehensive  than  the  other  attributes,  this  should  be  regarded  as  the 
representational  fimction  of  thought.  If  in  God's  thinking  the  attribute  of  extension 
or  of  whatever  exists,  it  exists  not  as  itself  but  as  the  idea  of  extension,  and  in 
God's  thinking,  there  do  not  exist  the  modes  themselves  of  every  attribute  but,  an 
idea  of  the  modes  of  every  attribute,  this  should  not  be  interpreted  as  idealism.  It 
is  not  the  case  for  Spinoza  that  everything  is  or  exists  in  God's  thinking,  but  that 
everything  is  represented  or  perceived  by  God's  thinking.  The  former  leads  to  the 
dominance  of  thought  in  the  idealistic  interpretation,  whereas  the  latter  emphasises 
the  representational  role  of  thought.  It  follows  that  we  can  point  out  the 
uniqueness  of  thought  in  Spinoza's  system  in  terms  of  the  representative  function, 
but  should  not  interpret  Spinoza's  system  as  idealism.  "The  dominance  of  thought 
in  a  representational  sense"  does  not  lead  to  idealism. 
Barker  interprets  Spinoza  as  an  epiphenomenalist,  holding  that  Spinoza's 
real  tendency  is  to  argue  "the  priority  of  the  body  over  the  mind.  "  He  finds 
support  in  the  scholium.  to  proposition  2,  part  III  and  argues  that  the  obvious 
tendency  of  this  scholium.  is  to  glorify  the  body  at  the  expense  of  the  mind. 
However,  the  scholium.  is  not  concerned  with  either  giving  a  priority  to  the  body 
ying  the  body  at  the  expense  of  the  mind.  But  it  is  concerned  with  the  or  glorif 
explanation  of  the  experience  of  the  body  in  order  to  refute  the  common  belief  of 
the  superiority  of  the  mind  over  the  body  (i.  e.  the  common  belief  that  mind 
commands  the  body).  The  proposition  to  which  this  scholium.  is  attached  is  that 
"the  body  cannot  determine  the  mind  to  thought,  neither  can  the  mind  determine 
the  body  to  motion  nor  rest,  nor  to  anything  else  if  there  be  anything  else"  (E,  III, 
230 Prop  2).  This  proposition  would  be  unjustified  if  we  treat  the  scholium  as 
presenting  "the  priority  of  the  body  over  the  mind"  as  Barker  argues. 
Furthermore,  there  is  an  incompatibility  between  Spinoza's  theory  and 
definitions  of  epiphenomenalism  as  follows:  Spinoza's  denial  of  causation  between 
the  mind  and  the  body  is  a  solid  basis  for  rejecting  this  epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation  since  epiphenomenalism  holds  that  there  is  causality  from  the  body 
to  the  mind.  Moreover  Spinoza's  affirmation  of  causation  between  mental  events 
is  also  incompatible  with  the  definition  of  epiphenomenalism  that  the  mind  is  never 
the  cause  of  even  any  other  mental  events.  Even  more,  due  to  Spinoza's  argument 
of  the  sameness  of  "the  relationship  between  the  mind  and  body"  and  "the 
relationship  between  the  idea  of  the  mind  and  the  mind,  "  epiphenomenalistic 
interpretation  is  committed  to  a  self  contradiction. 
Hampshire,  who  interprets  Spinoza  as  a  kind  of  materialist,  holds  that  for 
Spinoza  the  body  is  a  machine  for  producing  thought,  and  therefore  the  mind  is 
embodied  in  the  body  as  its  machine  or  contrivance.  Not  only  is  the  body 
independent  from  the  mind  in  explaining  it,  but  it  is  also  primary  and  the  mind  is 
secondary  in  the  order  of  explanation  by  virtue  of  the  predominance  of  the  laws  of 
physics.  Hampshire  emphasises  that  physical  descriptions  are  prior  to  mental 
descriptions  in  getting  an  overall  picture  of  the  world.  Hampshire's  explanation  is 
rooted  in  the  apparent  asymmetry  between  the  mind  and  the  body  in  the  scholium 
to  proposition  13  in  the  Ethics,  book  11:  "[I]n  order  to  determine  the  difference 
between  the  human  mind  and  other  things  and  its  superiority  over  them,  we  must 
first  know,  as  we  have  said,  the  nature  of  its  object,  that  is  to  say,  the  nature  of  the 
human  body.  "  But  this  asymmetry  runs  contrary  to  the  thrust  of  Spinoza's 
argument.  Arguably,  Spinoza  is  clami  mig  that  our  understanding  of  the  mind  is 
secondary  to  our  understanding  of  the  body  as  far  as  our  present  state  of 
knowledge  is  concerned.  Spinoza  really  has  this  sort  of  attitude  in  arguing  his 
philosophy:  our  knowledge  at  the  present  day  is  not  capable  of  completely 
grasping  some  facts,  but  we  shall  be  able  to  discover  them  when  our  knowledge  is 
increased  by  more  scientific  discovery.  For  Spinoza,  in  reality,  there  exists  a 
syrnmetry  between  the  mind  and  the  body.  In  many  places,  Spinoza  argues  for  the 
231 equivalence  of  mental  and  physical  descriptions:  for  example,  "the  object  cannot 
be  changed  unless  the  idea  is  also  changed,  and  vice  versa.  "' 
Apart  from  the  above  interpretations,  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  most 
often  interpreted  as  parallelism  and  this  interpretation  is  compatible  with  the  two 
key  conditions:  that  there  is  not  a  causal  relationship  between  mind  and  body,  and 
that  he  gives  equal  weight  to  mind  and  body.  But  it  is  crucial  to  recognise  that 
Spinoza's  parallelism  Mers  from  traditional  parallelism.  For  Spinoza,  parallelism 
ought  to  be  argued  within  an  identity  doctrine.  Unlike  traditional  parallelism, 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  asserts  the  identity  of  mind  and  body.  Whereas 
traditional  parallelism  argues  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are  parallel  because  they 
are  entirely  different  in  nature,  Spinoza  argues  that  the  mind  and  the  body  are 
parallel  because  they  are  identical  with  each  other.  We  can  see  how  Spinoza's 
parallelism  differs  from  traditional  parallelism.  According  to  the  traditional  view, 
parallelism  is  basically  a  dualistic  position,  but  in  Spinoza's  view,  it  is  a  monistic 
position.  Traditional  parallelism  holds  the  view  that  the  mind  and  body  run  parallel 
with  one  another  and  never  converge  nor  diverge.  However,  when  we  consider 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  we  should  do  so  along  with  his  ontological  theory. 
We  should  not  discuss  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  without  considering  his  whole 
metaphysical  system,  especially  substance  monism,  and  we  should  strive  to  make 
his  mind-body  theory  compatible  with  his  whole  system.  That  is  to  say,  traditional 
parallelism  is  substance  dualismý  while  Spinoza's  parallelism  is  conceptual  or 
property  dualism  within  substance  monism.  Spinoza's  Parallelism  is derived  from 
one  substance  and  one  order  of  events,  so  his  parallelism  should  be  understood  in 
the  sense  that  one  event  with  a  mental  description  is  the  very  same  event  which 
can  equally  be  given  a  physical  description. 
Bennett  and  Della  Rocca  interpret  Spinoza  somewhat  along  these  lines.  So 
their  interpretations  seem  to  be  closer  to  Spinoza.  However,  the  problem  is  that 
Bennett  mininuses  Spinoza's  argument  for  identity  while  Della  Rocca  perhaps 
overstates  it.  On  Bennett's  interpretation,  there  is  neither  a  numerical  identity 
1  Spinoza,  Short  Treatise  of  God,  Man  and  His  Well-Being,  Part  IL  Chapter  XX,  note  c,  #  10  in 
Edwin  Curley  (ed.  and  trans.  ),  The  Collected  Works  of  Spinoza,  vol.  I  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1985),  p.  136. 
232 between  mental  and  physical  events  nor  a  numerical  identity  between  the  mental 
and  the  physical  properties;  there  exists  only  an  identity  of  non-graspable 
determinables  of  which  the  mental  and  the  physical  are  determinates.  On  Della 
Rocca's  interpretation,  there  is  a  numerical  identity  between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  events  and  perhaps  also  between  the  mental  and  the  physical  properties 
(depending  on  whether  he  thinks  the  attributes  are  really  distinct  or  not). 
But,  given  that  Spinoza  maintains  substance  monism  and  the  real 
distinction  between  the  attributes  of  thought  and  extension  (and  that  his  mind- 
body  theory  follows  from  his  doctrines  of  substance  and  attributes),  we  should 
argue  that  for  Spinoza  there  is  a  numerical  identity  between  mental  and  physical 
events  and  that  there  is  no  identity  between  mental  and  physical  properties:  the 
mental  and  the  physical  events  are  one  and  the  same  event  described  under  mental 
and  physical  properties,  respectively.  From  this  fact,  it  follows  that  his  theory 
should  be  understood  as  a  kind  of  token  identity  theory.  Thus,  my  interpretation  of 
Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  entails  both  token  identity  and  property  (or 
conceptual)  parallelism  whilst  ruling  out  type  identity  as  well  as  substance 
parallelism.  If  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory  is  a  token  identity  theory,  which  leads 
to  a  parallel  relationship  between  the  mind  and  the  body,  we  ought  to  regard 
Spinoza  as  a  double  aspect  theorist,  since  the  double  aspect  theory  entails  both 
identity  and  parallelism.  For  this  reason,  I  have  called  his  theory  a  token  double 
aspect  theory. 
My  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  n-ýind-body  theory  has  to  maintain  the 
objective  interpretation  of  the  attributes.  Although  the  objective  interpretation  is 
nowadays  the  most  common  interpretation  and  I  agree  with  it,  there  are  the 
problems  in  this  interpretation:  (1)  if  Spinoza's  attributes  are  regarded  as 
objective,  how  can  distinct  attributes  all  constitute  the  nature  or  essence  of 
substance?  (2)  how  can  an  objectivist  explain  the  fact  that  Spinoza  introduces 
attributes  through  the  phrase  "which  the  intellect  perceives  as  (constituting  the 
essence  of  substance)"  in  definition  4  of  part  11  and  elsewhere?  In  order  to 
reinforce  my  interpretation  of  Spinoza's  mind  body  theory,  it  is  necessary  to  solve 
these  problems.  A  clue  is  provided  by  the  fact  that  Spinoza  uses  the  term 
233 express"  or  "manifest"  interchangeably  with  the  phrase  ",  which  the  intellect 
perceives  as  constituting.  " 
This  line  of  understanding  of  the  attributes  suggests  a  solution  to  the 
problems  in  the  objective  interpretations.  Since  the  attributes  constitute  and 
express  the  essence  of  the  same  substance  (or  the  same  essence  of  the  substance), 
there  must  be  something  common  in  the  ways  of  expressing  the  same  thing;  the 
tune  analogy  was  appealed  to  in  order  to  explain  this  point.  The  advantages  in 
treating  essence  as  "what  is  structurally  common  to  all  attributes"  are,  as  I  have 
mentioned  throughout  this  thesis,  as  follows:  (1)  it  can  explain  some  statements  in 
which  Spinoza  seems  to  identify  attribute  with  essence,  (2)  it  can  also  explain  how 
each  attribute  constitutes  and  expresses  the  essence  of  the  substance,  (3)  it  offers  a 
ground  for  Spinoza's  argument  that  mental  and  physical  properties  are  parallel  to 
each  other,  (4)  it  helps  us  to  explain  that  the  double  aspect  theory  is  compatible 
with  the  objective  interpretation,  and  (5)  it  makes  my  interpretation  of  the 
attributes  consistent  with  the  interpretation  of  the  mind-body  theory,  as  Spinoza 
wishes  to  claim. 
There  is  a  ffirther  problem  in  making  sense  of  Spinoza's  mind-body  theory. 
This  arises  from  his  representationalism.  His  concept  of  representation  seems  to  be 
problematic  if  we  consider  it  together  with  his  argument  of  parallelism  in  double 
aspect  theory.  Since  Spinoza  argues  that  ideas  in  the  human  mind  represent  both 
the  human  body  and  the  external  bodies,  his  representationalism  is  contradictory  to 
his  argument  of  one  to  one  correspondence  between  the  mental  and  the  physical. 
Furthermore,  his  argument  in  proposition  13  that  the  object  of  the  idea 
constituting  the  human  mind  is  the  human  body  and  nothing  else  is  clearly 
inconsistent  with  his  claim  in  proposition  16  that  the  human  mind  represents 
external  bodies  as  well  as  the  human  body.  Some  commentators  have  tried  to 
explain  these  incompatibilities  as  resulting  from  Spinoza's  confusion  between  the 
parallel  and  the  representational  relationship  owing  to  the  fact  that  he  uses  the 
same  term  "idea"  in  two  different  ways. 
I  argued  that  before  we  conclude  that  these  problems  result  from 
Spinoza's  confusion  we  should  try  all  possible  interpretations.  I  considered  some 
234 existing  interpretations,  but  suggested  that  if  we  understand  proposition  13  as 
referring  to  the  essence  of  the  human  mind  the  problem  can  be  eased 
(ameliorated).  What  Spinoza  wishes  to  claim  in  proposition  13  is  that  the  essence 
of  the  human  mind  is  constituted  by  the  idea  of  the  human  body.  This  can  account 
for  the  distinction  Spinoza  makes  between  the  idea  of  Peter  in  God's  mind  and  the 
idea  of  Peter  in  Paul's  mind.  Even  so,  I  have  argued  that  Spinoza  must  ultimately 
appeal  to  the  fact  that  our  ideas  are  confused  to  hold  his  representationalism  and 
parallelism  in  line. 
Finally,  I  looked  briefly  at  the  way  that  Spinoza  has  been  seen  as  influential 
in  contemporary  mind-body  theories  such  as  person  theory,  anomalous  monism, 
and  some  aspects  of  cognitive  science.  My  aim  there  was  to  warn  against  taking 
some  remarks  of  Spinoza  and  using  them  without  taking  his  whole  doctrine  into 
account.  Hence  I  have  not  fully  endorsed  the  use  made  of  Spinoza.  Nevertheless, 
it  is  clear  that  Spinoza's  theory  contains  much  which  chimes  in  with  modem 
approaches  to  the  problem. 
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